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Hungary and Dalmatia in 1340 
FERENC PITI 
Dalmatia was under the supremacy of Byzantium until the millennium, and then 
of Venice. In 1105 Koloman, king of Hungary (1195-1116) occupied a part of 
Dalmatia, which is why conflicts between Venice and Hungary became frequent 
from that time onwards.1 In the first quarter of the fourteenth century the Dalma-
tian cities fell into the hand of Venice and the Croatian barons. In 1340 Charles 
Robert (Charles I), king of Hungary (1301-1342) was planning to carry out 
a campaign in Dalmatia in order to reconquer those Dalmatian cities and territories 
which had belonged to Hungary previously but which had been fallen under the 
influence of Venice and the Croatian barons some decades earlier.2 In the end the 
campaign was not carried out, but through the charters of the year 1340 I try to 
analyse and explain probably why this undertaking did not occur, obtain an in-
sight into the diplomatic activity of Venice, and show how the problem of the 
Dalmatian campaign was connected with the Tartars. 
The first record of the king's arrival in Dalmatia is a decision of the Venetian 
State on 9 February 1340 by which the comités of Nona (Nin), Arbe (Rab) and Zara 
(Zadar)3 were ordered to find out information about the king's coming and make 
a report to Venice.4 It needs to be pointed out here that this precedes the papal 
1 For the relations between Hungary, Venice and Dalmatia in 11-13. centuries cf. the 
relevant parts of Gy. Kristó-F. Makk, Die erste Könige Ungarns. Herne 1999; F. Makk, 
Ungarische Aussenpolitik (896-1196). Herne 1999; Gy. Kristó, Histoire de la Hongrie médie-
vale. I. Le temps des Arpads. Rennes 2000; P. Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen. History of 
Medieval Hungary 895-1526. London 2001. 
2 Zs. Teke, "Dalmácia," [Dalmatia] in Korai Magyar Történeti Lexikon. [Lexicon of Early 
Hungarian History] (henceforth: KMTL) Editor in chief Gy. Kristó, eds. P. Engel and F. 
Makk. Budapest 1994,159-160. 
3 Today in Croatia. 
4 S. Ljubic, Listine o odnosajih izmediju juznoga slavenstva i mletacke republike. Monumenta 
spectantia históriám slavorum meridionalium. Vol. II. (henceforth: Ljub. II.) Zagreb 1870, 
59; F. Piti, Anjou-kori oklevéltár. Documenta res Hungaricas tempore regum Andegavensium 




tithe collector's record dated 20 February 1340 that the Tartars attacked Poland 
and that this disturbed Charles I and his kingdom.5 The Tartars played an impor-
tant role later but it seems sure that the Hungarian king's prime aim in foreign af-
fairs in 1340 was the Dalmatian campaign. 
On 10 March the Venetian doge, Bartolomeo Gradonico (1339-1342) and the 
Venetian Council published two orders about the Dalmatian case,6 because the 
comes of Arbe had made a report to Venice about his discussions with the comités 
Duym Frangepan and Bartholomew Frangepan on the intentions of Charles I 
concerning Dalmatia. (This means that Venice was informed very early of the 
Hungarian king's plans partly from the Frangepans.)7 That is why the comités of 
Arbe, Nona and Zara were ordered to find out the intentions of other comités of 
Sclauonia (as the charters name Dalmatia). This order was repeated many times, 
which means that Venice possibly feared that Venetian deputies controlling those 
Dalmatian cities which were under Venetian domination, would be unable to 
handle the conflict and the Dalmatian citizens would support the Hungarian 
king. 
Venice needed to clarify the intentions of the Croatian barons also. Among 
them the Frangepans: Duym and Bartholomew, comités of Veglia (Krk) and Mod-
rus (Modrus)8 were particularly important (especially Duym),9 because their ter-
ritories lay in those parts of Dalmatia nearest to Hungary. By supporting Charles 
I militarily and politically, the Frangepans could have made the king's way to 
Dalmatia much easier. What is more, Duym had a function in Hungary, also: he 
was comes of county Posega.1 0 So one can understand why the comes of Arbe 
(apart from the manner of the geographical proximity) initially negotiated with 
the Frangepans. 
The primary interest of Venice was to prevent the Hungarian attack taking 
place, so diplomatic steps were taken, because though Venice could have mobi-
lized soldiers and galleys, it could not have had too much confidence in the cities 
and citizens of Dalmatia. Venice hindered the trade of these cities, imposed taxes 
on them and controlled them politically, too. In these cities the Venetian domina-
tion and loyalty was represented only by the local comes and his soldiers, not by 
5 Monumenta Vaticana históriám regni Hungáriáé illustrantia. Series I, Tomus I, Budapest 
1885,433; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 91. 
6 G. Wenzel, Magyar diplomácziai emlékek az Anjou-korból. [Memories of Hungarian Diplo-
macy from the Anjou era] Vol. I. Budapest 1874, (henceforth: Wenzel, Dipl. eml. I.) 380-
382; Ljub. II. 63-64; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 136. and 137. 
7 On the situation of the Frangepans between Hungary and Venice, and the expectations 
of both sides towards them cf. G. Wenzel, A Frangepánok Magyarország történetében. 
[The Frangepans in Hungarian history] Századok (1890), (henceforth: Wenzel 1890) 210, 
214. 
8 Today in Croatia. 
9 The role of Duym and Bartholomew is accurately discussed by Wenzel 1890, 211-214. 
10 P. Engel, Magyarország világi archontológiája. [Secular archontology of Hungary] 1301-
1457. Vol. I. Budapest 1996,164. 
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the citizens, which is why the Venetian army in the Dalmatian cities needed to be 
strengthened. 
Venice could also have feared that these cities under its domination (e. g. Nona, 
Trau [Trogir], Spalato [Split], Sebenico [Sibenik], Zara)11 would open their gates 
one after the other to Charles I because these rich trading centres would have pre-
ferred Hungarian rule which could have supported the trade of these cities rather 
than merely drawing profit from them. (The situation was the same in the case of 
the ransomed cities under the domination of the Croatian barons.) That is why 
Venice wanted to keep Charles I far from these cities, and to avoid military con-
frontation, and against the power of the Hungarian army Venice primarily tried 
to use diplomatic means in addition to military preparations. 
Moreover the Croatian barons (of whom apart from the Frangepans the Subic, 
lords of Klissa [Klis] and Scardona [Skradin],12 Nelipich, and the Kurjakovich 
ought to be highlighted) were often at war with each other, and their loyalty to 
Venice seemed to be doubtful. But as their military power was potentially useful 
against Charles I, the negotiations with the barons took an important place in 
Venice's diplomacy. 
One of the charters dating from 10 March illustrates Venice's strategy in Dal-
matia in the case of the Hungarian attack: Venice wanted to cut the Hungarians' 
route from the cities and places providing food, and at the same time to leave 
them a free way to retire. 
On 28 March the Venetian Council promoted three constables to Dalmatia 
who had many tasks: to exhort the citizens to guarantee Venetian domination, to 
get to know the intentions of the cities and the barons, to establish a coalition 
among the barons against Charles I, essentially to organize the defence, to secure 
the territories and to obtain more news on the movements of the Hungarian 
king.13 Venice took the possibility of the Hungarian attack seriously. This attack 
could have led to Hungarian repossession of the cities, because the rule of Venice 
was not really strong in Dalmatia. 
It is not only Venetian data which can be related to the plan for the Dalmatian 
campaign but also a charter of Charles I dated 28 March 1340 by which the king 
delayed the discussion of the trial between the bishop of Zagreb, Ladislas and his 
dependants to the day when the king would arrive in Zagreb.14 
It is quite sure that the king would not have left for Croatia because of the trial -
this reference was in connection with the Dalmatian campaign. After Zagreb the 
road went in the direction of the coast, i. e. of the territory of the Frangepans. So 
all these data show that Charles I still wanted to leave for Dalmatia at the end of 
March, not as yet disturbed in this sense by the Tartars, whose activity close to 
Hungary is also highlighted by the data mentioned above. 
11 Today iri Croatia. 
12 Today in Croatia. 
13 Wenzel, Dipl. eml. I. 382-383; Ljub. II. 64-65; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 182. 
14 T. Smiciklas, Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae ac Slavoniae. Vol. X, Zagrabiae 
1912,533; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 181. 
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On 29 March the Venetian Council ordered the constables to go to Dalmatia.15 
Venice started the military fortification of Dalmatia, too: by a command dated 10 
April two pedestrian banderia were sent to defend Nona.16 
A source from 19 April says that the constables arrived in Dalmatia and 
started negotiations in Zara and Nona. According to their reports, Charles I 
would arrive to Dalmatia with his wife and younger son. This suggests that the 
king was confident and had planned a triumphal entrance. That is why the Ve-
netian Council ordered the consul at Zengg (Senj)17 and local traders to send emis-
saries to Hungary for news. 
So Venice was not satisfied with the news from the Frangepans only, and 
wanted the traders to spy on the king's plans, and the Council even wrote a letter 
to the Venetians at Charles I's court to obtain information and send it to Venice 
by messenger as to (as the source says) "why the king wants to come to Dalmatia 
and on whose demand".1 8 Perhaps Venice was afraid that Charles I would come 
not only of his own decision but also by invitation of the Dalmatian citizens. The 
sources do not answer this question but it is not impossible that some of the cities 
had somehow asked the king to liquidate the domination of Venice or that of the 
Croatian barons over them. 
Venice did not have exact information at this time (and as we will see: for 
a long time) about how far the king wanted to go, what his aim was, how strong 
his army was, by whom he was supported, and, if and when he would start and 
why. Venice was alarmed at this lack of clearness because the arrival of the king 
and his army could be more and more likely as the end of spring approached. 
On 13 May the Council of Venice ordered ten galleys for the constables in or-
der to defend Dalmatia in case of the king's arrival.19 It is known from a decision 
of the Council dated 20 May that on 13 May the constables negotiated with the 
Kuriakovich, namely comités Budislav, Paul and Gregory, sons of the late Curia-
chus, who proposed a coalition against Charles I between the Kuriakovich, the 
Frangepans and Nelipich, to deter the king from setting off. 
In this matter the constables sent envoys to these barons, and the Venetian 
Council decided that if this coalition could be brought about, Venice would give 
military support. The Council also ordered that if the Frangepans would not en-
ter the coalition, the constables should go ahead it with other barons.2 0 
According to an order of the Venetian Council of 1 July, the Council was in-
formed that the constables had gone to the Frangepans to ask what they knew 
about Charles I's movements. The envoy of Nelipich did not go to the constables, 
the Frangepans were considered by Venice as an uncertain element from the be-
ginning, comes Gregory Kuriakovich expected extreme claims for the coalition, 
is Ljub. II. 65; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 192. 
16 Ljub. II. 66; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 223. 
17 Today in Croatia. 
is Wenzel, Dipl. eml. I. 67-68; Ljub. II. 66-68; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 235. and 236. 
19 Wenzel, Dipl. eml. I. 386-387; Ljub. II. 69-70; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 307. 
20 Wenzel, Dipl. eml. I. 397-392; Ljub. II. 71-74; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 323. 
6 
HUNGARY AND DALMATIA IN 1 3 4 0 
Nelipich gave no answer about the proposal, and Mladen Subic was not asked 
to join this league - the coalition of the barons seemed to be failed by this time. It 
would have been hard to bring about a coalition among the barons against Char-
les I, for Venice. The seriousness of the situation is shown by the fact that the con-
stables asked Venice to let them return to Venice, because their stay in Dalmatia 
was unsuccessful and local loyalty towards Venice was diminishing.21 
Of course, Venice did not let the constables return, but ordered them to con-
tinue their work, and moreover nominated three envoys to negotiate with the 
representatives of the king of Serbia,22 Stephen Dusan (1331-1355). Venice and 
Serbia, as opponents of Hungary found each other.23 
The Serbian king assured Venice of his friendship, and referring to his ene-
mies in the territories bordering his country, asked for the possibility to escape to 
Venice in case of emergency. Moreover he suggested a military and commercial 
alliance24 which was accepted by the Venetian Council on 8 June, when they re-
ceived the king as "citizen of Venice" agreeing that if in danger he could go to 
Venice with his children and treasury.25 This decision was confirmed by the doge 
on 12 June.26 What the king probably had in mind was that a Hungarian attack on 
Dalmatia could be linked with an attack on Serbia as well possibly with aid from 
Bosnia as there were close and friendly ties between Hungary and Bosnia. 
According to a letter of the Council dated 10 June, the constables reported on 
30 May that they had negotiated with the Frangepans who said that Charles I 
would not go to Dalmatia that year. On the other hand the same letter says that 
the constables were informed on 5 June by comes Gregory Kuriakovich that the 
king would set off. The basis for this information was (says the source) a letter 
sent by the Hungarian king to comes Gregory, and information from people close 
to the king.2 7 
There is no more information about this letter of Charles I, so I cannot say 
what it contained and why the king wrote to comes Gregory. Possibly I can inter-
pret apparently two inconsistent pieces of information, that the king's primary 
aim by this time was not the Dalmatian campaign, but he did not abandon the 
plan finally, and tried to find a convenient way to carry out the campaign in the 
new situation created by the Tartar problem. 
The letter of the Council of 12 June clearly says that Charles I will definitely 
not go to Dalmatia that year because of his physical weakness and the attack of 
the Tartars (propter sui corporis infirmitatem et propter invasionem quamfecerunt Tar-
21 Wenzel, Dipl. etnl. I. 392-393; Ljub. II. 74-75; Anjou-oklt. XXIV. no. 355. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Stephen Dusan made Serbia a powerful state and he titled himself firstly in Serbia as 
czar. In the fourteenth century there were conflicts between Serbia and Hungary be-
cause of boundary problems. Cf. P. Rokay-M. Takács. "Szerbek, Szerb-magyar kapcso-
latok," [Serbs, Serbian-Hungarian connections] in KMTL 638-641. 
24 Wenzel, Dipl. eml I. 394-395; Ljub. II. 75-76; Anjou-oklt. XXIV. no. 364. 
25 Wenzel, Dipl. eml. I. 396-397; Ljub. II. 76-77; Anjou-oklt. XXIV. no. 366. 
26 Wenzel, Dipl. eml. I. 399-400; Ljub. II. 78-79; Anjou-oklt. XXIV. no. 379. 
27 Wenzel, Dipl. eml. I. 397-398; Ljub. II. 77-78; Anjou-oklt. XXIV. no. 369. 
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tari versus partes suas).28 However, it is curious that Venice heard of the Tartars 
relatively late, though it tried to get information on the king's intentions in many 
ways, what is more the Tartars surely influenced the king's plans after the begin-
ning of May. 
Though the attack of the Tartars against Hungary was surely not as powerful 
as those against Poland, Charles I was careful, which is why he decided that in 
the interest of the security of Hungary he would not start the Dalmatian cam-
paign. The exact date of the Tartar attack is not known but the data and relations 
mentioned above suggest that it could have happened in April, at the latest the 
beginning of May. 
Anyway, Venice did not call the constables back despite the news from Hun-
gary, moreover on 17 June it permitted Nelipich to bring weapons from Venice to 
Dalmatia.29 
The next relevant data is from 17 July, when the doge wrote to the comes of 
Arbe that he had received letters from the consul of Zengg and the comes of Zara, 
and these letters had contained reliable news on the king's arrival. That is why 
the doge ordered the comes of Arbe to remain prepared and obtain news on the 
king's movements.30 
It cannot be known what this "reliable information" was, anyhow the doge 
himself wrote a letter about the affair which shows that Venice did not ignore the 
possibility of a Hungarian attack. On 3 and 12 August the Council ordered the 
constables to continue their work as previously, with special regard to reaching 
agreement among the barons against Charles I.31 However, there was no further 
news on the king's coming in 1340, and the Venetian precaution was addressed 
the future - Charles I by this time had finally cancelled the idea of a Dalmatian 
campaign.32 
Glancing over the relevant Venetian sources, I will summarize and explain 
those events that influenced and changed the king's original plans. 
In Hungarian charters of the year 1340 there are data (mainly for the first half 
of May) which show that some trials were postponed to the fifteenth or twenty-
second day after disbanding of the royal army (residencia exercitus regis),33 i. e. to 
1341. This means that military preparations were made in the first half of May in 
Hungary. These postponing charters do not mention Dalmatia but name another 
target: one of the charters says that some litigants were to set off in the campaign 
28 Wenzel, Dipl. eml. I. 400; Ljub. II. 79; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 380. 
29 Wenzel, Dipl. eml. 1.401; Ljub. II. 80; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 394. 
30 Wenzel, Dipl. eml. I. 401; Ljub. II. 82; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 449. 
31 Wenzel, Dipl. eml. I. 402., 403; Ljub. II. 83^84; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 476. and 483. 
32 The plan of the campaign is briefly mentioned by F. Dobos, Az Ádria uralmának kérdése 
a XIV.-ik században. [On the domination of the Adriatic in the fourteenth century] Ko-
lozsvár 1905, 34; S. Domanovszky-J. Vértes, Nagy Lajos első hadjárata Velence ellen. [The 
first campaign of Louis the Great against Venice.] Századok (1900), 786. 
33 Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 289., 291., 292., 299., 311. 
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of the kingdom with Palatine William [Drugeth] (...in quadam expedicione regni ... 
in Ruteniam unacum Wyllermo palatino profecturos fore.. J.34 
In my opinion this is a very important point because it directs the discussion 
towards the conflicts between Poland and the Tartars (the Golden Horde).35 The 
palatine's military task would have been to lead a Hungarian army to Ruthenia, 
which was under the Tartars and not so far from the Hungarian border, and 
make a side movement against the Tartars who had attacked Poland and made 
an inroad into Hungary.36 
This military movement would have served either the security of Hungary or 
the friendship between Hungary and Poland. Though the sources mention "royal 
army" or "army of the kingdom", the task would not have been carried out by 
the whole Hungarian army. I am sure that in 1340 it was not called together 
solely for this task, mainly because of the problem of Dalmatia. In this case "army 
of the kingdom" only means the so called honor-army37 of the palatine, i. e. the 
soldiers of the castles and possessions controlled by him as a palatine. William 
Drugeth would be the leader of this operation, not the king - sources do not 
mention the king's intentions to lead any army to Ruthenia. 
So at the beginning of May Charles I put the Dalmatian campaign aside to 
concentrate on the defense of Hungary because of the Tartar attack. However, 
Venice, as I pointed, despite its diplomatic activity did not received notice until 
Summer 1340 that Hungarian foreign policy was primarily focused on the Tartars 
since May. This can mean that in May Charles I did not totally abandon the idea 
of the Dalmatian campaign, but tried to decide if the Hungarian army could be 
divided to carry out both tasks. Another attack of the Tartars could have been ex-
pected (not to mention the great fear for the Tartars among the Hungarians since 
1241/42). In this situation the problem of Tartars pushed the carrying out of 
Dalmatian campaign into the background. 
34 Anjoukori okmánytár. [Charterbook of the Angevin era] Vol. IV, ed. I. Nagy, Budapest 
1884, 26; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 286. The campaign was thought as a fact by M. Wertner, 
Magyar hadjáratok a XIV. században. [Hungarian campaigns in the fourteenth century] 
Századok (1905), 436; and A. Pór, Magyar-ruthén érintkezések a XIV-ik században. [Hun-
garian-Ruthenian connections in the fourteenth century] Századok (1904), 947-948. 
35 On the Golden Horde, see B. Spuler, Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolén in Russland 1223-
1502. Leipzig 1943; I. Vásáry, Az Arany Horda. [The Golden Horde] Budapest 1986. 
36 One can suggest that the real aim of the Hungarian army (beside helping Poland and 
repulsing the Tartar attack) would have been to acquire the princedom of Halich which 
was in the interest of Hungary for long time, and whose throne became empty in 
Spring 1340.1 think this is just a theory without any base in the sources: no Hungarian 
army seems to have fought in Halich in 1340, which anyway was conquered by Poland 
that year. On Halich cf. M. Font, "Halics," [Halich] in KMTL, 252. 
37 For the honor-system in fourteenth-century Hungary and the military organization, see 
P. Engel, "A honor," [The Honor] Történelmi Szemle (1981), 1-19; Idem, "Adatok az 
Anjou-kori magyar hadseregről," [Data on the Hungarian army in the Anjou era] in 
Analecta mediaevalia. Vol. I. ed. T. Neumann, Budapest 2001,73-82. 
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The campaign against Dalmatia was finally abandoned in July 1340. The rea-
sons were the activity of Venice, the illness of Charles I and above all the Tartars. 
Charles I did not want his kingdom to be defenseless because of the Tartars. He 
thought that he could not divide his military forces to fight in Dalmatia and in 
Ruthenia at the same time. So military preparations began in May 1340, but it was 
not connected with Dalmatia or Halich, but with the Tartars. 
Procrastination and discussions certainly characterised the planned campaign 
against the Tartars. Charles I had to make a decision: which was more secure for 
Hungary. He chose defense, though fortunately no more Tartar actions affected 
Hungary in 1340.1 am sure that no Hungarian army set off in 1340 either against 
Dalmatia or against Ruthenia - there is no exact data from charters or narrative 
sources which supports movements of Hungarian forces abroad in 1340.38 The ar-
mies stayed in Hungary and did not attack foreign territories.39 However, Dalma-
tia remained a target of Hungarian foreign policy, and finally Louis I the Great 
(1342-1382), son of Charles I reconquered it later on.40 
38 The standard Polish scientific literature places the origin of conflicts between Poland 
and the Golden Horde in the possession of Halich, which was finally conquered by Ca-
simir III, king of Poland (1333-1370). No Hungarian military help or presence in 1340 is 
mentioned by Polish historians or narrative sources. Cf. for example T. Manteuffel 
(red.), História Polski. Vol. I. Warszawa 1958, 450; J. Wyrozumski, Kazimierz Wielki. 
Kraków 1982, 79; R. Grodecki-S. Zachorowski-J. Dabrowski, Dzieje Polski sredniowiecz-
nej. Vol. I, Kraków 1995, 42. (I owe a debt to Dániel Bagi for interpreting the scholarly 
literature written in Polish.) 
39 Pope Benedict XII (1335-1342) gave spiritual support to Casimir III by letting him and 
the Polish prelates recruit crusaders against the Tartars not only in Poland, but also in 
Bohemia and Hungary. The pope negotiated with Tartar envoys, too, in order to solve 
the Polish-Tartar problem. A. Theiner, Vetera monumenta historica Hungáriám sacram il-
lustrantia. Vol. I, Romae 1859,637-640; Anjou-okit. XXIV. no. 471,472,490-492. 
40 On the military connections in the Anjou era between Hungary and the territories 
mentioned in this article, see Gy. Kris tó, Az Anjou-kor háborúi. [Wars of the Anjou era.] 
Budapest 1988. 
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Contributions to the Vénération 
of St. Eligius in Médiéval England* 
ISTVÁN PETROVICS 
It can be stated without exaggeration that St. Eligius who was for a long time one 
of the most popular patron saints of medieval Europe, and whose feast was uni-
versally celebrated in western and north-western Europe, particularly in France 
and Flanders, is not today among the most well-known saints. His person and 
activity is often confused with that of St. Egidius/Aegidius (St. Giles), following 
from the simple fact that their Latin names resemble each other. Consequently, it 
is desirable, first, to refer briefly to the life of the latter. St. Egidius, whose feast-
day is 1 September, was an abbot, said to have been born of illustrious Athenian 
parentage around the middle of the seventh century A. D. Having been touched 
by divine grace, as his legend says, he gave all his wealth to the poor and took 
ship for the west. After a long and exhausting voyage he landed at Marseilles. 
Having spent two years with St. Caesarius at Aries he withdrew to a dense forest 
near Nîmes. There he spent many years in the greatest solitude. He lived in 
a cave and his sole companion was a hind. One day the hind was discovered and 
pursued by a certain king of the Visigoths (Flavius or Wamba by name) who was 
hunting in the forest. Then, all of a sudden, the hind disappeared and took refuge 
with St. Giles in his cave. After a while one of the king's huntsmen shot an arrow 
at a gap into the bushes which sheltered the hermit's cave. Finally, when the king 
and his man had forced their way through the bushes they found Giles, wounded 
by the arrow, sitting with the hind between his knees. Having listened to the 
story of the injured hermit, Flavius begged his pardon, and the king - as compen-
sation - wanted to press generous gifts upon Giles. The hermit refused all the 
gifts and asked the king to leave him alone. After this affair the king, deeply im-
pressed by the behaviour of the hermit, often visited St. Giles, who eventually 
asked Flavius to devote his proffered alms to founding a monastery. King Flavius 
An earlier version of this paper was presented in Hungarian at the 1st Albion Confer-




agreed to do so, on condition that Giles would become the first abbot of the mon-
astery. Since Giles did not protest this time, an abbey was soon built near the 
cave. Then, St. Giles went to Rome to obtain recognition from the pope for the 
monastery. The pope granted St. Giles and his monks several privileges and pre-
sented him with two carved doors of cedar-wood. Demonstrating his faith in di-
vine providence St. Giles threw these doors into the Tiber. The doors sailed down 
the river, crossed the sea and sailed up the Rhone until finally they arrived at the 
saint's cave. In short, this is the story of the foundation of the famous monastery 
of Saint Gilles, located in Languedoc, France.1 
In contrast with Giles, Eligius - whose feastday falls on 1 December - was 
bishop of Noyon and Tournai, and died in 660 A. D., that is nearly half a century 
earlier than Egidius. The name of Eligius (Eloy/Eloi in French) derives from the 
Latin verb eligo. His name, apparently, refers to the fact that he was a chosen per-
son. His birth and other events of his life are told by the Vita Eligii episcopi Novio-
magensis. The Vita was long attributed to St. Audoenus (Dado), another holy man 
whom Eligius had met at the royal court of Dagobert I, and whose life was very 
similar to his own. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the majority of scholars the 
Vita Eligii was written, in fact, not by Audoenus but by a later monk of Noyon: 
consequently the author is referred to in recent literature as Pseudo-Audoenus.2 
The Vita tells us that Eligius was a native of Limoges, born at Chaptelat 
probably around 558. His own name and those of his father, Eucherius, and his 
mother, Terrigia, show that he was of Roman-Gaulish descent. "By grace of di-
vine prescience" - as his Vita continues - "he received the name Eligius, a fitting 
mirror of his mind. And as a foretaste of what he would do, or indeed what God 
' would do through him, it is fitting to tell what happened before he was born. [. . .] 
For when the blessed man was still in his mother's womb, his genetrix had a vi-
sion ordained in this matter. She saw a splendid eagle wheeling above her bed 
crying out to her three times promising I don't know what. And when she awoke, 
terrified by the reverberating voice, she began to wonder much what the vision 
might mean. Meanwhile the hour of the birth approached and the mother was 
beginning to be endangered in the greatest pain. So they called a certain religious 
1 For St. Giles see A. Butler, Lives of the Saints (ed., rev., and supplemented by H. 
Thurston and D. Attwatter. New York 1956, Vol. 3, 457-^58; M. Zender-J. Wollasch, 
"Aegidius," in Lexikon des Mittelalters. Band I, München-Zürich 1977, 176. For the 
monastery of Saint Gilles see W. S. Stoddard, "Saint-Gilles-du-Gard," in W. W. Kibler-
G. A. Zinn, eds., Medieval France. An Encyclopedia. New York 1995,841-42. 
2 The most reliable text of the Vita Eligii episcopi Noviomagensis is available in B. Krusch, 
ed., Monumenta Germaniae Histórica. Scriptorum rerum Merovingicarum. Passiones vitaeque 
sanctorum aevi Merovingici, Tomus IV, Hannoverae et Lipsiae MDCCCCII, (Unverän-
derter nachdruck 1977), 669-741. It was translated into English by J. A. McNamara. 
Medieval Sourcebook: The Life of St. Eligius, 558-660; http://www.fordham.edu/halsall 
/basis/eligius.htm; See also A. Butler, Lives of the Saints, op. cit. vol. 4, 455-458; I. Pet-
rovics, "Was There an Ethnic Background to the Veneration of St. Eligius in Hungary?" 
In: L. Löb-I. Petrovics-Gy. E. Szönyi, eds. Forms of Identity. Definitions and Changes. At-
tila József University, Szeged, 1994,77-87. 
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priest, a man of good repute, that he might pray for her. When he came to her, 
prophetic words soon seized him and he assured her: "Do not be afraid, mother, 
for the Lord has deigned to bestow a blessed birth upon you. He will be a holy 
man and chosen from all his people he will be called a great priest in the church 
of Christ."3 
Eligius's father was an artisan, who recognizing his son's unusual talent for 
engraving, apprenticed him to the famous goldsmith Abbo, master of the mint at 
Limoges. Soon after his apprenticeship Eligius went to Neustria and became 
known to Bobbo, treasurer to Clotaire II in Paris. Once Cloaire II, on his treas-
urer's recommendation, commissioned Eligius to make a royal throne adorned 
with gold and precious stones. Eligius managed to make two thrones out of the 
gold given to him, which turned out to be the origin of his good fortune.4 The 
king admired his skill and honesty and, in addition to taking him into his own 
household, appointed Eligius master of the mint. Eligius developed a close 
friendship with Clotaire II and his reputation as a prominent goldsmith soon be-
came widespread. His skill as a craftsman, his official position and his close rela-
tionship with the king made Eligius a very important person, whose soul and 
virtue were not contaminated by the corruption of the court. He was very gener-
ous to the poor, distributing large sums in alms to them, and ransomed a number 
of Roman, Gallic, Breton, Saxon and Moorish slaves. Nor should one ignore the 
fact that Eligius founded several churches and monasteries, for instance in So-
lignac, Noyon and Paris. After the death of Clotaire II in 629 his son and succes-
3 J. A. McNamara, Medieval Sourcebook: The Life of St. Eligius, op. cit. 1. 
4 "Volebat enim rex sellam urbane auro gemmisque fabricare; sed non inveniebatur in 
eius palatio, qui huiusmodi opus, sicut mente conceperat, posset opere perficere. Cum 
sciret ergo praefatus regis thesaurarius Eligi industriam, coepit eum explorare, si quo 
modo opus optatum possit perficere, et cum facile id apud eum fieri intellexisset, in-
gressus ad principem, indicat ei invenisse se artificem industrium, qui disposito sine 
cunctamine adgrederetur eius opere. Tunc rex mente gratissima tradidit ei copiosam 
auri inpensam, sed et ipse nihilhominus tradidit Eligio; et ille accepto opere cum ce-
leritate inchoavit atque cum diligentia celeriter consummavit. Denique quod ad unius 
opificii acceperat usum, ita ex ea duo conposuit, ut incredibile foret, omnia ex eodem 
pondere fieri potuisset; nam absque ulla fraude vel unius etiam siliquae inminutione 
commisso sibi patravit opere, non ceterorum fraudolentiam sectans, non mordacis li-
mae fragmine culpans, non foci edacem flammam incusans, sed omnia gemina fideliter 
complens, feliciter meriut felix remunerationem. Opus ergo perfectum defert protinus 
ad palatium traditque regi quam donaverat sellam, alteram penes se, quam gratuitu fe-
cerat, reservatam. Coepit autem princeps mirari simul et efferri tantam operis eligan-
tiam, iussitque ilico fabro tribuere mercedem laboris dignam. Tunc Eligius, alteram 
sellam in medio prolatam: 'Quod superfuit', iiiquit 'ex auro rie neglegens perderem, 
huic opere abtavi." B. Krusch, Vita Eligii episcopi Noviomagensis, op. cit. 672. The author 
of the Vita uses the Latin word sella for throne. It is quite strange that medieval writers 
translated this Latin word as 'saddle'. It can be stated with a high degree of probability 
that this might have been the origin of St. Eligius being regarded as a farrier and the 
patron of farriers. Cf. F. Arnold-Forster, Studies in Church Dedications or England's Pat-
ron Saints. 3 vols. London 1899, Vol. 3,472. 
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sor, Dagobert I, appointed his father's friend as his own first counsellor. It is also 
worth remarking that Eligius was an excellent diplomat, who later, on a mission 
for Dagobert, managed to persuade Judicael, prince of the Bretons to accept the 
authority of Dagobert. 
On the death of Dagobert I in 639, Eligius and his friend, Audoenus (Dado) 
fulfilled their desire to serve God as priests. They left the court and devoted 
themselves in seclusion to theological studies, eventually entering the priesthood. 
On the death of Acarius, bishop of Noyon-Tournai, on 13 May 640, Eligius was 
elected his successor. His election took place at almost the same time as Audoe-
nus was made bishop of Rouen. The new bishops were consecrated together in 
Rouen on 13 May 641. The apostolic zeal of Eligius led him to convert the inhabi-
tants of his diocese, most of whom were pagans. Though the task of converting 
the Flemish, Antwerpians, Frisians, Suevi, and the barbarian tribes along the cost 
was very difficult, Eligius persevered. Since Eligius looked after their sick and 
protected them from oppression, the barbarians finally relented and many of them 
were baptized by him. Eligius was a great organizer and a zealous apostle, reputed 
for his wisdom and kindness, and as good a bishop as he had been a layman.5 
During the Middle Ages his relics were the object of special veneration. Al-
though he was the patron saint of goldsmiths and metalworkers, coach drivers 
and farriers had also placed themselves under his protection. In Christian art he 
is generally represented in the garb of a bishop, with a crosier in his right hand 
and a miniature church of chased gold on the palm of his open left. Since Eligius 
was also the patron saint of farriers, he is represented in some cases with a horse's 
leg. Given the fact that most of his relics have come down to posterity from the 
fourteenth-sixteenth centuries, as the iconographic analysis carried out by Karin 
von Etzdorf demonstrates, it is now evident that the veneration of St. Eligius 
reached its peak in the western part of Europe in the late Middle Ages.6 
In an earlier work by us we have collected and enumerated the relics that 
prove the veneration of St. Eligius in medieval Hungary.7 These relics could be 
categorised as follows: 
I. Town seals. 
II. Patron saint of a parish church. 
III. A decoratively painted codex containing the mass of St. Eligius. 
5 Cf. Vita Eligii episcopi Noviomagensis, op. cit.; A. Butler, Lives of the Saints, op. cit. 455-
458. 
6 The Catholic Encyclopedia. An International work of Reference on the Constitution, Doctrine, 
Discipline and History of the Catholic Church. New York 1909, vol. 5, s. v. Eligius; M. 
Buchberger, ed., Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche. Zweite, Neubearbeitete Auflage des 
Kirchlichen Handlexikons. Freiburg im Breisgau 1931, vol. 3, s. v. Eligius; Lexikon des 
Mittelalters, München-Zürich 1986, vol. 3, s. v. Eligius. See also K. von Etzdorf, Der Hei-
lige Eligius und die Typen seiner Darstellung als Patron der Goldschmiede und Schmiede. 
München 1956. (Unpublished PhD dissertation). 
7 I. Petrovics, "Was There an Ethnic Background to the Veneration of St Eligius in Hun-
garary?", op. cit. 
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IV. Panel paintings on the altars of a variety of churches. 
V. Wooden statues. 
VI. An altar. 
VII. Seals belonging to the guilds of goldsmiths. 
From the relics the following conclusions could be drawn: 1) The veneration 
of St. Eligius reached its peak in Hungary more or less in the same period as in 
Western Europe, that is in the late Middle Ages. However, it must be stressed 
that one should not overlook the fact that due to wars and other disasters many 
relics have perished. 2) Eligius was venerated in Hungary primarily as the patron 
saint of goldsmiths. 3) It is the guild seals that form the majority of the surviving 
relics. 4) Despite the fact, that Eligius was a very popular saint in Hungary, only 
one parish church was placed under his protection. This church stood in the town 
of Temesvár (today Timi§oara in Romania). 5) The veneration of Eligius seems to 
have emerged in connection with the economic reforms launched by Charles I of 
Anjou, king of Hungary (1301-1342). Due to the mining and monetary reforms of 
Charles I, the role of goldsmiths and silversmiths had become increasingly sig-
nificant. Consequently, Hungarian goldsmiths and silversmiths found themselves 
in the mainstream of European Gothic art.8 
Unfortunately, at least at the moment, we cannot give a similarly accurate ac-
count about the veneration of St. Eligius in medieval England. This is due, pri-
marily, to the fact that we have just started our research into this vast and excit-
ing topic. However, one striking similarity has become apparent already in the 
very first phase of our investigation: in England, just like in Hungary, there ex-
isted only one church that was placed under the protection of St. Eligius in the 
Middle Ages. This contention is based on the research of Frances Arnold-Forster. 
This outstanding scholar, in his book of three volumes, entitled Studies in Church 
Dedications or England's Patron Saints, collected the names of patron saints that 
could be associated with medieval parish churches.9 When examining and ana-
lysing the names of patron saints, Arnold-Forster dedicated a separate chapter to 
those French bishops under whose protection a church stood in England. They 
are as follows: St. Denys, St. Julian, St. Lucian, St. Enurchus (Evortius), St. Cas-
sion, St. Firmin, St. Martin of Tours, St. Britius, St. German, St. Remigius, St. Ve-
dast, St. Vigor, St. Aubin, St. Lo (Lau), St. Medardus, St. Eloy, St. Ouen (Audoe-
nus), St. Genesius, St. Leodegarius, St. Lambert and St. Hubert. The term "French 
bishops" needs a little explanation: Arriold-Forster, for the sake of simplicity and 
convenience, uses the word French in a very wide sense, in stead of the more cor-
rect terms "Gallican" and "Frankish". We can agree with his argumentation, 
namely that with the exception of St. Lambert and St. Hubert, Bishops of Maas-
tricht and Liege, the sees of the aforesaid bishops were all within the borders of 
modern France, and roughly speaking, their names were introduced into England 
8 Ibid., 81-87. 
9 F. Arnold-Forster, Studies in Church Dedications, op. cit. 
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after the Conquest of 1066 through Norman channels.10 The above list shows, 
on the one hand, that the number of French bishops under whose protection 
a church had been placed in medieval England was 20, including Eligius and Au-
doenus, and, on the other, that St. Martin of Tours was the most popular French 
bishop in England. He, as a patron saint, can be associated with 160 churches in 
England.11 
The list also reveals that in contrast with Eligius to whom only one church 
was dedicated, Audoenus was the patron saint of three churches.1 2 The only 
church that to date bears the name of Eligius is in Great Smeaton.13 Today this is 
a small place with a few hundred inhabitants only, located in the North Riding 
of Yorkshire. In the Middle Ages Great Smeaton belonged to the archdiocese of 
York, but when, in 1836, the bishopric of Ripon was established it became a part 
of the latter. It also should be mentioned that the dedication of the church of 
Great Smeaton preserved not the Latin but the French form (St. Eloy) of the name 
of Eligius. In the opinion of Frances Arnold-Forster in the twelfth century, or 
perhaps a little earlier, Great Smeaton was donated by one Hardwin des Escal-
liers, landlord of the place, to St. Mary's Abbey in York. Unfortunately, it cannot 
be decided who chose the dedication: the Norman noble or the Benedictine Ab-
bey.14 
Nevertheless, says Arnold-Forster, there are scattered traces of various for-
gotten dedications with the name of Eligius. This fact cautions us that originally 
not one but more churches might have been placed under the protection of St. 
Eligius. Let it suffice here to mention just a few examples: around the middle of 
the seventeenth century in the parish of Tottenham there stood a little chapel 
known as "The Offertory (i. e. chapel) of St. Loy" and close beside it was a well 
called "St. Loy's Well". Kingston-upon-Thames also had a chapel whose patron 
saint was St. Loy. The case of Weedon-Lois in Northamptonshire is also interest-
ing: the existing church of this locality has SS. Mary and Peter as its patron saints, 
but it is very probable that originally the church had a different dedication. It 
should be recalled that there was in the parish a mineral spring known as "St. 
Loy's Well". This well provides us with the key to the name of the*parish, which 
in the early nineteenth century was still written Weedon Loys. This name ex-
presses very clearly the connection of the parish with St. Eligius and shows that 
the church was re-dedicated later.15 
The next category of relics contain literary works. We used the expression in 
the plural, though, at the moment, we know only one work that can be associated 
with St. Eligius. However, it is, undoubtedly, of primary importance, since this is 
The Canterbury Tales, Geoffrey Chaucer's greatest work, designed about 1387, 
10 Ibid., vol. 3,434-487. 
11 Ibid., vol. 3,434. 
12 Ibid., vol. 3,434. 
13 Ibid., vol. 3,257,475. 
14 Ibid., vol. 3,472,475. 
15 Ibid., vol. 3,475. 
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and written for the greater part in heroic couplets.16 The whole work, and the 
main Prologue in particular, is very interesting for the vivid picture it presents of 
contemporary life. A party of twenty-nine - or in other opinion thirty-one, in-
cluding Chaucer himself - pilgrims are assembled at the Tabard Inn in South-
wark, and they want to travel to the shrine of Thomas Becket at Canterbury. 
Among the pilgrims we find a prioress, Madame Eglentyne by name, who was 
well-educated, polite, and whose French was "after the school of Stratford-atte-
Bowe".1 7 This last statement certainly refers to the fact that Madame Eglentyne 
spoke the Norman or English version of the French language that was used in the 
royal court in England. Chaucer tells us concerning Madame Eglentyne that "Hir 
gretteste ooth was but by Seinte Loy" (Her greatest oath was but by Seinte Loy). 
This sentence proved to be a mystery for a long time, since nobody understood 
why the gentle lady had preferred to swear by St. Eligius rather than by any other 
saint. Finally, Professor Hales who wrote a work on Chaucer in the late nine-
teenth century discovered that on one occasion St. Eligius positively refused to 
take an oath demanded by his master, the king himself. St. Eligius at length con-
vinced the king that, at least in his case, an oath was needless. St. Eligius's Vita 
tells this story in the following way: "For some reason unknown to me, unless it 
were to obtain greater proof of his fidelity, one day at Rueil in the fields, in my 
presence, while I was living among the king's boys, the king ordered some relics 
of saints brought to Eligius and ordered that he place his hands upon the sacred 
tokens and take an oath. But moved by divine intuition, he humbly refused all 
attempted inducements. And when he was more urgently pressed, he soon burst 
into anxious tears fearing to offend the king but trembling sevenfold to impose 
his hands on the sacred tokens. Then the king, feeling his fear, and simultane-
ously marvelling at the man's great devotion, desisted from forcing him but sent 
him away with a kinder and gentler manner. His face beaming, he declared him 
more worthy to be believed than if he had given his oath many times."18 Hence, 
16 vVe used the electronically processed version of Geoffrey Chaucer's Canterbury Tales in 
our study; http://www.librarius.com/cantels.html. 
17 G. Chaucer, Canterbury Tales, op. cit., the main Prologue, lines 118-162. "And Frenssh 
she spak ful faire and fetisly,/After the scole of Stratford-atte-Bowe,/For Frenssh of 
Parys was to hir unknowe." 
18 "Me presente, nescio quam ob causam, nisi quod facile datur intellegi fidelitatis ob-
tento, dum apud regem puerolus habitarem, quadam die Rotoilo in agro accito rex 
Eligio quoram reliquias sanctorum praecipiebat ei, ut inpositione manuum sacris pig-
noribus donaret sacramentum; sed ille divino intuitu verens, recusare humiliter omni 
nisu temptabat. Cumque instantius id facere conpelleretur, anxius valde coepit mox 
ubertim lacrimas profundere, metuens scilicet regem offendere septuplumque pavens 
sanctis pignoribus manus inponere. Intuens itaque rex eius timorem simulque mirans 
tantam viri devotionem, desiit ultra eum cogere, sed magis blande liniterque demul-
cens laetissimo ilium vultu dimisit, pollicens se plus eum ex hoc iam crediturum, quam 
si multimoda tunc dedisset iuramenta." Vita Eligii episcopi Noviomagensis, op. cit. 673. 
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stated Professor Hales, an oath by St. Loy would naturally be no oath at all, 
a simple protestation.19 
The third category of St. Eligius's relics is represented by murai paintings. Let 
us refer first to the church of Broughton, Buckinghamshire. St. Eloy's figure can 
be discovered on the south wall of the nave together with that of St. Helena and 
St. George. The fifteenth century painting also shows blacksmith's tools.20 Next, 
we would like to call the attention to the memorably intimate, unspoiled church 
of Slapton, Northamptonshire. The mural painting on the south wall of the south 
aisle preserved the rare subject of St. Eloy with a horse being shod. The figures 
were incised with firm lines before being coloured.21 The most famous of all mu-
ral paintings is the one that can be found on the wall of the church of Shorth-
ampton, Oxfordshire. This small and humble church is of Norman origin, and it 
was dedicated to All Saints. The figure of St. Eligius can be seen on the south wall 
of the nave. The painting shows a strange episode from the life of St. Eligius: one 
day as he was shoeing a horse, the animal, for some reason, became restive and 
plunged violently. St. Eligius then quietly took off his leg at the first joint, nailed 
on the shoe and put the leg on again. The horse before the bishop seems to be 
standing in a sort of crate or wooden frame that gave him support while he was 
minus a leg. The figure of the horse and his master are fairly perfect on the wall-
painting, but unfortunately St. Eligus has lost his head. It is supposed that the 
guild of farriers have had this picture painted in honour of their saint.22 
This is how we arrive at our next category of relics. All over Europe several 
bas-reliefs exist that have preserved the above mentioned incident from St. Elig-
ius's legend. The most famous can be seen in the church of Or San Michele, 
Florance, Italy. In England there is a bas-relief at Durweston, Dorset, now placed 
over the south doorway. Surprisingly enough, as this bas-relief shows, the person 
bringing the horse to be shod is a lady of gay appearance and dressed in a fash-
ionable way. The details of the forge and figures are quaint and very interesting.23 
St. Eloy is also represented on a Suffolk bas-relief and on several screens of East 
Anglia and Devon. Mention should be made of the bas-relief that exists at Win-
19 F. Arnold Forster, Studies in Church Dedications, op. cit. vol. 3,474-475. 
20 A. Caiger-Smith, English Medieval Mural Paintings, Oxford, 1963, 132. I am grately in-
debted to Prof. Andrew Ayton (Department of History, University of Hull, England) 
for his generous help in collecting the most important pieces of medieval English vis-
ual sources concerning St. Eligius. 
21 Ibid., 164; N. Pevsner, Northamptonshire, In: The Buildings of England, Harmondsworth, 
1973,2nd edn, (Revised by B. Cherry), 404. 
22 A. Caiger-Smith, English Medieval Mural Paintings, op. cit. 168; J. Sherwood-N. Pevsner, 
"Oxfordshire," in The Buldings of England. Harmondsworth, 1974, 763; P. M. Johnston, 
"Shorthampton Chapel and its Wail-Paintings," The Archaeological Journal 62 (1905) 
170-171. 
23 Ibid., 170-171; J. Newman-N. Pevsner, "Dorset," in The Buildings of England, Harmond-
sworth 1972, 191; An Inventory of Historical Monuments in the County of Dorset, Vol. 
Ill, Central Dorset, Part 1. Royal Comission on Historical Monuments (England), 1970, 
plate 13. 
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canton church, Somerset, on which also it appears to be a fine lady that has 
brought the horse to be shod at St. Eloy's forge.24 
To sum up we can say that St. Eligius is a good example of a famous saint of 
antiquity whose cult attained its widest popular diffusion in the later Middle 
Ages. Despite the fact that in England only one ancient church was dedicated to 
him - to be more precise: we have unquestionable evidence only in one case -
Eligius was a very well known saint. It is partly due to the situation that he was 
reputed both as an apostolic bishop and a distinguished craftsman.25 The Nor-
man Conquest of England, and consequent Anglo-Norman contacts also played 
an important role in the diffusion of his cult there. It is not by chance that the 
English dedications and Chaucer's Canterbury Tales preserved the French form 
of his name in preference to the formal Latin Eligius. Finally, and it also should 
be stressed: our research concerning the cult of St. Eligius in medieval Hungary 
and England prove that a true picture of the extent of his veneration cannot be 
given exclusively on the basis of the number of churches that were dedicated to 
the bishop of Noyon. 
24 P. M. Johnston, Shorthampton Chapel and its Wail-Paintings, op. cit. 171. 
25 D. H. Farmer, The Oxford Dictionary of Saints. 2nd edn., Oxford 1988,140-141. 
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Les mouvements de réforme 
des Bénédictins hongrois au 14e siècle 
La première Bulle papale portant sur la réforme de l'ordre bénédictin et expres-
sément adressée aux Bénédictins hongrois date de 1225 et provient du Pape Ho-
noré III (1216-1227).1 Ce document concerne la convocation des chapitres provin-
ciaux suivant le modèle cistercien. Il y est constaté avec insatisfaction qu'en Hon-
grie les dispositions arrêtées par le 4e concile de Latran concernant l'organisation 
des chapitres provinciaux n'étaient peu ou pas du tout respectées. Le Pape confia 
alors aux abbés de Bulcs et Pécsvârad la convocation d'un chapitre de l'ordre la 
même année à Madocsa. Il prévoyait que tous les abbés - ou à défaut des abbés 
les prieurs - des monastères bénédictins seraient tenus d'y comparaître sous 
peine de sanctions ecclésiastiques. Les abbés des deux monastères cisterciens voi-
sins devaient être aussi invités pour pouvoir assister au déroulement du chapitre. 
Lors de cette réunion, les présidents du chapitre suivant devaient être également 
désignés. En outre, le pape Honoré III décréta que tous ceux qui seraient dépour-
vus de leur office par les visiteurs, pour cause de négligence, devraient être écar-
tés par les évêques du diocèse. Les Bénédictins hongrois commencent donc leurs 
réformes au 14e siècle avec la transcription de la Bulle du pape Honoré III datée 
Le 18 octobre 1327, le chapitre de Nyitra transcrivit, à la demande des abbés 
de cinq monastères du Nord de la Hongrie (Garamszentbenedek [Hronsky Bena-
dik], Kolos [Kliz], Széplak [Krâsna], Zobor [Zombor],2 Ludâny) le diplôme sus-
1 L. Erdélyi-P. Sörös, A pannonhalmi Szent Benedek rend története. [Histoire de l'ordre de 
Saint Benoît de Pannonhalma] I-XII/B. Budapest 1902-1916. (dans la suite: PRT) I. n. 
76, 663-666; PRT II, 9-10; L. J. Csóka, Szent Benedek fiainak világtörténete, különös tekintet-
tel Magyarországra. [Histoire mondiale des fils de Saint Benoît en particulier en Hon-
grie] Budapest 1969, (dans la suite: Csóka 1969) 544. 
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mentionné d'Honoré III prévoyant la réunion annuelle des chapitres.3 Cette trans-
cription a été réalisée à l'initiative, à la demande et avec le concours des abbés 
mentionnés. Les tentatives réformatrices menées au 13e siècle de l'extérieur, ins-
pirées par le Saint-Siège, ont cherché des solutions aux problèmes propres aux 
Bénédictins.4 On connaît une exception, lorsqu'une mesure a été prise à la suite 
du rapport d'un abbé de Pannonhalma, mais c'était à l'évidence le fruit de 
l'initiative isolée de cet abbé. Par contre, un décret édicté suite à une initiative 
interne et résultant du ralliement de plusieurs personnages n'a pu voir le jour 
avant le 18 octobre 1327. Il est remarquable que les protagonistes de cette affaire 
ne sont pas les grands monastères fondés par le roi: parmi ces cinq abbayes seules 
celle de Garamszentbenedek était de fondation royale, le reste appartenait à des 
seigneurs laïcs. Cela s'explique probablement par le fait que chacun des monastè-
res en question se trouvait dans le Nord de la Hongrie, sur les domaines ou près 
des domaines des grands seigneurs provinciaux; notamment les abbayes de Ga-
ramszentbenedek, Kolos, Ludány et Zobor, qui se situait sur le territoire de Máté 
Csák, tandis que l'abbaye de Széplak relevait de la zone d'influence du seigneur 
Amádé Aba et ses fils. Ces territoires étaient donc particulièrement exposés, 
d'abord, à la merci des grands seigneurs, puis aux effets néfastes des luttes unifi-
catrices du roi Charles Robert d'Anjou. Le renforcement politique des grands sei-
gneurs au détriment du pouvoir royal paraissait de plus en plus fort en Hongrie 
dès les années 1270. Charles Robert d'Anjou tâchait de restaurer le pouvoir royal 
sur les territoires que les grands seigneurs avaient usurpés en en faisant leurs zo-
nes d'influence autonomes. Après que le roi réussit enfin en 1323 à liquider le 
pouvoir des seigneurs provinciaux, lesdits monastères ont vécu des années plus 
calmes. Ils ont pu reprendre le mouvement de la rénovation des chapitres, jusque 
là abandonné, pour améliorer leurs conditions et plus généralement dans l'intérêt 
de tout l'ordre bénédictin. 
Or, il convient de remarquer qu'il existait des monastères bénédictins dans le 
Nord de la Hongrie,5 situés sur le territoire des grands seigneurs provinciaux, 
mais ceux-ci n'ont joué aucun rôle dans l'engagement du mouvement de réforme 
lancé par les cinq abbés du Nord de la Hongrie. Parmi les cinq abbayes qui ont 
sollicité des réformes, quatre se trouvaient sur le territoire de Máté Csák. On peut 
en conclure que c'est là que la nécessité de la restitution de l'état original s'est ré-
vélée la plus urgente. Cette circonstance seule aurait été, bien entendu, insuffi-
sante pour initier une mise au point. Il paraît probable que ces monastères 
avaient été dirigés par des abbés actifs et consciencieux, fort désireux de régulari-
ser la situation de l'ordre bénédictin, car ils ont choisi comme modèles, parmi les 
décrets pontificaux d'Innocent El et d'Honorius III, le plus sévère, celui qui a pres-
3 G. Fejér, Codex diplomaticus Hungáriáé ecclesiasticus ac civilis. I-XI. Budae 1829-1844, 
(dans la suite: Fejér) VIII/III, n. 86, 249-250; Anjou-kori oklevéltár. [Collection diploma-
tique angevine] Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia. 
1301-1387. Budapest-Szeged 1990-2002, Vol. XI. (1327) n. 499,235; Csóka 1969,549. 
4 PRTII, 8-9; Csóka 1969, 491^92. 
s PRT XII/B, 378,391,417. 
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crit la convocation annuelle des chapitres. Cela se justifiait particulièrement 
à Széplak, éloigné des quatre autres monastères. Son abbé Szigfrid est celui qui, 
lorsqu'il devint ensuite abbé de Garamszentbenedek, a participé à tous les mou-
vements de réforme du 14e siècle relatifs aux Bénédictins. Sa carrière est tellement 
liée à la réforme qu'il a été nommé abbé de Pannonhalma en récompense, entre 
autres, de son activité dans ce domaine.6 
Certains historiens hongrois supposent que les Bénédictins hongrois tinrent 
un chapitre de l'ordre dès 13297 Même si ce fut le cas, le système des chapitres ne 
put guère fonctionner d'une façon constante, parce qu'en 1332 on retrouve à nou-
veau une initiative des Bénédictins du pays en ce sens. 
Le pape Jean XXII (1311-1334) mentionne dans ses lettres du 22 juin8 et 27 
juin9 1332 le fait qu'un groupe d'abbés et prieurs bénédictins hongrois s'est ré-
cemment adressé à lui, en disant qu'en Hongrie ni les dispositions d'Innocent III 
ni celles d'Honorius III concernant l'organisation des chapitres de l 'ordre 
n'étaient respectées, et que pour « certaines raisons » il était impossible depuis 
quelque temps de convoquer des chapitres. Cette période pourrait remonter 
à l'invasion des Tartares en 1241-1242, et au plus tard à l'anarchie qui caractérise 
le règne de László IV dit le Couman, de 1272 à 1290. Les « certaines raisons » cor-
respondent probablement à la multitude des petits souverains provinciaux et aux 
luttes pour la centralisation, très défavorables aux monastères, lesquels se trou-
vaient déjà à l'agonie depuis l'attaque des Tartares. La preuve que ce n'est point 
erroné de remonter jusqu'à l'attaque des Tartares est fournie par un diplôme pa-
pal de 1344 décidant la reconstruction des monastères qui dépérissaient depuis le 
temps des luttes contre les Tartares.10 Bien que les diplômes de l'an 1332 ne répè-
tent pas mot pour mot la Bulle du pape Honorius III, ils en reprennent, pourtant, 
toutes les dispositions importantes; de plus, le document témoigne d'une réfé-
rence à Honorius III. Jean XXII décréta en outre que les Bénédictins hongrois de-
vraient tenir un chapitre en 1333 sous la présidence des abbés de Pannonhalma et 
de Garamszentbenedek, dont l'abbé était déjà Szigfrid, et ainsi de suite dans les 
années à venir.11 
6 Sur sa biographie, voir plus spécifiquement: N. Knauz, A Garam-melleti Szent Benedek-i 
apátság. [L'abbaye de Saint Benoît près de la rivière Garam] Vol. I, Budapest 1890, 
(dans la suite: Knáuz 1890) 70-75; V. Fraknói, Magyarország egyházi és politikai összekötte-
tései a római Szentszékkel. A magyar királyság megalapításától a konstanzi zsinatig. [Les rela-
tions ecclésiastiques et politiques de la Hongrie avec le Saint-Siège de Rome. De la fon-
dation du royaume hongrois jusqu'au concile de Constance] Budapest 1901, (dans la 
suite: Fraknói 1901) 165,194; K. Haiczl, A garamszentbenedeki apátság története. [Histoire 
de l'abbaye de Garamszentbenedek] Budapest 1913, (dans la suite: Haiczl 1913) 37; 
PRTII, 57-60, XII/B. 100-102, 371; Csóka 1969, 552,556-557,589-590. 
7 Csóka 1969,549. 
s PRT II, n. 105,370-371. 
9 Fejér VIII/III, 631-634. 
10 PRT II, n. 130,397-398. 
11 PRT II, 15-16; Haiczl 1913,15, 37; Csóka 1969, 549-550. 
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Malgré les tentatives précédemment évoquées, le système des chapitres n'a 
jamais pu fonctionner correctement. Le pape Benoît XII (1334-1342), le successeur 
de Jean XXH, a promulgué - pour la première fois depuis les dispositions concer-
nant les Bénédictins du 4e concile de Latran - une Bulle, intitulée Summa magistri, 
le 20 juin 1336, qui exposait les divers problèmes de la vie bénédictine, y compris 
les tentatives de réformes nouvelles et globales. Elle est devenue sous l'appella-
tion de Benedictina, le symbole des mouvements réformateurs bénédictins du 14e 
siècle, malgré le fait que ces décisions soient restées lettre morte presque partout, 
y compris en France. Cette bulle prévoit à son tour, dans ses premières disposi-
tions, l'organisation des chapitres de l'ordre, mais en adoptant une démarche 
plus tolérante, conformément à l'esprit du décret d'Innocent III, elle n'envisage 
que des convocations trisannuelles.12 La Benedictina dispose également sur les 
chapitres annuels dans les abbayes-mères, quotidiens dans chacun des filiales, 
sur la consolidation de leur base financière, sur les modalités d'admission dans 
l'ordre, sur les fonctionnaires de tous les monastères, sur leurs tâches et sur 
l'organisation de la vie intérieure monastique. Cependant la grande innovation 
de la bulle consistait à solliciter les études universitaires des Bénédictins. C'est la 
partie la plus minutieusement élaborée de la Benedictina. Les monastères ont été 
obligés d'envoyer un moine sur vingt à l'Université. Le Bulle papale réglemente 
d'une manière détaillée le mode du choix des futurs étudiants, leurs logements et 
frais divers, leurs bourses d'études ainsi que le temps prévu pour l'obtention des 
degrés universitaires.13 
Un diplôme papal délivré le 11 décembre 133614 ordonne le respect des points 
essentiels de la Benedictina pour l'ordre hongrois peut être considéré comme pré-
curseur de l'arrivée de la Bulle en Hongrie (1337). La Benedictina arrivera en 1337 
en Hongrie. Benoît XII fait fusionner dans une seule province les monastères bé-
nédictins des archiépiscopats d'Esztergom et de Kalocsa. Le pape a confié à qua-
tre abbés bénédictins, dont Szigfrid, abbé de Garamszentbenedek de trouver en-
fin un lieu convenable pour la première réunion du chapitre de l'ordre, voulue 
depuis longtemps. Après y être arrivé et tout le monde étant réuni, le chapitre 
a dû élire un président, étant donné que le rôle des abbés susmentionnés se bornait 
uniquement à organiser la réunion, sans avoir toutefois la fonction présidentielle. 
Le fait que parmi les participants se trouve aussi des procureurs montre que le 
diplôme permet la présence par l'intermédiaire des représentants. Les Bénédic-
tins hongrois se voient habilités par le Pape à renouveler et à suivre les disposi-
tions des anciens chapitres dans la mesure oû elles s'avèrent compatibles avec la 
Benedictina. Désormais le Saint-Siège exige des rapports concernant les dépenses 
et les revenus des monastères afin de pouvoir prescrire le nombre des moines que 
12 Lajos J. Csóka a mentionné les chapitres provinciaux bisannuels. Csóka 1969,495^496. 
13 Plus précisément: PRT II, 17-38; Csóka 1969, 495-501, 531. Encore: Haiczl 1913, 37. -
l'auteur a daté la bulle par erreur à 1337, en effet cette année est la date de l'arrivée de 
la bulle en Hongrie. 
14 Fejér VIII/IV. n. 75,181-187; PRT II, 38. - l'auteur ne fait pas mention parmi les abbés 
organisateurs, de celui de Garamszentbenedek; Csóka 1969,550. 
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les monastères sont susceptibles d'entretenir et combien d'entre eux pourront 
être envoyés à l'Université. 
La lettre notariale des conseillers15 bénédictins du pape datant du 1er avril 
1337 était jointe à la Bulle réformatrice et comportait des dispositions portant sur 
les modalités d'exécution de celle-ci.16 On peut supposer que les bénédictins hon-
grois ont tenu un chapitre provincial dans la même année où la Benedictina a été 
proclamé.17 
Benoît XII dans sa lettre du 15 octobre 133718 ordonne à l'évêque d'Eger de ré-
cupérer pour l'ordre des monastères occupés par des usurpateurs, d'y installer 
des moines fiables et d'y faire respecter l'esprit réformateur. Ce processus aurait 
dû être mis en marche par le chapitre de l'ordre bénédictins, ainsi ce document 
nous permet-il de nous douter de son efficacité réelle. 
Ce diplôme n'est pas le seul à nous avertir des difficultés concernant la réali-
sation du projet réformateur. Dans un contexte plus large nous pourrons évo-
quer, en tant que justification, la lettre du haut clergé hongrois de 1338 dans 
laquelle il porte plainte au pape Benoît XII concernant la politique ecclésiastique 
du roi Charles Robert. Parmi les atteintes portées contre l'ensemble de l'Eglise le 
manque des élections du chapitre, la donation du droit de patronage et l'obliga-
tion militaire des ecclésiastiques touchent également aux conventions monasti-
ques.19 
Dans l'histoire de la réforme bénédictine c'est le chapitre de l'ordre tenu à Vi-
segrád le 2 juin 1342 qui constitue le premier résultat fidèlement documenté de la 
lignée favorisant la convocation régulière des chapitres.20 Cette réunion du chapi-
tre s'est occupé de l'affaire des monastères récupérés pour l'ordre par Szigfrid, 
l'abbé de Garamszentbenedek. 
Le large contexte du chapitre de 1342 montre bien que le mouvement de ré-
forme bénédictine ne portait pas uniquement sur l'affaire intérieur de l'ordre. Le 
simple fait qu'il a eu lieu à Visegrád est signifiant: dans cette ville se trouvait un 
monastère bénédictin, mais celui-ci était moins important que ceux de Pannon-
halma ou Garamszentbenedek. La ville de Visegrád ayant des fonctions d'une 
capitale pour ainsi dire à l'époque de Charles Robert d'Anjou, on peut dire que le 
chapitre se déroulait dans le centre royal. Parmi les douze abbés dont nous con-
naissons le nom, huit dirigeaient des monastères fondés par le roi. Le déroule-
ment de la proclamation de la Benedictina en Hongrie était assuré surtout par des 
organisateurs et des présidents des chapitres venant des monastères de fondation 
15 C'est avec eux que le pape Benoît XII a conféré sur les points de Benedictina et ils les ont 
développé. PRT II, 16: 
16 PRT II, n. 119,384-385. 
17 Fejér VIII/III, n. 84,248. - par erreur daté à 1327. 
18 A. Theiner, Vet era monumenta histórica Hungariam sacram illustrantia. I-II, Romae 1859-
1860, Vol. I, n. 928,618-619; PRT II, n. 124,390-393. 
19 Gy. Kristó-F. Makk, Károly Robert emlékezete. [La mémoire de Charles Robert] Budapest 
1988,186-189. 
20 Fejér VIII/IV, n. 309, 604-605; PRT II, n. 128, 395-396; Knauz 1890. 71; PRT II, 38; Csóka 
1969,552. 
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royale. Ces faits permettent de tirer les conclusions suivantes: au première chef, le 
chapitre, qui devait sa renaissance au mouvement réformateur et qui le promou-
vait en même temps, faisait partie de la vie intérieure de l'ordre en 1327, et il était 
organisé par les monastères de patronage privé. Deuxièmement ledit chapitre 
sera dirigé par les monastères de fondation royale, il se déroulait au siège du roi 
sous le contrôle direct de Charles Robert. Il paraît donc que la réforme de l'ordre 
bénédictin hongrois était une partie de la politique de consolidation du roi à la 
suite des luttes unificatrices. C'était donc le cas des pays voisins de l'Europe cen-
trale et orientale; en Bohême et en Pologne c'était aussi les souverains qui ont mis 
en œuvre les réformes monastiques tout en soutenant leur politique.21 
Avant que le chapitre suivant ait eu lieu Clément VI (1342-1352), successeur 
de Benoît XII a ordonné le 18 mars 1344 aux abbés, prieurs et abbesses bénédic-
tins d'élire des personnes capables de récupérer et de restituer les droits et pro-
priétés des monastères dépérissant depuis l'invasion tartare, dont le nombre dé-
passait la quarantaine, les invitant à partager les frais.22 
On peut supposer un chapitre général de l'ordre en 1348, car Ulrik, le nouvel 
abbé de Dombó, a été élu par la réunion des abbés bénédictins au cours de la 
même année.23 Nous ne possédons pas d'autres preuves sur ce chapitre supposé. 
C'est bien plus tard qu'une preuve documentaire d'un chapitre suivant celui 
de Visegrád apparaît le 21 octobre 1366.24 Etant donné qu'on ne s'informe que 
d'une réunion provinciale en 1342 et d'une autre de 1366, ne pouvant pas pren-
dre pour certain les chapitres supposés de 1337 et de 1348, on peut douter de 
l'efficacité de la Benedictina concernant le mouvement chapitrai. Cependant un 
examen détaillé du diplôme du chapitre de 1366 qui contient des informations 
cachées pourrait en finir avec nos doutes. 
Un monastère (Garáb) dont on a des informations issues du chapitre de 1342 
se voit de nouveau sous la direction d'usurpateurs. La situation était pire 
qu'auparavant. Ledit monastère a été pris par Konrad, moine tchèque, dépourvu 
de lettre de recommandation. Y habitait une femme de mauvaise réputation dont 
la fille est devenue concubine de celui-ci. Il gaspillait les biens du monastère, et 
après avoir appris qu'il allait être défait, il a tenté de s'enfuir, en vain car il a été 
arrêté et transporté à Pécsvárad. Même la vie pécheresse de Konrad peut fournir 
des informations sur la régularité des chapitres, à savoir qu'il ne s'y présentait 
jamais. Vu qu'à l'époque du chapitre de Visegrád la vie de ce monastère était con-
forme aux règles de l'ordre, Konrad a dû occuper la place de l'abbé après 1342, et 
qu'il ressort des sources qu'il ne fréquentait pas les chapitres, nous pouvons ad-
mettre que plusieurs chapitres ont été convoqués entre 1342 et 1366. 
21 K. Elm, « Les ordres monastiques, canoniaux et militaires en Europe du Centre-Est au bas 
moyen âge, » in L'Église et le peuple chrétien dans le pays de l'Europe du Centre-Est et du 
Nord (XIV- XVe siècle), Rome 1990, (dans la suite: Elm 1990) 169,180. 
22 PRT II, n. 130,397-398; Knauz 1890, 72; Csôka 1969, 589. 
23 PRT XII/B, 432. 
24 PRT II, n. 190, 510-513; PRT II, 39; Csôka 1969, 551-553, 558. 
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Ce fait a été soutenu par l'expression « pro rite » qui fait référence au déroule-
ment du chapitre dans le texte du diplôme de 1366, et il suppose aussi une cer-
taine régularité. En plus il en ressort que le chapitre précédent était tenu à Ga-
ramszentbenedek, probablement en 1364.25 
Loin de parler d'une réalisation parfaite, il est donc à admettre que les dispo-
sitifs de la Benedictina portant sur la convocation des chapitres ont été plus ou 
moins respectés en Hongrie. Les procès-verbaux capitulaires non conservés, nous 
ne connaissons pas les ordres du jour. Un des dispositifs de la Benedictina n'a sû-
rement pas été suivi, notamment celui de l'obligation des études universitaires. 
On retrouve un nombre très limité de Bénédictins hongrois poursuivant des étu-
des à l'étranger. Les universités les plus proche par exemple celle de Vienne et de 
Cracovie, n'ont pas reçu d'étudiants d'entre eux au cours du 14e siècle.26 
Parmi les pays voisins de la Hongrie en Europe de l'Est en Pologne les réfor-
mes ont été lancées sous l'influence de la Benedictina, plusieurs monastères for-
mant une congrégation au sens large du terme,27 mais les réformes papales n'ont 
pas eu beaucoup d'effet.28 En Bohème les abbayes monastiques ont connu une 
prospérité au 14e siècle grâce pour la plupart à la politique monarchique.29 La ré-
forme des monastères bénédictins bohémiens était dirigée par l'abbaye de Brev-
nov; sa compétence ne se limitait pas aux prieurés de sa propre fondation mais 
grâce aux papes Benoît XII et Boniface IX ont reçu le V i s i t a t i o n de tous les abbayes 
bénédictins bohémiennes.30 
En tirant une conclusion générale on peut constater qu'au cours du mouve-
ment réformateur bénédictin en Hongrie du 14e siècle, parmi les dispositions de 
la Bulle Benedictina, seules celles portant sur la convocation des chapitres provin-
ciaux apparaissent dans le corpus des diplômes de notre pays. Il paraît aussi que 
ces tentatives, lancées pour la première fois par Innocent III, ont enfin connu un 
accomplissement vers le milieu du 14e siècle. L'autre résultat des efforts hongrois 
consistait en la reprise de quelques monastères perdus, mais on n'en trouve pas 
de mesures dans la Bulle Summa Magistri. Cependant nous pouvons admettre que 
pour réformer la vie des ces monastères reprises l'on pouvait appliquer les règles 
concernant le comportement quotidien des Bénédictins. 
25 II est présumable que un chapitre de l'ordre a eu lieu du 1348. Voire la note 22. 
26 Même au 15e siècle on ne connaît que sept moins bénédictins, qui étudiaient à Vienne 
ou à Cracovie. E. Mályusz, Egyházi társadalom a középkori Magyarországon. [La société ec-
clésiastique en Hongrie médiévale] Budapest 1971,246. 
2? Elm 1990,171. 
2s Csóka 1969,516. 
29 Elm 1990,169. 
30 Csóka 1969,515; Elm 1990,167. 
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1. The role and importance of the loca credibilia 
The places of authentication (loca credibilia)1 were peculiar and long-lasting in-
stitutions of the Hungarian legal system. Their formation had a strong connection 
with the spread of literacy in Hungary as well as to the parallel transformation of 
the Hungarian legal practices. According to our present conception, their range of 
activity can hardly be identified with that of any modern official organisations 
since these institutions, with special roots in the development of Hungarian law, 
carried out procedures simultaneously covering the tasks of today's public nota-
ries, investigators, and lawyers. As to the definition of the role the places of au-
thentication played in the contemporary administrative system, the literature 
usually draws parallels with that of the public notaries in Western Europe.2 The 
basis of their activity was, among other things, primarily the prestige created by 
the literacy of their members and/or the legalising role3 of the written word. Both 
The research on which the present study is based was supported by OTKA Nr. F29427. 
1 Up to the present, several shorter or longer studies can be read about the charter-issu-
ing activity of the places of authentication, but the completion of a modern synthesis 
based on detailed research about the particular places of such activity still to be waited. 
Suggested readings in foreign languages are: F. Eckhart, "Die glaubwürdigen Orte Un-
garns im Mittelalter," Mitteilungen des Institus für österreichische Geschichtsforschung IX. 
Ergänzungsband, Innsbruck 1915, 395-558; and Gy. Bónis, "Les autorités de 'foi publi-
que' et les archives des 'loci credibiles' en Hongrie," Archívum 12 (1962), 97-104. 
2 On the history of public notaries in Hungary and their relation to the places of authen-
tication, see I. Barta, "Középkori közjegyzőségeink történetéhez," [On the History of 
our Medieval Public Notaries] in Emlékkönyv Szentpétery Imre születése hatvanadik évfor-
dulójának ünnepére. Budapest 1938, 31-46; J. Köblös, Az egyházi középréteg Mátyás és a Ja-
gellók korában. [The Ecclesiastical Middle-Class at the Age of King Matthias and the 
Jagiellonian Rulers] Budapest 1994,57-66, (henceforth: Köblös, 1994); Gy. Bonis, "A sa-
sadi tizedper közjegyzői a XV. század derekán," [The Public Notaries of the Tithe Trial 
in Sasad in the Mid-Fifteenth Century] Levéltári Közlemények (1971), 103-113. 
3 On the transformation of procedural law in relation to literacy and the development of 




with private clients and official organisations, the principal token of confidence in 
the charters issued by the places of authentication was the use of seals possessed 
by these institutions, earning authenticity in secular legal practices and appearing 
already in the early phase of their activity.4 However, the charters issued by the 
places of authentication were valid only before secular courts, since ecclesiastical 
judicature did not accept the authenticity of their seals. 
2. The timescale of the activity of the loca credibilia 
In Hungary the first places of authentication started their activity in the last 
third of the twelfth century.5 The ground-breaking role in their development was, 
understandably, played by the most important cathedral and collegiate chapters.6 
However, at the beginning of the thirteenth century other major cathedral and 
collegiate chapters7 followed suit, and from the middle of the same century the 
convents of outstanding prestige usually of royal foundation also engaged in 
such activity.8 
The development of the places of authentication received a significant impetus 
by Article 21 of the law of 1231 which, in order to avoid malfeasance, ordered 
churchmen to join the bailiffs (pristaldus) in administering official procedures.9 
The decree of King Louis the Great in 1351 brought a turning point in the growth 
of the number of places of authentication, since under one of its articles the king 
had the right to use seals of the smaller convents re-examined.10 It was needed 
a feudális Magyarországon," [The Development of Charter as a Proving Tool in Trials 
in Feudal Hungary] in A magyar hivatali írásbeliség fejlődése, 1181-1981. Magyar Herold -
ELTE Történelem Segédtudományai Tanszék kiadványai, Vol. 1, ed. I. Kállay, Buda-
pest 1984, 279-293, (henceforth: MH, 1984); I. Hajnik, A magyar bírósági szervezet és per-
jog az árpád- és a vegyes-házi királyok alatt. [The Hungarian Judicial System and Proce-
dural Law During the Reign of the Kings of the Árpádian and the Mixed Dynasties] 
Budapest 1899,341-377. 
4 L. Solymosi, "A hiteleshelyi pecséthasználat kezdeteihez," [Contribution to the Begin-
nings of Seal Usage at the Places of Authentication] in MH, 1984,91-139, 
5 For the beginnings of the charter-issuing activity of the places of authentication, see I. 
Szentpétery, Magyar Oklevéltan. [Hungarian Diplomatics] Budapest 1930, 122-125, 
(henceforth: Szentpétery, 1930). 
6 Veszprém -1181; Székesfehérvár - 1184. 
7 Esztergom - 1208; Győr - 1210; Buda (Budapest) - 1211; Nagyvárad (Oradea) - 1215; 
Arad (Arad) -1221; Nyitra (Nitra) -1224; Zágráb (Zagreb) -1226. 
8 On the activity of the Benedictine monasteries as places of authentication an extensive 
study was prepared by László Solymosi. See L. Solymosi, "A bencés konventek 
hiteleshelyi oklevéladásának kezdeteim," [The Beginnings of the Charter-Issuing Ac-
tivity of the Benedictine Monasteries as Places of Authentication] in Mows Sacer 996-
1996. Pannonhalma 1000 éve. Vol. 1, ed. I. Takács, Pannonhalma 1996, 481^498 (hence-
forth: MS). 
9 J. Beér-A. Csizmadia, eds. Történelmünk a jogalkotás tükrében. Sarkalatos honi törvényeikből 
1001-1949. [Our History in the Mirror of Codification. Selections from Our Cardinal 
Laws 1001-1949] Budapest 1966, 97. 
10 See details in Szentpétery, 1930,214-215. 
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because in some ecclesiastical institutions serving also as places of authentication 
- mainly those convents under secular overlordship and/or those with a par-
ticularly small personnel - strong secular influence could be bad to serious 
doubts about the content of the charters issued there. The defeat at Mohács in 
1526 also meant an important milestone in the history of the places of authentica-
tion, though the division of the country into three parts in 1541 caused an even 
sharper break between their medieval and early modern activity.11 As a conse-
quence of the decomposition and/or transformation of the pre-Mohács adminis-
trative structures as well as the persistent hot conflicts with the Turks within the 
country, the archives of the places of authentication partly perished, and partly 
hidden in places - in most cases under the protection of other ecclesiastical insti-
tutions - more secure from the Turkish ravages.12 Therefore, even if the charter 
collection of a particular place of authentication remained extant, it was detached, 
for the whole period of the Turkish occupation, from the everyday life of the ter-
ritory where the charters were produced and, consequentially, the process of or-
ganic development was interrupted. These documents were also in danger of 
vanishing due to lack of systematic storage, their housing in unsuitable places, 
and their almost continuous movement from one place to another.13 Throughout 
this period, perhaps one of the biggest problems that the places of authentication 
had to face was lack of personnel.14 The troubles caused by this15 and the neces-
sarily enlarged geographical territories to be covered by their activity were even 
further aggravated by the general public disorder of the sixteenth-seventeenth 
centuries. The demand for the activity of the places of authentication and the use 
of their charters grew significantly after the expulsion of the Turks. In many 
cases, the charters surviving in the archives of the places of authentication were 
of great importance for the retrospective justification of proprietorial rights.16 The 
places of authentication also played a significant role in the reorganisation of the 
11 Up to the present, the basic work on the modern history of the places of authentication 
is still L. Papp, A hiteleshelyek története és működése az újkorban. [The History and Activ-
ity of the Places of Authentication in the Modern Age.] Budapest 1936 (henceforth: 
Papp, 1936). 
12 Naturally, this was not always a trouble-free process as is shown by the calvary of the 
chapter of Eger between 1596 and 1650. Papp, 1936, 20-21. 
13 The history of one of the most significant places of authentication surviving the Turk-
ish occupation was studied by L. B. Kumorovitz, "A leleszi konvent országos levél-
tára," [The National Archives of the Lelesz Convent] Levéltári Közlemények (1932), 223-
255. 
14 Papp, 1936, 8-17. He listed the causes of the decay of the places of authentication after 
1526 as follows: 1) the slackening of discipline in the chapters and convents, 2) the 
spread of Protestantism, 3) the troubled public order, 4) the Turkish presence. 
is Cf. Art. 1492/44, and 1552/41. 
i6 At that time, the majority of commissions given to the places of authentication was due 
to the 'neo-acquisition trials'. During the reclamation of proprietorial rights, they were 
commissioned to write down countless objections and deprivations. On this new role 
of the places of authentication, see Papp, 1936,41^42. 
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administration of the country. Owing to all these factors, the period between the 
end of the seventeenth and the middle of the eighteenth centuries was marked by 
the renewal of the activity of these institutions.17 Indeed, due to the - albeit only 
provisional - revaluation of their role, one can perhaps even speak about their 
transient second efflorescence.18 However, the importance of these places of au-
thentication and their organisational dimensions merely shadow their former, 
fourteenth-century glory.19 From the middle of the eighteenth century onwards, 
legal literacy gradually slipped into the hands and became the task of secular in-
tellectuals.20 The role of the places of authentication in lower level official admini-
stration was rapidly confined by the growing use of the written word in the 
counties, towns,21 and public notaries.22 This process was certainly accelerated by 
the appearance and advance of the reformed churches in Hungary.23 As a conse-
17 For example, the chapter of Nagyvárad (Oradea) from 1693, while those of Pécs and 
Vác from 1700 onwards revived their activity as places of authentication. However, the 
restoration of these institutions did not always go without difficulties, since the neces-
sary financial background of their activity and/or the possessions assuring that should 
have also been restored to the members of these institutions. For the cases of the places 
of authentication at Turóc (Klástor pod Znievom), Kapornak (Nagykapornak), and 
Zalavár, see Papp, 1936,26. 
18 The extensive readjustment of the activity fulfilled by the places of authentication was 
accomplished according to the Para. 39^14 paragraphs of the decree issued in 1723 by 
King Charles III. 
19 It can be stated despite the fact that in the seventeenth-nineteenth centuries new places 
of authentication arose that were non-existent during the Middle Ages, that is such ec-
clesiastical institutions gained also the right of issuing charters which earlier were not 
entitled to do so. Accordingly, for example, on the basis of the Para. 2 paragraph of the 
Art. 57 article of the law issued in 1647 (reassured by the Para. 3 paragraph of the Art. 
56 article of the law of 1741) the chapter at Zengg (Senj), while on the basis of the 15th 
decree of 1802 the chapter at Besztercebánya (Banská Bystrica), the latter in the place of 
the charter at Turóc, started functioning as places of authentication. 
20 The increasing spread of Protestant as well as Jesuit education and/or the significantly 
growing presence of the state in education meant a great contribution. The spread of 
secular literacy effected the way of administration at the places of authentication. In 
support of the above statement, a good example is the fact that from the seventeenth 
century onwards it became more or less regular that the clients wrote their avowals at 
home in their mother tongue and afterwards these avowals were copied word by word 
into the charters issued by the given places of authentication by this way authenticat-
ing the documents. 
21 To the boom of the charter production of the towns, see B. Bak, "Városi írásbeliség 
a XVIII. században," [Urban Literacy in the Eighteenth Century] in MH, 1984,294-310. 
22 For the early phase of secular literacy, see A. Kubinyi, "írástudás és értelmiségi fog-
lalkozásúak a Jagelló-korban," [Literacy and Professional Intellectuals in the Age of the 
Jagiellonian Rulers] in MH, 1984, 186-208; I. Kállay, "Magánhivatali írásbeliség," [Pri-
vate Legal Literacy] in MH, 1984,335-343. 
23 However, the above influence may not have been effecting directly, as in case of hav-
ing no other possibility it was obvious also for the non-Catholics and the urban citizens 
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quence of all the above elements, the places of authentication became mere de-
positories of charters and as such only produced copies of the documents in their 
custody. Article 35 of the decree of 1874 put a final end to their independent his-
tory the with its Para. 214 stating that the places of authentication could only 
prepare authentic copies of the documents preserved in their archives, but could 
not issue any new charters.24 The activity of the places of authentication embraces 
almost seven centuries of Hungarian statehood, therefore the charters issued by 
them represent an extremely rich source-basis for research into Hungarian his-
tory. 
3. The loca credibilia and the number of charters they issued 
On the territory of medieval Hungary almost eighty ecclesiastical institutions 
can be shown to have taken part, for a shorter or longer period, in the issuing of 
authentic charters. Some thirty per cent of all the documents extant from Middle 
Ages (1000-1526) are charters issued by chapters and convents, mostly produced 
as a result of their activity as places of authentication. This percentage likely rep-
resents the proportion of actual charter-issuing, as in medieval Hungary a signifi-
cant part of the charters issued were produced by the places of authentication. 
This is illustrated in the chart below according to centuries. 
Period Chapters Convents Total 
1101-1200 4 0 462 
1201-1300 3039 536 13886 
1301-1400 19422 7383 73260 
1401-1500 24487 24109 154499 
1501-1526 8945 10689 58874 
to turn with their cases to the places of authentication. The impact of Protestantism on 
the places of authentication was analyzed in Papp, 1936,11-14. 
24 The die-away process at the places of authentication had started earlier, the Art. 35 ar-
ticle of the decree issued in 1874 simply canonized an already settled situation. To 
prove this statement, László Papp - on the basis of the relevant protocols - mentioned 
the following data: "[...] the chapter at Esztergom from 1850 till 1854, that is during 
five years, issued altogether ten authenticated charters, moreover its majority was done 
for the canons of the chapter. [...] Between 1854-1863 the Esztergom chapter did not 
function as a place of authentication, while in the following ten years, between 1863-
1872, it issued twelve charters, with the exception of three, again all to its own canons. 
The situation was not much different at any other places. The Zalavár convent from 
1861 (restart) until 1867 (end), during seven years, emitted twenty-two charters, and 
that meant a relatively high number." Papp, 1936,50. As a comparison - on the basis of 
the electronic database prepared by the National Archives of Hungary (MOL) about 
the pre-Mohács (i. e. pre-1526) charters -, between 1350-1354 the chapter at Esztergom 
issued 59 charters, while between 1363-1372 this number was 65. 
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Table 1. The changes in the charter-issuing activity of the chapters and convents in relation 
to all extant medieval charters (Item/year) 
The extant material shows that the rate of charter-issuing by the places of au-
thentication grew with decreasing instensity during the Middle Ages. The decel-
eration was evident, primarily, in the activity of the chapters, which in the case of 






db % db % 
1201-1250 706 52 
1251-1300 5182 +4476 86 976 +924 94,6 
1301-1350 16716 +11534 69 4376 +3400 77,6 
1351-1400 21210 +4494 21 9881 +5505 55,7 
1401-1450 22733 +1523 6,6 19510 +9629 49,3 
1451-1500 25250 +2517 9,9 27488 +7978 29 
1501-1526 17454 21004 
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Table 2. The changes in time undergone in charter-issuing activity of the chapters and convents in 
proportion to all the extant medieval charters 
Due to the this tendency, from the second half of the fifteenth century on-
wards, the Hungarian convents issued more charters than the chapters usually 
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This phenomenon might be explained by the fact that the canons of the chap-
ters were less in the need of the income deriving from the authentication activity 
than the monks of the convents. 
4. The stages of activity done by the loca credibilia 
The places of authentication carried out their authentication role essentially 
for two large client-groups, and on that basis two main forms of activity devel-
oped.25 One of these groups was constituted by private clients who came to these 
institutions to arrange their various legal matters (such as buying and/or selling, 
mortgages (inpignoratio), exchanges of immovable/movable goods, arrangements 
for wills, avowals, etc.), and thereby gained written and authentically sealed evi-
dence, of their case. Certainly, the clients most frequently made their declarations 
(fassio) in the church, but it can also be rightfully presumed that in those cases 
when many witnesses were involved their reception of happened in the open air. 
In front of the places of authentication the parties involved could appear not only 
personally, but also through their authorised representatives (procuratores). For 
these representatives separate letters of commission were drawn up which could 
be validated for a single case, for a determined period of time, or with general 
validity. 
The other group using the places of authentication was constituted by official 
bodies involved in legislation26 in relation to actual phases of any legal proce-
dure. The places of authentication, by separate letters of mandate (mandatum), 
were commissioned to carry out different legal actions (such as inspection of 
boundaries (reambulatio), seisin of estates to new owners (statutio, introductio), in-
quiry, transcription of charters, etc.), after which the institutions concerned pre-
pared written reports (relatio). In such cases, the place of authentication con-
cerned usually sent its own commissioner, whose task was to act as a witness at 
the procedure carried out by his secular colleague and on return home to certify 
that the legal steps of the given process had been carried out.27 Most probably, 
the selection of witnesses from the places of authentication was determined by 
various elements collectively. Since the external authentication activity meant 
several days spent far from the community of the chapter and/or the convent, in 
a secular environment - resulting in serious trial concerning discipline and the 
observance of liturgical obligations especially in case of monks - only the most 
reliable persons were sent for these external tasks. Certainly, the very old a n d / o r 
25 On the circle of people using the places of authentication, see in details Szentpétery, 
1930,127-128. 
26 Practically, any official participants in the legislative process (king, palatine, seneschal, 
county, ban, etc.) could call upon the places of authentication to carry out particular le-
gal acts. 
27 For an exemplary analysis of the external activity fulfilled by the chapter at Pécs, see 
L. Koszta, A pécsi székeskáptalan hiteleshelyi tevékenysége (1214-1353). [The Activity of the 
Cathedral Chapter of Pécs as a Place of Authentication (1214-1353)] Pécs 1998,105-116 
(henceforth: Koszta, 1998). 
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feeble people, despite their spiritual constancy, were not used for carrying out 
such external activities. However, maturity was not only essential in order that 
the person could easier resist the attractions of secular life, but also because dur-
ing the procedures there was a great need for firm knowledge of composition and 
writing skills and, at the same time, the commissioners should be familiar with all 
the details of the appropriate legal procedures. On the other hand, the chapters 
and convents carried out the different tasks of authentication, above all, obvi-
ously, the issue of charters, for money. Clearly this was particularly the case with 
poorer communities.28 In practice, of course, the quantity of work would have 
principally determined the circle of commissioners sent out from the places of 
authentication. If a given chapter or convent was not able to send enough dele-
gates competent in every respect to fulfil the large number of commissions, other 
people would clearly be sent from time to time. If the number of commissions for 
external procedures was too great for the places of authentication to confine the 
work to one of their members/the chapters or convents in question.could also 
commission the priests of the parishes under their jurisdiction to help.29 In the 
practice of the larger places of authentication, there are examples to be found 
even for sending out apprentices. Sometimes it happened that the places of au-
thentication carried out external procedures at the request of private persons, 
though each of such cases had a well-defined reason behind it. Usually, the ill-
ness, that is the confinement to bed of the persons giving the avowals - com-
monly testators - provided the reason for calling a witness from a certain place of 
authentication. Another reason could be if women wanted to make avowals, in 
cases they were frightened to travel to the place of authentication due to the dan-
gers of journey. 
The scope of activity of the places of authentication covered the territory of the 
whole country. As in the case of external procedures - in order to prevent possi-
ble abuses - more places of authentication were commissioned with the same 
procedure, the spheres of operation of the places of authentication, in fact, over-
lapped with each other. The main principle in selecting a place of authentication 
was that it was situated in the county of the particular legal case. However, this 
principle was often disregarded if a place of authentication in the neighbouring 
county was closer. Though four places of authentication (the chapters of Buda 
and Székesfehérvár, the Bosnian chapter, and the Székesfehérvár Hospitaller 
28 Taking into consideration the difficulties of travel in the Middle Ages, the external au-
thentication activity was a tiring job and was not completely safe, therefore those 
churchmen not necessarily in the need of the income deriving from such activity -
having, for example, a lucrative prebend - tried to avoid being involved in such com-
missions. In the chapters, principally, the simple canons classified by József Köblös as 
'serving canons' undertook these tasks. Köblös, 1994, 79-80. 
29 In case of appointing parish priests, it was not necessary that'the parish church con-
cerned should be under the jurisdiction of the involved place of authentication. In the 
practice of the cathedral chapter of Pécs, for example, the major criteria of selection 
was that the parish church should be close to the landed property involved in the par-
ticular legal case. Koszta, 1998,109. 
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commandery) were given country-wide authority to issue charters, the territorial 
sphere of action, in principal, was shaped by everyday practice. 
The compiling and issue of the charters finalised the authentication processes 
- both in cases of internal and external cases. In the case of avowals and/or pro-
cedures accomplished outside the place of authentication a memorandum was 
prepared. The draft charters and, eventually, the charters themselves were pro-
duced on the basis of these memoranda. In compiling of the charters certain pat-
terns, existing formulae were used collected into separate books - formularies -
or taken from documents issued earlier. Several formula-charters are extant 
written only to provide model texts for the different types of legal cases. The 
completed charter was read over and, in necessary cases, was corrected by the 
person in charge, usually the lector or his deputy, the sublector. From the fifteenth 
century, the completion of checking was more and more frequently indicated on 
the back of the charters as well. The language of the charters until the mid-nine-
teenth century was Latin. Apart from sporadically occurring vulgar expressions, 
however, from the sixteenth century onwards, certain parts (e. g. attestations) 
were put into the charters in Hungarian. However, from the seventeenth century 
onwards, the whole text could be in Hungarian. Para. 6 of Article 6 of the decree 
issued in 1840 instituted the compulsory usage of Hungarian in issuing charters, 
even though the places of authentication were by that time hardly in action. 
The last, but perhaps the most substantial phase of the process of issuing 
charters was the authentication itself. The early method was to prepare a chirog-
raphy (chirographum) when the content of the charter was written twice, one be-
low the other, separated by the first letters of the alphabet, and afterwards the 
document was cut into two through these separating letters. One part of the 
charter created in this manner was given to the person or institution concerned, 
while the other copy (par) remained at the issuing place of authentication. The 
most important authenticating instrument was the seal kept by the custos or his 
deputy, the subcustos. The seal was most frequently placed on the charters pen-
dancy or impressed. The places of authentication always used one-sided seals. At 
certain places two different seals were in use simultaneously, the major one (sigil-
lum maius) used for issuing letters of privilege and the smaller one (sigillum memo-
riale) employed in any other cases. The seal-figure usually portrayed the patron 
saint of the given chapter or convent and/or his/her attribute(s). In addition to 
the seal of the particular place of authentication, on several occasions, the seal of 
the head of the community, its abbot or provost, was also placed on the charter. 
The applicant had to pay for issuing and sealing the charter.30 The fee, primar-
ily, depended on the character and type of the charter itself, that is how richly it 
was decorated and how elaborately it was composed. From the money paid for 
issuing the charter the lector and the notary (notarius) usually got a separate sum. 
The places of authentication preserved the texts of the charters issued in the form 
30 L. B. Kumorovitz, "A leleszi konvent pecsételési- és oklevéltaxa-lajstromai," [The Seal-
ing and Charter Issuing Fee-Registers of the Lelesz Convent] Levéltári Közlemények 
(1929), 312-325. 
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of copies or through copying them into registers, so later they were able to pro-
duce transcripts about the original documents. In the beginning, these copies, to-
gether with the treasures of the church, were usually stored in the sacristy. Later, 
due to the growing number of documents and their more frequent use, they were 
placed in separate rooms (e. g. in the scriptorium). From the seventeenth century 
onwards, it became quite frequent that the parties involved appeared at a given 
place of authentication with an already prepared draft, and the institution only 
composed an introductory and a closing part to the submitted document and 
gave it back as an already authenticated charter. 
5. The historical value of the charters issued by the loca credibilia 
The charters issued by the places of authentication serve as important sources 
of general history and of other fields. These documents are especially significant 
for ecclesiastical historical research. The ecclesiastical historical data to be gained 
from the charters concerned can be divided into two major groups. The first set of 
information relates to the places of authentication themselves as ecclesiastical in-
stitutions. Nevertheless, in investigating this data, it must be taken into consid-
eration that the charters issued by these places of authentication were official le-
gal documents, thus direct information about these places as ecclesiastical insti-
tutions only appeared in the texts to a small extent. However, this makes them 
even more valuable for church history, since in most cases they convey irreplace-
able knowledge from other sources. Such data might have crept into a charter, if 
the particular place of authentication itself had somehow been involved in the 
matter.31 In particular, it could happen if the place of authentication had acted in 
the legal case as an ecclesiastical landlord. The charters issued in such proceed-
ings, contribute beyond measure to a better understanding of the landed proper-
ties and serving personnel of the chapters and/or convents carrying out the au-
thentication activity. 
One of the most significant values of the charters issued by the places of au-
thentication that they make possible a knowledge of the persons playing a role in 
this activity and thus of the number of people in these institutions. Since, at the 
end of several charters, in order to increase the credibility of the given document, 
the dignitaries of the chapter or convent (series dignitatum) were also often 
listed.32 This happened in particular in the case of letters of privilege, that is in 
charters assuring especially important rights issued in solemn forms.33 
31 The places of authentication, though as far as we know there were no relevant legal in-
hibitions, tried to avoid issuing charters concerning their own matters to prevent later 
insinuations. Szentpétery, 1930,127. 
32 In case of the cathedral chapter of Pécs, see Koszta, 1998,110-111. 
33 On the analysis of these lists of dignitary, see Zs. Hunyadi, "A székesfehérvári johan-
nita konvent hiteleshelyi tevékenysége az Árpád-korban," [The Activity of the Székes-
fehérvár Convent of the Knights of St. John as a Place of Authentication in the Ár-
pádian Period] in Capitulum I. Tanulmányok a középkori magyar egyház történetéből, ed. 
L. Koszta. Szeged 1998, 54-55 (henceforth: Capitulum i); T. Kőfalvi, "A pécsváradi kon-
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Certain ecclesiastical persons are mentioned in the charters, who, in the ma-
jority of cases, did not appear in any other sources, therefore these documents are 
the major and basically the only source of information concerning them. This 
cognition is important not only in itself, but because through them significant 
conclusions can be deduced about the ecclesiastical layer they represent.34 
The second set of information to be gained about ecclesiastical history from 
the charters consists of data about the situation in the various institutions dealt 
with by the places of authentication. Here the first example to be mentioned are 
those when other institutions visited a particular place of authentication to have 
it issue charters about their own legal matters or have it transcribe their own 
charters. Significant ecclesiastical historical data could get into the documents is-
sued by the places of authentication during the inquiries fulfilled on commission, 
the audition of witnesses and/or the transcription of letters of mandate. Through 
the reports on the. malfeasance committed against churches, the economy and 
population of several ecclesiastical properties can be studied. 
There are many cases when the places of authentication carried on legal pro-
cedures against ecclesiastical landlords, and these are extremely interesting if 
both the accused and the plaintif were churchmen or ecclesiastical communities. 
Besides church history, the charters issued by the places of authentication can 
also contain valuable data for local history, genealogy, economic history, linguis-
tics, and material culture. 
vent hiteleshelyi tevékenysége az Árpád-korban (1254-1301)," [The Activity of the 
Pécsvárad Convent as a Place of Authentication in the Árpádian Period (1254-1301)]," 
in Capitulum 1,144-146. 
34 From this viewpoint, the investigation of the world of the chapters promises results, 
since the mobility and economic significance of the monks are much smaller in scale 
than those of the ecclesiastical middle-class and/or the secular priests. This is discus-
sed in Köblös, 1994. 
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Fra i movimenti ereticali diffusisi nell' Europa del 15 secólo il più noto è Y hussi-
tismo in Boemia. Questo ha esercitato una grande influenza anche in Europa 
Centrale e in particolare in Ungheria, mentre 1' effetto di altre eresie, per esempio 
quella di penisola Balcanica è trascurabile. Come vedremo, il carattere dell' ete-
rodossia di Bosnia è discusso, e non vi fu nessun corrispondenza fra le due cor-
renti eppure, tutt' e due s' affacciarono in Ungheria nel 15 secolo. 
In questo studio ho intenzione di fare un bilancio storiografico delle ricerche, 
e di mettere in rilievo alcuni nuovi risultati, non trascurando neanche i problemi 
rimasti irrisolti, sui quali potranno vertere le indàgini ulteriori. 
La ricerca sugli eretici presenta diverse difficoltà - in quanto le fonti sono per 
lo più frammentarie e di seconda mano, create dalla parte avversa.1 Le fonti rela-
tive ai gruppi eterodossi dell' Europa Centrale sono ancor più scarse, manca 
inoltre la letteratura canonistica e inquisitoriale. Ció nonostante che la storia polí-
tica e dottrinale dell' hussitismo sia stata molto più messa in luce rispetto aile di-
verse eresie precedenti dell' Europa Occidentale. Le testimonianze di altra natura, 
per lo più giuridica, rarefatte del resto in un periodo successivo, in certe regioni, 
anche in Ungheria dalle devastazioni dei turchi, evidenziano la presenza delle 
eresie solo casualmente. Alio stesso tempo, i nuovi metodi rendono possibile lo 
studio più dettagliato delle fonti e, in questo modo, il superamento - almeno su 
certi punti - delle affermazioni délia letteratura specifica degli ultimi decenni. 
1 E. Dupré Theseider, Mondo cittadino e movimenti ereticali nel Medio Evo. Bologna 1978; 
Sull' interpretazione delle eresie e degli eretici da parte degli autori ecclesiastici: 
L. Paolini, "V eresia. e 1' inquisizione. Per una complessiva riconsiderazione del pro-
blema," in Lo spazio letterario del Medioevo. Vol. I, II Medioevo latino, dir. G. Cavallo, Cl. 
Leonardi, E. Menestó. Vol II, La circolazione del testo. Roma 1994,362-378. 
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Per quanto concerne 1' eresia di Bosnia, essa non puö esser considerata dila-
gatasi in Ungheria, ma, come vedremo, in una certa misura i suoi riflessi arriva-
rono öltre i confini meridionali del Regno d' Ungheria. Le fonti relatíve al funzio-
namento del potere centrale, come per esempio la corrispondenza fra i sovrani 
ungheresi ed i papi, e le bolle di quest' ultimi, riportano notizie prima di tutto su-
gli eretíci di Bosnia e sulle ripetute intraprese militari, condotte contro di loro dai 
re Emerico, Andrea II, Luigi il Grande, chiarificando 1' histoire événementielle delle 
realtà eterodosse della penisola Balcanica.2 Si capisce, che queste intraprese sono 
la principale preoccupazione delle fonti, e non la descrizione del contenuto dot-
trinale delle eresie. Le missioni domenicane durante il 13. secolo,3 e nei secoli suc-
cessivi quelle francescane e la loro vicaria di Bosnia4 furono altri mezzi della poli-
tica papale nella regione. Le fonti provenienti dai due ordini mendicanti che ri-
guardano le realtà eterodosse ivi esistenti riportano più informazioni, ma sono 
per lo più scarse e in generale concise o frammentarie. 
La diffusione dei movimenti eterodossi in Ungheria ha raggiunto il suo cul-
mine nel 15 secolo. Le manifestazioni precedenti, studiate da György Székely, ri-
velanogià ail' época di Carlo I d' Angiö51' influenza dei valdesi e dei "bogomili" 
in Transilvania. Abbiamo notizia, nella seconda metà del 14 secolo della presenza 
di flagellanti e della gradúale diffusione dei gruppi valdesi, prima di tutto nella 
parte sud- occidentale del paese, nei comitati Somogy, Zala e Vas.6 È degno di at-
tenzione, che la traduzione ungherese della parola stessa 'eretico' (eretnek), oc-
corre per la prima volta in una proscrizione del comitato di Zala, e la persona 
coinvolta è designata come Johannes Cheh, cioè Boemo,7 il che rivela forse, che le 
influenze eterodosse arrivarono dalla Boemia anche prima del 15 secolo. Anche le 
decisioni delle assemblee comitali e i documenti giuridici di tanto in tanto par-
lano degli eretici. L' attività degli inquisitori Petrus Zwicker e Martinus de Praga 
mette in luce i gruppi di valdesi presentí in centri importanti come Sopron e Vác. 
2 F. èanjek, Les 'chrétiens' bosniaques et le mouvement cathare, XIIe-XVe siècles. Publications 
de la Sorbonne N. S. Recherches 20, Bruxelles-Paris-Louvain 1976, 72-76; J. V. A. Fine, 
The Late Medieval Balkans. A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman 
Conquest. Ann Arbor 1987,453-481. 
3 Sanjek, 69-71. 
4 J. V. A. Fine, The Bosnian Church: a New Interpretation. A Study of the Bosnian Church and 
its Place in State and Society from the 13th to the 15th Centuries. East European Mono-
graphs 10, New York-London 1975, 180-187; H. Holzapfel, Manuale históriáé ordinis 
fratrum minorum. Friburgi Brisgoviae 1909,143; J. Dzambo, Die Franziskaner im mittelal-
terlichen Bosnien, Werl/Westfalen 1991, 77-114. 
5 II primo re d' Ungheria (1301-1342), che appartenne al ramo ungherese degli angioini, 
nipote di Carlo II, re di Napoli (1285-1309). 
6 Gy. Székely, "Az egyházi nagybirtok újjászervezése" [La riorganizzazione della grande 
propriété ecclesiastical, in Tanulmányok a parasztság történetéhez Magyarországon a 14. 
században, a cura di Gy. Székely, Budapest 1953,364-367. 
7 Székely, 370. 
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La sentenza inquisitoriale ci rende note le loro dottrine.8 Tuttavia 1' infiltrazione 
dei valdesi in Ungheria potrebbe essersi realizzata anche a partiré dall' Austria. 
La diffusione dell' hussitismo è ben delineata dalla storiografia precedente per 
cui non si insisterà sull' argomento. Ne vanno tuttavia menzionati i momenti più 
importanti. Uno dei fautori più noti di Jan Hus, Hieronymus da Praga ebbe la 
possibilità di predicare alla corte reale a Buda, davanti a Sigismondo nel 1410. Il 
re indignato per le parole audaci e le critiche indirizzate aile autorità ecclesiasti-
che e secolari e istigato dal messaggio di Zbinëk, arcivescovo di Praga, prima 
l'incarcéré e poi lo fece cacciare dalla corte.9 Battista da Sebenico, provinciale fran-
cescano di Dalmazia, ricevette delle facoltà inquisitoriali valide anche in Tran-
sdanubio il che dimostra la larga diffusione degli eretici. Nella stessa regione, in 
un piccolo villaggio, a Kazsok, le autorità ecclesiastiche dovettero privare dal 
rango il párroco del luogo, probabilmente per le sue convinzioni eterodosse. 
A Zagabria si scoppiarono delle sommosse contro il vescovo e contro la Chiesa.10 
Durante il 15 secolo Sopron resta un centro con notevole presenza degli eretici 
e Sigismondo vi esiliô vedova di Venceslao, re abdicato di Boemia, la regina Sofia, 
che simpatizzô con le idee dell' hussitismo.11 
Sono inoltre presentí nella parte nord- occidentale del paese dei guerrieri hus-
siti arrivati o rifugiati dalla Boemia sotto la guida dei condottieri, fra i quali Jan 
Giskra costrui quasi uno stato indipendente nei dintorni di Trnava, in conflitto 
permanente con la popolazione indigena, il che hâ indotto alcuni autori a ritenere 
questo il motivo principale délia mancata diffusione dell' hussitismo in questa 
regione. Ci sono infatti solo casi sporadici di radicamento locale e restaño pochi i 
contadini sotto Y influenza dell' eresia, e 1' alleanza di nobili con gli hussiti ri-
mane occasionale, come nel caso del castello di Tapolcany.12 
8 J. Házy, Sopron középkori egyháztörténete. [Storia ecclesiastica della citta di Sopron nel 
Medioevo] Győregyházmegye múltjából 1, Sopron 1939,12; Sui valdesi in Austria e in 
Ungheria occidentale, e la pubblicazione delle sentenze: H. Haupt, "Waldensertum 
und Inquisition im südöstlichen Deutschland seit der Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts," 
Deutsche Zeitschriftßr Geschichtswissenschaft 3 (1890/1), 337-411. 
9 Sulla predicazione di Hieronymus a Buda: G. Fejér, Codex diplomaticus Hungáriáé eccle-
siascticus ac civilis. Vol. X/V, Buda 1843, no. 39; P. Tóth-Szabó, A cseh-huszita mozgalmak 
és uralom története Magyarországon. [Stória dei movimenti e del dominio hussiti-boemi 
in Ungheria] Budapest 1917,146. 
10 La facolta di Battista da Sebenico: P. Lukcsics, XV. századi pápák oklevelei. [I diplomi 
dei papi di XV secolo] Vol. I, Budapest 1931, no. 431; Sui eventi di Kazsok: E. Mályusz, 
Egyházi társadalom a középkori Magyarországon. [Societa ecclesiastica nell' Ungheria me-
dievale], Budapest 1971, 227-228; Sui eventi a Zagabria: Gy. Székely, "A huszitizmus 
és a magyar nép," [L' hussitismo e il popolo ungherese] Századok 90 (1956), 348. 
11 Házy, 11-14; K. Mollay, "Sopron ismerkedése a huszitizmussal" [Sopron fa la cono-
scenza deli' hussitismo] Soproni Szemle 18 (1964), 333-335; L. Verbényi, "A huszitizmus 
egyik fő támogatója Sopronban," [Una fautrice deli' hussitismo a Sopron] Soproni 
Szemle 21 (1967), 43-47. 
12 Tóth-Szabó, 101,119,151. 
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La storiografia marxista in Ungheriá ha accentuato le dimensioni del malcon-
tento religioso, e la connessione con le tensioni sociali. Non é alcuna prova pero, 
che nella rivolta contadina di 1437, la piü grande nel medioevo in Ungheria, con-
dotta da Antal Nagy (nominata anche Budai) abbia avuto un qualche ruolo il 
malcontento religioso, öltre a quello sociale Le fonti relatíve agli eretici non evi-
denziano in una maniera particolare i problemi sociali. Inoltre, la storiografia 
marxista ha semplificato il contenuto dottrinale delle correnti ereticali, ipotiz-
zando un'impronta esclusivamente taborita, escludendo i calicisti e gli orfaniti13 
e, al tempo stesso riteneva, che nei movimenti ungheresi si fossero riflesse anche 
le credenze degli eretici bosniaci, ed ha tentato di dimostrare, che le diverse cor-
renti ereticali, quali 1' hussitismo e 1' eresia dei cosiddetti "patarini" di Bosnia, si 
fossero intrecciate in quel periodo.14 Le fonti pero, come vedremo, non giustifi-
cano queste concezioni. 
II culmine dei movimenti in Ungheria si verifica alia fine degli anni trenta del 
15 secolo. Le fonti provengono per lo piü da Giacomo della Marca, vicario osser-
vante di Bosnia fra 1435 e 1438. Entro i quadri deli' ordine francescano, 1' osser-
vanza ha cominciato ad espandersi nel territorio ungherese in senso stretto fin 
dalla fine del 14 secolo, partendo dalla vicaria degli osservanti di Bosnia, fondata 
nel 1339, proprio nel periodo immediatamente precedente il vicariato del france-
scano italiano.15 Giacomo ebbe uno scopo molteplice: la riforma del clero, la ri-
forma deli' ordine e, in veste di inquisitore, la lotta contro gli eretici. Per questo 
motivo la sua attivitá provoco gravi conflitti in Bosnia. 
Fra le poche fonti ce ne sono due particolarmente preziose, entrambe in con-
nessione con 1' attivitá inquisitoriale di Giacomo Marca. Egli ha composto un Ar-
ticuli husitarum, servendosi delle esperienze vissute in Ungheria;16 inoltre sono 
consérvate nel suo lascito alcune lettere ricevute dai prelati, magnati e re.17 L ' al-
tra sono le Reprobationes, un commento scritto dal cardinale Torquemada alie opi-
nioni raggruppate in 38 punti degli eretici di Moldavia. Fra questi eretici c' erano 
anché quelli che fuggirono dall' Ungheria meridionale per le persecuzioni di Gia-
13 Tóth-Szabó, 166; Székely, "A huszitizmus...", 566-569. 
14 Székely, "A huszitizmus...", 557. sgg.; Toccheremo più avanti il probléma della prima 
traduzione della Bibbia in lingua ungherese. Accanto al dibattito vertente intorno al ca-
rattere ussita dei testo, alcuni storici gli attribuivano impronte dualistiche, dovute agli 
eretici di Bosnia. 
15 J. Karácsonyi, Szent Ferencz rendjének története Magyarországon 1711-ig. [Storia deli' or-
dine di San Francesco in Ungheria fino al 1711], vol I., Budapest 1922,311-324. 
16 Vat. lat. 7307; in questo codice si trova una delle versioni dei Dialógus contra fraticellos. 
Sulla datazione più précisa: Gy. Galamb, "San Giacomo della Marca e gli eretici di Un-
gheria," in San Giacomo della Marca e V Európa dei '400, Atti dei Convegno internazionale di 
studi, Monteprandone, 7-10 settembre 1994, a cura di S. Bracci, Padova 1997,211-220. 
17 II luogo della conservazione: Napoli. Mettiamo in rilievo prima di tutto quei docu-
menti, che fanno qualche cenno dei carattere delle eresie di cui parlano: Fejér, nno. 389, 
390, 394, 462; E. Fermendzin, Acta Bosnae potissimum ecclesiastica ab anno 925 usque ad 
annum 1752. Zagrabiae 1892, nno. 762-764, 767. 
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como della Marca.1 81 due documenti, molto vicini 1' uno all' altro, rendono possi-
bile il confronto del carattere delle diverse correnti eterodosse in Ungheria alia 
meta del 15. secolo. 
Entrambi i testi sono caratterizzati da un pluralismo dottrinale. Quanto all' Arti-
culi husitarum, i paragrafi non riguardano infatti solo i taboriti, ma anche i calicisti. 
Analizziamo prima la sua "tematica": 
- eucaristía e rito: 1 -4 , 8 ,10. (digiuno), 11. (le feste), 63;19 
- la negazione dei sacramenti: 21-22;2 0 
- il rifiutó del culto dei santi e della Vergine: 5 -8 ,14 -15 , 28,30;2 1 
- il disprezzo della venerazione delle immagini e della croce: 12 ,13 ,62 ; 2 2 
- il divieto dell' omicidio: 10;23 
- la critica del papato: 16-20; 31 ,32 ,40 ,42 , 49, 50,55; 2 4 
18 Le sigle sono riferiti da Th. Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, III, 
Roma 1980. Mi sono serviti i manoscritti seguenti: Val. lat. 974, 976, 2580, 5606. Su Tor-
quemada: Th. M. Izbicki, Protector of the Faith. Cardinal Johannes de Turrecremata and the 
Defense of the Institutional Church. Washington 1981. 
19 Gli Articuli husitarum sono conservati nella Biblioteca Apostólica Vaticana sotto il se-
gno Vat. lat. 7304. ff. 23r-24v. La loro pubblicazione: Lukcsics, 20-25.1. Quod omnes te-
nentur communicare sub utraque specie. 2. Quod in missa sujficit legere solam epistolam et 
evangelium et sine paramentis et sine viatico et ubique licet celebrare die ac node et in domibus 
et silvis. Et uterque sexus cantat in missa cantilenas. 3. Quod layci literati conficiunt corpus et 
sanguinem Christi et tenent, quod possint conficere. 4. Quod consecrabant in vasis ligneis, ubi 
commedunt et bibunt. 9. Quod nullus tenetur ieiuniare in vigilys sanctorum et in quatra-
gesima, quia hoc non precipit deus. 11. Quod nullum festum debet celebrari, nisi dies domini-
cas, quia aliafesta inventa sunt ab 63. Quod portant sanguinem Christi in flaschone de corio 
[decorio] secrete ad communicandum suos. 
20 21. Quod crisma et extrema unctio et aqua benedicta nihil valet. 22. Quod fons baptismi est in-
ventio hominum, quia Christus in flumen baptisatus est. 
21 5. Quod in hostia est sola caro Christi et in cálice solus sanguis. 6. Quod omnia nomina sancto-
rum deletunt de missali. 7. Quod virgo Maria cum alys sanctis non possit [potuit] nos iuvare, 
nisi solus Deus. 8. Quod non debemus nos genuflectere beate virgini Marie necque alys sanctis, 
nisi soli deo. 14. Quod non est necesse signare se signo crucis 15. Quod non debemus adorare 
reliquias, quia invente sunt ex avaricia. 28. Quod virgo Maria pulcre [pulchre] depicta apparet 
meretrix. 30. Quod non oportet credere dicta sanctorum, nisi sanctam scripturam. 
22 12. Quod non debemus adorare figuras, quia diabolus est in eis ad derisionem hominum, quia si 
mittitur asinus in ignem [unguem] fugit, sed crucifixus in truncho comburitur. 13. Quod non 
debemus depingere crucifixum neque crucem. 62. Quod venerantes ymagines sunt ydolatre. 
23 10. Quod nullus malefactorum debet occidi, quia [qui] audistis, quod dictum est antiquis, non 
occides. 
24 16. Quod papa non habet maiorem auctoritatem, quam simplex sacerdos, quia dicit: Quorum 
remiseritis peccata. 17. Quod indulgence non sunt vere nec papa possit dare. 18. Quod privile-
gia papalia non sunt observanda. 19. Quod nullus debet esse maior, etiam papa et imperator, 
quia omnes sumus fratres in Christo. 20. Quod neque papa neque imperator possunt facere le-
gem, sed sujficit observare legem divinam. 31. Quod ab uno latere carte pingunt Christum pau-
perem cum asino et ab alio papam cum equis et pompis. 32. Quod depingunt papam missam ce-
lebran tem et diabolus ministrat ei et demones in circuitu. 40. Quod vicarius Christi superbus 
non est dignus preesse uni adolescentule [adelescentule]. 42. Quod ecclesia Romana est simu-
lata et sinagoga sathanae et inventio hominum et mater fornicationis et origo et fons omnis 
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- i l rapporto fra clero e laici: 22-27, 36, 51. (trasmissione della salvezza); 29 
(purgatorio); 33, 38 (scomunica, interdetto); 34 (la negazione del celibato); 59, 60 
(la predicazione);25 
- la corruzione e la ricchezza del clero: 3 5 , 3 7 , 3 9 , 4 1 , 4 3 - 4 5 , 5 3 , 5 4 , 5 6 , 5 8 ; 2 6 
- la critica del diritto canonico e della gerarchia ecclesiastica: 4 7 , 4 8 , 5 2 , 5 7 ; 2 7 
- la Bibbia: 30;28 
- la proibizione del giuramento: 46.29 
La divisione tematica dimostra la mancanza di una struttura definita. La mag-
gior parte dei temi inizialmente trattati e raggruppati ritorna piü avanti e piü 
volte, come se alia prima redazione certi particolari fossero sfuggiti all' attenzione 
dell' autore. Ció suggerisce, che la redazione dell' elenco ebbe luogo immediata-
mente sul posto, ancora in Ungheria.30 
malí 49. Quod leges ecclesie narrant fabulationes et papa in talibus non est papa, sed subversor. 
50. Quod hi, qui sunt cum papa, sunt increduli lupi et subversores. 55. Quod in curia Romana 
non sunt pastores, sed perditores. 
25 22. Quod fons baptismi est inventio hominum, quia Christus in flumen baptisatus est. 23. 
Quod sacerdos non tenetur dicere officium divinum, nisi pater noster. 24. Quod quilibet laicus 
et mulier possit audire confessionem et absolvere. 25. Quod non debet genuflectere in confes-
sione ante sacerdotem, nisi ante deum. 26. Quod sacerdotes debent custodire bestias sicuti aly 
homines. 27. Quod suffragia non valent pro mortuis. 29. Quod purgatorium non est. 33. Quod 
excommunicacio non est timenda ñeque observancia, quia [qui] dum homo maledicit: deus bene-
dicit. 34. Quod episcopus possit ducere in uxorem virginem et quod religiones et canonici sunt 
inventi a diabolo. 36. Quod sacerdos in mortali non possit absolvere. 38. Quod prelati excom-
municantes populum dei sunt membra diaboli et antichristi. 51. Quod clerici faciunt se adorare, 
ut dy, sed Petrus non permisit se adorari a Cornelio et suspendatur cum Haman [Naman] su-
perbo. 59. Quod quando prelati mandant in virtute obedientie invocato Christi nomine, quod 
non predicent [predicant] capellis, sed potius [potuis] debent dicere, invocato diabolo in virtute 
[et] antechristi non predicare in capellis. 60. Quod quantumcumque [quantumque] sit parvus, 
potest predicare. 
26 35. Quod non debet aliquid offerri in altari etiam cándele, quia symonia est et avaricia. 37. 
Quod clerici circa temporalia occupati sunt membra diaboli. 39. Quod clerici ostendentes pieta-
tem circa temporalia bona sunt ipocrite et hostes sánete ecclesie. 41. Quod sacerdotes circa de-
cimas et temporalia et honores occupantes sunt heretici. 43. Quod sacerdos habens proprium 
habet centum demonia in anima. 44. Quod, qui vult absolvi in curia Romana, apportet bursam 
plenam et absolvetur ab omnibus peccatis. 45. Quod sacerdotes gaudent cadaveribus propter 
avariciam, sicut corvi. 53. Quod patriarchatus, archiepiscopatus, archidiaconatus, inventi sunt 
ex superbia et avaricia et sequuntur dyabolum. 54. Quod prelati sunt amatores equorum et fe-
minarum et concubinary uxorum aliorum. 56. Quod sacerdotes sunt pastores prebendarum et 
non animarum. 58. Quod de ecclesya fecerunt speluncam latronum et celebrant non populo: sed 
pro pecunia. 
27 47. Quod plus vult papa ex auctoritate observan cánones: quam novum et vêtus testamentum. 48. 
Quod leges ecclesie sunt contemptiones et cavillationes et sunt subversiones recti judicy. 52. Quod 
exactiones pape sunt symoniace heresis [...], sed ipsi pietatem extimant. 57. Quod sacerdotes 
[sunt] simplices subiecti prelatis et episcopis possunt predicare [predicere] ipsis contradicentibus. 
28 30. Quod non oportet credere dicta sanctorum, nisi sanctam scripturam. 
29 46. Quod iuramentum est omnino illicitum. 
30 Più dettagliatamente: Gy. Galamb, "San Giacomo della Marca e gli eretici di Unghe-
ria," in San Giacomo, della Marca e l' Europa del '400, Atti del Convegno internazionale di 
studi, Monteprandone, 7-10 setiembre 1994, a c. di S. Bracci, Padova 1997,211-220. 
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Gli Articuli da una parte fuor di dubbio dimostrano la presenza delle dottrine 
taboritiche, quali la negazione del purgatorio (29), dell' ordine ecclesiastico (58) il 
rifiuto del giuramento (46) e della rappresentazione della croce (12, 13, 14), ma 
dall' altra se ne distaccano in quanto mancano il chiliasmo e 1' antiintellettualismo 
contro le città e le université che permeavano in misura sempre crescente, le idee 
taboritiche a cavallo degli anrii dieci e venti del 15 secolo.31 
Al tempo stesso, pero, nell' elenco si leggono anche le idee tipiche dei calicisti. 
Lo provano la lingua dotta, la lingua dell' Université di Praga, da sempre il foco-
lare delle idee utraquiste. I punti 50-54 riecheggiano uno dei discorsi di Jan Hus, 
che non poté essere pronunciato a Costanza, davanti al concilio, ma che, dopo la 
sua morte, si diffuse nei circoli eterodossi ed è stato trasmesso dalla cronaca di 
Petrus Mladenowicz32 
Mladenozvicz: 
Increduli et subversores sunt tecum, lupi 
non oves sunt, talium tarnen tu pastor uti-
lis consideratio... 
Quomodo autem superbiunt clerici a sup-
remo ad infimum adorari cupientes ut dii? 
prohdolor ocularis monstrat cotidiana con-
versado. ubi est Petrus Christi humili vica-
rius qui Cornelium gentilem coram se pro-
cedere inhibuit. ...Etfactum est, cum in-
troisset Petrus obvius ven.it ei Cornelius et 
procidens [procedens ?] ad pedes eius adora-
vit. Petrus vero elevavit eum dicens: surge 
et ego ipse homo sum. ... Quocontra Aman 
superbissimus adorari cupiens ab homini-
busfactus confusus, patíbulo, quod Mardo-
cheo paraverat, est appensus. ... Caveant 
ergo superbi episcopi, prelati et clerici ne 
propter superbiam cum Aman superbissimo 
dampnabiliter suspendantur. 
Inde et Simonis questum estimant pietatem 
dum exacta et data vel caucionata pro 
gradu episcopatus vel dignitatis altioris 
magna pecunia ab illis dicitur magna [?] 
fore gracia. 
Unde ad quemlibet talium exclamando 
sanctus Bernardus super cantica ita dicit: 
Articuli: 
50. Quod hi, qui sunt cum papa, sunt in-
creduli lupi et subversores. 
51. Quod clerici faciunt se adorare, ut dy, 
sed Petrus non permisit se adorari a Corne-
lio et suspendantur cum Haman superbo. 
52. Quod exactiones pape sunt symoniace 
heresis legi [?], sed ipsi pietatem extimant. 
53. Quod patriarchatus, archiepiscopatus, 
archidiaconatus inventi sunt ex superbia et 
31 La cronaca di L. de Brezina, Fontes Rerum Austriacarum. I. Abt. Scriptores, VI. Bd, Theil 
II. Wien 1865, II/1391,399. 




o elate o ambicióse, sequete ducem tuum 
dyabolum, omne sublime videant et ap-
petant oculi tui, festina multiplicare reddi-
tus, inde Archidiaconatum evola. inde ad 
Archiepiscopatum aspira... 
Equi amatores infeminas et emissarii facti 
sunt unusquisque ad uxorem proximi sui 
hiniebat et qui sunt illi, ostenditur ibidem 
avaricia et sequuntur dyabolum. 
54. Quod prelati sunt amatores equorum et 
feminarum et concubinary uxorum alio-
rum. 
Un'altra considerazione ci rafforza nell' affermare la presenza dei calicisti. Alia 
fine delT elenco si trova infatti una versione dei "quattro articoli di Praga", sunto 
delle loro posizioni. Le coincidenze, per esempio nel caso delT articolo 4, con la 
versione di Laurentius de Brezina, cronista boemo dell' época, evidenziano le in-
fluenze tutt' altro che indirette dei circoli universitär! di Praga agli eretici unghe-
resi: 
Laurentius de Brezina: 
"Quarto, quod omnia peccata mortalia et 
specialiter publica alieque deordinationes 
legi Dei contrarie, in quolibet statu rite et 
rationabiliter, per eos, ad quos spectat, 
prohibeantur et destruantur... .In clero au-
tem sunt simoniace hereses et exactiones 
pecuniarum a baptismo, a confirmatione, 
a confessione, pro eucharistie sacramento, 
pro sacro oleo, a matrimonio et a XXX mis-
sis taxatis aut ab aliis missis emptis autfo-
risatis (sic) aut a missis defunctorum, ora-
tionibus, anniversariis et sic de aliis, a pre-
dicationibus, a sepulturis, et pulsationibus, 
a consecrationibus ecclesiarum, altariorum 
(sic) et capellarum, pro prebendis et benefi-
ciis, pro prelatis, dignitatibus personalibus, 
palliis et emtionibus et vendicionibus in-
dulgentiarum et alie innumere hereses, 
que ex his oriuntur et polluunt ecclesiam 
Christi. Moresque impii et injusti, ut sunt 
impudici concubinatus, cum augmento pro-
fano filiorum et fïliarum alieque fomicatio-
nes, ire, rixe, contentiones, frivole citationes 
et hominum simplicium pro lubitu vexatio-
nes et spoliationes, avare censuum exactio-
nes offertorium; 
Articuli husitarum: 
Quod peccata mortalia manifesta non sunt 
subicienda maxime in clero, ut symoniaci, 
hereses, exactiones pecuniarum pro bapti-
smo, confirmatione, confessione, commu-
nione, pro oleo sacro, pro matrimonio, pro 
XXX missis tassatis vel alys missis defunc-
torum anniversarys, pro sepultura, pro pre-
bendis et beneficys et prelaturis, dignitati-
bus, vendicionibus indulgenciarum et alie 
hereses innumere, que polluunt ecclesiam 
dei, prohibeantur concubinarii, impudici 
fornicator es, frivole citationes, expolaciones 
[sic] simplicium hominum, censuum exac-
tiones. 
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Questo frammento é preceduto dal commento seguente: "Quod synodus cele-
brata in plagha 1426. die 17. Junij, ubi statuerunt observare usque ad mortem infrascrip-
tos artículos videlicet. "33 
In base alia datazione, é molto probabile, che si tratti del sínodo tenuto nella 
chiesa di Tyn a Praga nell' giugno-agosto dell' anno stesso, convocato da Zyg-
munt Korybutowicz, nobile polacco, aspirante al trono di Boemia contro gli "ere-
tici" (cioé i taboriti). II sínodo ha confermato le tesi di Ján Pribram, maestro dell' 
universitá di Praga, propugnatore del credo dei calicisti moderati. Dunque, que-
sta tradizione del testo puó esser stata conservata solo da persone appartenenti 
all' ambiente dell' Universitá. 
Qüeste precise correlazioni sembrano avvalorare 1' originalitá del testo redatto 
dall' inquisitore, benché non si possa escludere categóricamente, pur non essen-
doci alcuna prova, che 1' inquisitore avesse letto le cronache di Mladenowiz 
e Brzezina.34 É molto piíi probabile, che si sia informato direttamente attraverso 
gli eretici interrogati. Un certo disordine del testo e, al tempo stesso, una certa 
conformitá alia realtá del momento sembrano, tuttavia, ribadire la formazione 
origínale del testo stesso. 
Non é certamente possibile, da un punto di vista metodologico tener presente 
solo il contenuto fórmale dei diversi articoli, nell' individuare la corrente eretica 
relativa. Nel medioevo gli appartenenti ad un movimento ereticale, determinato 
da una specifica realtá socio- religiosa, hanno confessato "credenze" formalmente 
uguali, ma con contenuto e significato particolare. Per questo, qualsiasi corrente 
eterodossa puó esser identificata in base alie diverse "opinioni" solo se quest' ul-
time costituiscono un insieme specifico, che proprio per la sua essenza particolare 
caratterizza una corrente data. Tenendo presente queste considerazioni, va notato 
súbito, che nel testo non appare nessuna traccia delle asserzioni dualistiche, rite-
nute tipiche degli eretici di Bosnia. 
Vi sono degli articoli che, formalmente, potrebbero avere una connotazione 
dualistica, come il rifiuto della croce e della Vergine (7, 8 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 28), ma questi 
sono, in questo caso, innestandosi in un altro contesto, segni caratteristici dell' at-
teggiamento dei taboriti. Senza scendere nei dettagli dottrinali, per i taboriti dal 
rigetto della croce, non deriva la negazione dell'incarnazione (il che sarebbe dav-
vero una traccia del dualismo o almeno di docetismo), bensi esso consegue dalla 
proibizione della rappresentazione di Dio, che si estende anche sul piano degli 
atti di venerazione. Anche le posizioni ascritte dal Brezina ai cosiddetti picardi 
contestano queste usanze partendo dal timore dell' idolatría.35 
33 Vat. lat. 7307, f. 24v. 
34 La biblioteca ben conosciuta dell' inquisitore non contiene né opere, né glosse che di-
mostrerebbero la familiarità degli autori cita ti. Sui volumi e sulle opere conservati nella 
biblioteca. Vedi A. Crivellucci: I codici della librería raccolta da S. Giacomo della Marca nel 
convento di S. Maria delle Grazie presso Monteprandone, Livorno 1889. 
35 Fontes Rerum Austriacarum, II/I, 504.: "dicunt christianos esse ydolatras propter imagines 
sanctorum et crucem Christi crucifixi". 
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A tal proposito i cronisti, per esempio Laurentius de Brezina parlano dell' in-
flusso esercitato dai picardi sul movimento hussita. Per questo, alcuni storici di-
stinguono una tappa del "libero spirito" del movimento hussita.36 Alcuni altri au-
tori hanno ribadito che nell' elenco figurano le loro tesi.37 Ma gli atteggiamenti 
piú tipici dei cosiddetti picardi, quali il chiliasmo, 1' antiintellettualismo (di cui 
abbiamo giá fatto menzione in relazione ai taboriti), la negazione della presenza 
eucaristica, i riti orgiastici (accentuati, owiamente dagli autori ostili verso di 
loro), mancano negli Articuli. Va anche tenuto presente, che dopo 1421 le opi-
nioni dei gruppi nominati "picardi" furono assorbiti nel complesso delle tesi as-
serite dai taboriti. Da allora in poi possiamo ritenere ingiustificato parlare di loro 
come un gruppo ben individuabile fra i raggruppamenti eterodossi, tanto piú che 
gli esponenti piú radicali furono massacrati dai soldati di Jan Zizka.38 Le notizie 
concernenti i picardi risalgono quindi esclusivamente agli anni 1418-1421. O 
é dunque un grande intervallo cronologico. Per questo, condivido 1' opinione di 
Robert Lerner, che ha messo in dubbio, in complesso, 1' influenza dei picardi su-
gli hussiti.39 Secondo questo autore i cosiddetti picardi non possono essere giunti 
dalla Picardía e dalT Artois, dove in quel periodo si svolsero processi solo contro 
i valdesi. Inoltre, quelli che arrivarono a Praga, vissero nei quadri delle famiglie, 
il che contraddice ai costumi dei picardi, ma é ammesso dai valdesi. La denomi-
nazione 'picardo' puó essere derivata cosi, non dai nome Picardía ma da 'be-
ghardo', la qualificazione dei diversi gruppi eretici presentí nei territori tedeschi 
vicini alia Boemia, immediatamente prima della vittoria degli hussiti. I partigiani 
di questi gruppi possono essersi introdotti a Praga in quegli anni. Essi aspiravano 
alia perfezione individúale d' Índole mística, mentre per loro era alieno il chilia-
smo carico delle esigenze sociali, il quale potrebbe essere stato trasmesso agli us-
siti per altra via.40 
Gli Articuli husitarum sono stati composti nel 1436 in Transilvania ovvero 
nelle partí centrali d' Ungheria, ma non in Ungheria meridionale, altrimenti Gia-
36 E. Werner, "Die Nachrichten über die böhmischen 'Adamiten' in religionshistorischer 
Sicht" in Th. Büttner-E. Werner, Circumcellionen und Adamiten. Zwei formen mittelalterli-
cher Haeresie. Berlin 1959, 79-92; H. Kaminsky, A History of the Hussite Revolution. Ber-
keley-Los Angeles 1967,353-358. 
37 T. Kardos, A huszita Biblia keletkezése. [La genesi della Bibbia hussital A Magyar Nyelv-
tudományi Társaság Kiadványai, 82. Budapest 1953, 3-4, 24; Székely "A huszitiz-
mus...", 557. 
38 F. Palacky, A huszitizmus története. [Storia dell' hussitismol Budapest 1984,295-313; Ka-
minsky, 431-432 (suli' azione di Zizka.), 454-456. (sulle idee concernenti 1' eucharistia 
che soprawivevano fra i taboriti); M. D. Lambert, Medieval Heresy. Popular Movements 
from Bogomilism to Hus. London 1977, 321-324; G. Leff, Heresy in the Later Middle Ages: 
the Relation of Heterodoxy to Dissent c. 1250-1450, Manchester-New York 1967, II, 701-
703. 
39 R. E. Lerner, The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages, Notre Dame-London 
1972,119-124. 
40 I. Döllinger, Beiträge der Sektengeschichte des Mittelalters. II. München 1890; Fontes Rerum 
Austriacarum II/1,391,399. 
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como farebbe menzione dei patarini, come lo fanno due lettere suggerite da luí.41 
Egli puó esser considerato un esperto in questo campo: scriveva dei trattati con-
tro i bosniaci, e probabilmente conosceva la tradizione trattatistica antiereticale 
francescana.42 
L' altra fonte di notevole rilievo di questo argomento sono le Reprobationes di 
Torquemada, composte nell' estáte del 1442, che trattano degli eretici in Molda-
via. In conseguenza delle persecuzioni di Giacomo, che raggiunsero Tapice nel 
1439 gli eretici fuggirono dall' Ungheria meridionale, come narra anche la Chro-
nica fratrum minorum, cominciata da uno dei vicari di Bosnia, Balázs di Zalka 
e scritta poi dai suoi continuatori.43 Si capisce, che i francescani di Bosnia organiz-
zarono piú missioni in questa regione per far ritornare alT ortodossia gli eretici 
fuggiaschi. La nascita del testo corrisponde bene alia cronología di queste spedi-
zioni: alia fine della prima e, immediatamente precedendo la seconda, nell' estáte 
del 1442.44 Le esperienze dei membri della prima missione si riflettono nel proe-
mio del testo, che parla palesemente della possibilitá di servirsi dei commentari 
aggiunti dal cardinale nel campo della propaganda antiereticale.45 Possiamo, 
dunque, supporre che nelle Reprobationes, almeno in parte siamo di fronte alie 
idee degli eretici provenienti dall' Ungheria meridionale. D' altronde la Moldavia 
fu, fin dagli anni venti, luogo di esilio degli hussiti, boemi e polacchi. Questi, da 
parte loro,, si infiltrarono anche in Transilvania, come rivela una lettera del ve-
scovo di quella diócesi.46 
Questo testo rispecchia tesi eterodosse parzialmente divergenti da quelle che 
sono identificabili negli Articuli husitarum. I punti concordanti racchiudono le 
idee taboritiche, come la proibizione dell' omicidio,47 il rifiuto del giuramento,48 
che sono peraltro presentí nelle numeróse eresie occidentali fin dal 11. secolo.49 
I due elenchi si accordano pressapoco sul piano ecclesiologico, condannando la 
41 Fermendzin, nno. 762,764; Fejér, no. 462. Un' interpretazione delle lettere: Fine, The Bo-
snian Church, 248. 
42 D. Lasic, De vita et operibus S. Iacobi de Marchia. Falconara Marittima 1974; Sulla trattati-
stica francescana relativa agli eretici bosniaci: Őanjek, 140-146. 
43 "Tunc etiam duo literati de eadem Kamancze, videlicet Thomas et Valentinus, cum quibusdam 
hominibus insanis et mulierculis consilio inito, node recedentes ad Regnum Moldáviáé intrave-
runt, ubi iidem duo clerici haeresim praedictam seminantes...": Blasius de Zalka, Chronica 
fratrum minorum de öbservantia provinciáé Boznae et Hungáriáé, in F. Toldy, Analecta mo-
numentorum Hungáriáé. Pesthini 1860, (repr. curavit G. Érszegi, Budapestini 1986), 240. 
44 Bidlarium Francuscanum, Nova Series 1, 1431-1455, ed. U. Hiintemann, ad Claras Aquas 
prope Florentiam 1929, nno. 1816,1818. 
45 ".. .petentibus quibusdam religiosis viris sanctitatis tuae nunciis in causis et negociis fidei in 
regnis Scithie, Bosne et Moldavie...". É vero che 1' introduzione contenente queste frasi 
(Prohemium) manca nella versione del 1442 e figura nelle altre versioni senza datazione: 
Vat. Ottob. lat. 497.187r; 718. f. 67r; Vat. lat. 976. f. 71r. 
46 Fejér, X/VII, no. 389. 
47 Articuli: 10, Reprobationes: 5. 
48 Articuli: 46, Reprobationes: 19. 
49 Sul giuramento: P. Prodi, II Sacramento del potere, Bologna 1992. 
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Chiesa di Roma e i poteri che gli aveva concesso il diritto canonico, particolar-
mente il diritto di scomunicare i fedeli, riprovando la gerarchia; e inoltre, biasi-
mando i preti che hanno commesso peccato mortale, assolvono tuttavia i fedeli.50 
Quanto alie differenze dei due testi, dobbiamo registrare che nelle Reproba-
tiones non sono presentí la tradizione colta, e le idee dei calicisti, rintracciabili 
negli Articuli husitarum. 
Gli eretici di Moldavia sono piü radicali nella rivendicazione ai laici del diritto 
di predicare (pecca mortalmente, chi non predica), giudicano piü duramente gli 
ordini monastici (condannando i fondatori), e si schierano per la partecipazione 
delle donne nella vita religiosa (possono confessare e daré 1' assoluzione). 
Uno degli articoli, pero, contraddice la concezione dei taboriti sul rifiuto della 
dottrina della transustanziazione. In origine, a cavallo degli anni '10 e '20 il pro-
pugnatore entro il movimento hussita di questo rifiuto fu Martinek Huska, per-
seguitato per le sue idee ed infine ucciso. Ma poco piü tardi, prima di tutto in 
conseguenza dell' influsso delle idee di Václav Koranda, la dottrina della transu-
stanziazione e della presenza eucaristica venne scartata anche dai taboriti. Questi 
ultimi affermarono, che il pane e il vino non contengono "sostanzialmente" il 
corpo e il sangue di Cristo, ma solo sacramentaliter o figuraliter. Anche i loro preti 
ribadirono questa posizione, per esempio durante il dibattito con i maestri calici-
sti dell' universitá di Praga nel 1431.51 Le Reprobationes non fanno cenno a questi 
argomenti; un' altra tesi, pero, che é in connessione con le polemiche sulla transu-
stanziazione, ci si trova: "Dicunt, quod corpus Christi et sanguis post elevationem re-
vertitur ad substantiam pañis et vini naturalis."52 Se i francescani, che hanno ripor-
tato quest' opinione, possono ritenersi affidabili, il contenuto di quest' articolo s' 
oppone alie tesi dei taboriti, secondo i quali il pane conserva la sua sostanza e si 
trasforma solo in senso seguente: "...dicimus, quod ... est credendum lesum eiusque 
verum corpus et sanguinem in sacramento altaris esse veraciter, sacramentaliter, ac spiri-
tualiter veri pañis et vini remanente substantia, non autem cum ómnibus proprietatibus 
tam essencialibus quam accidentalibus...".53 L' articolo 2 delle Reprobationes pero non 
dice affatto che la sostanza del pane rimanga, ma - badiamo bene - afferma che il 
corpo di Cristo viene ripristinato (revertitur) in pane. Da quest'articolo, lógica-
mente, non segue il rifiuto della transustanziazione, perché solo dopo di essa puó 
so Articuli 36, Reprobationes: 26. 
51 L' articolo 20. del 1420: Fontes Rerum Austriacarum, II/I, 439; Kaminsky, 454-456. I do-
cumenti del dibattito nel 1431 sono pubblicati da A. Molnár-R. Cegna (a cura di), Con-
fessio taboritarum. Fonti per la Storia d' Italia 105, Roma 1983. sull' eucaristía: 78-79 
(Confessio taboritarum), 346-347 (Articuli sacerdotum Taboriensium supra dictis articulis 
magistrorum in pluribus contrarii), 359 (Responsio sacerdotum Taboriensium ad artículos 
praemissos sinodi Pragae celebratae per eosdem). Tutto questo, del resto, contraddice la 
concezione dei cosiddetti picardi, che secondo il Tractatus contra errores picardorum 
(1422) affermarono: "Christus verus Deus et homo non possit esse multiplicative simul et se-
mel in pluribus locis in communicantibus."; poi dissero che il vero Dio sia presente nell' 
eucaristía solo sacramentaliter: Dóllinger, 691. 
52 Reprobationes 2. 
53 Molnár-Cegna, 359. 
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accadere la ritrasformazione. Possiamo dunque supporre che in questo caso affio-
rino le idee degli orfaniti, una terza corrente del movimento hussita, i quali, op-
postamente ai taboriti ed ai calicisti, non hanno abbandonato la convinzione nella 
transustanziazione.54 
Gli orfaniti vissero in Moldavia fin dagli anni venti, dopo essere fuggiti dalla 
Boemia e dalla Polonia. La loro presenza in questa regione ha fatto nascere 1' 
ipotesi, che uno dei loro capí, Peter Payne, ci fosse giunto durante i suoi viaggi.55 
Al tempo stesso, non possiamo escludere che i gruppi di orfaniti possano essere 
giunti. anche dalla Sirmia, cioè dall' Ungheria méridionale, insieme ad altri 
gruppi eretici in fuga per le persecuzioni di Giacomo della Marca. Difatti, i con-
dottieri mandatici dall' imperatore Sigismondo nel 1437 per combatiere i turchi, 
furono di quella fede.56 
Nell·' elenco del cardinale Torquemada balza, perô, subito ail' occhio il punto 
16.: "Dicunt Christum non esse passum, ñeque vere mortuum". Quest' asserzione 
mette in dubbio la natura umana di Cristo e 1' incarnazione. L' articolo non si ri-
collega agli altri, che accentuano il rigetto della croce e della crocifissione, infatti 
in quest' ultimi si tratta solo della negazione della venerazione degli oggetti.5 7 
É vero che, emerge qualcosa di simile dai picardi: "non esse memorándum passionem 
christi Domini";58 "Jesús Christus non sit verus deus et homo", ma, in contrasto a que-
sto, lo stesso elenco, in un altro punto che connette il problema a quello della pre-
senza eucaristica, accetta che Cristo diventó uomo: "Christus verus Deus et homo 
non possit esse multiplicative simul et semel in pluribus locis in communicantibus".59 Gli 
ussiti ritenevano, che nel regno di Cristo non ci fosse dolore e, per questo, non 
viene venera ta 1' Eucaristía; infatti, i fedeli si nutriranno della memoria della vit-
toria del Salvatore, e non di quella della sua passione. Né in questa idea si mani-
festa la negazione della veracità della passione, ma solo di ció che essa rappre-
senta, in una prospettiva escatologica.60 Non possiamo, dunque, vedere nell' arti-
colo 16 un influsso dei picardi. 
54 Sulle incongruenze fra le dottine dei taboriti e degli orfaniti Palacky, 298-314; Lambert, 
339. Sulle convinzioni di Zizka, il capo degli orfaniti: Kaminsky, 466. 
55 Su Payne e sul suo viaggio in Moldavia: S. Fest, "Adalékok az első magyar bibliafor-
dítás kérdéséhez" [Contributi alia questione della prima traduzione della Bibbia in un-
gherese], in Angol philologiai tanulmányok - Studies in English Philology, II, Budapest 
1937,21-41. 
56 II diploma reale é pubblicato da Tóth-Szabó, 370-371; Sulla campagna del 1437: P. En-
gel, "Magyarország és a török veszély Zsigmond korában," [Ungheria e il pericolo ot-
tomano all' epoca di Sigismondol Századok 128 (1994), 284. 
57 Laurentius de Brezina, inserendo uno degli elenchi contenenti delle idee dei picardi, ci 
fa sapere: "...de signo crucis nihil credunt asserentes quod nec venerari jam crucem in qua 
Christus pependit ...nec lanceam, nec Christi tunicam in consutilem, nec peplum Marie virgi-
nis...; et quod sacerdotes hoc invenerunt propter lucra sua": Fontes Rerum Austriacarum, II/I, 
504. 
ss Döllinger, II, 702-703. 
59 Döllinger, II, 691-692. 
60 Fontes Rerum Austriacarum, II/1,399. 
51 
GYÖRGY GALAMB 
Senza dubbio siamo di fronte a un' influenza del dualismo, che non poteva ar-
rivare che dalla Bosnia. Apparentemente, non si tratta di un preconcetto inquisi-
toriale, un topos, che emerse nella mente dei francescani nel registrare le opinioni 
eretiche, tanto é vero altri punti non contengono delle convinzioni dualistiche. La 
mancanza di altri articoli caratteristici dei dualisti dimostra, che i missionari in 
questa occasione sono "innocenti", non influenzati dai topos tradizionali. Tor-
quemada invece non a caso si accorse della carica dualistica dell' articolo, com-
mentando che "Articulus iste quijuit primo Manicheorum" - non assegnando a nes-
sun altro articolo questo contenuto. Cosi Y influsso degli eretici di Bosnia si ri-
specchia solo in un punto delle fonti. 
Come nell' elenco di Torquemada cosi nelle altre fonti sono sporadiche le 
menzioni in territorio ungherese (o a settentrione di esso) di persone o gruppi 
dualistici. L' attendibilitá di queste poche notizie é, per giunta, discutibile. Nel 
1414 un signore ungherese, János Maróti si rivolse al papa Giovanni XXIII. La sua 
lettera riporta che in un territorio presso il fiume Sava vivevano numerosi pagani, 
che per 1' incoraggiamento dei patarini non obbedivano al vescovo di Pécs e non 
gli pagavano la decima. Per trovare il rimedio supplicó il papa di nominare pre-
pósito il rettore della chiesa della sua famiglia e di mettere sotto la sua giuris-
dizione i parroci del territorio, sottraendoli alia giurisdizione del vescovo. 6 1 
É chiaro che il signore, mosso dai suoi interessi finanziari volle comprometiere gli 
abitanti della zona chiamandoli pagani e patarini. 
Le prove di una presenza dualistica potrebbero ritrovarsi nei due diplomi che 
giustificarono 1' attivitá di Giacomo della Marca. II diploma dato da László 
Tamási il 23 settembre del 1437 racconta, che in Ungheria meridionale, in Sirmia, 
accanto ai cristiani vivono anche greci, hussiti e bosnenses.62 L' altra é una lettera 
di Giacomo, vescovo di Sirmia, (il testo della quale, del resto, é quasi idéntico 
a quelle scritte da un altro prelato, Giuseppe, vescovo di Bosnia, e da un signore, 
László Maróti nell' interesse di Giacomo della Marca) che afferma, che fra i fiumi 
Danubio e Sava abitano insieme cattolici, greci e patarenos.63 Queste fonti pero 
devono essere prese in considerazione con cautela. La struttura del testo infatti 
riveía che fu proprio 1' inquisitore a far redigere queste lettere come testimo-
nianze positive della sua attivitá. Egli, ovviamente, fu considerato nel campo dell' 
"eresiologia" un' autoritá incontestabile, 1' opinione del quale non poteva esser 
messa in dubbio. Giacomo, da parte sua, poteva pensare, che, essendo la Bosnia 
vicina, gli eretici potessero infiltrarsi in Ungheria. Se avesse avuto informazioni 
di rifugiati arrivati dai Sud del fiume Sava per qualsiasi motivo (per esempio 
a causa dell' espansione musulmana) sarebbe stato nórmale identificarli con i pata-
61 J. Koller, Historia episcopatus Quinqueecclesiensis, vol. Ill, Posonii 1784, 311-313. 
62 Fejér, X/VII, no. 462. "mediante nostra conscientia testamur et pollicemur, maiorem partem 
praedictarum parcium Sirmiae Rascianos inhabitare, licet tamen quaedam civitates et villae 
christiano nomine fungantur; tamen in quam pluribus Rasciani et etiam Bosnenses cum Chri-
stianis mixtim commorantur. Quaedam civitates et villae sectis haereticorum Bosnensium ac 
Husitarum infectae per plurimos annos extiterunt...". 
63 Fermendzin, nno. 762, 763, 764. 
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rini, una categoría tradizionale dell' eresiologia della chiesa occidentale e dei 
francescani. 
Negli anni '40- '60 del secolo scorso, ha esercitato una grande influenza fra gli 
studiosi il fatto che la prima traduzione della Bibbia in ungherese, realizzata alia 
meta del 15. secolo, avesse forti impronte del dualismo ritenuto típico degli ere-
tici bosniaci. La cronaca dei francescani sopra menzionata racconta, che 
"Tune etiam dúo literati de eadem Kamancze, videlicet Thomas et Valentinus, cum 
quibusdam hominibus insanis et mulierculis consilio inito, nocte recedentes ad Regnum 
Moldaviae intraverunt, ubi iidem dúo clerici haeresim praedictam seminantes..." e ivi 
"utriusque testamenti scripta in Hungaricum idioma transtulerunt",64 
É stata discussa a lungo dagli studiosi ungheresi, se il carattere della tradu-
zione fosse ortodossa od eterodossa. Fra gli anni quaranta e sessanta prevalse la 
concezione, secondo la quale i traduttori, Thomas e Valentinus fossero stati in-
fluenzati anche dalle dottrine dualistiche, che s' affacciano piü o meno palese-
mente nel testo.65 Questa concezione é giá stata confutata in modo convincente 
(meno convincente é pero il tentativo di porre in dubbio che la nascita del testo, 
almeno in parte, sia legata ad ambienti hussiti).66 Tuttavia in uno dei codici si 
trova una glossa a margine in lingua ungherese (non della stessa mano dei tra-
duttori, beninteso) che si puó a stento interpretare diversamente da una traccia 
delle convinzioni dualistiche. Secondo la glossa, aggiunta al Libro di Daniele 
(7:13-14), "Gesü é tutt' uguale con Dio ed é Dio." Quest' osservazione ha senso solo 
se la interpretiamo come un' opposizione alie credenze dualistiche e docetiche, le 
quali non riconoscono 1' incarnazione di Dio. Queste evidenze, insomma, sono 
sporadiche e non dimostrano la presenza massiccia delle dottrine dualistiche, 
contrastando le affermazioni della storiografia precedente, ma gettano luce sulla 
loro esistenza e 1' infiltrazione casuale ed accidéntale nel territorio ungherese. 
Queste tracce sporadiche hanno un certo rilievo dal punto di vista delle di-
verse ipotesi formúlate negli ultimi decenni sul carattere degli eretici bosniaci. 
Alcuni storici negli ultimi decenni hanno messo in dubbio 1' immagine tradizio-
nale del carattere dualistico delle credenze dei "krstjani" di Bosnia. Sanjek e Fine 
hanno giustamente polemizzato con la storiografia precedente, che ha assegnato 
agli eretici di Bosnia unilateralmente le tesi dei bogomili. Tuttavia, talvolta, in se-
guito a una lettura forzata delle fonti, sono giunti a conclusioni esagerate, sottoli-
neando come le fonti provenienti dalla Bosnia, scritte in lingua slava autoctona, 
tacciano assolutamente sui dualisti e dichiarando forzatamente inattendibili le 
m Blasius de Zalka, 240. 
65 T. Kardos, A huszita Biblia keletkezése, 9-19. 
66 S. Károly, "Első bibliafordításunk szellet szava," [La parola 'spirito' della prima tradu-
zione ungherese della Bibbia] Magyar Nyelv (1955), 303-311; F. Szabó, "A huszita biblia 
és állítólagos patarén elemei," [I pretesi elementi patarinici della Bibbia hussitica] Iro-
dalomtörténeti Közlemények 70 (1966), 146-153.; F. Szabó, "Huszita-e a Huszita Biblia" 




fonti in lingua latina.67 É vero peraltro, che le traccie dei dualisti in questo gruppo 
di fonti sono tanto scarse, che la concezione tradizionale délia presenza massiccia 
(per lo meno nel 15. secolo) dei dualisti in Bosnia, penetratici pariendo da Bulga-
ria e cosï identificabili con i bogomili è difficilmente sostenibile. Ma i pochi passi 
delle fonti redatte in Ungheria evidenziano 1' esistenza - sporadica è vero - di 
gruppi d' índole dualistica sia nella penisola Balcanica, sia in Ungheria méridio-
nale, ai margini della chiesa di Bosnia dei "krstjani", indipendente da Roma e di 
carattere monástico, con una liturgia di lingua slava, tratti, che rendono possibile 
attribuirgli - per lo scopo di comprometterla - 1 ' etichetta "dualista". 
Tornando al nostro argomento, si puó in generale affermare che in Ungheria ci 
furono tre diverse zone fortemente influenzate dalle correnti ereticali. La prima 
fu la parte settentrionale del paese, dove i condottieri capeggiati da un certo Ján 
Giskra, di origine boema, fondarono fra gli anni quaranta e cinquanta quasi uno 
stato indipendente. Al tempo stesso i suoi soldati stranieri rimasero dei nemici 
ail' occhio degli abitanti indigeni, e perciô il loro hussitismo (taborita e orfanita) 
poté diffondersi solo molto limitatamente. Quanto alie altre due regioni, la Tran-
silvania e la Sirmia le due fonti principali, 1' Articuli husitarum e le Reprobationes 
del cardinale Torquemada rendono possibile la comprensione del contenuto in-
dividúale delle correnti ereticali ivi propagatesi. In base agli Articuli è possibile 
sostenere che taboriti e calicisti potrebbero essere diffusisi nel centro del paese 
e nel Transilvania, dove avrebbero potuto ricevere un appoggio dai taboriti resi-
denti in Moldavia. Possiamo supporre a buon diritto che nelle Reprobationes si 
rispecchino invece - almeno in parte - le asserzioni dei taboriti e forse degli orfa-
niti che prima della fuga nel 1439, vive vano in Sirmia, fra i fiumi Danubio e Sa va. 
Ció è reso plausibile dal fatto, che i successori di Giacomo della Marca nella sede 
del vicario della vicaria di Bosnia, a vendo evidentemente notizie della fuga del 
1439 (come le aveva il continuatore della Cronaca francescana del Balázs di Zalka) 
organizzarono ripetutamente delle missioni in Moldavia. 
Abbiamo visto, che negli Articuli si delinea un immagine dell' eresia in parte 
di Índole intellettuale, che si manifesta nei punti concordanti con il discorso di 
Giovanni Hus tenuto davanti al concilio di Costanza. Ci sono anche altri articoli 
che esprimono le esigenze del basso clero. Altre fonti confermano che in Unghe-
ria è spiccatamente alto il numero dei chierici fra gli eretici. Alla fine degli Arti-
culi Giacomo della Marca afferma, che fra gli eretici si trovavano ugualmente laici 
e chierici.68 Lo stesso pensa va un altro Giacomo, vescovo già menzionato di Sir-
mia,69 in due bolle del papa Eugenio IV a lui inviate ci conserva delle informa-
67 Fine, The Bosnian Church, passim. Sanjek accentua la contraddizione di una struttura or-
ganizativa típica delle chiese dualistiche e del sistema dottrinale dei bosniaci, nel 
quale egli - in base delle fonti autoctone - non scopre le tracce del dualismo. Una va-
lutazione più equilibra ta è quella di Lambert, 148. 
68 "Quorum omnium hereticorum inter sacerdotes et seculares conversa sunt predicacionibus mei 
fratris Jacobigracia dei cooperante homines XXV: m."\ Vat. lat. 7307. f. 24v. 
69 Fejér, X/VII. no. 443. "... [Jacobus de Marchia] in circum viánis partibus ante dictae Eccle-
. siae nostrae plurimos haereticos , tam clericos, quam laicos haereticae pravitatis maledictorum 
Hussitarum [...] diligenti inquisitione reperit". 
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zioni su di un prete chiamato Andreas Michaelis. Egli (insieme ad altri chierici 
non nominati) per le sue idee eretiche fu inizialmente escluso dall' ordine eccle-
siastico ma, piü tardi, avendo abiurato la propria eresia, denunciando pubblica-
mente quella dei suoi compagni probabilmente ottenne 1' assoluzione.70 Da una 
supplica di Balázs da Kamonc veniamo a sapere che Giacomo fece mettere al rogo 
due presbiteri diventati eretici.71 Lo stesso supplicante, secondo la Chronica fra-
trum minorum aveva fatto l'universitá a Praga, da dove torno in Ungheria infet-
tato (infectus) dall'eresia. La stessa opera racconta che Giacomo inquisitore fece 
riesumare dalla tomba due parroci, quello di Belcsény (Beocin) e di Széntmárton 
sospettandoli d'eresia. II testo menziona che furono due chierici, Valentinus 
e Thomas a tradurre la Bibbia.72 A Kamonc (Kamenica), sulla riva del Danubio 
scoppió una vera rivolta contro l'inquisitore la quale porto alia liberazione di tre 
persone, giá attaccate alie pile del rogo, e degli altri accusati dal carcere fra essi il 
nuovo párroco di Belcsény, Valentino.73 
Fatta eccezione per gli eventi di Kamonc (e forse per quelli di Pécs, da dove, 
ancora nel 1437 1' inquisitore fu cacciato, ma forse per motivi strettamente eccle-
siastici, poiché predicó contro la corruzione del clero)74 non abbiamo nessuna 
prova della connessione fra i movimenti sociali e 1' eresia. Le fonti concernenti la 
rivolta contadina di Transilvania del 1437 non fanno nessun riferimento agli ere-
tici. La paura dei prelati di essere trucidati, un motivo che ricorre nelle lettere in-
dirizzate a Giacomo, puó esser ritenuta piuttosto un luogo comune.75 Oltre alia 
questione della decima, neanche nell' elenco di Giacomo si manifestano le ten-
sioni sociali. 
Dopo 1' ápice degli anni trenta, 1' eresia in Ungheria si presentó nello spazio 
solo scarsamente e nelle periferie del paese, nel senso sociale solo accidental-
mente e sporadicamente, senza diventare una forza simile alT hussitismo di Bo-
emia. Tuttavia, durante la sua dimora in Ungheria Giovanni da Capestrano rice-
vette informazioni sulla esistenza di hussiti in Transilvania nel 1456.76 Ancora, nei 
dintorni della cittá Sopron i diversi condottieri ussiti, Konrad Weichtrachter 
e Hinko Tamfeld rappresentarono a lungo, fino agli anni '60, una minaccia perma-
nente tanto da tentare 1' assedio della cittá stessa. Infine, re Mattia ruppe la loro 
resistenza e fece seppellire vivi i loro predicatori. Quelli che rimasero in vita, fu-
ro Bullarium I, no. 306. 
71 Bullarium I, no. 1098. 
72 Blasius de Zalka, 240. 
73 Fermendzin, 786. 
74 Gli abitanti di Pécs furono ammoniti dallo stesso Sigismondo imperatore: Fejér, X/VII, 
no. 427. Giacomo stesso rievoco le sue predicazioni a Pécs nei suoi exempla: S. lacobus 
de Marchia, Sermones dominicales, Falconara Marittima 1975, intr., testo e note di Renato 
Lioi, vol. IV, 48, 63. 
75 Fejér, X/VII, nno. 392, 393, 443. 
76 B. Pettkó, "Kapisztrán levelezése a ¡magyarokkal," [Epistolario di Giovanni da Capes-
trano e gli ungheresi] Történelmi Tár 34 (1901), 187-188. 
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rono esiliati in Moldavia, come testimonia la tradizione annotata da un frate fran-
cescano di 17. secolo, Marco Bandino.77 
Alia fine del secolo Y eresia scomparve, ma il malcontento religioso si sfogö in 
un altra maniera, innestandosi alia fine del 15 secolo nei movimenti sociali, i quali 
furono animati dalle predicazioni degli osservanti. Le tensioni sociali sfociarono 
in una delle rivolte piü grandi dei contadini in Europa Centrale, quella condotta 
da György Dózsa, attorniato da numerosi francescani dell' osservanza.78 In que-
sta sede sarebbe troppo esaminare in particolare il paradosso, per il quale 1' os-
servanza francescana, la cui diffusione in Ungheria fu efficacemente promossa 
anche da un inquisitore e godeva 1' appoggio dei signori e dei re, divenne la base 
del malcontento popolare. 
77 K. Mollay, "Macskakő - Katzenstein," Soproni Szemle 17 (1963), 122-135; 132-134. 
78 J. Szűcs, "Ferences ellenzéki áramlat a magyar parasztháború és reformáció hátteré-
ben," [Un corrente francescano deli' opposizione nel retroscena della guerra dei conta-
dini e della Riforma in Ungheria] Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények 78 (1974), 409^35. 
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After the death of King Mathias (1458-1490) the Turkish-Hungarian frontier re-
mained generally peaceful. But the word "peaceful" should not be taken literally. 
This only meant that large-scale military operations led by the sultan himself did 
not take place. János Hunyadi dealt an annihilating defeat to the Turkish army, 
which had been engaged in the siege of Belgrade in 1456, and since then the 
Turks had been reluctant to launch large-scale military operations against the 
Hungarian Kingdom. King Mathias had kept the situation along the border 
firmly in his hands, and Turkish raids aimed at the realm or her frontiers were 
heavily defeated at the hands of the king's captains. During the reign of king 
Wladyslaw II (1490-1516) nothing seemed to have changed, Turkish raids were 
answered by similar Hungarian incursions into the territory of the Turkish Em-
pire. In fact, the situation was steadily worsening for the Hungarians, the upkeep 
of the border fortresses and the salary of soldiers took up two-thirds of the king's 
revenue.1 
Following the death of Wladyslaw II, his son, the young king Louis II (1516-
1526) sought to keep up the peace with the Turks. On 1 April 1519, the last Hun-
garian-Turkish cease-fire agreement was signed for the duration of three years 
with sultan Selim, who was engaged with the pacification of his empire after his 
large-scale conquests in the East. 
The situation changed fundamentally in September 1520, when sultan Selim I 
died, and was succeeded by his son, Suleyman I (the Magnificent). According to 
Turkish tradition the peace treaty made by the former ruler became invalid, so 
1 The period is dealt in detail in: F. Szakály, "A török-magyar küzdelem szakaszai a mo-
hácsi csata előtt (1365-1526)," [Phases of Turco-Hungarian Warfare before the Battle of 
Mohács (1365-1526)] in Mohács. Tanulmányok, ed. L. Rúzsás and F. Szakály, Budapest 
1986,11-57, and also see the literature there. 
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one of the first things the new sultan did was to send his envoy, Chiaus Behram 
to Hungary to renew the treaty. At least that is what the sultan said later. In the 
light of subsequent developments we can safely state that the real aim of the en-
voy was on the one hand to find out how deep-rooted was the Hungarians' de-
termination to withstand the Turks, on the other hand to lull the Hungarians into 
a false sense of security. The pretext for the declaration of war was the fact, that 
the Hungarian king did not give a definite answer to the peace offer of Chiaus 
Behram, but held him in a sort of respectable captivity in Buda, which was not at 
all an unusual practice in contemporary diplomacy. However, Suleyman consid-
ered this a casus belli, and in the spring of 1521, 65 years after the debacle of Bel-
grade, a Turkish army led by the sultan was heading towards Hungary. 
The events of the 1521 campaign are well known: Belgrade, Sabac and Zimony 
(by now a part of Belgrade) fell, and with this the Hungarian defence system 
practically collapsed. King Louis II summarised the situation in one of his letters 
in these words: "Our realm is now open to the Turks on rivers and on dry land, 
and will not be peaceful and pleasant until Belgrade and Sabac are in the hands 
of the enemy."2 In connection with this I still have to make the surprising conten-
tion, that from the Hungarian viewpoint the 1521 campaign should be considered 
as a partial success. My argument is based on the following. The objective of 
a war is the conquest of territories. To achieve this goal one must occupy certain 
fortresses of strategic importance, but occupation is not the goal, only a means to 
conquer the whole, or a large part of, the country. Consequently, the aim of the 
defensive party is to seek to prevent all this, in other words, to keep the fortresses 
of strategic importance to achieve the ultimate aim, the protection of territorial 
integrity. 
If we apply this train of thought to the 1521 campaign, we find that the Hun-
garian military command managed to reach the ultimate goal, they succeeded in 
protecting the territorial integrity of the realm (with the exception of Szeremseg, 
Sremska in present day Yugoslavia), but the fortresses of strategic importance fell 
victim to the war. Of course, this line of thought is only valid if I can prove that 
the Turks did not only want to occupy a few strongpoints, but wanted to break 
through deep into Hungary. That is, they did not only want a tactical, but meant 
to achieve a strategic breakthrough. 
In relation to this Turkish sources are extant, according to which the definition 
of Turkish military objectives took place in a military conference held in Sofia. 
During the conference the sultan stated that he wanted to march towards Buda 
itself and intended to break Hungary with a single decisive blow. However, the 
older and more experienced pashas, especially Grand Vizier Piri drew Suley-
man's attention to the fact, that it would be risky to lead the whole army against 
Buda without taking the border fortresses, primarily Belgrade.3 The most vulner-
able point of contemporary armies was the question of supply. If there were 
2 Acta Tomiciana. Vol. VII, Posnan 1857,306-307. 
3 J. Thury, Török történetírók. [Turkish Scriptors] Vol. II, Budapest 1896, 6-9, 42-46, 119-
145. 
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strongpoints in Hungarian hands along the supply lines of the Turkish army, 
these garrisons would make it impossible to supply the army with ammunition, 
food and fodder, which could have led to catastrophic defeat. Accordingly, the 
pashas advised the sultan to take the border fortresses first, and then, to march 
on towards the heart of the country. 
The sultan chose a combination of the two plans, and divided the troops into 
two army groups: Grand Vizier Piri surrounded Belgrade in the first days of July 
and started the siege, while the other army group launched the siege of Sabac, 
with the aim of taking it quickly, which would be followed by throwing a bridge 
over the river Sava, and intrusion into Hungary proper. The Turks managed to 
achieve only 50 percent of their plan. Although they took Sabac with a single at-
tack, and built the bridge over the river, Belgrade remained firmly Hungarian 
during the course of July. To make matters worse, the swollen river Sava swept 
away the bridge, causing supply problems for the troops, who had already bro-
ken into Sremska. The Turkish command received bad news from the reconnais-
sance units too: in the heart of the country at several points troops were massed 
with the aim of relieving Belgrade from the siege. 
The troops of Palatine István Báthory consisting of border defence units and 
battalions from southern Hungary were deployed between the rivers Danube 
and Tisza. János Szapolyai, voivode of Transylvania, who had originally pre-
pared for the defence of Transylvania proper, now having discovered the real 
Turkish intentions, lined up his forces along the river Tisza. The king left Buda in 
the middle of July, but marched slowly to make it possible for more soldiers to 
join his army. There were two factors, which made the centralisation of all forces 
nearly impossible. One of them was the huge extent of the territory to be de-
fended. When the Turks began their march, it was not clear, whether they would 
go for the west through the valley of the river Sava, or towards the heart of Hun-
gary, or towards Transylvania. It meant that troops should be held in reserve for 
the defence of all these territories. By the time it became clear where the Turks 
would strike, it was too late to concentrate the forces garrisoned along the long 
border. 
The other factor was the question of supply. Food and fodder were quite ex-
pensive before harvest. Most of the Hungarian army consisted of cavalry; horses 
needed an enormous amount of fodder, which was partly transported by the 
army itself, partly obtained in the vicinity of the theatre of war. Before harvest 
prices were higher, then they were considerably lower. Therefore a large part of 
the Hungarian army could only be mobilised in full force now and also in 1526 at 
the turn of July and August. 
The Turkish command being aware of these facts, decided to take Zimony af-
ter destroying smaller castles in Sremska, and then to concentrate their forces and 
to take Belgrade, which would be the prime achievement of the 1521 campaign. 
This decision was not made because they were afraid of the Hungarian army, 
which was anyway quite small (although it would be a mistake to underestimate 
its deterrent value), but because the river Sava had swept away the military 
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bridge, and because Belgrade was withstanding the siege even at the beginning 
of August. 
At this point, with all the Turkish forces concentrated around Belgrade, a sys-
tematic siege began, which consisted of round the clock bombardment of the bat-
tlements, attempts at scaling and sapping the walls. The defenders repelled all 
the attempts at scaling, repaired the destroyed bastions and towers, but their 
situation grew steadily worse and worse, first they had to give up the city, then 
the Turks managed to undermine and blow up the strongest bastion, so they had 
to withdraw to a tower. As their number fell to under seventy, and they were all 
wounded, and the food and water supply and the ammunition ran out, on 29 
August they gave up the fortress when free withdrawal was granted. Now the 
once proud stronghold of great fame resembled a heap of rubble and debris. 
The defenders cannot be blamed for the loss of the fortress; they did every-
thing they could to preserve it. But a successful defence cannot be guaranteed 
without a relieving force, in the absence of which static defence can fulfil its task 
for only a limited period of time. Why did the Hungarian army not relieve Bel-
grade? I have already referred to the problems of concentration of forces. At the 
moment Belgrade fell the Hungarian forces having grown to several ten thou-
sands were in camp at Mohács, which is about 130 miles from Belgrade. To cover 
this distance by forced marches an army would need at least 10 days, but in this 
case soldiers and horses would be exhausted. If they did not cover the distance at 
forced marches, 20 days would be needed. So the relieving army was simply un-
able to reach Belgrade in time to prevent its fall! According to some views the 
Hungarian command was reluctant to engage the Turks in pitched battle. This 
could really have been the case, but the underlying principle was not necessarily 
cowardice, but realistic calculation. Contemporary strategy was based on the tra-
dition of Vegetius (De Re Militari), according to whom one must avoid pitched 
battles because of their uncertain outcome. It would have been mere irresponsi-
bility to expose the only existing army of the country to almost certain defeat. 
In this situation the Hungarian command made the only possible decision: to 
wait until the main Turkish forces withdrew and then to attempt to recapture 
Belgrade. Accordingly, the army stayed in camp at Mohács and waited for the 
withdrawal of the Turks, which took place in the middle of September, as they 
did not intend to be caught up in further military operations in Hungary in this 
part of the year. Suleyman had Belgrade rebuilt, left a garrison of 3,000 there and 
began his long march home. Now the time was ripe to launch a campaign with 
the limited objective of retaking Belgrade. However, an epidemic broke out in the 
Hungarian camp, against which the only solution was to disband the army as 
soon as possible, but before that everybody made a vow to return the following 
year to attempt the recapture of Belgrade.4 
4 These events are discussed in detail in F. Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár, 1521: a vég kez-
dete," [Belgrade, 1521: The Beginning of the End] in F. Zay, Az Lándorfejirvár elveszésé-
nek oka e vót és így esött. Budapest 1980,85-153. 
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In 1522 the Turks were engaged in the siege of Rhodos, which could have of-
fered a good opportunity to try and achieve this plan. However, the country was 
paralysed by lack of financial resources. After the loss of Belgrade the king con-
vened the diet, which seemed to have realised how dangerous the situation was 
and an unprecedented high tax was offered, but people were reluctant to pay it 
the following year. To make matters worse/the king, in order to meet his short-
term financial needs, resorted to debasing of the currency, which totally ruined 
the country's economy. The king spent a greater part of 1522 in Bohemia to stabi-
lise his power there and to convince the estates to support his efforts against the 
Turks. 
Along the border open warfare began, fortunately the main Turkish forces 
were occupied elsewhere, so the Hungarians had to face only local Turkish units. 
Both sides managed to achieve successes in this struggle. In 1522 János Szapolyai, 
voivode of Transylvania broke into Wallachia, expelled the pro-Turkish voivode, 
and helped to crown a pro-Hungarian voivode. The most spectacular Hungarian 
victory was accomplished in 1523, as a result of the appointment of Pál Tomori as 
archbishop of Kalocsa. Tomori had been an excellent soldier before he entered the 
Order of Saint Francis. Now he became responsible for the organisation of the de-
fence of Lower-Hungary. Shortly after his accession to his see, in two battles in 
Sremska he defeated the army of Pasha Ferhat, who had been looting and pillag-
ing the country there.5 
Next year, however, the Turks gained an important victory by capturing the 
fortress of Szörény (now Turnu-Severin in Romania), the last Hungarian-held 
strongpoint on the Lower-Danube. With this, the first line of defence totally col-
lapsed, the only exception being Jajca (Jajce) in Bosnia, which held out until 1527. 
The lack of financial resources made it impossible to launch the offensive aimed 
at recapturing Belgrade, still, efforts were made to strengthen the line of defence. 
As a result of Tomori's resolution Titel, Szalánkemén and Pétervárad (now all in 
Yugoslavia) were strengthened to withstand gunfire. The latter could be counted 
as the main stronghold after the fall of Belgrade. 
In 1525 Jajca, which had been under nearly continuous siege, was on the verge 
of collapse. It was only at the last moment, when Kristóf Frangepán, a former 
condottiere in Italy managed to relieve it and supply into it with great difficulty. 
This feat of arms was the last success of the Hungarians before the battle of 
Mohács. 
At the beginning of 1526 reliable information arrived in Buda about the sul-
tan's determination to launch a decisive campaign against Hungary. Pál Bakics 
Serbian voivode, who had participated in the sultan's military conference, in 
which they discussed the ways and means to launch a campaign against Hun-
gary, fled to the Hungarian court. He informed the king about what was to be 
expected. Louis II established contact with all the rulers of Europe in order to 
5 A. Kubinyi, "A szávaszentdemeter-nagyolaszi győzelem 1523-ban (Adatok Mohács 
előzményeihez)," [The Victory Of Szávaszentdemeter-Nagyolaszi in 1523 (Data on the 
Precedents of Mohács)] Hadtörténelmi Közlemények (1978), 194-222. 
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obtain substantial help against the infidel.6 Because of the Habsburg-Valois an-
tagonism, which divided contemporary Europe no substantial aid could be given 
to Louis n. The king could rely only on Hungary's military force, but the mobili-
sation and concentration was hindered by the same factors as in 1521: the prelates 
and noblemen had to wait until the end of the harvest to deploy their units, and 
those units, which had been garrisoned along the border, were scattered and dif-
ficult to concentrate, as the Turks were careful enough to keep their military ob-
jectives in secret. Hungarian military command was hesitant, e. g. János Szapo-
lyai, voivode of Transylvania at first got an order to break into Wallachia and 
catch the Turks off balance, and then he received another, which instructed him 
to join the king's forces in Hungary. By the time he managed to find out that the 
latter order was correct and he managed to mobilise the Transylvanian troops 
(which faced the same problems as the ones in the rest of Hungary), it was too 
late. By that time the Turks were closer to the point of concentration than 
Szapolyai's forces. 
The sultan began crossing the River Sava at the beginning of July; then he 
marched towards Buda, following the line of the River Danube. He took all the 
castles in his way. The small fortifications did their best to slow down the enemy, 
but after a few days of resistance they had to be abandoned. Pétervárad (today 
part of Novi Sad, Yugoslavia) put up the strongest resistance, which lasted for 
two weeks. Pál Tomori, with his troops numbering about 4,000, had to watch 
passively the fall of Pétervárad from the other side of the River Danube, as they 
were too few to hinder it in any way. 
Meanwhile the main Hungarian forces were gathering in Tolna, then they 
marched to Báta, and finally to Mohács. A few days before a military conference 
was held, where they decided to engage the enemy in pitched battle, even in spite 
of the great numerical superiority of the Turks. Together with those reinforce-
ments, which arrived on the last day, there were about 24-25,000 troops with the 
king. Cautious estimates put the number of the Turkish army at 54-55,000, Pál 
Tomori estimated the combatant forces at 75,000. Contemporaries and military 
historians of later centuries agree that the Turkish army was followed by a huge 
number of secondary, auxiliary troops, whom Tomori called "a miserable rabble". 
If we take only the main forces into consideration, there was a two- or three-
fold numerical superiority. In such a situation the defensive party might have 
a fair chance of success. But due to its composition, the Hungarian army, consisting 
mainly of cavalry, was not apt for defence. In these circumstances there was only 
a very small chance of victory. The only factor the Hungarian army could rely on 
was the element of surprise. 
Because of the relative scarcity of sources we do not know much about the 
actual battle. In a study I made a new attempt at reconstructing the engagement 
6 See, e. g. F. Sebők, "Angol-magyar kapcsolatok a mohácsi vész időszakában," [Eng-
lish-Hungarian Relations at the Time of the Battle of Mohácsi Acta Histórica. Különszám 
(1991), 33-39. 
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by putting together the pieces of information we possess.7 What we know for 
sure is that the battle began with the attack of the Hungarian cavalry, which took 
the Turks by surprise, because they had thought that the engagement would take 
place the following day and had set about making camp. But by the time Tomori 
could deploy the second battle formation, the Turks had already managed to 
overpower the Hungarians and make them flee from the battlefield leaving about 
15,000 casualties behind. Subsequently the sultan could march on and take Buda 
without any serious resistance, then he crossed the Great Hungarian Plain be-
tween the rivers Danube and Tisza, and in October he left a devastated country 
behind. The withdrawing Turks were harassed by Szapolyai's Transylvanian 
troops, but they were unable to cause serious loss to the enemy. 
Summing up this phase of Turco-Hungarian warfare we can come to the con-
clusion that now the characteristics of the struggle have changed substantially. 
During the time of king Mathias seemingly equal forces faced each other, and the 
Hungarians were able to keep the Turks at bay. Now the overpowering military 
potential of the Turkish Empire began to make itself felt. Suleyman's father, 
Selim nearly doubled his realm, and he left a legacy to his son: to expand towards 
the west. Suleyman appeared in the European theatre of war and diplomacy as 
an opponent of the Habsburg dynasty (which meant that he was practically an 
ally of the Valois), and his main military objective was the capture of Vienna. In 
order to achieve this goal Hungary's resistance had to be destroyed first. By 1526 
Suleyman succeeded in breaking down Hungary, and he was confident, that the 
next step would be the siege and capture of Vienna. So the first great phase of 
Turco-Hungarian warfare ended in an unprecedented Turkish victory, and sev-
eral more decades were to pass, before it became clear that the Turkish Empire 
was unable to wipe out Hungary. The Turkish occupation, though it lasted for 
a long time, also marked the beginning of the long decay of the empire of the sul-
tans. 
7 F. Sebők, "Újabb szempontok a mohácsi csata megítéléséhez," [The Battle of Mohács 
from a new perspective] in "Magyaroknak eleiről". Ünnepi tanulmányok a hatvan esztendős 
Makk Ferenc tiszteletére, ed. F. Piti, Szeged 2000,457-471. 
Богдан Хмельницкий 
как „регент Украины 
БЕАТА КЕРТЕСНЕ ВАРГА 
В 1648 году Хмельницкий, провозглашенный в Запорожской Сечи гетманом, 
поднял восстание против Польши, которое привело к созданию автоном-
ного украинского гетманства и открыло новое измерение в его существова-
нии. Вопрос о том, была ли Украина государством, или же она оставалась 
только восставшей частью государства польско-литовского, - вопрос чрез-
вычайно спорный в исторической литературе.2 Этот вопрос является важ-
ным, потому что положение Украины в период 1648-54 гг. определило и её 
дальнейшую судьбу. 
При переговорах с польскими комиссарами в начале 1649 года Хмель-
ницкий так определял границы „Казацкой Украины" - „река Горынь и 
Припять, а от Брацлавского и Подольского воеводств по Каменец".3 Факти-
чески власть гетмана ограничивалась только выше указанными пределами. 
Во главе украинского народа становился гетман, получающей свою власть 
от всенародной рады (т. е. народного собрания) и осуществляющий её 
вместе с казацкой старшиной. Гетман - глава всей исполнительной власти, 
он обладает также законодательной властью и осуществляет полномочия 
верховного судьи. Таким образом, на Украине Хмельницкого налицо все 
три составных элемента государства, - мы видим единую территорию, 
1 Источники Малороссийской истории, собранные Д. Бантыш-Каменским. Москва 
1858, 74. 
2 Выдающиеся современники этой эпохи уже сознавали, что Украина -государство. 
Юрий Крижанич в сочинении «Описание пути от Львова до Москвы» писал: 
„...самому царскому величеству не стыдно назваться вечным гетманом Под-
непровским, Волынским и Подольским, потому что такое гетманство то же, что и 
великое княжество, если не царство..." 
3 Летопись с. Величко. Киев 1848,173. 
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единый народ, а также верховную власть, до 1650 г. неограниченную и не-
зависимую.4 
Когда же возникло и как образовалось это новое государство? После 
побед 1648 года к Хмельницкому явились послы всех соседних государств 
поздравить его в связи с новым положением. Все послы предлагали гетману 
союз и покровительство, все стремились использовать окрепшую силу ка-
заков. Это было международным признанием нового государства. 
„...послы прибыли в 1649 г. после торжественного въезда Хмельницкого 
в Киев... Соседние державы признавали его за ... монарха, посылая к нему 
послов..."5 
Как же отнеслась к этому Польша? Польско-литовское правительство не 
признавало Хмельницкого „самодержцем русским", как он называл себя 
комиссарам. Только в 1658 г. в Гадяцком договоре с Выговским Речь Пос-
политая впервые признала „Великое княжение Русское" равным Великому 
Княжеству Литовскому и самой Польше. 
Несмотря на это, большинство украинских и польских историков соз-
наёт, что в период 1648-1654 гг. Украина была самостоятельной военно-де-
мократической республикой.6 
Первым и привилегированным сословием самостоятельной Украины 
было казачество, доступ в которое во время восстания был возможен для 
всех. На самом деле, сословные границы исчезли из общественных отноше-
ний: все стали равны по правам, отличаясь друг от друга лишь факти-
ческим положением. Отделялись казаки, т. е. отбывающие военную службу, 
от неказаков, т. е. людей, которые не могли или не хотели её нести. Лишь 
одно православное духовенство составляло привилегированную группу, но 
и оно не замыкалось в сословие. Это "однородное" общество разбивалось на 
полки - деление, преследующее прежде всего военные, но затем и админи-
стративные цели. 
Но такое упрощенное общественное состояние, обеспечивавшее своей 
простотой значительную степень социального равенства, - не только сос-
ловного, правового, но и экономического, - не могло долго сохраняться в 
силу как внешних, так и внутренних причин: соседние сильные государст-
венные организмы, втягивавшие Украину в сферы своего влияния, должны 
были интенсивно воздействовать на ее общественный строй, и молодое 
украинское общество не могло развиваться независимо от социальных 
тенденций того времени. 
В первое время после 1648 года все, кто не был мещанином или духовным 
лицом, считал себя казаком. Особенно интенсивно пополнились ряды ка-
зачества крестьянами, сбросившими с себя феодальные путы, но уже с 1651 
4 С 1950 г. Хмельницкий фиктивно признал над собой сюзеренитет турецкого па-
дишаха. 
5 А. Я Ефименко, История украинского народа. Киев 1990, 72. 
6 Н. Б. Розенфельд, Присоединение Малороссии к России (1654-1793). Петроград 1915, 
12. 
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г. старшина начала принимать меры для того, чтобы ограничить переход 
посполитых в казачество. К1654 году число казаков определялось приблизи-
тельно в 100 тыс., что с семействами составляло около 500 тыс. человек, т. е. 
половину тощашнего населения Украины. 
Казаки пользовались весьма значительными привилегиями и правами. 
Они были освобождены от всякого рода податных и натуральных повиннос-
тей, неся вместо них военную службу. Они имели исключительное право за-
ниматься некоторыми важнейшими в крае промыслами. Кроме того, их не-
отъемлемой привилегией было и право свободного выбора всех должност-
ных лиц . 
Организации казачества соответствовала организация всей Украины: 
военно-сословное построение казачества совпадало с административно-фи-
нансовой системой всего государства. Основной единицей и территориаль-
ной, и административной, и финансовой, и военной был полк, который 
пришёл на смену прежним староствам. Что касается власти, осуществля-
ющейся на этой территории, то её можно представить в виде трех концент-
рических кругов, из которых наибольший радиус имел круг власти гене-
ральной казацкой старшины, средний радиус - полковой и наименьший -
сотенной. 
Отдельно от городского казачества организовалось Запорожье - „воль-
ный орден"7 низовых казаков, над которыми стоял кошевой атаман, пользо-
вавшийся большой самостоятельностью и независимостью по отношению 
к гетману. 
Вторым сословием „Казацкой Украины" было мещанство, в положении 
которого также произошли перемены. С этого времени мещане постепенно 
расширяли свои имущественные (напр. право владеть землей) и политичес-
кие права (напр. большая самостоятельность самоуправлений в судебных 
делах), и вместе с тем они совершенно освобождались от воинской повин-
ности. 
Что касается духовенства, то оно пользовалось в своей внутренней жизни 
почти неограниченной автономией, так как находилось под юрисдикцией 
далёкого константинопольского патриарха. 
Помимо двух основных сословий - казачества и мещанства - мы видим 
на Украине остатки шляхты, а также крестьянство. Эти две категории яви-
лись во время восстания 1648-1654 гг. в преображенном виде, т. е. наступало 
полное социальное переустройство. 
В 1649 году Зборовский договор дал полную амнистию всем шляхтичам 
и обещал, что в будущем должности и чины в воеводствах киевском, брац-
лавском и черниговском будут раздаваться исключительно местным шлях-
тичам православной веры. Договор расширял и права православной иерар-
хии, вводя киевского митрополита в сенат Речи Посполитой. Польско-ли-
товское правительство повышало количество казацкого войска до 40 000 
и предоставляло гетману право в определённых районах вписывать в казац-
7 Там же, 15. 
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кий реестр и крестьян как королевских, так и шляхетских имений. Часть 
крестьянства таким путём вводилась в привилегированные ряды казачества, 
но более многочисленная масса крестьян оставалась по-прежнему подчи-
нённой. 
Таким образом Зборовский договор сохранил в неприкосновенном виде 
тот сословный строй, против которого направляло свои удары восставшее 
по призыву Хмельницкого крестьянство. Договор сохранял между возрос-
шим по своей численности казачеством и оставшимся под властью помещи-
ков крестьянством ту же резкую разграничительную черту, которая суще-
ствовала между ними и до восстания. 
Исполняя Зборовский трактат, Хмельницкий издал грозные универсалы, 
которые должны были вернуть крестьян возвращающейся на свои земли 
щляхте. Но эти универсалы ни к чему не привели, и гетман вынужден был 
разрешить всем „казаковать".8 
Белоцерковский договор 1651 г. явился результатом тяжёлого поражения, 
которое казацкое войско потерпело под Берестечком, поэтому значительно 
сократились права и льготы восставших, добытые под Зборовом. Число ка-
зацкого реестрового войска снижалось по двадцати тысяч и это войско 
должно было располагаться исключительно в королевских имениях киев-
ского воеводства. На практике, однако, этот трактат оказался ещё менее 
жизнеспособным, чем Зборовский. Казачество и теперь не вмещалось в рамки 
условленного реестра, а крестьянство по-прежнему не хотело знать над 
собой власти однажды изгнанных „ляцких панов". 
После Белоцерковского договора начали складываться две группы владе-
льцев. Одна включала прежних владельцев, а вторая группа державцев - ка-
зацкую старшину. 
А каковы же были политические стремления Хмельницкого? Целью всей 
своей политики гетман поставил борьбу с Польшей, и с этой целью он, бла-
годаря его громадному дипломатическому такту и умению, создал вокруг 
себя крепкую стену вольных и невольных союзников. Со стороны Москвы 
Хмельницкий обезопасил себя непрестранными просьбами о протекции, со 
стороны Турции - прямым принятием в 1650 г. турецкой протекции, Мол-
давию он заставил принять брак сына Тимофея с дочерью молдавского гос-
подаря, а Швецию гетман натравливал на Польшу. 
Однако Украина, отделившись вследствие социальных, религиозных и 
политических причин от Польши, не могла долго просуществовать само-
стоятельно. 
Само географическое положение Украины, расположенной на равнине, 
не имеющей естественных защитительных границ и окруженной с юго-
запада турецкими вассалами, с запада врагами ляхами, а с северо-востока 
Москвой, указывало на невозможность долгового самостоятельного бытия. 
Если бы Хмельницкий добровольно не вошёл в союз с окружающими госу-
дарствами, его бы поглотили сразу, ибо слишком заманчиво и для Турции, 
8 Летопись Г. Травянки. Киев 1854, 93. 
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и для Москвы было бы иметь силу Украины у себя в подчинении. Для гет-
мана это было ясно с самого начала, и он немедленно начал переговоры 
с Москвой и Турцией. 
Не порывая фиктивной вассальной зависимости от Турции, Хмельниц-
кий начал хлопотать о „протекции" Москвы. Русско-украинские перего-
воры имеют долгую историю. Ещё в 1622 и 1625 гг. украинское духовенство, 
вследствие усиливающихся религиозных притеснений, обращались к царю 
с просьбой принять украинские земли в своё подданство.9 
В начале восстания 1648-1654 гг. сам гетман говорил: 
„.. . я думаю, ни у кого нам нельзя просить помощи, кроме москалей... 
они православные и ради одной с нами веры могли бы за нас вступиться.. . " 1 0 
Сношения самого Хмельницкого с Москвой начались в 1648 г. в значи-
тельной степени под влиянием Константинопольского патриарха Паисия. 
В 1648 г. он переписывался11 через посланцев с царем, выражая желание 
видеть „православного християнского государя" на польском престоле, т. е. 
мысли о подданстве у гетмана ещё не было, но появилось желание видеть 
православного царя на троне польских королей. 
Одной из существенных задач московских государей была защита пра-
вославной веры и эта черта проходит через всю политику Москвы. Алексей 
Михайлович, конечно, был очень рад возникшей на Украине смуте, так как 
всякое ослабление старинного врага - Польши - служило усилению России. 
С этого времени царское правительство тайным образом поддерживало ка-
заков, дозволяя им селиться в царских владениях и покупать в России хлеб. 
На самом деле Москва играла роль друга и поляков и восставших, во 
любом случае рассчитывая иметь свою выгоду: победят поляки, царь явился 
искренним другом, всегда находившимся в готовности помочь своим союз-
никам; победят казаки, они должны быть благодарны Москве за дружест-
венный нейтралитет. 
Хмельницкий требовал от царя более прямой политики: 
„...хотите воевать с нами.., или хотите быть нашими приятелями? Если 
последнее, так прибывайте к нам на помощь, а мы, как случись, обязаны бу-
дем отслуживать вам во всякое время.. ."1 2 - писал гетман в Москву. 
Но на все эти просьбы, которые неизменно сопровождались требованием 
помощи против ляхов, из Москвы отвечали, что если польский король гет-
мана и его войско освободит, тогда царь изволит принять их под свою руку. 
Но и после этого сношения казаков с Москвой не прерывались. 
9 На ходатайство Иова Борецкого в Москве ответили знаменательной фразой, что 
„Царь с Патриархом об этом подумают, коща у казаков против поляков будет 
соединение и укрепление..." П. А. Кулиш, Материалы для истории воссоединения 
России. Спб. 1879,230. 
10 Н. Н. Костомаров, Историческая монография Богдана Хмельницкого. Спб. 1884, т. I, 
72. 
11 Акты ЮЗР. Т. III, 253. 
12 Костомаров, 79. 
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В 1648 году Хмельницкий послал в Москву для ведения переговоров 
Мужиловского, посольство которого было тайной не только для украин-
ского народа, но и для казацкой старшины. Цель миссии Мужиловского 
состояла в том, чтобы на месте разведать, как русское правительство пос-
мотрит на казацкое восстание и какое значение придаёт ему, и вместе с тем 
Мужиловский должен был попытаться заручиться помощью. 
Со своей стороны, царское правительство, хорошо осведомленное о поло-
жении дел на Украине через своих пограничных воевод, видело крайнюю 
необходимость вступить в сношения с Хмельницким, чтобы узнать о его 
дальнейших намерениях. 
Долго царь не давал ответа казацкому послу, так как он колебался: по-
могать. .. но на каких условиях? Какие выгоды в свою очередь может извлечь 
Москва из этой помощи? Константинопольский патриарх говорил, что 
Хмельницкий желает поступить под высокую руку государя, а Мужилов-
ский о том ни слова.13 Москве надо было иметь точные сведения, чего ка-
заки желают и что может Москва от них получить? С таким запросом был 
послан к гетману гонец Василий Михайлов. 
Царский посол привёз от гетмана грамоту, в которой Хмельницкий про-
сит принять его и всё запорожское войско под высокую руку государя 
и послать своих ратных людей под Смоленск.14 Но Алексей Михайлович 
ответил, что ему ратных людей под Смоленск послать не доведётся, потому 
что у него с Польшей заключен вечный мир. 
Если бы царское правительство хотело помочь казакам - возразил на это 
гетман - то оно может это сделать, не нарушая мир с Речью Посполитой, 
таким образом: у государя есть вольные люди - донские казаки; запо-
рожские казаки пошлют их звать к себе на помощь, а царь бы РЕП ПОЗВОЛИЛ 
на помощь прийти. 
Этот практичный совет казацкой старшины не был принят Москвой. 
Русские бояре отвечали послу Хмельницкого, что пусть лучше казаки 
пошлют своих послов в Польшу на сейм и уговорят панов, чтобы вместе 
с казаками избрали своим королем русского государя, а если у них король 
уже избран, то они помирились бы на том, чтобы запорожскому войску 
быть в подданстве Алексея Михайловича без нарушения вечного мира 
между Польшей и Россией, и если паны на это согласятся, тогда царь 
примет украинцев под свою высокую руку. 
В своей грамоте Богдан Хмельницкий сказал следующее: 
„.. . Да мы и теперь свободны..., теперь в Польше и Литве выбран 
королем Ян Казимир, которого мы не выбрали, не короновали и 
креста ему не целовали... Польши и Литвы... опасаться нечего: без 
нашего запорожского войска везде они будут худы... теперь счастье 
само даётся в руки государя: без всякого ущерба он может получить 
большое государство и множество людей... и если государь нас не 
13 Акты ЮЗР X, № 8,172. 
14 Там же, 183. 
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принимает и от своей милости отгоняет, то нам кажется, что мы 
православные християне ему не годны и милостивым к нам быть не 
хочет..."15 
Хмельницкому не могло не казаться обидным, что Москва не хочет 
понять его великой идеи, но он всё-таки не терял надежды когда-нибудь 
привлечь царя к своим планам. 
Казацкие посольства в Москву не принесли Хмельницкому каких-либо 
выгод. Правда, Алексей Михайлович всё время войны украинцев с поля-
ками держал по отношению к нему дружественный нейтралитет, пре-
доставив даже свободу донским казакам помогать ему, но активного участия 
в событиях не принимал. Почему же русское правительство в течение 6 лет 
не рискнуло принять Украину под свое подданство, несмотря на просьбы 
казаков? Вернее всего на этот вопрос можно ответить словами гетмана: 
в Москве опасались Речи Посполитой, потому что польско-литовское госу-
дарство причинило России в прошлые годы большое разорение. А кто мог 
поручиться, что если казаки будут приняты в подданство царя, крымский 
хан останется спокойным? 
В 1651 г. царский посол Богданович уже милостиво похвалил Хмельниц-
кого за желание поддаться к царю, а в этом же году состоялось постанов-
ление Земского Собора: в случае, если польский король не удовлетворит 
многих обид, нанесенных царю, то Собор решит принять Богдана Хмель-
ницкого в русское подданство. 
Поражения под Берестечком и Белоцерковский договор меняли отноше-
ния гетмана к Москве. До этого времени он добивался помощи царя, хотя 
бы ценой подданства; когда же это ему не удаётся, он получает необходимое 
той же ценой от Турции. Но хан в критическую минуту ему изменил, 
и Хмельницкий остался один. В результате этого с 1652 г. он делался настой-
чивее и определеннее в своих просьбах к русскому правительству. Но 
государь отвечал опять уклончиво, предлагая казакам переселиться на сво-
бодные земли в Московском государстве. Хмельницкого это не удовлетвор-
яло и в 1653 году он грозил отдаться Турции.16 Эта настойчивость, наконец, 
заставила царя принять решение. 14 марта того же года тайно было решено 
согласиться на домогательство казацкого гетмана, но Москва делала ещё 
одну последнюю попытку - она уговаривала Польшу примириться с каза-
ками на условиях Зборовского договора, указывая, что в противном случае 
она будет считать казаков свободными от присяги подданства. 
22 июня 1653 года царское правительство послало казацкой старшине 
грамоту с извещением о согласии на принятие в подданство, 1 октября 
вопрос ставится на обсуждение Земского Собора, а 8 января 1654 г. Богдан 
Хмельницкий и всё запорожское войско приводится к присяге. 
Такова долгая эпопея русско-украинских переговоров, в которой харак-
терны настойчивость гетмана и нерешительность царя. Чем последняя была 
« Там же, 222. 
16 Там же, 321. 
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вызвана? Недостатка в желании присоединить Украину у московского пра-
вительства не могло быть - это отвечало и традиционной политике соби-
рания земли, и задачам общей русской политики XVII века - расширения до 
естественных границ, возвращало Москве Киевскую землю, укрепляло 
авторитет царя как защитника веры православной, делало границу России 
более защищенной. Но Москва была осторожна: она боялась начинать 
войну с Польшей и Алексея Михайловича сильно смущали сношения 
Хмельницкого с Турцией и Крымом. Но когда стало ясно, что Хмельниц-
кому грозит опасность, вследствие которой он может навсегда отдалиться от 
Москвы и соединиться с султаном и ханом, Москва, наконец, решилась 
объявить гетману о своём согласии. 
И сам Хмельниский, убедившись в невозможности отбиться собствен-
ными силами от польских притязаний, принял решение окончательно 
оторваться от Польши и соединиться с Москвой. В свою очередь русское 
правительство, упорно, несмотря на все просьбы украинского гетмана, ук-
лонявшееся от прямой помощи ему, пока не имело достаточной уверен-
ности в слабости Речи Посполитой и не видело в такой помощи реальных 
выгод для себя, теперь охотно приняло предложение Хмельницкого о при-
соединении Украины к Москве. 
Официально причиной согласия в решении Земского собора 1653 г. выс-
тавлялась защита „Святых Божих церквей" и нежелание, чтобы „Малорос-
сия" поддалась Турции. Вместе с тем под это нарушение мира с Польшей 
подводился юридический фундамент - царь объявлял, что так кале Ян Кази-
мир не исполнил своей присяги не притеснять православных и не преследо-
вать веры, то тем самым он освободил все православное население Польши 
от подданства, и „они присягой королевской стали вольны".17 
„Казацкая Украина", отделившись от Речи Посполитой, прожила само-
стоятельной государственной жизнью шесть лет. За это время Хмельницкий 
уже привык к своему „царственному" положению, но ему более, чем кому-
либо, была ясна невозможность долго устоять одному, и волей-неволей 
в 1654 г. ему пришлось узаконить свои отношения с Москвой. 
Украинская старшина хотела бы поставить Малороссию в положение 
приблизительно такого же вассала Москвы, какими были для тогдашней 
Турции Венгрия, Молдавия и Валахия. Вассала, обязанного уплачивать 
своему сюзерену определённую дань и выставлять вспомогательное войско, 
но за то пользующегося полной свободой в своих внутренних делах и даже 
некоторой самостоятельностью в сфере внешней политики. 
В украинской исторической литературе18 результат Переяславского сог-
лашения 1654 года обычно характеризуется, как династическая уния 
Украины с Московским государством. Во главе этого вассального государ-
ства должен был стоять выборный гетман, носивший свой сан пожизненно 
и не нуждавшийся в утверждении царя, а лишь извещавший его о своем 
17 Царское правительство таким образом официально назвало Украину, 
г« Акты ЮЗР X, № 8,391. 
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избрании и приносивший присягу на верность. За пределами этих вассаль-
ных отношений Малороссия получала широкую внутреннюю автономию 
и удерживала самостоятельный социальный строй. Серьёзной новостью 
в этой области являлись только численное увеличение реестрового казачества 
и расширение его привилегий. 
Сами условия соединения Украины с Москвой на самом деле носили 
форму скрепленного двумя сторонами договора.19 Договорные статьи яви-
лись результатом длительных переговоров и тщательного обсуждения всех 
вопросов, в которых участвовали две равные стороны. Эти статьи заклю-
чают права и обязанности для каждой стороны, и определяются самим 
Московским правительством как „договорные статьи", как трактаты. 
Противники теории договора20 указывают на то, что в Переяславе в 
январе 1654 г. никаких договоров не заключали, а Малороссия раньше 
присягнула, а потом получила жалованную грамоту, и Москва утвердила 
статьи. 
Читая статьи 1654 г., мы прежде всего видим, что вся установившаяся 
политическая жизнь Украина сохранялась неприкосновенной. „Малорос-
сии" обеспечивались не только те права, которыми пользовались раньше „за 
яснейшими королями польскими", но и те преимущества, которые она себе 
завоевала после 1648 г. 
Богдан Хмельницкий чувствовал себя гетманом старого типа, предста-
вителем не только страны, сколько одной определённой общественной 
группы, живущей своими обособленными интересами. И это обстоятель-
ство наложило резкий отпечаток на характер условий, привезенных послан-
цами Хмельницкого в Москву. В ряду этих условий на первом месте были 
поставлены права и привилегии казачества, сохранение за ним полной 
свободы самоуправления, своего совершенного независимого суда и всех 
вообще казацких „вольностей". За этим следовали просьбы об определении 
числа казацкого войска в 60,000 человек; о свободном выборе гетмана; 
о пожаловании гетману на булаву Чигиринского староства, о неприкосно-
венности казацких земельных имуществ и о назначении жалованья всему 
войску казацкому. Наряду с этим в „статьях" Хмельницкого говорилось и 
о других отраслях управления и о других общественных классах, но уже да-
леко не с такой обстоятельностью. 
При таких широких правах, выговоренных себе Малороссией, она, 
присягая на вечное подданство царю и его наследникам, обязывалась им 
„служить, прямить и всякого добра хотеть". Не так было на практике. Во все 
время гетманства Хмельницкого число казаков осталось неограниченным 
и сам гетман определял его более 100 тысяч; местные сборы поступали в 
бесконтрольное распоряжение гетмана и никакого жалованья из этих сумм 
19 Д. Н. Эварницкий, История запорожских казаков. Т. 1-Ш. Спб. 1895; М. Грушевский, 
Истор1я Украгни-Руси. Том 9. Кпв 1928. 
20 Розенфельд, 30. 
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войску не уплачивалось, вместе с тем, в своих международных дипломати-
ческих отношениях гетман выходил далеко за рамки договорных статей. 
Сам Хмельницкий смотрел на эту связь с Москвой как на вассальную 
зависимость. Он действительно не исполнил указа царя соединиться с 
русской армией, ссорился с московскими воеводами. Когда Москва заклю-
чила перемирие с Польшей и обратила свои силы против Швеции, Хмель-
ницкий заключил договор с Швецией и Ракоци о тройственном разделе 
Речи Посполитой. В отношениях с Карлом и Ракоци гетман чувствовал себя 
как равный с равным, несмотря на присоединение Украины к Москве, а с ца-
рем он чувствовал себя стесненным. 
Но тройственный союз распался и Хмельницкий осознал бесполезность 
одиночной борьбы с Польшей. В то же время Москва оставалась во всё его 
гетманство корректной и спокойной. Она не забывала, что гетман принял 
царское подданство "по добровольному и непринужденному изволению 
своему". Но когда Богдан Хмельницкий умер, Алексей Михайлович немед-
ленно предъявлял свои притязания на точное исполнение Переяславского 
договора и начинал активно проводить свой взгляд на этот договор, как на 
средство подчинения. 
Невозможность самостоятельной, независимой жизни стала ясной после 
6-летней жизни „без государя" (т. е. царя) и необходимость жить под защи-
той другого, сильного государства была сознаваема казацкой старшиной. 
Но союзом и подчинением Москве многие были недовольны - одни из-за 
польско-шляхетский симпатий (духовенство), другие из-за боязни полного 
подчинения (некоторые полковники). Рядом с недовольством Москвой уже 
в ту эпоху намечалось стремление опереться на Турцию, что впоследствии 
использовал Дорошенко, и на Швецию - торная дорожка для Мазепы. 
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L'étude de l'image de la Hongrie au 18e siècle ne peut se faire sans examiner le 
niveau de développement technique. En effet, ce critère revêtait une importance 
primordiale au siècle des Lumières, et avait même une valeur référentielle sur-
tout lorsqu'on parlait d'un pays étranger. On retrouve aussi cette notion dans 
l'Encyclopédie dont le sous-titre (Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des 
métiers) signale déjà une sorte d'égalité entre les sciences, les arts et les métiers.1 
Bien que les origines de l'implantation du génie moderne remontent en Hon-
grie à l'époque de la guerre d'indépendance de Rákóczi (1703-1711), les idées du 
Prince dans ce domaine ne se sont réalisées que vers le milieu du 18e siècle sous 
l'effet des mesures de politique culturelle de Marie-Thérèse. Nous devons en 
même temps tenir compte des guerres turques de la fin du 17e siècle puisqu'on 
trouvait encore en Hongrie, durant les premières décennies du 18e siècle, bon 
nombre d'experts militaires français qui avaient participé aux opérations lancées 
à la fin du siècle précédent en vue d'expulser les Turcs. 
Pour cette raison, on trouve des noms de famille français chez des personnes 
ayant servi soit dans l'armée impériale, soit dans l'administration camérale. On 
peut citer par exemple le nom du général Mortaigne qui fut promu en 1691 com-
mandant de la forteresse de Szeged. Mais au cours de cette année-là, il fut blessé 
dans une bataille contre les Turcs et il mourut. Il fut enterré à l'église des Francis-
cains à Szeged. 
Au cours de cette période, plusieurs ingénieurs militaires français ont égale-
ment travaillé en Hongrie. Ils y ont dirigé les travaux de fortification ou de dé-
molition de châteaux après le départ des Turcs. Le plan de reconstruction de la 
forteresse de Szeged fut élaboré par un officier du génie français du nom de De la 
Croix Paitis. Son nom est aussi lié à une carte de 1713, représentant la Hongrie du 
Sud. La présence militaire française se fait aussi signaler par le fait que de nom-
1 Cf. le Discours préliminaire de l'Encyclopédie, écrit par D'Alembert. Cf. encore K. Simo-
nyi, A fizika kultúrtörténete. [Histoire culturelle de la physique] Budapest 1986, 293-301. 
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breux soldats ayant des noms français ont servi dans les garnisons de Hongrie. La 
garnison de Szeged a compté entre 1731 et 1733 des soldats du régiment de Lor-
raine. Il est évident que des Français de Lorraine ont aussi servi dans ce régiment. 
Ce n'est donc pas le fait du hasard si on trouve des épitaphes de quelques soldats 
français dans l'église des Franciscains de Szeged.2 
La guerre d'indépendance du prince François II de Rákóczi, qui a éclaté juste 
après la libération du joug turc, n'a pas pu se passer des relations avec l'étranger. 
Les raisons principales de cette attitude relevaient de la politique militaire. Ainsi 
la diversion hongroise devint une alliée « évidente » de Louis XIV qui luttait 
à cette époque pour la succession espagnole. Un des premiers résultats de cette 
alliance fut justement l'appui intellectuel qui se manifesta dans les activités des 
officiers du génie français en Hongrie. 
Dans le royaume de France, en lutte permanente contre l'étranger depuis le 
milieu du 17e siècle, on nomma dès 1688 des ingénieurs royaux qui ne s'occupè-
rent à partir de 1712 que des commandes d'Etat. Les activités des officiers du gé-
nie français comprenaient dès cette époque le développement du réseau routier et 
la construction des ponts, des canaux et des ports. Pendant la première moitié du 
18e siècle, ils firent entrer dans la culture européenne des travaux d'architecture 
hydraulique et de tracés fluviaux (donc de transformation de l'environnement 
naturel).3 Nous tenons à signaler ici que le repeuplement du Banat (sud de la Hon-
grie) au 18e siècle a été organisé et dirigé par le gouverneur général Florimond de 
Mercy (1666-1734) qui était originaire de la Lorraine. Il a réalisé, avec l'aide de 
spécialistes français, l'assèchement des marais, l'implantation de la viticulture et 
de l'industrie de la soie.4 Le prestige et l'importance des activités du génie se ma-
nifestent aussi par la traduction en hongrois en 1778 du manuel de Garnier, offi-
cier du génie français, qui allait servir d'ouvrage de base. Deux décennies plus 
tard, on publia la deuxième édition du livre d'András Dugonics « sur la science », 
dont un des chapitres les plus importants traite justement de la science des ingé-
nieurs-géodèses5. Tout cela est évidemment le résultat d'un long processus. 
2 L. Palásti, Francia családnevek Szegeden a XVIII. században. [Noms patronymiques fran-
çais à Szeged au 18e siècle] Szeged 1959,43. 
3 K. Zelovich, A M. Kir József műegyetem és a hazai technikai felsőoktatás története. [L'Univer-
sité Royale de Technique József et l'enseignement supérieur technique en Hongrie] Bu-
dapest 1922,13-14. 
4 L. Baróti, Adattár Délmagyarország XVIII. századi történetéhez. [Base de données à l'his-
toire de la Hongrie du sud au 18e siècle] Temesvár 1893, 7; M. Horváth, Magyarország 
története [Histoire de la Hongrie] t. VII, Budapest 1873,158. 
5 F. Kováts, Az utak', és utszák' építésének módja, mellyet írt Gautier úr, Frantziai Országban 
Királyi Indzsenér, és a Hidak', Töltések', Ország-Utak', s Városi Utszáknak Inspektora. Mostan 
pedig, hasznos megjegyzésekkel megbővítve, és szükséges Táblákkal megékesítve Magyarúl ki-
adott Kovats Ferentz M. O. E. Mathematikus. [Les modes de construction des routes et des 
rues] Pozsony-Kassa 1778. Cf. J. Szinnyei, dir., Magyar írók élete és munkái. [Vie et oeu-
vres d'écrivains hongrois], t. VI, Budapest 1899, 1214-1215. A. Dugonics, A tudákos-
ságnak két könyvei, melyekben foglaltatik a Betővetés (algebra) és a Földmérés (geometria). 
[Deux livres des Sciences contenant l'algèbre et la géométrie] Pozsony-Pest 1784. Du-
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Le premier grand groupe d'ingénieurs français est arrivé en Hongrie en pas-
sant par la Pologne afin d'appuyer la guerre d'indépendance de Rákóczi.6 Le 
prince fait même mention dans ses Mémoires du fait que quelques officiers et in-
génieurs français sont arrivés à Misckolc de Pologne. De la part du roi de France, 
un gentilhomme nommé Fierville, fut mandaté comme ministre du roi auprès du 
prince.7 Ce dernier était en fait le chevalier Louis Fierville le Hérissy, premier re-
présentant de Louis XIV à la cour de Rákóczi. On doit aussi souligner parmi les 
officiers du génie le nom de Louis Le Maire. Il assura une part des tâches militai-
res (lors du siège d'Esztergom, les batteries furent aussi ordonnées d'après son 
plan). Louis XIV lui confia en outre à titre provisoire en 1710 un travail d'agent 
secret8 politique. 
Dans les mémoires de Rákóczi, on trouve évidemment les noms de nombreux 
ingénieurs français, surtout (à côté de Le Maire) ceux de Jean-François de Rivière, 
Barsonville, Damoiseau, Saint-Just et La Motte.9 Ce dernier avait été plus tôt un 
des aides de camp du maréchal Vauban connu et reconnu partout en Europe. 
Dans son mémoire adressé au prince Rákóczi, La Motte proposa la création de 
deux arsenaux nationaux, basés à Kassa et à Munkács. Le projet prévoyait un 
troisième centre à Érsekújvár, encouragé surtout par le prince. Le mémoire de La 
Motte servit de toute façon de base à l'organisation de l'armée des insurgés.10 Les 
décrets de Rákóczi consacrés à l'industrie de l'armement ont été en partie fondés 
sur ce mémoire. Un des décrets selon lequel la fabrication des produits de l'arme-
ment ne serait autorisée que d'après des dessins techniques approuvés par le 
prince exprima certaines velléités de « standardisation » suggérées par La Motte.11 
L'enceinte fortifiée du château de Munkács, de forme heptagonale régulière, 
doit être rattachée au nom du brigadier du génie Damoiseau. La forteresse de 
Munkács, facile à défendre, est construite sur un rocher escarpé recouvert de peu 
de terre. C'est ici que le prince créa en 1706 une manufacture produisant pour 
l'armée les draps qui se sont vite révélés d'une grande importance.12 
gonics voulait ainsi protester contre le décret impérial de Joseph II, qui fit de l'alle-
mand la langue obligatoire de l'enseignement. Il prouvait qu'on pouvait traiter en 
hongrois même des « sciences élevées ». Cf. encore idem, A tudákosságnak III. könyve: 
A három szögellések (trigonometria) és IV. könyve: a csúcsos szelésekről (de sectionibus conicis). 
[Le IIIe livre des Sciences: la trigonométrie; IVe livre: sécante parallèle! Pozsony-Pest, 
1798. Cf. Szinnyei, t. II (1893), pp. 1115-1117. 
6 B. Köpeczi, A Rákóczi-szabadságharc és Franciaország. [La guerre d'indépendance de Rá-
kóczi et la France] Budapest 1966,56-63. 
7 Rákóczi, Ferenc, Emlékiratok. [Mémoires] Budapest 1985,120. 
s Köpeczi, 161-175. 
9 Rákóczi, 198,226,242,252,279-283,301-305,322-325. 
10 B. Köpeczi-Á. R. Várkonyi, II. Rákóczi Ferenc. [François II de Rákóczi] Budapest 1976, 
170 et 199. 
11 G. Heckenast, Fegyver és lőszergyártás a Rákóczi-szabadságharcban. [Fabrication des armes 
et des munitions pendant la guerre d'indépendance de Rákóczi] Budapest 1959, 82-83. 
12 I. Rosta, Fejezetek Magyarország technikatörténetéből. [Chapitres de l'histoire de la techni-
que en Hongrie] Budapest 1995,121-122. 
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Il revint à Damoiseau, entre autres, la gestion du plan directeur d'attaque lors 
du siège de Medgyes. Le brigadier devait être un ingénieur très bien formé: 
même Rákóczi remarqua dans ses mémoires que Medgyes aurait pu être prise 
plus facilement si le comte Forgách avait suivi les conseils de Damoiseau concer-
nant le placement des batteries. Il n'en fut rien, et, bien que Medgyes eût été prise 
après une longue lutte meurtrière, l'ingénieur demanda sa révocation du service 
à cause de son différend avec le comte.13 Ce ne fut pas le seul cas où le comman-
dement et les connaissances de génie militaires se trouvèrent en antagonisme. 
Rákóczi fit remarquer au général borgne Bottyán que celui qui s'occupait en pas-
sant des fortifications croyait aussi s'y connaître. Pour cette raison, il ne prêta ja-
mais attention au lieutenant du génie envoyé par le prince, et construisit sa tête 
de pont d'après ses propres conceptions.14 
Sans doute en raison des activités des ingénieurs français en Hongrie, François 
II de Rákóczi, attiré lui-même par les sciences de l'ingénieur, prêta une attention 
toute particulière aux questions techniques.15 Pour des raisons de politique mili-
taire, il considérait évidemment la sidérurgie comme une activité très importante. 
Pál Jányi, propriétaire de Sajógömör et habitant à Rozsnyó fut nommé inspecteur 
des forges du comitat Gömör. On construisit dans ce comitat trois fonderies de 
fer. Une fabrique d'épées fut fondée à Dobsina. On envisagea l'établissement 
d'une usine de faux à Koszteviarszka, près de Besztercebánya. A Libetbánya, on 
s'occupa de la fonte d'obus et de bombes.16 
Outre les intérêts bien réels du génie militaire, le prince Rákóczi s'intéressait 
aux sciences naturelles et à la technique. Il s'intéressait en général aux construc-
tions techniques. Il porta une attention particulière aux activités d'István Si-
mándi, professeur au collège calviniste de Sárospatak, qui venait de rentrer de 
son voyage d'études. Le professeur avait ramené de nombreux instruments de 
physique et fut le premier en Hongrie à enseigner la physique de manière empi-
rique.17 
Les relations techniques entre la France et la Hongrie furent intenses au 18e 
siècle non seulement dans le domaine du génie militaire, mais aussi dans celui du 
génie civil. Montesquieu visita en 1728 Újbánya et ses environs. Il en fit mention 
dans ses mémoires, ainsi que de la « machine de feu » (machine à vapeur) qu'il y 
avait vue. Parmi les spécialistes des mines et de la métallurgie, l'ingénieur des 
mines Gabriel Jars, d'origine lyonnaise, vint en 1757 en Hongrie afin d'étudier les 
moyens d'extraction et d'utilisation des minéraux. Il publia un livre sur ce voyage 
13 Rákóczi, 160. 
14 Ibid., 165. Cf. Mercurius Veridicus ex Hungaria, édition fac-similé, Budapest 1979, 85-86. 
Le journal de la guerre d'indépendance de Rákóczi, premier journal hongrois, a com-
mencé à paraître (encore en latin) le 26 mai 1705. Les premiers numéros, édités par 
l'imprimerie Brewer de Lőcse, ont encore porté le nom Mercurius Hungaricus. 
15 II est curieux par exemple de noter qu'en 1702, lorsqu'ils se réfugiaient dans le château 
de Brezán (Brzezani), en Galicie, Rákóczi et Bercsényi se cachaient sous l'identité des 
officiers du génie français. Voir Köpeczi-R. Várkonyi, 107. 
16 A Magyar Mérnök Egyesület Közlönye (1898), 497. 
17 Köpeczi-R. Várkonyi, 298; Szinnyei, t. XII (1908), 1028-1029. 
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à Lyon en 1774. Il y décrivit aussi ses expériences hongroises. Il évoque entre au-
tres que le bélier hydraulique fut fondamentalement modernisé par József Hell. 
Celui-ci avait découvert que les pistons de la pompe pouvaient être agités non 
seulement par la vapeur, mais aussi par de l'eau sous haute pression ou par de 
l'air comprimé.18 Ainsi ést née en 1749 la machine à colonne d'eau et en 1753 la 
« machine à air ». La description de cette dernière nous est restée grâce aux tra-
vaux de Miklós Boda et de Kristóf Traugott Delius, deux professeurs à l'Acadé-
mie des Mines de Selmec. La machine à air élevait 23,5 m 3 d'eau par heure à une 
hauteur de 32 mètres. Outre la machine à air de Hell, Kristóf Traugott Delius ré-
suma plusieurs autres systèmes mécanisés dans son ouvrage. Son chef-d'œuvre 
parut à Vienne en 1773, sous le titre « Introduction à la théorie et à la pratique des 
mines, ainsi qu'à la connaissance des sciences de la trésorerie des mines. »19 
A côté de la construction et des mines, les données géographiques du pays se 
sont révélées d'une importance primordiale pour le régime des eaux. Les premiè-
res grandes constructions hydrauliques de la Hongrie commencèrent au début du 
18e siècle, après la libération du pays du joug ottoman. Selon l'opinion qui fait 
l'unanimité, des ingénieurs en hydraulique et des géologues, avant le commen-
cement des travaux contre les inondations, s'étaient occupé d'un territoire de 
3987672 arpents cadastraux qui avait été recouvert d'eau dans le bassin des Car-
pathes durant la majeure partie de l'année. Outre cela, quelque 2,736,876 arpents 
cadastraux furent recouverts temporairement. On peut donc estimer à 6,724,548 
arpents cadastraux les terres appartenant à l'empire des eaux. Etant donné que 
presque la moitié du territoire du bassin des Carpathes se trouve au niveau des 
plaines, le résultat fut qu'un quart des terres de ce type furent recouverte d'eau. 
Cela représentait une grande partie du territoire du pays. De plus, c'était là que 
se trouvaient les terres agricoles les plus fertiles. On observa même que les cha-
loupes transportant le sel à travers la Grande Plaine quittèrent le lit de la Tisza et, 
pour raccourcir le chemin, se dirigèrent « directement » vers Szolnok. D'impor-
tants intérêts économiques ont donc motivé ces changements. 
La première raison de la régulation des cours d'eau a été la protection de la 
région de Ternes. La construction de canaux d'approvisionnement et de fuite en-
tre le Ternes et le Béga eut lieu grâce à des ingénieurs français. Ces travaux furent 
suivis par ceux de l'assèchement des marais des frontières militaires du Sud. Les 
activités des officiers du génie français ont visiblement dépassé, dès le début, les 
devoirs strictement militaires, puisqu'ils ont aussi été les auteurs des premières 
cartes et les premiers acteurs conscients de la lutte contre les inondations. 
L'image ne serait pourtant pas complète si on ne mentionnait pas, à côté de 
l'importante contribution des ingénieurs français, le fait que les sciences techni-
ques ont aussi connu en Hongrie un essor au 18e siècle. Ce n'est pas le fait du ha-
18 J. F. Michaud, Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, t. 21, Paris 1818, 415-416. J. Faller, 
« Kétszáz évvel előtt használtak először sűrített levegőt vízemelési célokra, » [Il y a deux 
cents ans, on a utilisé pour la première fois l'air comprimé à élever de l'eau] Bányászati 
Lapok (1953/10), 516-521. 
19 Rosta, 126. 
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sard si, vers la fin du siècle, on a justement voulu moderniser la formation des in-
génieurs français en imitant l'exemple hongrois. 
Dans un rapport présenté à la Convention Nationale en septembre 1794 au 
nom des Comités de salut public, d'instruction et des travaux publics, Fourcroy, 
grand organisateur de l'instruction en France, attire l'attention sur le fait que « le 
service des armées de la République exige impérieusement des ingénieurs de plus d'un 
genre; le besoin s'en fait sentir à chaque instant, et devient de jour en jour plus pres-
sant. »20 Pour cette raison, il faudrait: 
« 1° des ingénieurs militaires pour la construction et l'entretien des fortifi-
cations, l'attaque et la défense des places et des camps; pour la construction 
et l'entretien des bâtiments militaires, tels que les casernes, les arsenaux, 
etc.; 
2° des ingénieurs des ponts et chaussées pour construire et entretenir les 
communications par terre et par eau, les chemins, les ponts, les canaux, les 
écluses, les ports maritimes, les bassins, les jetées, les phares, les édifices 
à l'usage de la marine; 
3° des ingénieurs-géographes, pour la levée des cartes générales et parti-
culières de terre et de mer; 
4° des ingénieurs des mines pour la recherche, l'exploitation des minerais, 
le traitement des métaux, et la perfection des procédés métallurgiques; 
5° enfin, des ingénieurs constructeurs pour la marine, pour diriger la 
construction de tous les bâtiments de mer, leur donner les qualités les plus 
avantageuses à leur genre de service, surveiller les approvisionnements 
des ports en bois de construction et en matériaux de toutes les sortes. »21 
Il rappelle par la suite que la physique et la chimie sont enseignées en France 
seulement d'un point de vue théorique alors qu'en Hongrie on fait déjà autre-
ment: 
« L'école des mines de Schemnitz [Banská Stiavnica] en Hongrie nous 
fournit un exemple frappant de l'utilité de faire exercer ou pratiquer par 
les élèves les opérations qui sont la base de ces sciences utiles. Des labora-
toires y sont ouverts et munis des ustensiles et des matériaux nécessaires 
pour que tous les élèves y répètent les exercices et voient de leurs yeux 
tous les phénomènes que les corps présentent dans leur union, y*22 
Ce texte nous permet de dresser deux constats. Le premier relève de la forma-
tion empirique qui fut implantée en Hongrie par István Simándi et qui était en-
core bien vivante à la fin du 18e siècle, et cela même si plus d'un avait jugé ses 
méthodes de « diaboliques » au début du siècle. Le second concerne la formation 
technique hongroise qui a servi d'exemple pour l'Europe surtout en ce qui con-
cerne formation d'ingénieurs des mines. 
20 Ibid., 134. 
21 Michaud, t. V (1816), 367-370. 
22 Moniteur, Vendémiaire 8 de l'An III (29 septembre 1794), 37. 
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The Author and his Work 
In 1861 a book was published in Pest which opened a window for Hungarian 
readers on Latin America: Uti emlékezetek Amerikából (Memories of Travels in 
America) by Pál Rosti.1 
The author, Pál Rosti (1830-1874)2 made up his mind some time in the early 
1850s to realize his childhood dreams and make a tour in the New World roughly 
following the route of Alexander von Humboldt in a land which was almost 
completely unknown to the Hungarian public of the day. His decision was also 
motivated by the fact that after the fall of the 1848-1849 Hungarian revolution 
and war for independence, living under the system of Austrian oppression he 
could not see other possibilities of acting for national advancement than the fields 
of arts and sciences.3 After several years of careful preparations4 he started the 
big journey on 4 August 1856 sailing from Le Havre, France for the USA on the 
French steamliner "Alma". Returning two years later, he landed on 8 August 
1858 in Southampton, UK. 
1 P. Rosti, Uti emlékezetek Amerikából. [Memories of Travels in America] Pest 1861, ed. 
G. Heckenast, Facsimile edition: Budapest 1992, (henceforth: Rosti, Uti emlékezetek...). 
2 This short paper does not have room for a detailed biography of Pál Rosti. Recently 
a study of Károly Kineses was published by the Hungarian Museum of Photography 
and Balassi Kiadó at the same time as the facsimile edition: Rosti Pál 1830-1874. [Pál 
Rosti 1830-1874] Budapest 1992, (henceforth: Kincses). 
3 Cf. Rosti, Uti emlékezetek..., Foreword. 
4 In the autumn of 1849 Rosti went into voluntary emigration to Germany and he stud-
ied chemistry at the University of Munich for four years. In 1853 he returned home and 
spent a year in Pest studying geography and ethnography. In December 1854 he trav-
elled - presumably legally - to Western Europe, to England and France. He learned 
photography because he was convinced that the new technique was the best method to 
diffuse geographical knowledge. See P. Rosti, "Úti vázlatok. Olvastatott a Magyarhoni 
Földtani Társulat 1859-ki február 28-án tartott szakgyűlésében," [Sketches of Travels. 
Read at the meeting of the Hungarian Geological Society on 28 February 1859] in 
J. Szabó, ed., A Magyarhoni Földtani Társulat Munkálatai. Pest 1863, Vol. II, 160. 
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The "Humboldtian" trip to Latin America started on 12 January 1857 when 
Rosti arrived at Havana, Cuba from New Orleans and ended on 7 April 1858 in 
the harbour of Veracruz, Mexico. The special feature of Rosti's journey was his 
interest in photography which was still in its infancy in those years. Rosti learned 
the new technique in Paris some time between 1854-1856. In the course of his 
tour in Latin America he made nearly fifty serviceable photographs of the sights 
of the countries he visited. He can thus be considered one of the pioneers of Latin 
American photo-history and he is doubtless one of the first landscape-photogra-
phers of the New World. 
So Rosti's travels in America resulted in two works for posterity. One of them 
and the first to be published was the famous Fényképi Gyűjtemény (Collection of 
Photos) exhibited for the Hungarian public at the beginning of 1859 in the Na-
tional Casino. Experts agree that Rosti's photos are of unique value in the history 
of Hungarian photography but there are numerous questions and uncertainties 
around them. As far as we know neither before nor after his Latin American trip 
did Rosti take photographs, only his Latin American pieces have survived. Of 
these, four albums are known, three of which are located in Hungary. Unfortu-
nately no negatives indicating his technique have survived so we do not know 
exactly whether he used the so-called collodium-procedure or the Le Gray wax-
paper-negative method.5 We don't know either where he made or had the copies 
made though the albums containing them were prepared for certain in Paris, in 
the workshop of Despierres, the court bookbinder and they were ready by 1 No-
vember 1858. On this day Rosti visited his ideal, Baron Alexander von Humboldt, 
in the latter's residence in Berlin-Tegel and presented one of the albums to him.6 
The contents of the three albums located in Hungary are not identical. The 
copy in the National Széchenyi Library which was originally given to the Hun-
garian National Museum contains 45 pictures, the album in the Museum of Pho-
tography which came into the collection from the legacy of Ágoston Trefort con-
tains 47 pictures, the album of the Loránd Eötvös Geophysical Institute contains 
40 pictures. Out of the maximum 47, four pictures show parts of Havana, 11 
photograph landscapes and buildings in Venezuela, and the remaining 32 com-
memorate Rosti's experiences in Mexico7. Though in the mid-nineteenth century 
numerous lifelike engravings and many photographs were made of the different 
regions of Latin America, Rosti's photos are doubtless a valuable source for the 
historians of the visited countries. 
5 Károly Kineses is of the opinion that Rosti used the Le Gray waxpaper-negative 
method. Cf. Kineses, 23-24. 
6 Rosti, Uti emlékezetek..., 70. According to the author Humboldt recognized and greeted 
among the pictures the photo about the giant "Zamang del Guayre" tree, the tree 
which he himself described in his work Voyage aux régions équinoxiales (Cf. op. cit., 
Tome V, 142). 




The other result of Rosti's journey considered more important by the author 
himself was the book entitled Uti emlékezetek Amerikából (Memories of Travels 
from America), published in 1861 in Pest, which as mentioned before opened 
a window to Latin America for the Hungarian reading public. Prior to this book 
only scattered newspaper articles and geography books translated from other 
languages informed those people who could read only Hungarian about the dis-
tant continent. More profound or detailed knowledge - e. g. the works of Hum-
boldt - was available only for those who could read foreign languages (especially 
German and French).8 Rosti's work is the first original Hungarian report based on 
personal field experiences about such important countries of Latin America as 
Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico. 
Rosti's lavishly illustrated large format book consists of 194 pages and a table 
of contents. The short Foreword is followed by three major units clearly separated 
even by the pagination of the chapters re-starting in each part. Though our short 
paper is confined to an introduction and analysis of Rosti's experiences in Cuba it 
seems necessary to outline the structure of the whole work. 
The first part divides into nine short chapters and bears the title "Habana". 
Eight chapters (pp. 3-31.) deal with Rosti's Cuban experiences, the last one (pp. 
32-36) relates his journey to La Guayra, Venezuela, via St. Thomas. 
The second part (pp. 39-119.) is entitled "Venezuela". It contains 17 chapters, 
the last two dealing with Rosti's experiences in Trinidad and his journey to Vera-
cruz, Mexico. After a general introduction to the country and a description of Ca-
racas the author thought it necessary to divide the book into three major parts: 
"A. The seaside region. The valley of Aragua. B. Llanos. C. The Orinocco (sic!) re-
gion." In contrast to the other two main parts of the work, the chapters dealing 
with Venezuela are well known to historians specializing in Latin America since 
these parts were published in Spanish in 1968 under the title Memóriás de un viaje 
por América.9 
The third part (pp. 107-194.) of the book is entitled "Mexico" and consists of 
19 chapters. This unit is relatively the largest (87 pages) and has an extra Introduc-
tion (pp. 107-109). 
The book is well-proportioned as the sizes of the major parts correspond to 
the length of time Rosti spent in the given country and also the readers are taken 
into consideration e. g. he knew that the events in Mexico were of great public in-
terest. Rosti spent two months in Cuba, five in Venezuela and seven in Mexico 
where he had to break his journey because of the approaching civil war. We 
8 It is well known that Humboldt published his works in French. In the 1830-1840s in 
Hungary there was a great interest in French culture and language, many members of 
the educated, reformist gentry and the intellectuals knew the works of Alexander von 
Humboldt. Rosti was made to learn about Humboldt's travels presumably in his child-
hood by his geography teacher Antal Vállas. 
9 P. Rosti, Memorias de un viaje por América. Introducción: Prof. T. Wittman. Traducción 
y notas: J. Sárosi, Universidad Central de Venezuela. Publicaciones de la Escuela de 
Historia. Serie: Varia III (1968). 
82 
PÁL ROSTI'S CUBA IN 1 8 5 7 
know that he had planned to visit Peru as well but for unknown reasons this visit 
did not take place. 
Rosti used the photographs, the products of his exhausting efforts to illustrate 
the book. As the printing technique of the day was not able to reproduce photo-
graphs a young painter, Gusztáv Klette made lithographs about some of the pic-
tures. Under the direction of Rosti the lithographs were supplemented by draw-
ings of persons whom the photographs could show only dimly or in no way at all 
because of the considerable length of the time of exposure. Woodcuts were made 
of another group of the photographs, the editor Gustav Heckenast ordered them 
from D. Freemann. The final result was a lavishly illustrated book with two col-
oured pictures, 13 lithographs, 25 woodcuts and two steel-engravings (these last 
were not based on Rosti's photographs but the editor bought the publishing right 
of the engravings of J. M. Rugendas from the G. G. Lange Verlag in Darmstadt).10 
Cuban Impressions 
At the end of a pleasant three-days voyage, embarking from New Orleans, Pál 
Rosti disembarked in Havana on 12 January 1857 and he left the island on 12 
March 1857 for Venezuela via St. Thomas. His book makes it clear that originally 
he had intended to spend only two weeks in Cuba. We do not know what made 
him change his mind, why he stayed much longer. He mentions, that he had 
planned to travel also in the inner parts of the island and wanted to see other fa-
mous towns apart from Havana e. g. Trinidad and Sant-Yago de Cuba (sic!) but 
"shortage of time and other circumstances" kept him from doing so.11 The in-
creasing danger of yellow fever and the growing heat are given as reasons for his 
departure: he had not yet got used to the extreme heat of the climate and thought 
it safer and better spend the high summer in Caracas located at a higher altitude. 
The Cuba part of the Memories of Travels... can be read as an intelligent snap-
shot recording the impressions of two months. This snapshot raises at least two 
intriguing questions. 
The first one asks how authentic Rosti's pieces of information were for his 
contemporaries, how valid in the long run his statements and judgments were 
based on two months' experiences remembering that his book was the main 
source of information about Cuba's social and economic system for the Hungar-
ian reading public.12 
10 Kineses, 25. 
11 Rosti, Uti emlékezetek..., 32. 
12 Information about Cuba were not abundant in nineteenth-century Hungary. Readers 
could use some geographical works like the General or Universal Geography by Can-
nabich (Pest, 1817.) translated by István Czövek into Hungarian; or the Manual of Geo-
graphy (Pest, 1831) by Elek Zádor which gave the geography of the countries of the 
world after foreign models. Every now and then a newspaper article was published 
about the island (e. g. a description of Havana by an unknown refugee of 1848 in the 20 
July 1850 issue of the Pesti Hírlap [Pest Journal]. Still, until the publication of Rosti's 
book Cuba was terra incognita for the Hungarian public. 
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The second one asks how far Rosti's book can serve as a historical source for 
present day research. Does it offer information which confirms, colours or modi-
fies the results of modern historiography? Would it be worthwhile for Cuban 
historiography to rely more heavily on Rosti's vision of Cuba and to incorporate 
it into works analysing mid-nineteenth century problems? This second set of 
questions attracts two comments at the very beginning. Latin American research 
in Hungary is of course well acquainted with Rosti's book and relies on it when 
dealing with nineteenth-century problems of the continent. The best example is 
Tibor Wittman's book Latin-Amerika története (A History of Latin America) in 
which Rosti is quoted in both the Venezuela and Mexico parts.13 Also, the Cuba 
chapters of the Memories of Travels... are not completely unknown in Cuba. Salva-
dor Bueno's book Cinco siglos de relaciones entre Hungría y América Latinau gives an 
ample and basically correct survey of Rosti's book and goes into details about the 
Cuba chapters though his interpretation is partly (but not completely) based on 
Wittman's study published in Spanish.15 However, as far as we know, in spite of 
Salvador Bueno's pioneering work Rosti's book has not left its mark on Cuban 
historiography in the last quarter century and has not been used in works ana-
lyzing the problems of the mid-nineteenth century.16 So we feel encouraged to at-
tempt within the confines of a short paper to introduce and interpret the Cuba 
chapters of the Memories of Travels..., being fully aware that a really successful in-
troduction to the international research community would demand the publica-
tion of Rosti's book in Spanish or in English. 
Pál Rosti's book Memories of Travels in America contains eight chapters dealing 
with Cuba: 
I. Habana leírása általában (General Description of Havana) 
II. Egy vasárnap Habanában (Sunday in Havana) 
III. Habana égalja. Sárgaláz (The Climate of Havana. Yellow fever) 
IV. Czukor-ültetvények. Czukorgyártás (Sugar Plantations. Fabrication of 
Sugar) 
V. Rabszolgaság (Slavery) 
13 T. Wittman, Latin Amerika története. [A History of Latin America] Budapest 1971, 150, 
270, 292-293, 329. A Spanish version of this book was published as well. Ádám An-
derle's book (Szabadságra született Amerikánk [Our America Born to be Free] Budapest, 
1983), deals with Rosti's impressions in Mexico. There exist many scattered references 
to Rosti which emphasize his photographic work but do not deal with the main work, 
the Memories of Travels... 
14 S. Bueno, Cinco siglos de relaciones entre Hungría y América Latina. Budapest 1977. Bueno 
introduces Rosti's book in general, and on pp. 115-117 he gives a more detailed de-
scription about the Cuba chapters. 
15 See T. Wittman, Observaciones de un viajero húngaro sobre la Venezuela de los últimos años 
de Monagas. Foreword to the 1968 Venezuelan edition of Rosti's work. 
16 The literature on Rosti has about one notable Cuban reference apart from Bueno's 
book. A study was published by Maria Eugenia Haya (Apuntes para una historia de la 
fotografía en Cuba, Casa de las Americas, 1979.) which mentioned Rosti as one of the 
pioneers of scientific photography. C. p. Kineses, 9. 
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VI. Szabad szerecsenyek s kevert vérűek (Free Blacks and Mixed Races) 
VIL Szabad telepítvények (Free Settlers) 
Vili. Dohány és szivargyártás (Tobacco, and Fabrication of Cigars) 
The ninth chapter (Habanából St. Thomas és La Guayrába - From Havana to 
St. Thomas and la Guayra), closing the first part, deals less with Cuba its main 
interest being the voyage to Venezuela. In it Rosti draws a very vivid picture of 
travelling conditions in the Caribbean with great emphasis on the advancement 
of shipping, stating that "one can leave Havana any week by steamliner not to 
mention the numerous sailing ships leaving each day towards each part of the 
world."1 7 It is clear from the text that Havana had far better communication with 
the USA than with Spain: meanwhile steamliners go to New Orleans and New 
York twice a month, to Mobile and Charlestown once a month, to Cádiz only one 
ship per month. 
The Cuba part of the Memories of Travels... is the best-written and most homo-
geneous part of Rosti's book considered as a narrative literary text. It is also en-
igmatic and mysterious in a way. 
It is mysterious because in contrast with the parts dealing with Venezuela and 
Mexico the author does not refer either to his ideal Humboldt or to any other 
authors or sources.18 Nevertheless, he most certainly used some and did not re-
strict himself to his own notes. The details of contracts with Chinese coolies or 
some data in the chapter about tobacco cultivation betray it. But in this homoge-
neous narrative text he does not quote even his own notes or his letters sent to 
Hungary though in other parts of the book this happens several times.19 
The text is mysterious also because it displays a Cuba without history. Rosti 
does not write anything about the history of the island, his work is a snapshot in 
the true sense of Havana and her surroundings. This is remarkable because in the 
Venezuela part he does not only describe the dictatorship of president Monagas 
but briefly relates the history of the country's becoming independent. As for the 
history of Mexico, he gives quite a detailed account and dwells on the country's 
political life and institutions in a separate chapter. In the case of Cuba not much 
more than casual remarks refer to the island being a colony of Spain or inform the 
reader that the governor, the captain-general of the island is General Jozé (sic!) de 
la Concha at the time of Rosti's visit.20 
17 Rosti, Uti emlékezetek..., 32. 
18 Rosti quotes Lucas Alaman's book "História de Megico" (sic!). He refers to Humboldt 
several times (e. g. Rosti, Uti emlékezetek..., 45, 70, 139, etc.). He quotes the 1856 
Mexican statistics on demography referring to the newspaper Noticias de la ciudad de 
Mexico. 
19 He recalls his trip to the Llanos by referring to his diary, even the title of the chapter is 
"A Trip to Llanos after my Diary." See Rosti, Úti emlékezetek..., 79-90. Several times he 
quotes his letters sent to Hungary! E. g. he builds into the text a letter sent from the is-
land of St. Thomas (op. ext., 103-104.) and another from Mexico (op. cit., 166-167.) in 
which he analyzes the political situation of lanuary 1858. 
20 Rosti, Uti emlékezetek..., 12. 
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Rosti does not write about the political problems of the colonial system. His 
readers learn nothing about the great slave rebellions of the previous decades or 
about annexionism, the Creole political ambition to solve the problems of the is-
land by joining the United States.21. There's no doubt that Rosti arrived at Havana 
in a blessed period of tranquility, of political standstill. But it is hard to believe 
that he did not know about the political problems of the island since he had pre-
pared for the trip in New Orleans, one of the centres of annexionist Cuban emi-
gration. Prior to this, during his travels in the United States he probably met 
a considerable number of Hungarian emigrants, and in New Orleans too, he was 
the guest of his former teacher, Antal Vállas. It is hard to believe that he did not 
hear about the expeditions of Narciso López to liberate Cuba and about the 
members of the Hungarian emigration who had taken part in the last revolution-
ary action.22 True, by 1855 the first wave of annexionism had calmed down, the 
organizations of Cuban emigrants in the USA dissolved. But in Cuba the move-
ment was most probably a frequent topic of conversation especially after the 
Pintó plot revealed in 1855.23 We do not know whether lack of knowledge or 
some other reason made Rosti avoid political problems in the Cuban part. We 
suppose that the main reason was of a political nature. While criticising sharply 
Mexican and Venezuelian politics the author did not want to enter into discuss-
ing delicate problems concerning the interests of a European power which was 
on friendly terms with Austria. 
Finally, Rosti's Cuba-image is mysterious because he writes almost nothing 
about his social connections. Presumably he had entry into the so called "good 
society" and acquired most of his information from these circles. Also he was in 
touch with members of the plantation aristocracy. But we almost know nothing 
about his actual acquaintances in Havana. 
A survey of the chapters of Rosti's book reveals that he was interested in three 
major topics in Cuba. The compulsory topic of travel books comes first: the de-
scription of the host city and its social life. Secondly, he gives an account of the 
economic characteristics and specificities of the country. The chapters dealing 
with sugar processing and the tobacco industry serve this purpose. Last but not 
least, and in close connection with this former subject, he deals with the problems 
of coloured people which can be read - from another point of view - as an at-
tempt to analyze the labour force problems of Cuba. The detailed analysis of 
slavery, the description of the social status of free Blacks and Mulattoes and the 
special problems raised by the importation of a labour force - the coolies - from 
China give evidence about this third field of his interest. 
21 Cf. L. Bethell, ed., Cuba. A short History. Cambridge, 1993, 10-20; F. Portuondo, Historia 
de Cuba 1492-1898. La Habana 1965, 345-418; R. Guerra Y Sánchez, Manual de historia de 
Cuba. La Habana 1971,553-643. 
22 Cf. Á. Anderle, "A 48-as magyar emigráció és Nárciso López 1851-es kubai expedí-
ciója," [The Hungárián Emigration of 1848 and Narciso López' Cuban Expedition of 
1851] Századok 107 (1973), 687-709. 
23 Cf. Portuondo, op. ext., 371-372. 
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Rosti judges Havana beautiful but dirty. "The streets of the inner town are 
narrow, filthy and dark, the pavements are unusually narrow and one has to be 
on guard all the time in fear of being run down by the 'volante' equipped with 
broad wheelbase." (. . .) "Filth and untidiness belong to the character of Havana. 
Ugly half-naked children are rolling around on the ground with negritos,.."24 On 
the other hand he finds very attractive the promenade dividing the old inner and 
the new outer town (paseo de Isabel II-da) and the streets of the rapidly developing 
outer parts especially the so-called calzadas (Calzada de la reina, Calzada del monte) 
fringed with trees and bungalows in Italian style.25 
Havana people appear in Rosti's book as friendly and hospitable though 
somewhat untidy in the daytime. Women receive their visitors with loose hair, 
wearing dressing-gown and slippers, without stockings and over-garments. They 
dress up properly only in the evening when they drive out in the volante to shop 
or to take a walk.26 
Rosti was fascinated by the volante, this vehicle "constructed denying all the 
known laws of equilibrium" and very characteristic of Cuba. He gives a thorough 
and detailed description of it and thinks it fit even to be a part of the coat-of-arms 
of the city.27 
As for work, the morning hours were regarded as the most intensive in Ha-
vana. Rosti gives a very vivid and lifelike descriptions of the market place and 
the harbour. The European traveller (and his readers) found it strange that cattle 
were butchered in the market place and cows were milked there, under the eyes 
of the customers. The bread-seller (panadero), the poultry-seller and the fodder-
seller (malojero) carrying a whole stack on his horse are introduced as well.28 
In Rosti's book the readers could follow a complete Havana Sunday. The day 
started between 6 and 9 in the morning going to church, at 11 people crowded in 
the Valle de Gallos where the big national entertainment, cockfighting started. At 4 
pm. the other major entertainment, bullfighting invited the public. About five 
o'clock the good society's favourite pastime commenced: splendid volantes in-
vaded the Paseo de Tacon and everybody went for a ride. Public entertainments 
ended in the Plaza de Armas where next to the governor's palace an excellent 
military band gave a concert at 8 pm. each day.29 
However, descriptions of cockfights, bullfight, pleasure-driving are perhaps 
less interesting for the reader of our day than Rosti's account of a religious serv-
ice. Havana in the mid-century seems much more religious than in later years. 
Rosti was surprised to see that in the Havana churches no chairs or benches were 
provided. The maids of the ladies going to church carried carpets and small 
chairs and the women - ladies and black maids alike - settled themselves in the 
24 Rosti, Uti emlékezetek..., 4-5. 
2s Ibid., 5. 
2* Ibid., 5. 
27 Ibid., 4. 
28 Ibid., 10-11. 
29 Ibid., 6-12. 
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centre of the church on these carpets. The gentlemen were standing or kneeling at 
the sidewalls. Church music was also a surprise to Rosti. On the one hand he 
could hardly bear the very special interpretation of the black orchestra playing 
the masses of Haydn or Mozart, on the other hand he had to listen often to fash-
ionable Italian opera-pieces on the church organ during the service.30 
Church was one of the scenes of temporary earthly equality. The cockfight 
was the other. In the viñadero all differences of rank melted away, high class gen-
tlemen cheered and shouted together with low class people in common excite-
ment and bets were even made for large sums between people of very different 
social status. These oral bargains were held in respect, the looser paid. But at the 
end of the cockfight the short-term acquaintances were over.31 
Describing Havana life, Rosti adds lots of details to the picture of American 
influence though he does not mention that, by that time, the US was the most im-
portant consumer of Cuban sugar. But we can learn from his book that in the fi-
nancial chaos of the island the US dollar (called: peso sencillo) and its change, the 
dime had become more and more frequently used as currency. In the more dis-
tinguished Cuban houses American rocking chairs gave comfort to the inhabitants. 
Havana was a popular winter resort for wealthy American ladies, and in the 
fashionable cafés like the Dominica the excellent ice cream was kept cold with the 
help of ice imported from the lakes around Boston. The Cuban rail system fol-
lowed the American model, the locomotives and carriages were purchased in the 
US.32 
Relying on Tibor Wittman's works Hungarian writers tend to emphasize that 
Pál Rosti suggests a brighter, more optimistic vision of Cuban society and the 
economy than of Venezuela or Mexico which were independent countries but 
struggling with deep political crisis. This opinion is doubtless an authentic one 
though we think that Rosti shunned political problems intentionally. On the 
other hand we know that in the first couple of months in 1857 the island was po-
litically stable after the uproar of the annexionist movement had calmed down 
and also the blessings of an economic boom, the prospering sugar industry could 
have been felt since 1855. The Crimean war increased demands and crisis was not 
approaching until the summer of 1857 when Rosti had already left. In the sum-
mer a considerable number of plantation owners became ruined in a short time 
and some banks depending on the boom went bankrupt as well.33 But Rosti vis-
ited a sugar factory, the ingenio Isabel in January 1857.34 So we can say that he 
made a snapshot of the sugar industry as well in the last favourable stage of a pe-
riod of boom. 
30 Ibid., 6-7. 
31 Ibid., 7-8. 
32 Ibid., 4,5,12,15-16. 
33 See Guerra, 566-568; J. Le Riverend, Historia económica de Cuba. La Habana 1974, 358-
363. 
34 Rosti, Uti emlékezetek..., 15-19. 
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Rostí describes in detail a typical half-mechanized sugar factory. The ingenio 
Isabel was a terminal in 1857 for the railway line starting from Havana and later 
going towards Matanzas via Güines.35 Also it lent its name to a nearby settlement 
La Isabel still existing in our day.36 So Rosti's book can offer an interesting source 
to Cuban researchers dealing with local history. The plantation supplying the 
sugar factory extended to cc. 50 caballería (c. 670 hectares) and altogether 400 
slaves (including women and children) lived and worked on it. The ingenio Isabel 
belonged to the old-type sugar factories which produced the bulk of Cuban 
sugar. Sugar-cane was squeezed already with the help of steam-engines but the 
other phases of the technology - condensing the guarapo, cleaning and refining 
the raw sugar, etc. - were done in the traditional way about which Rosti gave 
a fairly exact description. Rosti visited the nearby sugar factory Unión as well 
which was more modern, equipped with vacuum-boilers, steam-pumps and 
centrifuge, with gas-light installed in the factory buildings, the batey. The work of 
the approximately 500 slaves of this factory was less exhausting according to 
Rosti than the work of their fellows in the ingenio Isabel. 50-60 Chinese workers 
were employed as well especially for the more delicate tasks. Rosti also heard 
about even greater ingenios much better equipped. In these the buildings and ma-
chines themselves were worth more than a million pesos and they yielded almost 
as much to their owners in a year37 
So Rosti experienced the metamorphosis of the sugar industry which was ac-
celerating in the 1850s.38 Thirty years earlier the wilderness had reigned in the 
place of the ingenio Isabel. It began to flourish in 1849 when the railway reached 
the plantation. In the second half of 1850s, according to Rosti, the ingenio Isabel se-
cured an average of 300,000 forint, c. 150,000 dollar (peso sencillo) as income to its 
owner who is referred to in the book as "Don C. F.". This was regarded as a rela-
tively modest income - "una renta regular" - among plantation owners.39 
Visiting the ingenio Isabel made it possible for Rosti to encounter directly the 
problem of slavery to which a long part is dedicated in the book.40 The owner of 
the ingenio Isabel tried to convince his guest that his slaves were happy and slav-
ery was a form of good luck, a life without daily problems. Rosti severely rejects 
this general Cuban opinion and the system of slavery as well. The most revolting 
element of slavery for him is the fact that a human being is compelled to place his 
whole life at someone else's disposal because God created him black.41 Rosti ac-
cepts some of the stereotypes characteristic of his age, e. g. he believes that col-
as Cf. O. Zanetti, O.-A. García, Caminos para el azúcar. La Habana 1987,27-63, 69. 
36 See Atlas de Cuba. La Habana 1978,118-119. 
37 Rosti, Uti emlékezetek..., 19 
38 Cf. Le Riverend op. ext., 151-173, and M. Moreno Fraginals, El ingenio. Complejo 
económico social cubano del azúcar. La Habana 1978, Vol. I—III. This is the best work 
known to us about the Cuban sugar industry. 
39 Rosti, Uti emlékezetek..., 19. 
40 Ibid., 17,20-23, etc. 
41 Ibid., 20. 
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oured people are less intelligent than whites but he is sure that this is the conse-
quence of maltreatment and the lack of education. He thinks Cuban slavery alto-
gether milder than the North American, especially the Louisiana version. In Cuba 
the work at the sugar plantations is the most exhausting. Rosti gives a detailed 
account of the five month long zafra, the sugar-cane harvest, about the hard work 
done in six-hour shifts almost without a break. The building where the slaves live 
on the ingenio Isabel is like a prison, "the rooms of the Blacks are miserable holes, 
dark cells."42 Urban slaves lived in better circumstances especially if they were 
good cooks, coachmen or masters of some other important trade. Such a skilled 
slave was worth 1,500-2,000 dollars in the second half of the 1850s.43 
Pál Rosti did not see any chance for the abolition of slavery as an institution. 
But he thought the humanity of the Havana people promising; they treated their 
slaves "kindly" and often gave them their liberty. The other way towards liberty 
was the so-called coartación. This old invention gave the possibility for self-libera-
tion to the slave as once he had saved 50 dollars he could make his master deter-
mine the sum of his ransom and start the manumission procedure based on pay-
ing installments. 
As a consequence of these two possibilities and of demographic growth the 
number of free Blacks and Mulatoes was steadily growing in Havana, and a good 
number of important professions were mainly in their hands. This group pro-
duced the majority of musicians whose art was much disliked by Rosti who was 
well educated in music but starting from the world of European harmonics he 
did not understand and therefore did not enjoy Cuban music. But he thought that 
racial prejudices against free blacks were weaker in Cuba than in the USA so 
there was a chance in the society for the peaceful and free coexistence of whites 
and blacks in the long run.44 
The chapter describing the situation of the Chinese labour force is very im-
portant as a historical source. The Hungarian traveller most certainly was one of 
the first foreign observers of this as the importation of Chinese coolies had started 
only ten years earlier, in 1847, to lessen the increasing shortage in the labour 
force.45 The first "contractual slaves" had been liberated not much earlier than 
Rosti's visit. Rosti is exceedingly well informed on this field. Forinstance he de-
scribes the contents of the contracts much the same way as historiography does 
today (8 years of work, 4 pesos wage per month, obligatory place of work, etc.) 
and draws the conclusion that within the confines of these contracts the Chinese 
"are actual slaves for 8 years."46 Their assimilation into Cuban society seemed to 
be difficult, their work produced profit only for plantation owners, tobacco fac-
« Ibid., 17. 
43 Ibid., 22. 
44 Cf. ibid., 24-26. 
45 Cf. e. g. P. Deschamps Chapeaux-J. Pérez De La Riva, Contribución a la historia de la 
gente sin historia. La Habana 1974,115-162,191-250. 
46 Rosti, Uti emlékezetek..., 26. 
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tory owners and for trading houses specializing in the importation of Chinese 
(e. g. Cambell el Comp., mentioned by Rosti). 
Pál Rosti closes the book on his Cuban peregrination with a optimistic chapter 
about the second biggest branch of the Cuban economy namely the tobacco in-
dustry.47 He stresses the exquisite quality of the Vuelta de abajo (sic!) tobacco pro-
duced mainly by smallholders. According to his information this tobacco grow-
ing region gave work for c. 60-70,000 people in the mid-1850s. A detailed de-
scription is given of the sorting of tobacco leaves and the preparations for pro-
ducing cigars. The major phases of production, are explained, and we learn that 
150 tobacco factories worked in Havana including around 30 first class ones. The 
two great rivals were Cabanas and Partagas. The letter produced the "Figaro" 
brand highly approved by the author. 
With the last snapshot closing the chapter Pál Rosti, the Hungarian pioneer of 
popularizing Latin America in writing and pictures shows us a smoking Havana. 
A city where everybody (men and women alike) everywhere and almost all the 
time smoke: life goes on with a tabaco (cigar) between the lips. But in this very last 
picture - as a sign of the changing times - in the parlours of the ladies the cigarette 
makes its appearance, waste tobacco-bits wrapped in paper made by Spanish 
soldiers in their spare time.48 
47 ibid., 28-31. 
48 Ibid; 31. 
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Im Februar 1922 wurde die Einheitspartei [Egységes Párt] vom Ministerpräsiden-
ten Gr. István Bethlen und von dem Bauernpolitiker István Nagyatádi Szabó, 
dem Präsidenten der Kleinlandwirtepartei (Kisgazdapárt), gegründet. Diese wurde 
eines der wichtigen Elemente der Konsolidierung des politischen Lebens. Man 
kann sogar behaupten, dass Bethlen und Nagyatádi durch die Gründung dieser 
Partei - durch diese Art und Weise der Machtausübung - eine Regierungspartei 
ins Leben gerufen hatten, worauf sich die politische Elite stützen konnte. Die 
Elite passte sich den Veränderungen der innenpolitischen Kräfteverhältnisse an, 
wodurch sie den Staat bis 1944 im Wesentlichen ohne größere politische Krisen 
führen konnte. Die Bedeutung der Einheitspartei für die Politikgeschichte wurde 
jedoch von den Historikern weder in der Zwischenkriegszeit noch in der Zeit des 
Staatssozialismus noch nach der Wende entsprechend beachtet. Wegen des Man-
gels an Grundforschung sind die Meinungen der Historiker, die die Synthesen 
schreiben, weder über den Zeitpunkt der Gründung der Einheitspartei, noch 
über den Eintritt von Bethlen und der Gruppe der Dissidenten in die Partei der 
Kleinlandwirte, noch dessen Umgang identisch. Die genauere historiographische 
Darstellung dieser Probleme kann hier - wegen des begrenzten Umfanges - nicht 
durchgeführt werden. Deswegen sind nur die Autoren und deren Synthesen zi-
tiert, die für unser Thema aus dem Aspekt der historiographischen Forschung 
wichtig sind, und über die Gründung der Einheitspartei gegensätzliche und so-
gar in sich widerspüchliche Darstellungen bieten. Ich möchte damit ihre Stand-
punkte diskutieren und so meine Thesen darlegen. 
Sándor Pethő schrieb in seinem Buch Világostól Trianonig (Von Világos bis 
nach Trianon), das 1925 erschien: „am 5. Januar [1922] traten Bethlen und die ihn 
unterstützenden Dissidenten in die Partei von Nagyatádi ein." Er datierte die 
Gründung der Einheitspartei auf diesen Zeitpunkt.1 Dezső Nemes stimmte einer-
1 S. Pethő, Világostól Trianonig. A mai Magyarország kialakulásának története. [Von Világos 
bis nach Trianon. Die Geschichte der Entstehung des heutigen Ungarns] Budapest 
1925, S. 335 
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seits in seiner 1956 herausgegebenen Studie, die als Prolog zu einer Quellenaus-
gabe verfasst wurde, damit überein, namentlich, dass „der Eintritt von Bethen 
und seiner Gruppe in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte" am 5. Januar geschehen sei. 
Andererseits schrieb er auch, dass „die Dissidenten unter Bethlens Führung am 
2. Februar [1922] in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte einzogen." Unter den Dokumen-
ten kann ein am 2. Februar 1922 erschienener Bericht von der Ungarischen Nach-
richtenagentur (Magyar Távirati Iroda; MTI) gefunden werden, der uns „über die 
Vereinigung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte mit der Gruppe der Dissidenten"2 in-
formiert. 
Diese widerspruchsvollen Behauptungen führten dazu, dass in der Synthese 
des zweibändigen Magyarország története (Geschichte Ungarns) - dessen Chef-
redakteur Erik Molnár war, und das im Jahre 1964 und 1967 veröffentlicht wurde 
- steht, dass „Bethlen und die Politiker um ihn am 5. Januar 1922 zum Abendes-
sen der Partei der Kleinlandwirte erschienen, und ihren Beitritt ankündigten." Im 
chronologischen Durchblick dieser Ausgabe steht, dass die Einheitspartei am 
5. Januar 1922 gegründet worden sei.3 Ich löste diese historiographischen Wider-
sprüche in meinem 1973 erschienenen Essai unter dem Titel A Kisgazdapárt kor-
mánypárttá bővülése (Die Erweiterung der Kleinlandwirtepartei zur Regierungs-
partei) auf, indem ich bewies: 1) Am 5. Januar zeigte Bethlen am Abendessen der 
Partei der Kleinlandwirte nur das an, dass „ich persönlich und auch meine 
Freunde sich mit dieser Partei fusionieren wollen." 2) Die Partei der Kleinland-
wirte nahm schon am 25. Januar das Attribut „bürgerlich" an. 3) Bethlen und die 
Dissidenten schlössen sich am 2. Februar 1922 der Partei der Kleinlandwirte an, 
und dadurch wurde die Einheitspartei gegründet. 4) Dieser Prozess und auch der 
nachkommende Eintritt in die Partei - kurz, aber doch nicht genau ausgedrückt -
können als die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Regierungspartei be-
schrieben werden.4 
Im 1976 veröffentlichten achten Band des zehnbändigen Magyarország története 
(Geschichte Ungarns) - dessen Redakteur György Ránki, Tibor Hajdú und Lóránt 
Tilkovszky waren - ist nicht genau beschrieben, wann die Einheitspartei gegrün-
det wurde. Hier wurde nur festgestellt, dass Bethlen „seine Vorstellungen dem 
Vorsitzenden der Partei der Kleinlandwirte vom 5. Januar 1922 an mehrmals dar-
stellte, und endlich hat man eine Vereinbarung über den organisatorischen Rah-
men der neuen Regierungspartei am 23. Februar 1922 getroffen." Im chronologi-
schen Durchblick kann nur gelesen werden, dass am 5. Januar 1922 „Bethlens er-
ste bedeutende Rede beim Abendessen der Partei der Kleinlandwirte im Interesse 
2 D. Nemes, „A fasiszta rendszer kiépítése és a nép nyomora Magyarországon 1921-1924," 
[Der Ausbau des Faschismus und das Elend des Volkes in Ungarn 1921-1924] in Iratok 
az ellenforradalom történethez 1919-1945,2. Bd, Budapest 1956, S. 63,65,265. 
3 E. Molnár, Chefred., E. Pamlényi, Gy. Székely, Red., Magyarország története [Geschichte 
Ungarns] 2. Bd, Budapest 1967, 380-381, S. 586. 
4 J. Sipos, „A Kisgazdapárt kormánypárttá bővülése," [Die Erweiterung der Kleinland-
wirtepartei zur Regierungspartei] in A Szegedi Tanárképző Főiskola Tudományos Diák-
köreinek Kiadványai. Red. J. Kóbor und J. Sipos, Szeged 1973, S. 45-61. 
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der Gründung der Einheitspartei gehalten wurde." 5 Ferenc Pölöskei schrieb in 
seinem Buch Horthy és hatalmi rendszere 1919-1922 (Horthy und sein Machtsystem 
1919-1922) - das 1977 erschien - dass Bethlen „seine Partei am 23. Februar 1922 
gleichzeitig mit der Liquidation der Partei der Kleinlandwirte gründete." An die-
sem Tag sei nämlich das Präsidium der Einheitspartei gewählt worden.6 
Im Gegenteil dazu kann im von Péter Gunst zusammengestellten Magyar törté-
nelmi kronológia. Az őstörténettől 1970-ig (Ungarische geschichtliche Chronologie. 
Von der Vorgeschichte an bis zum 1970) gelesen werden, dass „István Bethlen 
und seine Parteigänger (die ehemaligen Dissidenten) am 5. Januar 1922 z u m 
Abendessen der Partei der Kleinlandwirte erschienen, und dann am 2. Februar 
der Partei der Kleinlandwirte beitraten, die unter dem Namen Christliche Klein-
wirt-, Landwirt- und Bürgerpartei (Einheitspartei) zur einzigen Regierungspartei 
wurde."7 Diese Ansicht ist auch in dem Kapitel von Ignác Romsics präsentiert, 
das in der 1985 veröffentlichten von Sándor Balogh redigierten Synthese unter 
dem Titel Magyarország a XX. században (Ungarn im 20. Jahrhundert) erschien: 
Seiner Meinimg nach konnte es Bethlen nur nach heftigen Diskussionen schaffen, 
„am 2. Februar 1922 gemeinsam mit weiteren 20 konservativen und konservativ-
liberalen Abgeordneten durch die Partei der Kleinlandwirte als Mitglied aufge-
nommen und als „Führer" anerkannt zu werden."8 
Gegen diese Behauptungen und Datierungen erschienen im Handbuch Ma-
gyarország történeti kronológiája (Geschichtliche Chronologie Ungarns), das von 
Kálmán Benda zusammengestellt und vom Verlag Akadémia 1982 herausgege-
ben wurde, neue Thesen: „Bethlen teilte [am 5. Januar 1922] im Klub der Partei 
der Kleinlaridwirte den Wunsch mit, die Christlich-nationalistische Vereinigungs-
partei mit der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zu vereinigen." A m 22. Februar 1922 
„vereinigte sich die Christlich-nationalistische Vereinigungspartei mit der Partei 
der Kleinlandwirte. Der neue Parteiname: Christliche Kleinwirt-, Landwirt- und 
Bürgerpartei." (Das sich um diesen Zeitraum handelnde Kapitel wurde von Judit 
Fejes zusammengestellt.)9 Ignác Romsics sah in seiner 1991 veröffentlichten erfolg-
reichen Bethlen-Biographie, dass „das wesentliche der neuen Vorstellungen [des 
Ministerpräsidenten seit Ende 1921] der Bruch mit den Legitimen... und ... die 
Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Regierungspartei war." Demnach 
„unterschrieben die Mitglieder der Gruppe der Dissidenten am 1. Februar ihre 
5 Magyarország története 1918-1919, 1919-1945. [Geschichte Ungarns 1918-1919, 1919-
1945] Gy. Ránki, Chefred., T. Hajdu und L. Tilkovszky, Red. Budapest 1976, S. 445, 
1244. 
6 F. Pölöskey, Horthy és hatalmi rendszere 1919-1922. [Horthy und sein Machtsystem 
1919-1922] Budapest 1977, S. 189. 
7 P. Gunst, Red. Magyar történelmi kronológia. Az őstörténettől 1970-ig. [Ungarische ge-
schichtliche Chronologie. Von der Vorgeschichte an bis zum 1970] Budapest 1979, 
S. 475. 
8 S. Balogh et al. Magyarország a XX. században. [Ungarn im 20. Jahrhundert] Budapest 
1985, S. 133. 
9 K. Benda, Chefred. Magyarország történeti kronológiája 1848-1944. [Geschichtliche Chro-
nologie Ungarns] 3 Bd, Budapest 1982, S. 884. 
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Beitrittserklärung und schlössen sich formal [an die Partei der Kleinlandwirte] 
an", aus der durch diese Art Lind Weise die Einheitspartei wurde.10 Im Gegenteil 
dazu wird im von Jenő Gergely, Ferenc Glatz und Ferenc Pölöskei zusammenge-
stellten Handbuch Magyarországi pártprogramok 1919-1944 (Parteiprogramme in 
Ungarn 1919-1944) behauptet, dass Bethlen „am 5. Januar 1922 mitteilte: seine 
Partei, die Christlich-nationale Vereinigungspartei [KNEP] will sich mit der Par-
tei der Kleinlandwirte vereinigen," in die er mit Hilfe der ehemaligen Politiker 
aus der Arbeitspartei „die Kleinlandwirte integriert hat, die die Selbständigkeits-
bestrebungen der Kleingrundbesitzer vor Augen haben. Die Partei wurde offizi-
ell am 22. Februar 1922 unter dem Namen Christliche Kleinwirt-, Landwirt- und 
Bürgerpartei (mit bekannterem Namen: Einheitspartei) gegründet."11 
Diese Behauptungen sind fast in jeder Synthese rezipiert worden.12 Es kann 
noch im 1998 herausgegebenen Buch Magyarország a két világháború korában 1914-
1945 (Ungarn in der Zwischenkriegszeit 1914-1945) von Mária Ormos, die diesen 
Zeitraum ausgezeichnet kennt, gelesen werden, dass Bethlen „Anfang Januar 
1922 den Klub der Partei aufsuchte, und bekannt machte, seine eigene Partei, die 
Christlich-nationale Vereinigungspartei, mit den Kleinlandwirte vereinigen zu 
wollen. Das hieß praktisch, dass der Ministerpräsident mit seinem etwa zwei 
Dutzend Anhängern am 22. Februar 1922 der Partei der Kleinlandwirte beitrat 
und die neue Organisation den Namen Christliche Kleinwirt-, Landwirt- und 
Bürgerpartei aufnahm." (Hervorhebung von mir - J. S.) Im Widerspruch dazu 
wird im chronologischen Teil behauptet, dass „István Bethlen und seine Anhän-
ger [am 2. Februar 1922] in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte eintraten, die den Namen 
Christliche Kleinwirt-, Landwirt- und Bürgerpartei aufnahm (im Allgemeinen ist 
die als Einheitspartei genannt)."13 Gegenüber der Ansicht von Mária Ormos und 
Ignác Romsics meinen Jenő Gergely und Pál Pritz in dem im selben Jahr veröf-
fentlichten Buch A trianoni Magyarország 1918-1945 (Trianoner Ungarn 1918-1945: 
„In der Fachliteratur ist die Konzeption bis heutzutage anzutreffen, dass Bethlen 
und seine direkten Gesinnungsgenossen sozusagen der Partei der Kleinlandwirte 
„beitraten", (Hervorhebung von mir - J. S.) dann organisierten sie die Einheits-
partei, die zukünftige Regierungspartei. In der Tat war gar nicht davon die Rede, 
sondern von der Vernichtung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte, die Marginalie von 
Nagyatádi und der gestiefelten Abgeordneten."14 Vielleicht schrieb aus diesem 
10 I. Romsics, Bethlen István. Poitikai életrajz. [István Bethlen. Politische Biographie] Buda-
pest 1991, S. 142,145. 
11 J. Gergely, F. Glatz, F. Pölöskei, Red. Magyarországi pártprogramok 1919-1944. [Partei-
programme in Ungarn 1919-1944] Budapest 1991, S. 64. 
12 I. Belényi-D. Gyapay, Magyarország rövid története. [Kurze Geschichte Ungarns] Buda-
pest 1992, S. 552; Zs. L. Nagy, Magyarország története 1918-1945. [Geschichte Ungarns] 
Debrecen 1995, S. 100; I. K. Tarsoly, Chefred. Magyarország a XX. században. [Ungarn im 
20. Jahrhundert] 1. Bd, Szekszárd 1996, S. 55. 
13 M. Ormos, Ungarn in der Zwischenkriegszeit 1914-1945. [Magyarország a két világ-
háború korában 1914-1945] Debrecen 1998, S. 101-102, 290. 
14 J. Gergely-P. Pritz, A trianoni Magyarország 1918-1945. [Trianoner Ungarn 1918-1945] 
Budapest 1998, S. 60. 
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Grund Ignác Romsics in seiner 1999 veröffentlichten hervorragenden Synthese 
Magyarország története a XX. században (Geschichte Ungarns im 20. Jahrhundert) 
auf folgende Art über diese Frage, um seine frühere Meinung zu korrigieren: 
„Gleichzeitig mit der Änderung des Wahlrechtes änderte Bethlen auch die bishe-
rige Parteistruktur. Im Laufe des Jahres 1922 schaffte er, beide große Parteien, die 
Vereinigte Partei der Kleinlandwirte (die war anders genannt - J. S.) und auch die 
Christlich-nationale Vereinigungspartei aufzulösen, und diese zum Teil zu ver-
schmelzen." (Hervorhebimg von mir - J. S.) Im chronologischen Durchblick steht 
auch schon bei ihm: „am 22. Februar 1922 wurde die Einheitspartei unter der 
Führung von István Bethlen gegründet.15 Jenő Gergely und Lajos Izsák beschrie-
ben in ihrem Buch A huszadik század története (Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts) 
die Schaffung der Einheitspartei auch als die Auflösung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte 
und der Christlich-nationalen Vereinigungspartei, sagten aber nichts über den Zeit-
punkt der Gründung dieser Partei.16 Im Gegenteil dazu kann in der 2001 veröf-
fentlichten Gyula Gömbös-Biographie von Jenő Gergely gelesen werden, dass 
„István Bethlen an der Spitze der Dissidenten in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte 
einzog, so dass die Einheitspartei durch die Vereinigung der Partei der Klein-
landwirte mit den Dissidenten entstand."17 
Dieser historiographische Überblick beweist, dass es über den Zeitpunkt, die 
Form und die Weise der Beurteilung der Gründimg der Einheitspartei nicht zum 
einheitlichen Standpunkt gekommen ist. Im Gegenteil! In der Fachliteratur findet 
man einander widersprechende Behauptungen. Es kommt aber auch vor, dass 
derselbe Autor zwei verschiedene Zeitpunkte der Organisierung der Einheits-
partei angab, bzw. seine ehemalige Meinung beurteilt. Aus der Fachliteratur 
könnten noch dazu ähnliche widersprüchliche Behauptungen zitiert werden. Da-
für gibt es hier und jetzt keine Möglichkeit, sie sind vielleicht auch überflüssig. In 
meinem Essai unternehme ich in Auseinandersetzung mit den oben genannten 
Bestimmungen folgende Beweisführungen: Die Christlich-nationalistische Verei-
nigurigspartei vereinigte sich nicht mit der Partei der Kleinlandwirte. Die Christ-
lich-nationalistische Vereinigungspartei war nicht Bethlens Partei. Anfang Januar 
1922 zogen sich Bethlen und seine Anhänger in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte 
nicht ein. Die Partei der Kleinlandwirte legte sich das Attribut bürgerlich nicht 
am 22. Februar. 1922 zu. Der Ministerpräsident mit seinen zweidutzend Anhänger 
trat in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte nicht am 22. Februar 1922 ein. Die Einheits-
partei wurde nicht am 22. Februar 1922 gegründet. Bethlen schaffte es nicht, die 
Partei der Kleinlandwirte aufzulösen und sie mit der KNEP zu verschmelzen. Die 
Einheitspartei wurde durch die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte ge-
15 I. Romsics, Magyarország története a XX. században. [Geschichte Ungarns im 20. Jahrhun-
dert] Budapest 1999, 224, S. 589. 
16 J. Gergely-L. Izsák, A huszadik század története. [Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts] Buda-
pest 2000, S. 61-62. 
17 J. Gergely, Gömbös Gyula. Politikai pályakép. [Gyula Gömbös. Politische Laufbahn] Buda-
pest 2001, S. 118-120. 
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gründet. Danach wollen wir die wichtigsten Thesen näher ins Auge fassen, die 
den in den Synthesen lesbaren Behauptungen widersprechen. 
* 
Erstens lohnt es sich klar zu machen, dass die KNEP nicht die Partei Bethlens 
war. Der Parteivorsitzende war bis zum 4. Januar 1922 Gyula Gr. Andrässy. Er 
teilte gerade am 4. Januar in der Sitzung der KNEP mit, dass er - wegen der 
Haltung einiger Parteimitglieder, wie sie sich bei der Anerkennimg des Dethroni-
sierungsgesetzes und danach benahmen - austreten würde. Er und seine könig-
streuen Gesinnungsgenossen attackierten auch am nächsten Tag in der National-
versammlung Bethlen und seine Regierung heftig, bzw. führten sie durch die 
Unterstützung der katholischen Priester eine weit verbreitete legitime Propa-
ganda im Staat. (Übrigens vereinigte sich Andrässy und seinen 10 königstreuen 
Abgeordneten am 15. Januar mit der Christlich-nationalen Partei von Friedrich, 
und gründeten die Christlich-nationalen Landwirt- und Bürgerpartei. Friedrich 
veröffentlichte die Gründimg am 21. Januar in der Sitzung im Abgeordneten-
haus.)1 8 Aus diesem Grund erschien Bethlen am Abend des 5. Januar zum 
Abendessen der Partei der Kleinlandwirte, wo er der legitimistischen Propa-
ganda den Kampf ansagte und zum Schluss seiner Rede meinte: „diese Partei ist 
der Fels, worauf das zukünftige Ungarn aufgebaut werden könnte (minutenlan-
ger Beifall), ich und meine Freünde wollen uns mit dieser Partei vereinigen. (Jubel. 
Die Parteimitglieder stehen wieder auf und jubeln begeistert dem Ministerpräsi-
denten zu.) Ich bitte euch das Gleiche zu tun. (Beifall und Jubeln ohne Ende.)"1 9 
(Hervorhebung von mir - J. S.) 
Wen hat er „Freunde" genannt? Was passierte danach? Die treuesten politi-
schen Freunde und Unterstützer des Ministerpräsidenten waren die Abgeordne-
ten der sogenannten Dissidenten, die schon früher aus der KNEP und der Partei 
der Kleinlandwirte ausgetreten waren, und schon eine Weile die Gründung der 
Einheitspartei angestrebt hatten. Sie äußerten sich auf der Sitzung am 6. Januar: 
„Dadurch, dass jeder in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte eintreten soll, kann die 
Einheitspartei nicht gegründet werden."20 Sie waren also in dieser Zeit noch ge-
gen die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Einheitspartei. Für die 
Aufklärung des Missverständnisses veröffentlichte die Ungarische Nachrichten-
agentur (MTI) am 7., dass Bethlen am 5. nur „die Bereitschaft mitteilte sich mit 
der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zu vereinigen."21 (Hervorhebung von mir - J. S.) A m 
5. Januar 1922 besuchte also Bethlen die Partei der Kleinlandwirte, aber er wollte 
diese nicht mit der KNEP, sondern mit seinen Freunden, also mit den Dissiden-
18 J. Kardos, Legitimizmus. Legitimista politikusok Magyarországon a két világháború között. 
[Legitimismus. Legitimistische Politiker in Ungarn in der Zwischenkriegszeitl Buda-
pest 1998, S. 84-91. 
19 Gróf Bethlen István beszédei és írásai. [István Gr. Bethlens Reden und Schritte] 1. Bd, Bu-
dapest 1933, S. 225. Siehe auch: A Kisgazda, 5. Januar 1922. 
20 Új Nemzedék, 8. Januar 1922. 
21 Pesti Napló, 8. Januar 1922. 
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ten vereinigen. Das zeigt also deutlich, dass zu der Zeit weder er, noch seine An-
hänger in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte eintreten wollten! 
Im Folgenden bezweifele ich also die Behauptung, dass die Partei der Klein-
landwirte am 22. Februar 1922 das Attribut bürgerlich angenommen hätte. Beth-
len versuchte Ende November 1921 seine eigene Einheitspartei aufgrund seines 
Programms und der Auflösung der Parteien zu gründen. Dagegen wollten 
Nagyatádi und seine Anhänger die Konzeption über die Erweiterung der Partei 
der Kleinlandwirte als alleinregierende Partei einsetzen und damit auch das Pro-
gramm und das Attribut „bürgerlich" annehmen. Bethlen und seine Anhänger 
wollten dies damals noch nicht.22 Nagyatádi und seine Anhänger waren nur un-
ter diesem Umstand bereit die Einheitspartei zu gründen. Dagegen traten drei 
Mitglieder der liberalen Gruppe aus der Partei aus. Die komplizierten und den 
ganzen Januar laufenden Verhandlungen wurden eng mit dem von Bethlen und 
Klebesberg unterstützten Gesetzvorschlag über das Wahlrecht verbunden. Da-
durch sollten - wie bekannt - die offenen Wahlen auf dem Land wieder einge-
führt werden. Nagyatádi und seine Anhänger waren aber zu dieser Zeit dagegen. 
Aus diesem Grund übte der neokonservativ-agrarische Flügel ihrer Partei, die 
Gruppe von Gömbös und Bethlen, Klebesberg, bzw. Horthy politischen Druck 
auf sie aus. Nach der am 25. Januar bei Horthy stattgefundenen Sitzung äußerte 
sich Bethlen: er sei jedoch für die auf dem Land offenen Wahlen, wie im Geset-
zesentwurf vorgeschlagen wurde, dessen Anerkennung aber die Regierung nicht 
von Parteien abhängig gemacht habe. In der Nationalversammlung soll also jeder 
nach seinem Gewissen stimmen. 
Das beruhigte den liberalen, agrardemokratischen Flügel der Partei der Klein-
landwirte, weil sie daran glaubten die Mehrheit für die Geheimabstimmung si-
chern zu können. Demzufolge wurde am selben Abend in der Sitzung der Partei 
die folgende wichtige Entscheidung getroffen: „Die Partei behauptet, als Verkör-
perung der offiziellen christlich-agrarischen Gedanken, die ehrliche Durchfüh-
rung der Bodenreform, die durch die Gesetze 1920/1. (Nationalversammlung) 
und 1920/XVII. (Kompetenz des Verwesers), und 1921/XLVII. (Dethronisierung) 
festgehalten wurde, gegen aus allen Richtungen kommenden Angriffe zu bewah-
ren. Die Zeit ist soweit, alle, die mit Gedanken der Partei einverstanden sind, in 
die Parteimitgliederschaft zu nehmen. Die Partei nimmt das Attribut „bürgerlich" 
an, wie das im Dezember 1921 beschlossen wurde und wartet mit brüderlicher 
Liebe auf alle aus der Schicht der Produktion und der geistigen Arbeit, die bereit 
sind mit den Millionen der Arbeiter der Agrarschicht zusammen, Hand in Hand 
für die Auferstehung und Stärkung des unabhängigen Ungarns zu arbeiten.23 
Der Kern dieses Beschlusses ist also, dass die Partei der Kleinlandwirte nur 
diejenigen in ihr Lager rief, die ihr Programm anerkennen, besonders die Durch-
führung des Bodenreform, den bisherigen Rahmen der Verfassung, die Erweite-
22 J. Sipos, „Nagyatádi Szabó István és a második Bethlen-kormány megalakulása," [Ist-
ván Nagyatádi Szabó und die Entstehung der zweiten Bethlens Regierung] Szabolcs-
Szatmár-Beregi Levéltári Évkönyv XV (2001), S. 155-286. 
23 Világ, 26. Januar 1922, Kisgazda 5. Februar 1922. 
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rung der Kompetenz des Verwesers und das Dethronisierungsgesetz. Letztes 
verhinderte den Eintritt der Königstreuen und Ultralegitimen, also der katholi-
schen und legitimen Großgrundbesitzer und des legitimen Klerus in die Partei. 
Die Erweiterung des Parteinamens um das Attribut bürgerlich heißt jedoch, dass 
es nicht um die Vernichtimg der Partei ging - wie es bisher in der Fachliteratur 
mehrheitlich behauptet war - , sondern um die Absicht ihrer Erweiterung zur Re-
gierungspartei. Worin lag also das Kompromiss? Worum es sich in der Stellung-
nahme nicht handelte: Sie föderte weder die geheimen Wahlrechte und die De-
mokratisierung der Verwaltung, noch das von Bethlen betriebene Reform des 
Herrenhauses. 
Die Partei der Kleinlandwirte legte sich also das Attribut bürgerlich nicht am 
22. Februar 1922, sondern am 25. Januar zu. Es geschah freiwillig, nach den Re-
geln der Innerparteidemokratie. Als Gegenleistung dafür drängte der liberale, 
agrardemokratische Flügel von Bethlen in der Nationalversammlung vom 26. Ja-
nuar auf die gesetzliche Anerkennung des Unfallversicherungszuschlages für 
Landarbeiter und Diener und die Beschleunigung der Verwirklichung des Bo-
denreformgesetzes. Sie akzeptierten, dass das Gesetz über die Wiederherstellung 
des Herrenhauses - das auch schon vor der öffentlichen Rechtskommission war -
in der Nationalversammlung besprochen wird. Das konnte aber nicht mehr im 
Februar 1922 geschehen. Dieser Gesetzvorschlag wurde von den Abgeordneten 
nur nach dem Tod Nagyatádis diskutiert, also nach dem 1. November 1924. 
Demnächst muss kurz bewiesen werden, dass der Ministerpräsident mit sei-
nen zwei dutzend Anhänger nicht am 22. Februar der Partei der Kleinlandwirte 
beitrat, sondern am 2. Februar. Hieraus schließe ich darauf, dass die Einheits-
partei am 2. Februar gegründet worden ist. Gleichzeitig muss auch das Missver-
ständnis behoben werden, dass die Anhänger des Ministerpräsidenten keine 
Mitglieder der KNEP waren. Den am 25. Januar anerkannten Beschluss der Partei 
der Kleinlandwirte sendete Nagyatádi am 28. im Namen der Parteivorsitzenden 
den Dissidenten. Er fügte einen Brief bei, worin er formulierte: „die Erweiterung 
des Parteirahmens" sei beschlossen worden und er hoffe auf die Verwirklichung 
der Vereinigung mit den Dissidenten, die bedingungslos [Bethlen] folgen."2 4 
(Hervorhebung von mir - J. S.) 
Nachdem die Dissidenten diesen Brief und den Beschluss der Partei der Klein-
landwirte in die Hand bekommen hatten, wurde ein Dokument herumgegeben 
um die Vereinigung mitzuteilen. Dieses Dokument wurde zuerst vom Minister-
präsidenten Bethlen unterschrieben. Am 1. Februar schlössen die Dissidenten die 
Liste der Unterschriften auf dem Anschlussdokument ab. Bethlen und die 
Gruppe von den Dissidenten, bzw. zwei Parteilosen (Károly Ereky und József 
Tasnádi-Kovács) und bloß ein Abgeordneter der KNEP (Lajos Szádeczky-Kar-
doss) traten am 2. Februar 1922 in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte an. In der Zeit 
schlössen sich - mit Bethlen - 22 Abgeordneten der Partei der Kleinlandwirte an. 
Das erschien jedoch - obwohl es ziemlich auch widerspruchsvoll ist - 1956 in ei-
nem Prolog eines Dokumentbandes von Dezső Nemes. Das chronologische 
24 Népszava, 26. lanuar 1922. 
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Handbuch von Péter Gunst, das sechs Auflagen erlebte, und die vor 1999 ge-
schriebenen Bücher von Ignác Romsics - wie gesehen - betrachteten den 2. Feb-
ruar 1922 als den Zeitpunkt der Gründung der Einheitspartei.25 
Im Gegenteil dazu wurde die Einheitspartei in den nach der Wende geschrie-
benen Synthesen am 22. Februar 1922 gegründet, nur Jenő Gergely behauptet den 
2. Februar 1922. Wer hat Recht? Die parlamentarische Debatte des Gesetzvor-
schlages über das Wahlrecht war bis zum 16. Februar abgeschlossen. Gleichzeitig 
lief das zweijährige Mandat der Nationalversammlung ab und Horthy - nach 
dem Vorschlag des Ministerpräsidenten - löste die Nationalversammlung auf. 
Bethlen sagte in der am selben Tag organisierten Abschlussparty der zur allein-
regierenden Partei erweiterten Partei der Kleinlandwirte: „Die Koalitionsregie-
rungen waren in Ungarn immer zum Tode verurteilt. Man braucht eine Einheits-
partei um die Last der Regierung in Ungarn tragen zu können, nur dann kann sie 
die Vorteile auch genießen. Wir konnten .. .eine Einheitspartei... bis heute nicht bis 
zum Ende verwirklichen, wir müssen sie vor den Wahlen verwirklichen." (Her-
vorhebung von mir - J. S.). Bethlen wollte „das Zusammenhalten von den unte-
ren, oberen und mittleren Ständen" auf diese Weise erreichen. Nagyatádi er-
kannte, dass es vor der Gründimg der Einheitspartei theoretische Kämpfe gäben, 
auch zwischen ihm und dem Ministerpräsidenten, aber er hoffte darauf, dass die 
theoretischen Grundlagen fest stehen. Er hielt besonders diejenigen für gefähr-
lich, die „die Königsfrage durch Putsch lösen wollten und wollen" und „die im 
Land zwischen den Konfessionen Streit anstiften." Unter den veränderten Um-
ständen müssen wir „die verfassungsmäßigen Fragen in Ordnung bringen" -
sagte er, was das aber konkret heißen sollte, legte er nicht ausführlicher dar.2 6 
Als Gegenleistung für die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte gab 
Bethlen der Agrarsphäre weitere wirtschaftliche Subventionen: Nach seinem 
Vorschlag bewilligte der Ministerrat am 17. Februar den 11,800,000 Kronen Zu-
schlag zu den Ausgaben für Sachanlagen, die zu den unter dem Landwirt-
schaftsministerium arbeitenden wirtschaftlichen Fachausbildungsstätten gehö-
ren. Außerdem wurde der Export der gemästeten Schweine um 4000 erhöht, bis 
am 27. Januar 8,000 pro Monat erlaubt wurden. 
Am 17 Februar wurde von dem Ministerpräsidenten - unter der Bevollmächti-
gung der ehemaligen Vorsitzenden der Partei der Kleinlandwirte - an die fol-
genden Parteien appelliert: die außerparlamentarische Nationale Mittelpartei, die 
ein Teil der ehemaligen Arbeitspartei von Tisza war; an die Ungarische Ord-
nungspartei, die die ehemalige Verfassungspartei zusammenbindet; bzw. an die 
Vereinigte Unabhängige und 48er Partei. Ihre Mitglieder wurden aufgerufen sich 
der Einheitspartei anzuschließen. Demzufolge verkündete die Nationale Mittel-
partei ihre Auflösung und beschloss den Emze/beitritt ihrer Parteimitglieder. A m 
selben Tag teilten die Ungarische Ordnungsparteivorsitzenden mit Bethlen in 
25 Nemes, vgn. S.62-67. 
26 Szózat, 17. Februar 1922; Kisgazda 26. Februar 1922. 
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einem Brief mit, „mit Freude die Gründung der Einheitspartei mitzumachen." 
Zum Eintritt der zwei Parteien in die Einheitspartei kam es am 24. Februar.2 7 
Am 22. Februar aber geschah kein politisches Ereignis, das zur Behauptung 
der neuen Synthesen führen würde, wonach die Einheitspartei durch die Verei-
nigung der KNEP mit der Partei der Kleinlandwirte an diesem Tag gegründet 
worden sei. Woher kam dieses Datum und dieser Zusammenhang in den neuen 
Zusammenfassungen? Wie gesehen, konnte dieses Datum und dieser Zusam-
menhang zum ersten Mal im von Kálmán Benda zusammengestellten akademi-
schen Handbuch Magyarország történetei kronológiája gelesen werden. Danach 
tauchte dieses Datum - meines Wissens - in einem chronologischen Überblick ei-
nes Universitätslehrbuches Magyarország története 1918-1975 (Geschichte Ungarns 
1918-1975) auf, das von Sándor Balogh, Lajos Izsák, Jenő Gergely und Gizella 
Föglein geschrieben wurde und 1986 erstmals erschien: „22. Februar 1922. Die 
Christlich-nationale Vereinigungspartei vereinigte sich mit der Partei der Klein-
landwirte von Nagyatádi unter dem Namen Christliche Kleinwirt-, Landwirt-
und Bürgerpartei (bekannter Name: Einheitspartei)." Dies wird übrigens im Ka-
pitel des Buches, in dem es um die Gründung der Einheitspartei geht, nicht be-
hauptet. Es gibt also schon innerhalb des Lehrbuches einen Widerspruch.28 Das 
1982er akademische Handbuch gilt also als Quelle für die Feststellungen der neu-
sten Synthesen, wonach die Gründung der Einheitspartei am 22. Februar 1922 ge-
schehen sei. Dieses Datum ist unannehmbar, weil an diesem Tag kein nach sol-
cher Art erklärbares Ereignis passierte. Akzeptabler scheint der 2. Februar 1922. 
Einerseits, weil Bethlen und die Dissidenten dann in die Partei der Kleinland-
wirte eintraten, andererseits betrachteten die Politiker und Tageszeitungen der 
Zeit diesen Zeitpunkt als den Tag der Gründung der Einheitspartei. Aus diesem 
Grund - nach vielen Diskussionen und Missverständnissen - empfehle ich dieses 
Datum. 
Die Wahl der Einheitsparteivorsitzenden fand am 23. Februar statt. Hier sagte 
Bethlen zur Beruhigimg des unzufriedenen liberalen agrardemokratischen Flü-
gel: „Ich kam hierher nicht um das Prinzip, die Programme der Partei zu verän-
dern, sondern um diese zu ergänzen und zu vervollständigen." (Hervorhebung 
von mir - J. S.) Ich kam nicht hierher - sagte er - „um der Partei den demokrati-
schen Charakter zu nehmen, um das demokratische Parteiprogramm auf ein re-
aktionäres Programm zu reduzieren." Nach seinem Vorschlag wurden die Par-
teivorsitzenden und der Verwaltungsausschuss durch die Parteiversammlung 
gewählt.29 Bethlen empfahl Nagyatádi zum Parteivorsitzenden, Gaszton Gaál 
zum Mitvorsitzenden zu wählen, das andere Amt des Mitvorsitzenden sollte be-
setzt werden. Die Vizepräsidenten wurden: István Sokorópátkai Szabó, István 
Rubinek, Zoltán Meskó, Bálint Szijj, Gyula Gömbös und Gyula Fay von den Dis-
27 Iratok az ellenforradalom történetéhez 1919-1945. [Akten zur Geschichte der Gegenrevolu-
tion 1919-19451 2. Bd, S. 268ff. 
28 S. Balogh et al. Magyarország története 1918-1975. [Geschichte Ungarns 1918-1975] 2. 
Auflage, Budapest 1988, S. 62, 341. 
29 Világ, 25. Februar 1922.; Kisgazda 5. März 1922. 
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sidenten. Sie vertraten die innerparteilichen Richtungen. Nagyatádi rechnete vor 
allem mit Szijj, Meskó und Gaszton Gaál. 20 Mitglieder des Verwaltungsaus-
schusses wurden diesmal gewählt. Von diesen gehörten nur drei zu den ehema-
ligen Dissidenten, 12 waren Anhänger Nagyatádis, 5 gehörten zum neokonser-
vativ-agrarischen Flügel der Partei der Kleinlandwirte, die in mehreren Fragen 
mit dem Ministerpräsidenten und den Dissidenten einverstanden waren. Nach 
Bethlens Vorschlag wurden 4 - 5 Sitze für die später Beitretenden freigehalten. Die 
Parteiminister und Staatssekretäre wurden von Amts wegen Mitglieder des Ver-
waltungsausschusses. (Bethlen hatte zu dieser Zeit kein formelles Amt, aber in 
der Tat war er der eindeutige Führer der Partei.) Die Zusammenstellung der 
Parteivorsitzenden war also nicht Bethlens Werk, obwohl er die Liste der Perso-
nenempfehlungen vorgeschlagen hatte. Das war ein Kompromiss zwischen ihm 
und Nagyatádi. Die Zusammensetzung entsprach den innerparteilichen Kräfte-
verhältnisse und dem Prinzip, dass die Beitretenden nur ihrem Zahlenverhältnis 
gemäß Vertretung im Vorstand bekommen dürfen. Aufgrund der Zusammenset-
zung der Vorsitzenden durfte Nagyatádi das Gefühl haben, einen annehmbaren 
Kompromiss mit Bethlen abgeschlossen zu haben, dass er und seine Anhänger 
ihr politisches Gewicht in der Einheitspartei bewahren und somit auch die Rich-
tung und den Inhalt der Konsolidierung beeinflussen können. 
Die Frage lautet: Kann dieser Zeitpunkt als das Datum der Parteigründung 
betrachtet werden? Die Synthese des 8. Bandes der zehnbändigen Geschichte Un-
garns behauptete, dass „eine Vereinigung über die Organisationsrahmen der 
neuen Regierungspartei am 23. Februar 1922 erzielt wurde."3 0 In Wirklichkeit 
wurden nur die Vorsitzenden und der Verwaltungsausschuss der neuen Partei 
gewählt, und das nicht einmal endgültig. Der Name der Partei wurde schon am 
25. Januar um das Attribut „bürgerlich" erweitert. Über die Organisationsrahmen 
sagte Bethlen nur, dass es die Aufgabe des Verwaltungsausschusses sei „die 
Zentralbehörden auf dem Land und in der Stadt aufzubauen und zu organisie-
ren." Ferenc Pölöskei bestimmte aber in seinem Buch Horthy és hatalmi rendszere 
1919-1922 (Horthys Machtsystem 1919-1922) dieses Datum als den Zeitpunkt der 
Gründung der Einheitspartei. Die Mehrheit der Historiker waren anderer Mei-
nung, bzw. bezeichneten fälschlicherweise den 22. Februar als den Tag der Par-
teigründung. Die Wahl der Landesvorsitzenden der Einheitspartei wurde auch 
von den Zeitgenossen nicht als Parteigründimg betrachtet. 
Der Einheitspartei traten - wie schon erwähnt - am 24. Februar die von Zsig-
mond Gr. Perényi geführte Nationale Mittelpartei und ein Teil der Ungarischen Ord-
nungspartei, die von Károly Grecsák geführt wurde und einen Teil der ehemali-
gen Verfassungsanhänger zusammenfasste, bei. Die erste Vorstandssitzung der 
Einheitspartei fand am 28. Februar statt. Bethlen teilte hier mit, dass er nach der 
letzten Parteiversammlung Gyula Gömbös gebeten habe, das Amt des geschäfts-
führenden Vizepräsidenten zu übernehmen. Zu Vizepräsidenten wurden Gr. Pe-
rényi und der pensionierte Generalleutnant Dezső Molnár; in den Verwaltungs-
ausschuss Vilmos Gr. Lers, Imre Gr. Károlyi und László Almássy gewählt. Damit 
30 Magyarország töréntete 1918-1919,1919-1945, S. 445,1244. 
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war die formelle Mehrheit von Nagyatádi und seiner Anhänger innerhalb des 
Parteivorstandes aufgehoben. Die Kräfteverhältnisse zwischen Bethlen und Nagy-
atádi glichen sich auf dem Papier aus, aber die Initiative hielt Bethlen in der Hand: 
Danach machte Gömbös das Parteistatut und den Plan der Wahlvorbereitun-
gen bekannt - diese Texte sind noch unbekannt. Bethlen veröffentlichte den vom 
Ministerrat angenommenen Verordnungsentwurf des Wahlrechtes, und bestand 
wieder auf die Einführimg der offenen Wahlen auf dem Land. Nagyatádi argu-
mentierte für Geheimwahlen. Er wurde von Mihály Dömötör und Sándor Simo-
nyi-Semadam unterstützt. Bethlen behauptete, da es hier um Regierungsmaß-
nahmen gehe, trage nur die Regierung und nicht die Partei die Verantwortung. 
Simonyi-Semadam bestritt auch diesen Standpunkt, blieb aber am Ende in der 
Minderheit. Nach der Sitzung äußerte sich Nagyatádi über die Frage des Ver-
zichts auf Geheimwahlen: In Bewahrung seines prinzipiellen Standpunktes beuge er 
sich der verfassungsrechtlichen Erklärung des Ministerpräsidenten. Wie allge-
mein bekannt, veröffentlichte Bethlen die Wiederherstellung der Wahlrechtsver-
ordnung über die offenen Wahlen in den Landwahlbezirken danach, am 2. März. 
Nach dem Brief Bethlens vom 17. Februar löste sich die Vereinigte Unabhängige 
und 48er Partei wegen innerer Streitigkeiten auf, dann trat der ehemalige linke 
Flügel (ungefähr 40 Personen) unter der Führung Pál Hoitsys am 2. März der 
Einheitspartei bei. Von ihrem Beitritt erhofften sich Nagyatádi und seine Anhän-
ger eine Verstärkung ihrer eigenen innerparteilichen Positionen.31 
Wie bewerteten die Historiker bisher die Gründung der Einheitspartei? Laut 
dem 8. Band der 1976 erschienenen Geschichte Ungarns „war die Einheitspartei 
durch Bethlens Plan so gegründet, dass Nagyatádi und seine Parteianhänger ihre 
totale Niederlage anfangs gar nicht erkannten."32 (Hervorhebung von mir - J. S.) 
Diese Feststellung wurde von Ferenc Pölöskei 1977 so weiterentwickelt: „Bethlen 
gründete also seine Partei gleichzeitig mit der Auflösung der Partei der Klein-
landwirte. Nagyatádi Szabó, der mit dem ehrenvollen Präsidentenamt belohnt 
war, hat die Bedeutung der Ereignisse nicht einmal geahnt, da er sowohl hin-
sichtlich seiner Konzeption als auch angesichts seines taktischen Gefühls weit 
hinter Bethlen stand, der die führende Gestalt der Gegenrevolution wurde." 3 3 
Das 1988 erschienene Universitätlehrbuch von Sándor Balogh, Lajos Izsák, Jenő 
Gergely und Gizella Föglein behauptete, dass „der Handschlag zwischen Bethlen 
und Nagyatádi in der Wirklichkeit den Tod der Partei der Kleinlandwirte bedeu-
tete."-34 Nach dem 1993 erschienenen Buch von József Nagy unter dem Titel 
A Nagyatádi-féle földreform (Die Bodenreform von Nagyatádi) wäre der Handschlag 
zwischen Bethlen und Nagyatádi „ein historischer Irrtum von Nagyatádi Szabó", 
wodurch die Bauernpartei von ihm „an die Aristokraten verkauft wurde." 3 5 
31 J. Sipos, A Kisgazdapárt Egységes Párttá bővülése. [Die Erweiterung der Kleinlandwirte-
partei zur Einheitspartei] Manuskript, S. 65. 
32 Magyarország története 1918-1919,1919-1945, S. 445. 
33 Pölöskei, Horthy és hatalmi rendszere, S. 189. 
34 Balogh et al. Magyarország története 1918-1975, S. 62. 
35 J. Nagy, A Nagyatádi-féle földreform. [Die Bodenreform von Nagyatádi] Eger, 1993. 
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Diese einseitigen Feststellungen, die Nagyatádi und seine Anhänger unmöglich 
machen, über ihre totale Niederlage und ihren Verrat sprechen und Bethlens po-
litische Genialität überschätzen, entsprechen meiner Meinung nach nicht den hi-
storischen Fakten, deshalb halte ich sie für übertriebene Behauptungen. 
Die Bewertungen der Synthesen nach der Wende entsprechen bezüglich unse-
res Themas auch nicht immer den geschichtlichen Tatsachen. Folgende Feststel-
lungen halte ich für falsch: Die KNEP wollte sich mit der Partei der Kleinland-
wirte vereinigen; Bethlen habe sich mit Hilfe der Politiker der ehemaligen Ar-
beitspartei „die Kleinlandwirte, die die Bestrebungen der selbständigen Klein-
grundbesitzer unterstützten [in die KNEP] einverleiben wollen"36; es ginge um 
„die Auflösimg der Partei der Kleinlandwirte, um die Marginalisierung von 
Nagyatádi und der „gestiefelten" Abgeordneten."37 Auch die Meinung von Ignác 
Romsics kann ich nicht akzeptieren, wonach Bethlen „beiden großen Parteien, die 
Vereinigte Partei der Kleinlandwirte und die Christlich-nationale Vereinigungs-
partei aufzulösen und zusammenzuschmelzen vermochte."3 8 Ich halte auch die 
Ansicht über die Entstehung der Einheitspartei nicht für gerechtfertigt, dass „der 
wahrhaftige Kräfteverhältnisse verdeckende operettenartig-veranstaltete „Hand-
schlag zwischen Nagyatádi und Bethlen" in der Tat so viel bedeutete, dass Beth-
len und seine Gruppe mit seinem Einzug in die Partei der Kleinlandwirte die ei-
gentlichen Landwirte, Nagyatádi und die Bauerndemokratie fordernden „Gestie-
felten" ausgebootet haben."39 
Hier kann man - um diesen Prozess kurz zusammenzufassen und zu bewer-
ten - vielmehr über die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Einheitspartei 
sprechen. Warum? Weil die Gründung der Einheitspartei durch die Erweiterung des 
Namens, Organisationsrahmens und der Programme der Partei der Kleinlandwirte ge-
schah, aber weder durch die Einschmelzung, die Auflösung der Partei und die Marginali-
sierung von Nagyatádi, noch durch die Zersetzung und teilweise Verschmelzung der 
zwei Parteien. Nagyatádi wurde der Parteivorsitzende, seine Anhänger bekamen 
bedeutungsvolle Ämter im Parteiverwaltungsausschuss. Den Handschlag zwi-
schen Bethlen und Nagyatádi halte ich also nicht für einen Verrat des Bauerpoli-
tikers, sondern für einen Kompromiss. Um das Ausmaß dieses Kompromisses 
gibt es zur Zeit Streit zwischen meinen verehrten Kollegen und mir. Sie nehmen 
im Wesentlichen die schematischen Feststellungen an, die schon seit mehreren 
Jahrzehnten existieren. Ich akzeptiere diese dagegen nicht, weil meine Grundfor-
schungen beweisen, dass sie mit den geschichtlichen Fakten nicht übereinstim-
men. Aus diesem Grund befürworte ich die Diskussion. Es ist unsere gemein-
same Aufgabe, den Handschlag zwischen Bethlen und Nagyatádi und die Kon-
solidierung Bethlens genauer als bisher zu bewerten. 
Für die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Einheitspartei spricht 
auch, dass im Frühling 1922 ihre Organisationen im Bezirk, in den einzelnen Be-
36 Magyarországi pártprogramok 1919-1944, S. 64. 
37 Gergely-Pritz, A trianoni Magyarország, S. 60. 
3S Romsics, Magyarország története, S. 224. 
39 Gergely-Izsák, A huszadik század története, S. 64. 
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zirken, in der Stadt und auf dem Lande - soweit der Handschlag zwischen Beth-
len und Nagyatádi anerkannt war - nicht aufgelöst, eingeschmolzen, sondern zu 
Organisationen der Einheitspartei umgewandelt wurden. Über diesen Prozess 
gibt es aber noch keine genügenden Informationen. Wahrscheinlich veränderte 
sich der Charakter der lokalen Parteiführung: Sie verminderte den bäuerlichen 
und verstärkte den Herren-, Beamter- und Kleriker-charakter. Das heißt aber 
noch nicht, dass sich der bäuerliche Charakter der Parteiwähler und -mitglieder 
auch verändert hätte. Die Erweiterung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Ein-
heitspartei ist die Form des Kompromisses, wodurch nicht nur in den obersten 
Schichten, sondern auch anderswo gesichert werden konnte, dass der Besitzbau-
ernstand - vor allem für die Dorfreichen - staatlich und lokalpolitisch zu vertre-
ten wird Lind die Durchsetzung seines Interesse ermöglich ist. Aus diesem Grund 
betrachte ich die Einheitspartei - mindestens bis zum Tod Nagyatádis - nicht nur 
als die Regierungspartei, die „auf dem Gleichgewicht zwischen den Großgrund-
besitzern, Großbürgern und Herrenmittelstand beruht," sondern auch als die po-
litische Vertretung des Besitzbauernstandes. Genau deshalb bin ich auch mit der 
Ansicht nicht einverstanden, dass „die Auflösung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte 
auch soviel bedeutete, dass die Landwirtgesellschaft bis 1930 keine eigene politi-
sche Organisation hatte."40 Da die Einheitspartei, also die Christliche Kleinwirt-, 
Landwirt- und Bürgerpartei, die Regierungspartei selbst gleichzeitig auch die 
Bauerpartei war. Diese politische Konstruktion und die offene Wahlen auf dem 
Land sicherten die politische, gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Konsolidie-
rung der 20er Jahre und die jeweilige Mehrheit der nachkommenden Regie-
rungsparteien. Aus diesem Grund gebe ich Hirata Takeshi Recht: Die Erweite-
rung der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Einheitspartei „kann als eine der wichtig-
sten Schritte von Bethlens Konsolidierung betrachtet werden - politisch bedeutete 
sie die gemeinsame Distanzierung des Bauerstandes und der Großgrundbesitzer 
gegen den Arbeiterstand." Und damit „trug die Bauerpartei im Endeffekt zum 
Aufbau der Regierungsordnung" in Ungarn bei.41 
Die Quintessentz meiner Konzeption ist, dass der wirtschaftliche, gesellschaft-
liche, soziale und politische Inhalt der Konsolidierimg Bethlens ohne den politi-
schen Kampf des liberalen, agrardemokratischen Flügels der Partei der Klein-
landwirte und von István Nagyatádi Szabó konservativer gewesen wäre. Ohne 
sie hätten die Grundbesitzer und der Herrenmittelstand keine solche Bodenre-
form und keine landwirtschaftliche Sozialpolitik erlaubt, wozu sie dadurch ge-
zwungen waren. Die Konsolidierung hätte noch wenige menschliche und politi-
sche Freiheitsrechte und Bauerninteressen vertreten. Deshalb müssen die Tätig-
keiten der Bauerpolitiker und ihrer Anhänger, die im Interesse der Erweiterung 
der Partei der Kleinlandwirte zur Einheitspartei tätig waren, und ihre innerpar-
teiliche Arbeit unumgänglich erforscht werden. 
40 Nagy, Magyarország története 1918-1945, S. 100. 
41 H. Takeshi, „A Bethlen-konszolidáció a nemzetközi politológiai irodalom tükrében," 
[Bethlens Konsolidierung nach der internationalen politologischen Literatur] Rubicon 
(1997/1), S. 13f. 
105 
"Shylock is whetting his blade" 
Fear of the Jews in Hungary during World War II 
LÁSZLÓ KARSAI 
In the summer of 1943 László Németh, the distinguished Hungarian writer ap-
praised the possibilities of the war in a speech made before his fellow thinkers 
and writers, and soon to be published in print as well. As he said, he had been 
watching the war "with deep pessimism from the first moment" because he 
thought whether the Germans, the English or the Russians were going to win it, it 
would be a great trial for Hungarians. In August 1943, Németh saw that the 
Germans could not win, and that this would have the following consequences: 
". . .there is a peace here, with them [i. e. the Jews - L. K.] as its prompters and 
even as its appointed redeemers... the revengeful Jewry, without self-criticism, 
must have grown extremely strong during the last four or five years as opposed 
to the shy respecters of culture, and he must be deaf to knife whetting who fails 
to hear that it is the heart that Shylock wants.. ."1 His fellow writer, Gyula Gom-
bos spoke even more explicitly when refusing a bourgeois democratic or a so-
cialist-leftist development for the same reason: one could not expect anything 
concrete from either but the "wild revenge of the Jews."2 
Had a Jewish refugee from Poland heard or read these speeches, he would 
probably have started to wonder what these Hungarian writers were afraid of 
since the Jews had "hardly" been molested in the Carpathian Basin so far. Arrow-
Cross and other extreme right-wing members in the House of Representatives 
showered reproaches upon the government of Miklós Kállay even in the winter 
of 1943 particularly because of the "fruitlessness" of its Jewish policy. According 
to Count Miklós Serényi3, the Jews were still able to exploit Hungarian peasants 
1 László Németh spoke during the lectures and discussions of the summer camp of Ma-
gyar Élet at Balatonszárszó. Budapest 1943,49. 
2 Gy. Gombos, Magyar út [The Magyar wayl quoted in Gy. Juhász, Uralkodó eszmék Ma-
gyarországon 1939-1944. Budapest 1983,306. 
3 Count Serényi was one of the best friends of vitéz László Endre. Endre was sub-prefect 
in Pest County, the largest in Hungary between 1938 and 1944, and became one of the 
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on a million and a half acres, one could hardly see an open shop-window in Bu-
dapest at Yom Kippur, and industry was still "firmly held by Jewish hands". 4 
In trying to answer the question of what "people" thought of the Jews during 
World War II, a few fundamental characteristics of the Hungarian Holocaust 
need to be considered. With respect to the number of dead Jews "only", the Hun-
garian Holocaust might appear "average." The Nazis and their Hungarian ac-
complices murdered about 550,000 of the 825,000 Jews who lived within the bor-
ders of Hungary as redrawn by 1941.5 However, on March 19 1944, the day that 
German troops occupied Hungary, more than 90% of those Jews were still alive. 
Hungary was the only ally of the Nazis during World War II that tried to settle 
the Jewish question in a constitutional way, by legislation.6 The so-called Jewish 
Acts between 1938 and 1942 and a series of executive orders connected to them 
excluded the Jews from civic equality. Their economic, entrepreneurial, and em-
ployment possibilities were restricted, the latter especially for professionals. Mar-
riage between Jews and Gentiles was prohibited, and extramarital sexual rela-
tionships between them qualified as race defilement (Rassenschande).7 In the sum-
mer of 1941, more than 18 thousand Jews of allegedly irregular citizenship were 
handed over to Nazi murderers at Kőrösmező; In January 1942, more than 700 
Jews (and thousands of Serbs) were massacred at Újvidék (Novi Sad). Apart from 
these cases, however, the only Jewish lives in immediate danger were those of the 
Jews conscripted for unarmed forced military labour. Approximately one and 
a half million acres of land owned by Jews were expropriated, but the factories, 
banks and even real estate of the Jews were not touched. As a police report on the 
morale of the population pointed out in the autumn of 1941, "The Jews admit that 
there are no other countries in Europe where they could live so comfortably."8 
Despite the repeated demands of the Germans, the cabinet of Kállay (9 March 
1942 to 22 March 1944) would not force the Jews to wear the yellow star of David, 
most zealous collaborator of Eichmann as under-secretary in the Ministry of the Inte-
rior from the spring of 1944. 
4 Képviselőházi Napló [Journals of the House of Representatives] (henceforth: KN) 1939-
1944-Vol. XIX, 52. (14 December 1943). 
5 Between 1938 and 1941, parts of historical Felvidék [Northern Hungary], Subcarpathia, 
Northern Transylvania and parts of Délvidék [Southern Hungary], lost after World War 
I, were re-annexed with the assistance of Hitler and Mussolini. 
6 This was pointed out by Géza Benkő, MP of the governing party in a criticism of the 
radical proposals (demanding ghettos, yellow stars, and deportation) of the extreme 
right. KN-1939-1944-Vol. XVI, 427. (2 December 1942). 
7 For the Hungarian Holocaust in detail, see R. L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide. The 
Holocaust in Hungary. 2 vols. New York 1994. Revised and enlarged Hungarian edition: 
Budapest 1997. 
8 Report on the morale of the population no. 41/8-1941 (concerning the period from 11 
September to 10 October) from the police headquarters at Nagyvárad to the Public Se-
curity Department of the Ministry of the Interior. (Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hun-
garian National Archives] (henceforth: OL)-K149-Belügyminisztérium reservált iratok. 
[Ministry of the Interior - reserved documents]-651. f.-2-l941-7-6000). 
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then move them to ghettos and deport them. The "Jew protecting" policy of the 
Kállay cabinet has several explanations: it was feared that if they deported the 
Jews, the Hungarian economy would collapse. In the wake of Stalingrad, the in-
fluence of conservative, moderate anti-Semites had increased, who were looking 
primarily to Mussolini. As long as Rome refused to surrender its Jews, Budapest 
(and Bucharest) had something to refer to.9 
Who feared the Jews' revenge in Hungary, and when and why? In order to be 
able to answer these questions with an at least approximate precision, we have 
studied journals of parliamentary debates, police and gendarmerie reports on the 
morale of the population in addition to newspapers, which were published under 
the conditions of a functioning, though restricted, parliamentary system, and 
limited by prior military censorship. 
According to one of the oldest anti-Semitic topos, the God of the Jews, as well 
as the Jews themselves are revengeful. According to anti-Semites, the Jews live by 
the principle of "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth" (Leviticus 24:20) while 
the forgiving God of Christians teaches, "ye resist no evil: but whosoever shall 
smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also" (Mt 5:39). Új Magyarság, 
the daily paper of László Baky's10 national socialist party quoted deputy Reichs 
press chief Sündermann with deep approval saying that Germany regarded itself 
as being at war with the Jews of the world, whose every act barely hides Jewish 
"faces distorted by Old Testament hatred."11 One of the authors of Magyarság, the 
paper of Arrow-Cross leader Ferenc Szálasi, held forth thus: "Jews embody ha-
tred on earth, they are prototypes of inhumanity. How could it be otherwise, 
when their national religion itself prescribes as a commandment the humiliation, 
hatred, and indeed, the elimination of non-Jews." Following a brief historical 
survey, the writer continues: "We can feel no pity for the Jewish people, since the 
complete elimination of the twenty million Jews of the world could only partially 
compensate for the horrible evil deeds they have committed against mankind as 
a whole."12 
The figure of the criminal, bloodthirsty Jew appears in medieval anti-Jewish 
writings as well. Jews, the murderers of Christ were regarded as satanic crea-
tures, capable of all kinds of other crimes. A number of the elements of anti-Jew-
ish Christian teaching were successfully built into their anti-Semitic propaganda 
by the Nazis and their Hungarian comrades. The Jewish bioterrorist, infecting the 
Aryan race, spreading diseases like syphilis, the moral terrorist, causing moral de-
struction and spreading prostitution, and the cultural terrorist, spoiling traditional 
arts and inventing avant garde and surrealism were joined after 1918 by the judeo-
9 Ch. Browning, The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office A Study of Referat D II. of 
Abteilung Deutschland 1940-1943. New York-London 1978. 
10 László Baky, retired gendarme major, confidant of the Nazis, was one of the chief or-
ganizers of the deportation of the Jews as under-secretary of the Ministry of the Inte-
rior from 24 March 1944 onwards. 
Új Magyarság, 10 October 1943,4. 
12 L. L.[evatich], Szánalom nélkül [Without pity]. Magyarság, April 18,1944,5. 
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bolshevist revolutionary terrorist, spreading pacifism, stabbing the fighting army in 
the back. In the winter of 1942-1943, these Jews were complemented by the figure 
of the military terrorist Jew, initiating the world war, and generally responsible for 
the protraction of the hostilities and for the barbaric bombings that inflicted so 
much suffering on the civilian population. 
The Hungarian press discussed the massacre at Katyn as proof of the venge-
fulness and inhumane cruelty of the Jews. Referring to sources in Berlin, Új Ma-
gyarság reported that the massacre at Katyn was executed by "Jewish kosher 
butchers" commissioned by Stalin and followed the blueprint provided by So-
viet-Jewish writer Ilya Ehrenburg, their ultimate goal being the extermination of 
all European races.13 Milotay reports the extermination of one and half million 
Polish civilians carried off to Siberia and of ten thousand Polish officers, prisoners 
of war, projecting a vision of "Siberian horrors, Europe thrown to mass death, 
mass extermination, massacre, and the depths of mass graves" - in the case of 
a Soviet victory. What Milotay writes about is darkness and cruelty inconceivable 
to the European mind, heart, and imagination, demonic and satanic depravity, 
a true apocalypse.14 The perpetrators of the massacres at Katyn and elsewhere were 
Jews, the GPU units were commanded by Jews, and even 60% of the assigned 
executioners were Jews, another journalist wrote.15 
In Hungary, the defeat in World War I, and the loss of two thirds of historical 
Hungary was all blamed by anti-Semites on the subversive activities of Jewish 
liberal bolsheviks. They remembered with fury and shuddering fear the Hun-
garian Soviet Republic proclaimed on 21 March 1919 and its Jewish leaders 
headed by Béla Kun.16 The reign of terror of the "brigand Jews of the sewers" in 
1919 turned Hungarians into "hunted animals" for four months, the journalists of 
the extreme right wrote frequently during 1942-1944.1 7 It was precisely that, an-
other Jewish-communist "reign of terror," that the anti-Semites of the political 
right was afraid of. And they really began to be afraid when, prisoners of their 
own propaganda, they slowly realised that the axis powers were not going to win 
the war. László Baky, Ferenc Szálasi and their comrades, i. e. the representatives 
of the Hungarian extreme right, trusted in the final victory of the Axis until as late 
as April 1945. The conservative, moderate anti-Semites, watching the military de-
velopments of the war more realistically, had started to be afraid of the Red 
Army and the revenge of Jews right after Stalingrad. 
13 Új Magyarság, 16 April 1943, 2. 
14 I. Milotay, "Katyn," Új Magyarság, 2 May 1943,1. 
15 I. vitéz Csicsery-Rónay, "A leálcázott kommunizmus," [Communism in disguise] 
Új Magyarság, 20 August 1943,3. 
16 "...it took the horrors of the bolshevist terror for hatred to flare up in us against them 
[i. e. the Jews - L. K.], along with the feeling of mortal danger," wrote István Milotay in 
his article entitled "Gyűlölettel vagy gyűlölet nélkül?" [With or without hatred?] Új 
Magyarság, 13 September 1942,1. See also L. Marschalkó, Kik árulták el 1918-ban Magyar-
országot. [Who betrayed Hungary in 1918] Budapest 1944. Reprinted: Budapest 2000. 
17 I. Milotay, "Közös cél, közös sors, közös harc," [Common goal, common destiny, com-
mon struggle] Új Magyarság, 1 February 1942,2. 
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The war was regarded both in Budapest and in Berlin as a Jewish war, a world 
war started by Jews and waged for Jewish interests. Zoltán Bosnyák, one of the 
most eminent Hungarian anti-Semites declared in the spring of 1943, " . . .there can 
be no doubt that the Jews of the whole world, filled with unrestrained hatred and 
insatiable vengefulness, wanted this war. United in one tight spiritual unit, all the 
Jews in the world, from the ghettos in the Ukraine to the City of London and the 
Wallstreet [sic!] in New York, wanted retribution and satisfaction at any price" -
only because Germany and Italy had dared to defy their aspirations to world he-
gemony, said Bosnyák.18 
Following Goebbels, right-wing journalists in Hungary also claimed that bol-
shevism exposed a people of nearly 200 million to Jewish terror.19 Since the offi-
cer corps of the Red Army had been judaized, they claimed, that army was noth-
ing but "the obedient and willing instrument of Jewish world imperialism."20 The 
expressions "bolshevist sceptre," "red terror" gained acceptance in official usage. 
Calling upon the inhabitants of his town to cultivate unploughed lands, or to 
contribute to charities, the mayor of Mohács often mentioned the struggle against 
the "red, bolshevist sceptre."21 Róbert Haála, a member of Parliament watched 
with understanding what he said was the rumour-mongering, subversive machi-
nations of the Jews disrupting the unity of the nation because, as he said, " . . .the 
war is waged to eliminate the Jews from Europe, therefore, they are defending 
themselves."22 
A great number of gendarmes also held that the Jews, all of them, were ene-
mies, worse than the bloodiest minded communists. One gendarme sub-lieuten-
arit reported to his superiors already in the summer of 1941: "The truth is that 
Jews are the enemies of the system developing at present - all Jews, without ex-
ception, whether they are poor, rich, merchants, landowners, religious or con-
verts, etc." He also made concrete proposals: Jewish men between 18 and 50 
ought to be interned, their radios, firearms confiscated.23 
The author of a confidential report delivered to deputy chief commissioner of 
the police József Sombor-Schweinitzer was of the opinion that with the anti-Jew-
ish acts and decrees passed and issued so far "we have excited [the Jews] against 
ourselves," but "no significant or final measures have been taken."24 "Let us not 
stop at halfway," demanded György Oláh, a member of Parliament; if we take 
18 Z. Bosnyák, "A zsidókérdés jövője," [The future of the Jewish question] Nemzetőr, 
7 May 1943,1, 3. 
19 J. Ambrus, "Dobjátok el az Istent, testvérkék!" [Drop God, little brothers!] Nemzetőr, 
5 March 1943,1. 
20 (no author given) "Zsidók a Szovjetunió hadseregében és flottájában," [Jews in the 
Army and the Navy of the Soviet Union], Magyarság, February 13,1944,8. 
21 Baranya Megyei Levéltár - Pécs - Mohácsi polgármesteri i. - 2759/1943 and 3475/1943 
[Baranya County Archives - Pécs - papers of the mayor of Mohács]. 
22 KN-1939-1944-Vol. XVIII, 575. (3 December 1943). 
23 Report No. 201/1941. of the mixed station at Törökszentmiklós to the detective subde-
partment HQ, VI. Gendarmerie District, July 2,1941 (OL-K149-651. f. 11/33). 
24 OL-K149-651. f.-12-3. 
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away the lands of the Jews, its "logical consequence" can only be locking them up 
in ghettos. The Jew, divested of his property, Oláh argued, "is fearfully danger-
ous." The publican without his liquor licence, the tobacconist without a tobacco 
market, the timber merchant, the cement merchant and the paraffin merchant 
stripped of their concessions are now being joined by impoverished Jewish pro-
letarian elements, Jewish landowners, tenants.25 More than one million Jews in 
Hungary today are an enemy within, declared Ákos Eitner MP. Once the gov-
ernment "has thrown down the gauntlet to the Jews..., they ought to expect that 
the Jews accept that challenge, and inveterate hatred and vengefulness are among 
the racial qualities of the Jews," argued Eitner.26 
It was not only lower rank gendarme or police officers that bombarded their 
superiors with proposals concerning the Jews. Arrow-Cross member of Parlia-
ment Gábor Vajna, who would be Szálasi's Minister of the Interior after 15 Octo-
ber 1944, demanded in the House of Representatives in the spring of 1942 the 
suppression of the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions co-operating 
with it as one of "the urgent measures to be taken towards the solution of the 
Jewish question."27 Vajna submitted his proposal with reference to battle-worn, 
valiant soldiers, to "the public mood of the whole of Christian Hungary," empha-
sizing that upon learning of "all those horrors and crimes that the Jewry of the 
world have committed against the nations and peoples of Europe," Hungarians 
unanimously demand a solution to the Jewish question. Vajna proposed decree-
ing the mandatory wearing of the yellow patch, compulsory earlocks for Jewish 
men,28 the marking of Jewish businesses, restrictions on the travelling of Jews, 
and sending them to labour camps in the Ukraine. 
His fellow member of Parliament, Károly Maróthy remarked regretfully a few 
months later that "we do not dare to collect [the Jews] in ghettos" despite the fact 
that "it was they themselves that declared war on us," despite the fact that they 
listen to Moscow and London on the radio, commit acts of sabotage, indeed, 
some Jews would like to see the streets paved with Hungarian skulls.29 According 
to the morale report of the Ministry of Defence and Propaganda (Nemzetvédelmi és 
Propaganda Minisztérium, henceforth: NPM) industrial workers all over the coun-
try were convinced that the Jewish managers of the factories were sabotaging, 
"even under the strictest control," by, for example, employing their workers only 
part-time under the pretext of a shortage of raw materials.30 
The fear of Jews was increased by the news of Jewish partisans. One journalist 
wrote of Tito's partisans, known never to take prisoners, as escaped convicts, in-
25 KN-1939-1944-Vol. XIII, 460. (10 June 1942). 
26 KN-1939-1944-Vol. XVI, 329. (27 November 1942). 
27 KN-1939-1944-Vol. XIII, 196. (29 April 1942). 
28 This proposal, according to the Journals of the House of Representatives, excited "consi-
derable amusement" in the House. 
29 KN-1939-1944-Vol. XIII, 321, 324, (2 lune 1942). 
30 OL-K64-1943-41-664. Strictly confidential morale report of the NPM for 26 April to 
1 May 1943. 
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ternational, bloodthirsty terrorists emphasizing that a number of "communist 
agitators of the Jewish race" were fighting among their ranks. They made Mosha 
(Moses) Pijadet one of Tito's deputies, claiming that his other lieutenant was 
originally called Fisher, and was, therefore, a Jew.31 And it was regarded as 
a really horrifying example of Jewish inhumanity and moral depravity that Jewish 
girls also fought among the Jewish partisans on the Russian front behind the 
German lines, and, what is more, "they showed great self-sacrifice" in the proc-
ess.32 In the summer of 1943, the NPM was informed of 2,500 Russian parachut-
ists dropped at Kőrösmező, accompanied by a great number of Jewish forced 
military labourers, who "intended to sneak into the country to start disruptive 
activities."33 
The editors of right-wing newspapers were watching out for signs that could 
be interpreted as indicative of the vengefulness of Jews. A Jewish poet, according 
to Új Magyarság, encouraged his readers to take notes of the many cruel words 
and deeds they come up against, and add them to the others. The journalist be-
lieved that instead of working diligently, the Jews "were collecting documents for 
the revenge."3 4 
The newspapers also published judicial decisions that punished Jews who be-
haved in a threatening way. Merchant Ede Fisher was sentenced to seven months 
imprisonment for saying, "All Christians will have been hanged before the last 
Jew is carried out of Hungary." Office-boy László Berkovics received two months 
for claiming that "Only the Soviet[Union] has order, there the roads are paved 
with Christian heads. In Palestine we shall do the same."3 5 
Kaufmann demanded the sterilization of the German people, Varga, a Hun-
garian, wanted to send ten million German men to do forced labour for life in Si-
beria, Félix Langer would plunder the Germans and have their men work for 
years rebuilding the destroyed countries - the papers went on and on in that 
vein, reporting the alleged revengeful designs of Jews.36 Editor-in-chief István 
Milotay tells in an editorial of his paper of regularly receiving anonymous letters 
trying to intimidate him, promising "merciless retribution, calling to account, and 
punishment" for him and his extreme right-wing comrades.37 
Undaunted, Milotay continued his anti-Semitic incitement, but the number of 
those who were watching the developments on the military scene with growing 
anxiety was steadily increasing during 1943. The Ministry of the Interior regu-
larly had the German and Slavic language broadcasts of the radios in Moscow 
31 V. Görgey, "Tito," Új Magyarság, 29 December 1943,1. 
32 Új Magyarság, 16 May 1943,4. 
33 OL-K64-1943-41 -664. Strictly confidential morale report of the NPM for 26 July to 
1 August 1943. 
34 Új Magyarság, 20 May 1942,4. 
35 Új Magyarság, 13 May 1942,2. 
36 F. Vajta, "Béketervek béke nélkül," [Peace plans without peace] Új Magyarság, 18 May 
1943,1, and Magyarság, 18 June 1944, 9. 
37 I. Milotay, "Fenyegetnek," [They threaten] Új Magyarság, 31 October 1943,1. 
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and Kuybishev monitored, and their contents summed up and reported. News-
casters in Moscow noticed as early as in January, 1943 that Prime Minister Kállay, 
earlier introducing anti-Jewish measures by the dozen, had completely stopped 
paying attention to the Jews. According to a commentary from Moscow, "Hun-
garian government circles can see that Hitler's boat is sinking, and are trying to 
save their skins."38 Antal Pándi, one of the Arrow-Cross members of Parliament 
said it to the face of the government supporters in the House, " . . .we know that 
you had one opinion before Stalingrad, and had a different opinion after Stalin-
grad."3 9 
Before the winter of 1942-1943, the Jews were verbally abused, but they were 
not feared. In September 1942, a military specialist discussed the "death throes of 
the Red Army at Stalingrad."40 The landing of the British and American forces in 
North Africa (7 November 1942), and the fall of Mussolini (25 July 1943) created 
a great stir in Hungary. The confidential morale report of the NPM in May 1943, 
based on a national survey and collection of data emphasized that since the de-
feat of Rommel's army in Africa the behaviour of Jews has become "gloating and 
offensive."41 
Jews were exerting fatal, destructive influence on Hungarian public opinion as 
well, the Arrow-Cross claimed. Vajna asked indignantly in the House of Repre-
sentatives, "How could militarist propaganda be made in this country when at 
least a hundred thousand radios bellow London and Moscow and at least one 
and a half million Jews and Jewish hirelings spread the news of Moscow and 
London every day?"4 2 Jewish propaganda was successful if the comments of Fe-
renc Rajniss (member of Parliament of the right-wing Magyar Megújulás Pártja 
[Party of Magyar Renewal]) are to be trusted, "Nor can we afford to have some 
people in the internal destruction look upon Soviet Russia, armed to the teeth, 
like hypnotised chickens, and spread destruction at home saying there is nothing 
to do, Hungary is unable to defend herself."43 The morale report of the NPM for 
July 1943 says that the conspicuous wealth of the Jews, the advantages they en-
joyed in terms of housing, the salary of the physicians on forced military labour, 
and the good time the Jews enlisted for military forced labour were having in 
general " . . . is not so much generating passions as rather reflects a feeling of res-
ignation" because people relate the "good time" of the Jews to the development 
of the war.4 4 
38 OL-K149-651.f.-10/21-BM Központi Rádióállomás jelentései [reports of Central Radio 
Station, Ministry of Internal Affairs], 5/1943. (5 January). 
39 KN-1939-1944-Vol. XIX, 77. (15 December 1943). 
40 V. Görgey, "A legnagyobb győzelem," [The greatest victory] Új Magyarság, 24 Septem-
ber 1942,1. 
41 OL-K64-Külügyminisztérium reservált politikai i. [reserved political papers of the For-
eign Ministry]-1943-41-664. Morale report of NPM, 10-16 May 1943. 
42 KN-1939-1944-Vol. XVII, 164. (24 November 1943). 
43 KN-1939-1944-XVIII.vol.-270. (26 November 1943). 
44 OL-K64-1943-41-664- Confidential morale report of the NPM for 5 to 11 July 1943. 
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The frightened people, fearing, among other things, the revenge of the Jews 
started manoeuvring for positions, tried cautiously to render services, or at least 
to indicate that they had not meant whatever they had been doing or saying in 
the previous years. According to the morale report of the NPM for May 1943, 
many people all over the country thought that the estates of Jews were given to 
"state employees, military officers and administrators with connections because 
in the case of changes they would return the estates of their own will to the origi-
nal owners."45 The morale report of the NPM for July 1943 established again that 
"manoeuvring phenomena" could be observed among the public.46 In November 
1943, Milotay wrote about a society "living in blind carelessness, self-confidence, 
or anonymous anxiety," sharply criticizing those who could take good times only. 
These people in the old days had outdone everyone in anti-Semitism, glorifying 
Hitlerism and Fascism, but then "they started, first silently then with growing 
speed, slipping away, and turning against, first secretly, later more and more 
openly, everything they had noisily be swearing upon and pledging their word to 
when there were victories only, and belonging there meant success and advan-
tages."47 The businesses of Jews had been claimed and obtained by citizens, peas-
ants living "in blind carelessness, self-confidence." During the research commis-
sioned by the Yad Vashem Archives I have been conducting with my colleagues48 
in the provincial archives of Hungary we have found masses of papers that prove 
that as long as it could be done "legally," assisted by the authority of the state, 
common people claimed the businesses, lands, etc. of their Jewish neighbours 
without inhibitions. However, due to the developments of the military situation, 
more and more people started living in what Milotay called "anonymous anxi-
ety," trying to oblige the "other" side as well. 
Zoltán Szitnyai wrote with a contemptuous jeer about a friend of his, whose 
political coat was always cut according to the latest fashion. When the Maginot 
line seemed unbreakable, he was humming French songs, then started to abuse 
the decadent Gallic spirit and glorify the German genius imbued with natural 
force. Now he has turned his coat again, is worried about the fate of the country, 
renewing his connections with leftist persons, old friends, whispering with them 
in hidden corners of cafés. According to Szitnyai, his friend would be on the 
march for ever, always under victorious standards, contemptuous of those who 
remain true to themselves.49 Róbert Haála, member of Parliament, was also of the 
opinion that fear, manoeuvring for position, turning coats were spreading all 
over the place. Many people were able to whine and fear only, in high society 
bets were being made about the outcome of the war, and "a great game of ma-
« OL-K64-1943-41-664- Confidential morale report of the NPM for 17 to 23 May 1943. 
46 OL-K64-1943-41-664- Confidential morale report of the NPM for 19 to 25 July 1943. 
47 I. Milotay, "Marxék színészei," [The actors of the Marxs'] Új Magyarság, 21 November 
1943,1. 
48 Judit Molnár, Zoltán Vági, Gábor Kádár, László Csősz, Zsuzsa Toronyi, Sándor Gáspár, 
Tamás Majsai. 
49 Z. Szitnyai, "Köpönyeggondok," [Coat problems] Új Magyarság, 19 December 1943, 8. 
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noeuvring for positions is going on because everyone would like to know where 
to step, to the left, to the right, or to the middle because the outcome of the war is 
doubtful," said Haála.50 
The "evasive operations" of the German army were celebrated in vain by the 
right-wing press. The maps published every day in the papers clearly showed 
how the front was approaching the Carpathian Basin from the east. Those on the 
extreme right in Hungary were hoping until the Spring of 1944 that if the British 
and the Americans tried to open the second front, the invasion would be frus-
trated.51 László Baky declared in February that the eastern front would be 
dwarfed in significance by the second front, and the decision would be made in 
the west, " . ..and we believe that Europe will be victorious."52 
A perusal of the June numbers of Magyarság reveals that until 12 June it was 
firmly believed that the invaders would be repelled from the Atlantic Wall with 
a bloodied nose. It was only on June 14 that the correspondent of Magyarság re-
ported from Berlin that "Germany wants to give her enemies the decisive battle 
in the heart of France."53 
Perhaps this is where the answer lies as to why the Hungarian authorities 
were ghettoizing and deporting Jews in such an suprematic way, at times, in-
deed, enthusiastically in the spring of 1944. There were a number of possible rea-
sons for the behaviour of the Hungarian authorities in 1944. Regent Miklós Hor-
thy remained in place, appointing Döme Sztójay, his former ambassador to Berlin 
Prime Minister, thus giving real legitimacy to the new cabinet. The decade-long 
anti-Semitic propaganda, the "legal" deprivation of Jews of their rights and prop-
erty had made officials, police and gendarme officers, as well as the population at 
large accustomed to viewing the Jews as enemies, second-class citizens. Hungar-
ian civil servants, the members of the armed forces were well disciplined, and 
knew their duty. Now they were ordered to plunder and deport the Jews, and 
that is exactly what they did, they carried out their orders. 
It was, to some extent at least, the successes of the invasion forces that forced 
Regent Horthy to stop the deportations on 6 July 1944, thereby temporarily sav-
ing the lives of approximately 250,000 Jews in Budapest. Horthy's decision had 
other motives as well: he was under serious pressure by his conservative friends 
and advisors, including former Prime Minister István Bethlen and others. At the 
end of June, he received telegrams from King Gustave V of Sweden, President 
Roosevelt, and Pope Pius XII. The leaders of the Hungarian churches, including 
50 KN-1939-1944-Vol. XVIII, 573-575. (3 December 1943). 
51 "...the year 1943, with its four, unexpected crises - the defeat at Stalingrad and the 
Don, the surrender of the Italians, that caused by the German evasive operations early 
in the autumn, and finally that intended by the terror bombings - have failed to stag-
ger Europe," wrote the military expert of Magyarság with forced optimism. E. vitéz 
Zách, "Gondolatok az őszi csata mélyén," [Thoughts in the depths of the autumn bat-
tle] Magyarság, 21 December 1943,4. 
52 Magyarság, 10 February 1944,1. 
53 Magyarság, 14 June 1944,1. 
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Calvinist bishop László Ravasz, also asked him to reconsider his Jewish policies. 
It is also possible that he believed that Under-Secretary of the Interior Baky was 
concentrating considerable gendarmerie forces around Budapest at the end of 
June 1944 not in order to deport the Jews of the capital but in preparation for 
a coup d'état against him. The Central Jewish Council was also diligently spreading 
the rumour that if the Jews were taken from the capital, the western Allies would 
carpet-bomb Budapest. Fearing for his power and the population of the capital, 
the Regent finally gave in to pressure, stopped the deportations, and even or-
dered the gendarmes to leave Budapest.54 
The German occupation of Hungary, the stigmatization of the Jews with the 
yellow star, the organization of ghettos, collecting camps and then the deporta-
tions all contributed to the growing fear of the Jews. One of the reasons was the 
increasingly devastating bombing raids of the British and American air forces. 
Major cities and railway junctions had not been seriously bombed before the 
spring of 1944. The Hungarian press, however, regularly reported on the "terror 
raids" against German cities. This is what a German women said to the military 
correspondent of Új Magyarság in May, 1943: "What goes on here has nothing to 
do with the war. The international Jews are exercising their sadistic instincts here. 
The English, the Americans, and their Negro pilots are merely blind instruments 
in the hands of that satanic race."55 
The figure of the barbaric, murderous Jew often appears in the Hungarian 
press in 1944. "We must indict the Jews for the increasing savagery of the war, for 
the bombing of the civil population, women, and children, for the destruction of 
hospitals... Why do they stain themselves with crimes that cry to heaven, with 
mass murder. . . It is they who drive hatred to fury, who demand the destruction 
of Europe. . ." wrote one extreme right-wing journalist.56 
It was a view widely held among people that the British and American bomb-
ers spared the lives of Jews. The "pollsters" of the NPM reported in June, 1943, 
that "according to rumour-mongers," the war was lost. However, many people 
believed that "Hungary is not bombed because the Jews here are not treated as 
they are in other countries, and because there are many Jews in Hungary and in 
Budapest."57 After the first seriously damaging air raid in the Spring of 1944, the 
military correspondent of Magyarság was obliged to point out not without some 
surprise that "On April 3 the fallacy was proved wrong that Budapest would be 
exempted from all kinds of terrorist attacks by the three hundred thousand peo-
ple of an alien race [i. e. the Jews - L. K.] residing there."58 
54 Braham, The Politics, Ch. 25. 
55 V. vitéz Görgey, "Zaporozsje-Berlin-Ostende," Új Magyarság, 6 October 1943, 5. 
56 K. Koltai, "Vádirat a zsidóság ellen," [Indictment against the Jews] Magyarság, 16 April 
1944,17. 
57 OL-K64-1943—41-664. Confidential morale report of the NPM for 7 to 13 June 1943. 
5S E. Zách, "Schaffhausentől - Budapestig," [From Schaffhausen to Budapest] Magyarság, 
5 April 1944,1. 
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However, what the military expert understood and wrote did not convince 
the inhabitants of great cities. When it became widely known that the Jews in Bu-
dapest would be moved to ghettos, Under-Secretary of the Interior Endre has-
tened to set the minds of the population of the capital at rest: "We do not intend 
to collect the Jews into a closed Jewish quarter. Jews will be concentrated every-
where, i. e. in the vicinity of factory buildings, railway stations, etc. where hostile 
air raids can be expected."59 Endre was probably aware that the Allies did not 
care who lived where. He probably had Jews moved into the neighbourhood of 
railway stations in Csepel because he wanted to have as many Jews as possible 
killed if war factories and railways were bombed. 
The air raids provided the Arrow-Cross with a new opportunity to write arti-
cles about the satanic warfare of the Jews, a manifestation of their six-thousand-
year old sadism.60 A constantly recurring claim of these articles was that the ter-
rorist bombers dropped satanic devices in the form of dolls, which, when picked 
up by innocent children, exploded in their hands.61 After visiting a German camp 
for prisoners of war, Vince Görgey described his experiences among "Jewish, In-
dian, and Negro" pilots in an article.62 
However, the fear of Jews, of the Red Army fighting for the Jews, and of Jew-
ish-Negro-Indian terrorist bombers was not general. Tens of thousands were only 
too glad to grab the opportunity and eagerly jumped at the fortunes of the Jews 
collected in ghettos, collecting camps and then cattle-trucks. Housing depart-
ments were besieged, and the movables of the Jews, where possible, were stolen 
and carried away.63 Hungarian writer Sándor Márai wrote with deep contempt 
and desperation in the spring of 1944: "Cold May. I shiver in the sun. Nothing to 
talk about with people. Like you cannot argue with a drunk or a lunatic: the 
Hungarian middle classes have gone mad and drunk from the Jewish question. 
The Russians are at Kőrösmező, the English and the Americans over Budapest, 
and this society, obsessed and foaming at the mouth, wants to talk about nothing 
but the Jews."6 4 
To the genuine satisfaction of Eichmann, more than 437,000 people were de-
ported from Hungary between 15 May and 6 July 1944, most of them to Ausch-
witz, as the result of the co-ordinated, orderly, at times definitely enthusiastic 
"work" of tens of thousands of gendarmes, policemen and railwaymen. In May 
1944, Márai prayed in his diary for God to give the Jews enough strength to bear 
the persecution, torture and oppression. "And then, he continued, if they have 
survived the persecutions, give them strength not to lose their heads, not to be-
59 Magyarság, 16 April 1944,4. 
60 Magyarság, 25 April 1944,1. 
61 Magyarság, 9 May 1944,5; 10 May, 4. 
62 V. vitéz Görgey, "Amerikai terrorbombázók társaságában, zsidó, indián és néger piló-
ták között," [In the company of American terrorist bombers, among Jewish, Indian, 
and Negro pilots] Új Magyarság, 22 April 1944,5-6. 
63 Braham, The Politics, Ch. 19-21. 
w S. Márai, Napló 1943-1944. [Diary 1943-1944] Budapest 1990,156. 
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come hunters running amok. Give them strength to be strong enough to have 
human stature and patience. Because all that revenge begets is new passions."6 5 
Marai also knew very well that hundreds of thousands were being plundered 
and carried of to their deaths in the spring and summer of 1944 by the Hungarian 
authorities, the accomplices of the Nazis. The Jews would indeed have needed 
God's help to suffer all that peacefully, without wishing to retaliate. Otto Ko-
moly, one of the leaders of the Zionist resistance in Hungary wrote in his diary 
on September 9, 1944 that there was a meeting in the Ministry of the Interior, ac-
cording to the information he had, at the Department of Public Safety, where 
those concerned discussed what was to be done if "the understandable and just 
despair of the Jewish masses" exploded. Miklos Mester, under-secretary of the 
Ministry of Education, one of Komoly's high ranking patrons went as far as to 
ask him what the Zionists thought could be done to avert the explosion of the 
"understandable despair" of the Jews.66 
-V If Komoly was really well informed, it has to be assumed that those concerned 
in the Ministry of the Interior were very much afraid. They were mostly afraid 
that after Rumania changed sides (23 August 1944) the front would collapse and 
that the Red Army would be given a happy welcome in Budapest as their libera-
tor by hundreds of thousands of Jews. We should remember that most Jewish 
men, at least most able-bodied men capable of bearing arms, were at this time 
doing forced military labour service either on the front or in the hinterland. 
It takes very desperate or very frightened people to expect women, children and 
old people to revolt. General Geza Lakatos, the new Prime Minister (29 August to 
15 October 1944) openly admitted in the House that "The military advantage to-
day is obviously with the other side."67 The 7th detective sub-department of the 
VII. (Miskolc) Gendarmerie District near the eastern border reported at the end of 
September that a unit of twenty-one partisans had parachuted in their district, 
and Hungarian Jewish forced military labourers in a number of prisoners' camps 
were preparing to fight as partisans on the side of the Red Army. The report 
mentions seventeen Jewish forced military labourers by name.68 
The news of the advancing Soviet troops late in the autumn of 1944, after the 
Arrow-Cross take-over on 15 October 1944, were full of words like blood, death, 
horror. And the red bandits, the Arrow-Cross press roared, were led by Jewish 
forced military labourers.69 Robert Haala called the Red Army "Asian hordes or-
ganized by Jews."7 0 
65 Márai, Napló, 160, (around May, 1944).· 
66 For the passage in Ottó Komoly's diary in Hungarian, see M. Schmidt, Kollaboráció 
vagy kooperáció? A Budapesti Zsidó Tanács [Collaboration or co-operation? The Bu-
dapest Jewish Council] Budapest 1990, 193. 
67 KN-1939-1944-Vol. XIX, 260. (21 September 1944). 
68 Report no. 1734/B.1944 (25 September) of VII. (Miskolc) Gendarmerie District to the 
Gendarmerie Intelligence Centre (OL-K149-651.f.-ll/53). 
69 Nemzetőr, 4 November 1944. "They rape even demented women," the newspaper 
wrote among others. 
70 Journals of the Arrow-Cross House of Representatives, Sopron, 12 January 1945,141. 
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Epilogue 
In the words of the Hungarian poet Attila József, the activities of many people 
(politicians, policemen, gendarmes, those of the middle class, workers, and peas-
ants) in Hungary during World War II were controlled by "cunning fear."71 Most 
politicians knew that whatever was being done to the Jews, in however "legal" 
and "parliamentary" way, was against justice and the law. Not every Hungarian 
politician wished the Jews dead, though. Many would have been satisfied with 
having some (or all) of the wealth of the Jews confiscated, and their civic rights 
curtailed. Even more would have been glad to see them emigrate. The plundering 
and the death of the Jews were wished by a smaller group, but they, to quote an-
other Hungarian poet, "killed willingly and with pleasure, not obeying orders."7 2 
It would be legitimate to ask whether (one of) the reason(s) the Hungarian 
Jews were deported to their death was because they were feared. The anti-Sem-
ites were afraid of the Jews first of all because of their own anti-Semitic preju-
dices. They "knew" that the people of the Old Testament were cruel, despicable, 
and revengeful. But they also knew that the Hungarian Jews were treated cruelly, 
despicably, and unlawfully. The Nazi and, in its wake, the Hungarian war 
propaganda changed its tone and subject after Stalingrad. The propaganda of 
success was followed by the propaganda of fear. The struggle of life and death 
became a constant central motif. Either we win, or the Jewish bolsheviks will ex-
terminate the Germans, the Hungarians, the press of the extreme right roared. 
The Hungarian national socialists and the Arrow-Cross, the most faithful collabo-
rators of the Nazis, as we have indicated, were confident in the final victory of 
the Germans until the spring of 1945. The development of military events, the 
fear of Jews or of the Red Army never had any impact on the behaviour of civil 
servants, gendarmes, soldiers, or the people at large. Tens of thousands claimed 
and obtained the businesses, the lands of the Jews, plundered the movables the 
latter had left behind. And thousands of civil servants, gendarme and police offi-
cers, excepting very few decent individuals, organized the deportation of the 
Jews in 1944 in a highly orderly manner. Fear of the revenge of Jews was rather 
selective than general. 
According to the Hungarian political thinker, István Bibó, humans are the 
only creatures who know they will die. Fear of death, of being killed by another 
human being is one of the oldest fears. Bibó says that the meaning and end of 
European social development is the humanization of power, the elimination of 
the dangers threatening the lives of people.73 If we try to understand what hap-
pened to the Jews during World War II and why, it will be obvious that the Holo-
caust was, among other things, a failure of Judeo-Christian European civilisation. 
71 A. József, "Hazám," [My homeland] (1937). 
72 M. Radnóti, "Töredék," [Fragment] (19 May 1944). 
73 I. Bibó, Az európai társadalomfejlődés értelme. [The meaning of European social develop-
ment] Budapest 1986,11-13. 
Роль Венгрии 
во Второй мировой войне 
Вступление в войну против Советского Союза 
в зеркале дневников и воспоминаний 
Юдит Пихурик 
Со второй половины восьмидесятых годов прошлого века в Венгрии появля-
ется все большее количество дневников, записок, воспоминаний, автобио-
графических заметок (в дальнейшем „мемуары"), относящихся к периоду 
правления Хорти. Часть этих материалов ранее уже публиковалась за рубе-
жом, другие же годами и десятилетиями лежали „в столе". Мемуары часто 
оказывались в центре внимания, особенно, коща их авторами были извест-
ные лица. Читателя больше всего привлекает субъективный взгляд автора, 
однако у исследователя как раз это должно вызывать наибольшую осторож-
ность. Действительно, мемуары сознательно выражают точку зрения лич-
ности, показывают ее роль и возможности. Мотивом к составлению мемуа-
ров часто служит стремление к самооправданию. Именно поэтому каждое 
утверждение должно быть многократно перепроверено, не только из-за 
субъективизма, но и из-за возможных ошибок. Это означает не только про-
верку по данным источников и специальной литературы, - очень поучи-
тельным бывает также сравнение с высказываниями современников. Для оп-
ределения степени достоверности приведенных в мемуарах фактов и дан-
ных очень важно учитывать личность автора, а также условия, в которых ру-
копись появилась на свет. 
Человек может быть творцом или просто свидетелем и участником со-
бытий, но в его дневниках всегда отражается то, что он чувствовал, думал, 
какую систему ценностей исповедовал в данный период, какие имел воз-
можности, и по каким причинам воспользовался или не воспользовался дан-
ными возможностями, насколько отвечал ожиданиям общества, к каким 
целям стремился и какие и почему отверг, как на него повлияли идеи 
и тенденции его времени. Автор дневников ведет свои записи одновременно 
с событиями, в его откровенных высказываниях об этих событиях звучат лич-
120 
Р о л ь ВЕНГРИИ ВО ВТОРОЙ МИРОВОЙ ВОЙНЕ 
ные нотки, ведь цель автора не в том, чтобы дать читателям информацию, 
а в том, чтобы зафиксировать свои собственные впечатления и мысли. Не-
посредственные высказывания, мгновенные реакции и свободное изложе-
ние переживании способствуют созданию общей картины. Среди публика-
ций относительно редко встречаются дневники, которые велись регулярно 
в течение продолжительного времени, чаще автор записывал свои мысли 
только в период или в ситуации, которую он считал важной, часто мотивом 
к ведению записок послужил какой-либо резкий поворот в его судьбе, на-
пример, плен или нелегальное положение. 
Мемуары, воспоминания пишутся задним числом, декларируемой целью 
их авторов является научное изложение данных, их обзор, может быть ана-
лиз, но чаще всего мотивом служит стремление к самооправданию. Автор 
берется за раскрытие подоплеки исторических событий, корректировку 
ошибочных, по его мнению, взглядов, или публикует неизвестные до сих 
пор факты и документы. Тогда, во всяком случае, теоретически, централь-
ное место должен занимать рассматриваемый исторический период, а не 
личность. В случае мемуаров мы также не можем предполагать, что они 
всегда создавались в спокойной обстановке. Многие воспоминания писа-
лись в условиях плена, эмиграции или вынужденного ухода от дел, забве-
ния, что также не способствовало взвешенному анализу и беспристрастным 
оценкам. Однако эти обстоятельства могли способствовать и тому, что в рас-
поряжении автора, кроме его собственных дневников и заметок, оказыва-
лись другие источники или специальная литература. Таким образом, точка 
зрения мемуаристов, наряду с другими факторами, может быть в значи-
тельной степени обусловлена приобретенными позднее знаниями и опы-
том. Надо также учитывать и то, что в расчете на публикацию автор мемуа-
ров до известной степени приспосабливает, или вынужден приспосабливать 
их к картине событий, сложившейся ко времени публикации. 
Запечатленные в мемуарах воспоминания дают своеобразную картину 
прошлого. Многообразие взглядов делает известный или казавшийся из-
вестным исторический период более ярким и близким к читателю. Мы мо-
жем наблюдать, насколько осуществляется самоконтроль и объективность 
в случае дневников, и как память справляется с фактами в мемуарах. Есть 
множество примеров того, насколько плохо люди помнят имена, факты 
и даже события, которые они наблюдали собственными глазами, насколько 
влияет на их воспоминания все, что они позднее прочитали, узнали, часто 
в противоречии с их собственным опытом. 
Учитывая все вышесказанное, мы можем на основании часто противо-
речащих, но и дополняющих друг друга дневников и мемуаров составить 
более тонкое представление о спорных вопросах данного периода, о по-
доплеке тех или иных решений, о том, как сталкивались желания и реаль-
ность, как трудно давалось осознание реальной расстановки сил, как судьба 
Венгрии оказалась практически не управляемой в отсутствии внутреннего 
контроля и гарантий великих держав, и как из-за мнимых или реальных 
интересов она втягивалась во Вторую мировую войну. Ниже мы попытаемся 
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с помощью мемуаров проследить оценки, связанные с обстоятельствами 
вступления страны в войну, их формирование и изменение. Наиболее часто 
возникающие и спорные вопросы заключаются в том, было ли вступление 
в войну исторической необходимостью, кто при этом играл главную роль -
Миклош Хорти1 (Horthy Miklós), Ласло Бардопш2 (Bárdossy László), Хенрик 
Верт3 (Werth Henrik), крайне право настроенные офицеры или немцы, 
а также кто и почему бомбил Кошице. 
После начала боевых действий Второй мировой войны основной целью 
венгерского политического руководства было сохранение военного нейтра-
литета. С сентября 1939 до апреля 1941 г. это удавалось сделать, однако 11 
апреля 1939 г. Венгрия присоединилась к нападению на Югославию. После-
довавшее затем самоубийство премьер-министра Венгрии Пала Телеки4 
(Teleki Pál), по мнению многих, демонстрировало безысходность ситуации: 
в сложившемся положении не существовало настоящей альтернативы для 
самостоятельных шагов. Посол Венгрии в Лондоне Дьёрдь Барца (Barcza 
György) еще 7 февраля 1941 г. отправил сообщение о том, что министр 
иностранных дел Великобритании Идеи (Eden) вызвал его к себе и выразил 
желание провести „дружескую, но абсолютно откровенную" беседу. Среди 
прочего он заявил, что хотя и ясно понимает всю тяжесть положения Венг-
рии в связи с немецким давлением, в случае победы английское прави-
тельство будет делать различие „между вынужденной и добровольной го-
товностью, стремится страна противостоять давлению, или нет."5 Заметки 
Пала Телеки от 3 марта 1941 г. отражают его сомнения в связи с вышеуказан-
ным: великие державы и после этого будут относиться к малым государст-
вам в соответствии с собственными интересами, не учитывая „различий в их 
положении". Таким образом, очень трудно одновременно соответствовать 
поставленным англичанами условиям и противостоять „притягательной 
силе современных идеологий, опирающихся на свои победы".6 Позднее, 
в воспоминаниях, связанных с вторжением в Югославию (в так называемые 
„Южные территории"), у . Черчилль также писал, что Венгрия тоща должна 
была выбирать из двух зол: или немецкая оккупация, или нарушение дан-
ного слова7. Решение о присоединении мотивировалось стремлением за-
вершить территориальную ревизию, в соответствии с решением Высшего 
1 Правитель Венгерского Королевства в 1920-1944 гг. (1868-1957). 
2 Премьер-министр Венгрии с 3 апреля 1941 по 7 марта 1942 г. (1890-1946). 
3 Начальник Генерального штаба армии с 19 сентября 1938 по 4 сентября 1941 г. 
(1881-1952). 
4 Премьер-министр в 1920-1921 гг., а также с 16 февраля 1939 по 3 апреля 1941 г. 
(1879-1941). 
5 Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához. [Дипломатические документы внеш-
ней политики Венгрии] V. Под ред. Gy. Juhász, Budapest 1982. (В дальнейшем: 
DIMK. V.) 860-861. 
6 DIMK V. 893-902. 
7 W. S. Churchill, A második világháború. [Вторая мировая война] I—II, Budapest 1989, 
481-482. 
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Военного Совета участие Венгрии в боевых действиях не должно было 
распространяться за ее исторические границы.8 В соответствии с триа-
нонским договором 1920 г. после распада Австро-Венгерской монархии 
прекратило свое существование и единство исторической Венгрии: к по-
явившимся на месте Австро-Венгерской монархии государствам отошло две 
трети территории страны и 57% населения. Более 30% населения этих по-
терянных земель составляли венгры. Напряженность обостряло и то, что 
значительное венгерское население проживало вдоль новых границ, то есть 
мирный диктат разделил также этнически однородные территории. Глав-
ной внешнеполитической задачей периода правления Хорти была мирная 
ревизия границ, но возможность для этого появилась только в конце 30-х гг. 
с немецкой и итальянской помощью. Этот факт бросил тень на результаты 
осуществленной ревизии,9 и определил внешнеполитическую ориентацию 
Венгрии. Весной 1941 г. венгерское политическое руководство в надежде на 
возврат так называемых „Южных территорий" приняло решение о присое-
динении к нападению на Югославию и о пропуске немецких войск через 
свою территорию. Этот шаг рассматривался как следующий этап терри-
ториальной ревизии. Принятие решение осложнялось и тем, что в декабре 
1940 г. Венгрия и Югославия заключили договор о вечной дружбе. Однако 
весной 1941 г. в Югославии произошел антинемецкий политический пово-
рот, следствием которого стало немецкое нападение. Венгерские политики 
оправдывали вступление в войну, в результате которой были присоединены 
новые земли, распадом страны, заключившей договор, образованием незави-
симой Хорватии и защитой венгерского населения „Южных территорий".10 
Успехи ревизионизма способствовали росту популярности правителя Мик-
лоша Хорти, повышали общее настроение, однако многие политики пре-
дупреждали об опасности пронемецкой ориентации. После нападения 
Германии на Советский Союз 22 июня 1941 г. в основном среди высшего 
военного командования встречались те, кто был ранее знаком с военными 
планами и считал, что во имя союзнической верности и для борьбы с боль-
8 Стоит отметить, что военная операция все же распространилась за эти границы. 
Быстрый корпус под командованием генерала Листа с 16 апреля по 6 мая 1941 г. 
был придан 12-ой немецкой армии. Под командованием немцев корпус перешел 
границы Венгрии 1918 г. и через Восточную Хорватию дошел до сербского го-
рода Вальево, однако не принимал участие ни в каких боевых действиях. 
9 2 ноября 1938 г. в соответствии с так называемым первым венским арбитражем от 
Чехословакии к Венгрии отошла южная, населенная в основном венграми часть 
территории исторической „Верхней Венгрии". 15 марта 1939 г. с согласия немцев 
венгерские войска вошли в Закарпатье, ще венгры составляли почти 10% на-
селения. В соответствии со вторым венским арбитражем 30 августа 1940 г. страна 
вернула себе Северную Трансильванию и область Секей с населением в 2,5 
миллиона человек, но примерно 1 миллион населения составляли румыны, в то 
время, как в Южной Трансильвании осталось около 400 тысяч венгров. 
10 Примерно 40% населения „Южных территорий" составляли венгры. 
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шевизмом11 Венгрия должна вступить в войну на стороне Германии. Пре-
мьер-министр Пасло Бардоши, однако, в то время еще отвергал подобного 
рода предложения, так как немцы ясно заявили, что не нуждаются в воен-
ном участии Венгрии. Многие выдающиеся политики, в их числе и бывший 
премьер-министр Ипггван Бетлен12 (Bethlen István), указывали на опасность, 
которую представляет для страны участия в этой войне. 
Однако, 27 июня 1941 г. Пасло Бардоши истолковал воздушный налет на 
Кошице, обстоятельства которого до сих пор не ясны, как военные действия 
Советского Союза, и с согласия правителя объявил о том, что Венгрия и Со-
ветский Союз находятся в состоянии войны. 26 июня 1941 г. три неопознан-
ных самолета, появившихся с юго-восточного направления, бомбили город 
Кошице, находившийся на вновь присоединенной территории историче-
ской Верхней Венгрии. Было сброшено 29 бомб, в результате бомбежки по-
гибло 32 человека, 60 получили тяжелые, и еще 220 легкие ранения. Был на-
несен также значительный материальный ущерб. В тот же день в районе 
Рахова воздушному налету подвергся следующий в Будапешт скорый поезд. 
При таких обстоятельствах правительство и обе палаты государственного 
собрания, мнение которых согласно закону было запрошено задним чис-
лом,13 поддержали это решение, никто не высказал сомнений в том, что на-
падавшие самолеты были советскими.14 
Стремление удержать вновь присоединенные территории также укреп-
ляло согласие в этом вопросе, в то время как Румыния и Словакия как союз-
ники немцев уже отправили свои войска на советский фронт. В надежде на 
быструю победу Германии до декабря 1941 г. последствия не казались опас-
ными. Однако символическое по началу участие Венгрии, по мере измене-
ния хода войны становилось все более важным для теряющего превос-
ходство немецкого командования. В 1942 г. Венгрия была вынуждена отпра-
вить войска на советский фронт. Принятие таких тяжелых обязательств и 
изменение хода войны заставило многих пересмотреть решение 1941 г. В ме-
11 С 21 марта по 1 августа 1919 г. в Венгрии была предпринята попытка установить 
власть по советскому образцу, которая, однако, провалилась. 
12 с 1921 по 1931 гг. премьер-министр, позднее один из главных советников прави-
теля. (1874-1946) 
13 В соответствии со статьей закона 1920/ХУП. правитель имел право отправлять 
венгерские войска за границы страны, если существовала непосредственная опас-
ность нападения. Однако он должен был запросить немедленное последующее 
одобрение парламента. 
14 Позднее многие ссылались на то, что премьер-министр Бардоши скрыл от Мик-
лоша Хорти и венгерского правительства телеграмму посла Венгрии в Москве 
Иозефа Криштофи, который передавал заявление Молотова о том, что Совет-
ский Союз не хочет войны с Венгрией, и не советские самолеты совершили налет. 
В своих мемуарах Хорти также упоминает этот случай. Мы не можем знать, ка-
ким образом заявление могло бы повлиять на принятие решения, так как с вен-
герской стороны в данной ситуации была полная уверенность в том, что прои-
зошло нападение со стороны Советского Союза. 
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муарах появляется мысль о том, что Венгрию втянули в эту ситуацию 
„жаждущие славы военные" во главе с Хенриком Вертом, а также Ласло Бар-
допги15, а в 1944 г. некоторые мемуаристы оценивают сложившуюся ситуа-
цию уже как результат немецкого влияния (и даже заговора). В то же время 
ставится вопрос и об ответственности Миклоша Хорти.16 
Начальник Генерального штаба Хенрик Верт в мае-июне 1941 г. действи-
тельно стремился к тому, чтобы было достигнуто соглашение о немецко-
венгерском военном сотрудничестве в предстоящей в скором будущем войне 
с Советским Союзом. Не получив благоприятного ответа на свои мемо-
рандумы от 6 и 31 мая, в новом отношении Министерству иностранных дел 
от 14 июня он выдвинет следующие доводы: „Я твердо убежден, что Венг-
рия не может оставаться в бездействии в немецко-русской войне. Мы должны 
принять в этой войне участие: 
1. потому что это требуется для обеспечения территориальной целост-
ности страны, а также для обеспечения нашего государственного, общест-
венного и экономического порядка, 
2. потому что в интересах нашего будущего ослабление русского со-
седства и удаление его от наших границ является нашей первостепенной 
национальной задачей, 
3. потому что этого требует наше покоящееся на христианской нацио-
нальной основе мировоззрение и принципиальное противостояние больше-
визму, как в прошлом, так и в настоящем, 
4. потому что в политическом плане мы окончательно связали себя со 
странами оси, 
5. потому что от этого зависит дальнейшее расширение нашей страны."17 
Ласло Бардоши, который как премьер-министр оставил за собой и пост 
министра иностранных дел, тогда же 14 июня на чрезвычайном заседании 
совета министров зачитал это отношение и ответил на него. Основные 
пункты его ответа: Венгрия уже предоставила достаточно доказательств 
того, что она стоит на стороне стран оси, нет необходимости вновь это де-
монстрировать, а о развитии немецко-советских отношений он не был про-
информирован, несмотря на запрос. В отношении венгерского участия он 
подчеркнул, что немцы не просили об активном сотрудничестве. По его све-
дениям, Гитлер готовит для не имеющей территориальных претензий к Со-
ветскому Союзу Венгрии роль, отличную от Румынии и Финляндии. Бар-
15 См. Gy. Barcza, Diplomata emlékeim, 1911-1945. [Мои воспоминания дипломата, 
1911-1945] I-II. Magyarország volt vatikáni és londoni követének emlékirataiból. [Из воспо-
минаний бывшего посла Венгрии в Ватикане и в Лондоне] ред. L. Antal, Budapest 
1994, (В дальнейшем: Barcza II. 1994), V. Nagybaczoni Nagy, Végzetes esztendők, 1938-
1945. [Роковые годы, 1938-1945] Budapest 1986, (В дальнейшем: Nagybaczoni 1986), 
Náray Antal visszaemlékezése, 1945. [Воспоминания Антала Нараи, 1945] ред. S. Sza-
kály, Budapest 1988. (В дальнейшем: Náray 1988). 
16 См. M. Fenyő. Az elsodort ország. [Унесенная страна] Budapest 1986, (В дальнейшем: 
Fenyő 1986). 
17 DIMK V. 1176-1179. 
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доши один за другим опровергал доводы Верта, однозначно заявив, что „без 
решительного высказанного желания или призыва Германии" не даст сво-
его согласия на начало военных приготовлений.18 Этого решения Бардоши 
и придерживался вплоть до бомбардировки Копгаце. Хотя и несомненно, 
что целью Хенрика Верта было скорейшее вступление в войну, а его связи 
в немецких военных кругах подталкивали его к действиям, как начальник 
генштаба он принял к сведению решение политиков. Генерал Курт Химер19 
(Kurt Himer) даже отметил в своем докладе, что „Верт не способен осознать 
величие момента", так как подчиняется решению политиков, тогда как 
„сейчас слово за солдатами".20 
Несмотря на эти факты в части мемуаров точка зрения авторов одноз-
начна: ответственность за вступление Венгрии в войну лежит лично на пре-
мьер-министре и / и л и Хенрике Верте. Дьёрдь Барца также обвиняет Бар-
доши, так как считает, что тот „...без всякого принуждения со стороны нем-
цев одним росчерком пера втянул страну в войну против Советов. ... Од-
нако многим показалось чрезвычайно подозрительным вся история с воз-
душным налетом, который случился именно в тот момент, когда Бардоши 
требовался предлог, для того чтобы оправдать в глазах венгерского общест-
венного мнения объявление войны Советскому Союзу."21 Тут же Барца об-
виняет и Верта в том, что как „активный германофил" он принял участие 
в провокации. 
Ипггван Бетлен также подчеркивает личную ответственность Бардоши. 
По его мнению премьер-министр был добросовестным политиком, который 
однако не мог устоять перед „соблазном" и под давлением немцев „объявил 
войну России и Америке и мы втянулись также в войну с Англией,"2 2 в то 
время как Гитлер не призывал Венгрию к вооруженному выступлению и не 
оказывал политического давления на правительство. Как и большинство 
мемуаристов, Бетлен подчеркивает иррациональную и опасную сущность 
войны с Советским Союзом. Он отрицает, что Венгрия связана с Германией 
„вечной благодарностью", не верит, что произошла преднамеренная прово-
кация, и опровергает также утверждение о том, что страна защищает мир от 
большевизма: „.. .не этот состоящий из горстки людей народ, сами жизнен-
ные основы которого подверглись нападению, был призван по наущению 
is DIMK V. 1180-1182. 
19 Генерал-майор Курт Химер, приданный высшему командованию венгерской 
армии генерал, начальник штаба связи (март-август 1941 г.). 
20 J. Kun, „A német hadvezetés magyarországi politikájához 1941. március-július," 
[К венгерской политике немецкого военного командования в марте-июле 1941 г.] 
Századok 99 (1965), 1228-1245. Йожеф Кун (Kun József) отмечает, что журнал штаба 
связи, назначенного высшим немецким командованием в Венгрии, вел капитан 
д-р Перси Эрнст Шрам (Percy Ernst Schramm), 1140-1141. 
21 Наряду с другими Дьёрдь Барца также пишет „объявление войны" вместо „сос-
тояния войны". Barcza II. 1994,24-25. 
22 Bethlen István emlékirata, 1944. [Воспоминания Ипггвана Бетлена, 1944 г.] ред. I. Rom-
sics, Budapest 1988,113. (В дальнейшем: Bethlen 1988). 
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кичащихся национальной верностью „героев" на словах, совершенно на-
прасно, приняв героическую позу, встать на пути русского парового катка, 
который готовился раздавить не нас, а Германию..."23 Характерно сжатое 
резюме Густава Хеннеи24 (Hennyey Gusztáv): „Под давлением премьер-
министра Ласло Бардоши, в котором значительную роль играл начштаба 
генерал-полковник Хенрик Верт, и по призыву Гитлера Совет министров 
решил объявить войну России..."2 5 
Миклош Хорти, напротив, снимает ответственность с Бардоши. Он не 
находит объяснения некоторым действиям Бардоши, однако считает приго-
вор народного суда несправедливым, а его казнь называет „мученической 
смертью". Объяснение таково: „Кто никогда не совершал ошибок в поли-
тике, пусть первый бросит камень в Ласло Бардоши."26 Сформулированное 
в 1945 г. мнение Антала Нараи27 (Náray Antal) может служить итогом после-
военных оценок, практически полностью отрицающих политическую от-
ветственность. Общие черты этих оценок следующие: главная ошибка - это 
слабость, подверженность влияниям, однако виноваты те, кто оказывал вли-
яние, - большей частью иностранцы и деятели крайних взглядов. С этой 
точки зрения характерно, что пишет Нараи о Бардоши: „Несмотря на мно-
гие правильные представления, у него все же не хватило сил помешать 
тому, что внешние силы и скрывающиеся в их тени амбициозные деятели, 
часто вводя в заблуждение господина Правителя, постепенно довели нашу 
страну до посылки на фронт второй венгерской армии и ее печального 
поражения."28 Во всех случаях он указывает на роль генштаба, подчеркивая 
значение влияния офицеров-карьеристов. 
В связи с ролью Хенрика Верта возникает вопрос: если даже на основа-
нии указанных политических резонов он считал закономерным вступление 
в войну с Советским Союзом, насколько он считал Венгрию подготовленной 
для этого в военном отношении? В связи с этим вопросом существуют раз-
личные мнения. Воспоминания Ференца Сомбатхеи29 (Szombathelyi Ferenc) 
указывают на то, что, став начальником генштаба, он попробовал развеять 
романтические представления, сложившиеся благодаря его предшественни-
23 Bethlen 1988,113. 
24 Генерал-полковник, с 27 августа по 16 октября 1944 г. министр иностранных дел. 
(1888-1977). 
25 G. Hennyey, Magyarország sorsa Kelet és Nyugat között. Egy volt magyar királyi külügy-
miniszter visszaemlékezései. [Судьба Венгрии между Востоком и Западом. Воспоми-
нания бывшего королевского министра иностранных дел} ред. L. Antal, Budapest 
1992,59. (В дальнейшем: Hennyey 1992). 
26 М. Horthy, Emlékirataim. [Мои воспоминания! ред. L. Antal, Budapest 1990, 245. 
(В дальнейшем: Horthy 1990). 
27 Генерал-майор, с марта 1942 по март 1944 г. председатель Венгерского Телеграф-
ного Агентства и Радио (1893-1973). 
28 Náray 1988, 60-61. 
29 Генерал-полковник, с 6 сентября 1941 г. по 19 апреля 1944 г. начальник Генераль-
ного штаба армии (1887-1946) 
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кам: он хотел, чтобы пришло осознание того, что венгерская армия мало-
численна и отстала и годится только для оккупации.30 Упомянутые пред-
шественники - военный министр Карой Барта (Bartha Károly) и Хенрик 
Верт. 1 апреля 1941 г. на Высшем Оборонном Совете Барта говорил следу-
ющее: „.. .дух и подготовка венгерской армии отличные. Что касается совре-
менного вооружения, то тут есть, над чем поработать, однако выступление 
на стороне Германии приведет к тому, что немцы могут с избытком снаб-
дить нас вооружением, снаряжением и боеприпасами."31 Мемуары Мик-
лоша Каллаи (Kállay Miklós) полны противоречий: в связи с катастрофой 
1943 г. на Дону он подробно описывает недостаточное снабжение венгер-
ских войск и их безвыходное положение, а затем вспоминает, что „до руко-
пашного боя, в котором так силен венгерский солдат, дело не дошло." 3 2 
В патетических выражениях он описывает выносливость и жертвенность сол-
дат, однако через несколько страниц занимается поисками причин „духов-
ной деформации" армии, сравнивая венгерских солдат, воевавших в Пер-
вую и во Вторую мировую войну. Он называет несколько причин изме-
нений. Дисциплина в армии уже не та, что прежде, и исправить положение 
просто грубостью, как это пытались сделать, по его наблюдениям, некото-
рые молодые офицеры, невозможно. Другая причина, которую называли 
многие, заключается в том, что солдаты не видели смысла воевать. Они не 
понимали, что после успешной ревизии территорий им делать в войне 
с Советским Союзом, вдали от Венгрии. 
Некоторые авторы считают определяющим влияние политизированного 
офицерства, особенно „швабского" происхождения. Еще до 1945 г., кроме 
всего прочего, большую роль в распространении этого взгляда могло играть 
мнение Эндре Байчи-Жилински (Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre)33, влияние кото-
рого чувствуется во многих мемуарах. Вильмош Надьбацони Надь34 (Nagy-
baczoni Nagy Vilmos) ссылается на их разговор в 1944 г., и в связи с этим за-
мечает: „Часть деятелей немецкого происхождения склонны видеть вен-
герские интересы там, где есть интересы не венгерские, а чисто немецкие. 
Они всеща превозносили Германию и переоценивали немецкие достиже-
ния по сравнению с венгерскими. Мы, кровные венгры, лучше, чем они 
способны любить и ценить своих сородичей даже вместе с их ошибками."3 5 
Многие принимают приведенное выше мнение, и во многих мемуарах 
30 Szombathelyi Ferenc visszemlékezése, 1945. [Воспоминания Ференца Сомбатхейи, 1945 
г.] ред. Р. Gosztonyi, Budapest 1990,25. 
31 Náray 1988,49. 
32 М. Kállay, Magyarország miniszterelnöke voltam 1942-1944. [Я был венгерским пре-
мьер-министром в1942-1944] I-П, ред. L. Antal, Budapest 1991,158. 
33 Политик, депутат парламента, публицист. С самого начала выступал против 
союза с немцами и войны с Советским Союзом. Как руководитель антифашист-
ского сопротивления после прихода к власти нилашистов был арестован и казнен 
24 декабря 1944 г. (1886-1944). 
34 Генерал, с 24 сентября 1942 г. по 12 июня 1943 г. военный министр (1884-1976). 
35 Nagybaczoni 1986,195-196. 
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можно найти сходные высказывания.36 Можно считать типичными выводы 
уже упомянутого Антала Нараи: „У меня сложилось впечатление, что на-
чальник генерального штаба Венгрии вместе со своей оперативной группой 
и в полном согласии с немецким военным командованием подталкивал вен-
герскую политику к вступлению в войну. А венгерской политике не хватило 
смелости сохранить правильную основную линию и заявить исполнитель-
ной военной власти: „Sutor, ne ultra crepidam"! Так венгерский государст-
венный муж окончательно проиграл в борьбе с испытывающим сильное не-
мецкое влияние венгерским военным руководством, забыв о том, что таким 
образом отказался от духовного руководства жизнью государства и необхо-
димой для нашего существования благоразумной осторожности. Опасаясь 
последствий, он передал бразды правления честолюбивым военным."3 7 
Нараи также ссылается на то, что „штабные карьеристы" заявляли: „Защита 
Венгрии будет осуществляется на Дону." 3 8 Ни в коем случае не следует 
обобщать приведенные мнения: восприимчивость к крайним взглядам, 
„германофильское направление" части офицерства связано скорее с духом 
того времени, а не с их происхождением. Попытка после поражения в войне 
делать обобщения на основании их поведения и установок мотивирована 
поисками „козла отпущения", при анализе причин поражения можно было 
ссылаться на офицеров и генералов „швабов". 
После войны роль немецкого влияния подчеркивалась и в другой связи. 
Довольно долго бытовало своеобразное объяснение бомбардировки Ко-
шице, согласно которому нападение провели немецкие самолеты, замаски-
рованные под советские с целью провокации, чтобы вынудить колеблю-
щееся венгерское руководство напасть на Советский Союз. Согласно этой 
версии это наблюдал один из инструкторов аэродрома в Кошице капитан 
Адам Круди (Krúdy Ádám) и доложил Ласло Бардоши, который замолчал 
этот важный „факт" перед правителем Хорти. Как мы уже упоминали, до 
сих пор неясно, чьи самолеты произвели налет, а вышеприведенная версия 
родилась в 1944-1945 г. и может быть опровергнута по многим пунктам. 
Проблему налета на Кошице подробно обсуждает в своей книге Юлиан 
Боршани39 (Borsányi Julián), который был членом комиссии, на второй день 
36 См. Gy. Kádár, A Ludovikától Sopronkőhidáig. [От Людовики до Шопронкёхда] I-II. 
Budapest 1978, 255. Shvoy Kálmán titkos naplója és emlékirata 1918-1945. [Тайный днев-
ник и заметки Кальмана Швой 1918-1945] ред. М. Perneki, б. м. 1983,121 (В даль-
нейшем: Shvoy 1983), Е. Újpétery, Végállomás Lisszabon. Hét év a magyar királyi külügy 
szolgálatában. [Конечная станция - Лиссабон. Семь лет на службе венгерских коро-
левских иностранных дел] Budapest 1987,278-279. 
37 Náray 1988,58-59. 
38 Náray 1988,61. 
39 См. J. Borsányi, A magyar tragédia kassai nyitánya. [Кошицская прелюдия венгерской 
трагедии] München 1986, (В дальнейшем: Borsányi 1986). Он же: „Az 1941. június 
26-ai kassai bombatámadás 'fehér foltjai'. Visszaemlékezések és személyes észrevéte-
lek," („Белые пятна" бомбардировки Кошице 26 июня 1941 г. Воспоминания и 
личные наблюдения). Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 91 (1991/2), 88-113. 
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после бомбардировки расследовавшей события. Боршани пишет, что сви-
детели давали противоречивые показания. Кто-то видел два, кто-то три или 
четыре самолета, рознятся также описания внешнего вида и технических 
характеристик: свидетели указывали цвет опознавательных знаков от ко-
ричневого до желтого разных оттенков, кто-то видел одномоторные само-
леты, - в зависимости от того, что он думал об их принадлежности. Увидев, 
насколько влияет на память людей полученная позднее информация, автор 
замечает: „Только немедленная запись и протоколирование фактов может 
сделать сообщение достоверным."40 Юлиан Боршани собирал документы 
к своей работе в течение нескольких десятков лет, и на основании своих 
исследований считает наиболее вероятным, что налет произвела советская 
авиация по ошибке, но доказательств этой версии, естественно, не сущест-
вует. 
На основании написанных под непосредственным впечатлением от со-
бытий дневников складывается картина, отличная от той, которая полу-
чается в процессе чтения позднее написанных воспоминаний и мемуаров. 
Дневники подтверждают, что современники, независимо от их отношения 
ко вступлению в войну, хотя и были удивлены, но поверили, что произошло 
советское нападение и не оспаривали необходимости ответных шагов. 
Мысль о внешнем влиянии тогда еще не возникала. Интересный пример -
мемуары Кальмана Швои41 (Shvoy Kálmán). В 1941 г. он записывает о собы-
тиях 27 июня лишь следующее: „Наступило состояние войны между Венг-
рией и Советским Союзом. - Пасло Бардоши в двух словах объявил об этом 
в парламенте." Однако в 1952 г., явно приводя его в соответствие с актуальной 
тогда оценкой периода правления Хорти, он дополняет свой дневник сле-
дующей записью: „Что касается объявления войны, правительство нару-
шило Конституцию, потому что объявило парламенту об уже состоявшемся 
объявлении войны, тогда как должно было получить для объявления войны 
согласие обеих палат."42 В других мемуарах также встречается выражение 
„объявление войны" или его описание вместо объявления о состоянии 
войны. Исключение составляет, например, Миклош Хорти, который цити-
рует официальное заявление: „Из-за неоднократных, противоречащих меж-
дународному праву воздушных налетов Советской России на свою суве-
ренную территорию, Венгрия считает себя находящейся в состоянии войны 
с Советским Союзом."43 В этом вопросе самым существенным является то, 
что не производилось дипломатического выяснения инцидента. Если бы во 
Второй мировой войне военные действия, случайно затрагивающие нейт-
4° Borsányi 1985, 54. 
41 Офицер генерального штаба, позднее политик, депутат парламента (1881-1971). 
42 Shvoy 1983, 225. Кальман Швой запечатлел свои воспоминания об этом периоде 
тремя способами: в 1941 г. он вел дневник, в 1942 г. составил (на основании за-
меток) воспоминания в виде дневника о периоде с 25 июля 1914 по 31 декабря 
1940 гг., а в 1952 г. дополнил все это своими мемуарами. 
« Horthy 1990, 251. 
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ральные государства, приводили к их вступлению в войну, Швейцария 
и Швеция также вступили бы в войну с Германией и ее союзниками. Геза 
Лакатош44 (Lakatos Géza), анализируя ситуацию, приводит слова Хенрика 
Верта: независимо от того, кто ее осуществил, бомбардировка Кошице 
„пришлась кстати"45, так как послужила предлогом для вступления в войну. 
В его дневнике 1944 г. имеется замечание о том, что, по мнению автора, 
вступление Венгрии в войну произошло под немецким давлением, более 
того, в результате провокации. Хотя предположение о том, что немецкий 
и венгерский генштаб могли организовать налет, с целью вынудить венгерс-
кое политическое руководство предпринять определенные шаги кажется 
логичным, оно явно не выдерживает критики. Предположение об участии 
венгров в провокации служило дискредитации режима Хорти и после 1945 
г. отвечало политической конъюнктуре. Интересно, что легенду Круди пе-
ренимают многие авторы в эмиграции, даже те, кто мог предполагать, 
что подобная провокация бессмысленна и маловероятна. Естественно, что 
в данном случае цель была другой, - переложить ответственность за вступле-
ние в войну на немцев, на Гитлера. 
Микша Феньо46 (Fenyő Miksa), который из-за своего еврейского проис-
хождения скрывался в „выходящей во двор-колодец комнатке", в 1944 г. 
указывает на то, что имела место немецкая провокация и даже предполагает 
соучастие Хорти. 4 июля он записывает в свой дневник: „Для него (Хорти) 
было ясно, что бомбардировка Кошице дело рук немцев, однако он терпел, 
когда его правительство заявило, что на страну напали русские самолеты. 
Он объявляет войну США и отправляет на смерть в русских полях четверть 
миллиона венгерских мальчиков, среди них и своего сына."47 Феньо не ука-
зывает, откуда он получил сведения для данного предположения. Воз-
можно, что слухи о немецкой провокации он дополнил собственными пред-
положениями о роли Хорти, так как в эти дни в своем дневнике подвергает 
деятельность правителя резкой критике. 
Ипггван Бетлен, который пишет свои воспоминания после немецкой ок-
купации летом 1944 г. также находясь на нелегальном положении, не упо-
минает о немецкой провокации. 
Миклош Хорти в своих воспоминаниях принимает историю Круди: „Го-
сударственный секретарь президиума совета министров Ипггван Барци 
(Bárczy István) в 1944 году задним числом доложил мне о тайном сговоре, 
возможности которого я никогда не предполагал. На основании непосред-
ственного знания предыстории Барци рассказал, что инструктор аэродрома 
в Кошице летный капитан Адам Круди письменно доложил премьер-ми-
нистру Бардоши о том, что видел своими глазами: бомбы сбросили немец-
44 Генерал-полковник, с 29 августа по 16 октября 1944 г. премьер-министр. (1890-
1967). 
45 G. Lakatos, Ahogyan én láttam. [Как я видел] ред. L. Antal, Budapest 1992, 47. 
46 Писатель, публицист (1877-1972). 
47 Fenyő 1986,44. 
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кие самолеты. Однако в то время уже наступило состояние войны. Поэтому 
Бардоши призвал капитана Круди молчать и предупредил, что в против-
ном случае он может иметь для себя неприятные последствия. Служащие 
президиума совета министров также получили приказ молчать. В принципе 
не исключена возможность того, что наблюдение капитана Круди 26 июня 
1941 года было ошибочным, однако это очень маловероятно по двум при-
чинам. Как я уже упоминал, наш начальник генштаба был заинтересован 
в том, чтобы мы вступили в войну так же, как и Гитлер."48 Далее он ссылается 
на то, что после 22 июня получил от Гитлера письмо с призывом вступить 
в войну, однако по желанию Бардоши и правительства, и вопреки мнению 
Верта, дал на него отрицательный ответ. Поэтому он и считает логичной 
возможность сговора между начальником генштаба и немецким руководст-
вом с целью получить „вызов". Однако нет никаких следов упомянутого 
письма Гитлера, в отличие от тех посланий, в которых немецкое руко-
водство сообщает о том, что в июне 1941 г. не требует венгерского военного 
участия. 
Кроме бывшего правителя, и другие некритично принимают и излагают 
различные версии истории Круди, например Пал Ауэр4 9 (Auer Pál): „Бар-
доши знал о том, что не русские сбросили бомбы на Кошице и Мукачево не 
только из телеграммы Криштофи50 (Kristóffy) и донесения военного ми-
нистра Барта. Начальник аэродрома в Кошице полковник Адам Круди 
письменно доложил премьер-министру, а затем подтвердил под присягой, 
что видел собственными глазами, как бомбы сбросили с немецких самоле-
тов. В ответ Бардоши обязал Круди и своих сотрудников соблюдать тайну. 
Так он обманул не только правителя, но и весь венгерский народ, чтобы 
иметь юридическое основание для объявления войны. На следующий день 
он объявил войну Советской России."51 Это уже „развитие" истории Круди, 
содержащая множество ошибок ее версия. 
Многие мемуаристы согласны, что из-за своего географического поло-
жения Венгрия должна была выбирать га двух великих держав, она должна 
была решить, уступить ей немецкому или советскому влиянию. По их мне-
нию, малые нации беззащитны в поле действия политики великих держав. 
После войны эти авторы описывают вступление в войну как неизбежный, 
предопределенный судьбой шаг, и, ссылаясь на „роковую неизбежность", 
„трагическую венгерскую судьбу" или на немецкое влияние, не исследуют 
внутреннюю "подоплеку этого решения. Миклош Хорти пишет в своих вос-
поминаниях: „Рассматривая роль моей родины в тридцатые годы, с рассто-
яния двух десятилетий и с той пришедшей впоследствии прозорливостью, 
которую дал нам страшный опыт Второй мировой войны, я вынужден 
прийти к выводу, что развитие исторических событий определяет роко-
48 Horthy 1990,250-251. 
49 Адвокат, политик Партии мелких хозяев, дипломат, журналист (1885-1978). 
50 См. сноску 14. 
51 Р. Auer, Fél évszázad. [Полвека] Washington 1971,210. 
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вая необходимость... свобода действий малого государства всегда ограни-
чена...".5 2 Сходную точку зрения высказывает и Антал Уллеин Ревицки53 
(Ullein Reviczky Antal): „...Венгрия, как и другие страны, как пушинка была 
подхвачена водоворотом гигантских сил, не будет преувеличением сказать, 
что в конечном итоге судьбу страны определили эти силы, а не более или 
менее успешные комбинации венгерской дипломатии. ... маленькая страна, 
оказавшись в центре мирового переворота, не делает историю, а является ее 
пассивным объектом."54 
Объяснения спорных вопросов вступления Венгрии в войну появились 
еще во время этой войны, а после 1945 г. различные, в зависимости от целей 
авторов, версии нашли свое место в опубликованных в Венгрии и за грани-
цей мемуарах. В опубликованных за границей воспоминаниях часто встре-
чаются столь же критичные мнения, как и в появившихся внутри страны. 
От живущих в эмиграции авторов не требовалось того, на что мы указывали 
выше в связи с венгерскими публикациями: они не должны были давать 
негативную картину режима. Их возможная предвзятость может происте-
кать из другой причины: трагические последствия вступления Венгрии во 
Вторую мировую войну естественным образом могли заставить авторов 
критически отнестись к данному периоду и попытаться возложить на кого-
то ответственность за случившееся. После войны все шире распространя-
ются и принимаются оценки, которые, оттесняя на задний план реальные 
события и тенденции, рассматривают вступление в войну как результат 
внешнего влияния, а в некоторых случаях предполагают и пособничество 
венгерских руководителей. Однако есть и авторы, которые, по крайней 
мере, по прошествии событий попытались раскрыть подоплеку ошибочных 
решений. Возможно, и им не удалось найти правильных ответов, однако 
заслуживает уважение уже само намерение, - их мемуары не дают новую 
пишу для иллюзий, а позволяют приблизить картину событий к реаль-
ности. 
52 Horthy 1990,175. 
53 Дипломат (1894-1955). 
54 A. Ullein-Reviczky, Német háború, orosz béke. Magyarország drámája. [Немецкая война, 
русский мир. Драма Венгрии] ред. L. Antal, Budapest 1993,5. 
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à la reconstruction et à Vinflation 
dans Vhistoire européenne après 
la Seconde Guerre mondiale 
Notre sujet rend problématique la délimitation dans le temps de la période de re-
construction qui a compensé la dépression économique qui a fait suite aux rava-
ges de la guerre. En effet, toutes les périodisations historiques sont toujours un 
peu arbitraires et, en règle générale, conventionnelles. En outre, lorsqu'il s'agit 
d'histoire économique, il est particulièrement difficile de définir les différentes 
périodes par des dates bien déterminées. En ce qui concerne les périodes de re-
construction, on prend comme point de départ par convention les indices écono-
miques de la dernière année d'avant-guerre. Une fois que le niveau de l'économie 
d'après-guerre a atteint le niveau économique de celle-ci, la période de recons-
truction s'est terminée selon les avis contemporains. Cette conception a été évi-
dente dans l'historiographie au cours des décennies qui ont suivi la Seconde 
Guerre mondiale. Toutefois, l'émergence de la théorie des lignes de la croissance 
économique de Ferenc Jânossy a profondément mis en doute cette évidence. Un 
des points de la théorie du Jânossy traite des périodes de la reconstruction. Voici 
le schéma du déroulement de ces périodes.1 
1 F. Jânossy, A gazdasági növekedés trendvonaláról. [Des tendances de l'accroissement éco-
nomique] Budapest 1975, 32-39. 
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* -3 .s t 
u à 
A F - la ligne de développement économique 
A B - la croissance de la production jusqu'à la 
guerre 
B C - la dépression de la production pendant la 
guerre 
C E - la croissance de la production pendant la 
période de la réconstruction jusqu'à 
CD - l'atteinte du niveau d'avant guerre 
DE - l'atteinte de la ligne originale 
E F - le développement de la pruduction après 
la fin de la période de la ré construction 
Temps 
Ce schéma semble être évident. Sans en donner une analyse détaillée, on peut 
toutefois souligner que: la reconstruction ne se termine pas quand l'économie at-
teint le niveau de la dernière année d'avant-guerre. La période de reconstruction 
s'achève quand la production reprend son niveau d'avant-guerre en fonction du 
même rythme de développement économique que celui d'avant-guerre. Dans une 
période de reconstruction, la croissance économique connaît un vif essor bien 
qu'elle se ralentisse pour atteindre le niveau de la dernière année d'avant-guerre. 
La théorie de Jânossy est assez connue dans l'histoire économique européenne.2 
L'ouvrage de Milward intitulé, « The Reconstruction of Western Europe », traite 
de la période comprise entre 1945 et 1951, malgré le fait que le P. N. B. dans cer-
tains pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest se développait de la façon suivante:3 
La production nationale brute (1948,1950) 
(L'indice de PNB en comptant par les prix invariables) 
(1938 = 100) 






















On peut voir que les économies de marché de l'Europe de l'Ouest ont atteint, 
voire dépassé, le P. N. B. de l'exercice de 1938 jusqu'en 1948 sauf l'économie de 
l'Allemagne de l'Ouest qui avait une situation particulière et qui souffrait le plus 
2 H. Van Der Wee, A lefékezett jólét. [Bien être bloqué] Budapest 1986,41-43. 
3 A. S. Milward. The Reconstruction of Western Europe. London 1992.; Van Der Wee, 22. 
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des conséquences des destructions de la guerre. Malgré cela, Milward date la fin 
de la période de reconstruction à 1951. La périodisation de László Bogár coïncide 
avec celle de Milward: la reconstruction de l'économie hongroise après la Se-
conde Guerre mondiale s'est terminée à la fin de 1951.4 Selon L. Bogár les résul-
tats extraordinaires de la première année du premier plan quinquennal en 1950 
(qui ont largement dépassé les projets) ne s'expliquent pas seulement par les in-
vestissements forcés mais également par l'élan de la croissance de reconstruction. 
Ce phénomène a abusé l'administration communiste de l'époque qui a élevé les 
chiffres du plan en février 1951 en extrapolant les indices pour quatre ans en se 
reposant sur l'année précédente qui avait été extraordinaire. En 1952, le cycle de 
reconstruction - associé à une croissance très rapide - s'est terminé. Ainsi, non 
seulement les chiffres sont devenus élevés, mais aussi les calculs du plan sont de-
venus irréels. Malgré la coïncidence de la périodisation, il est évident que Bogár 
et Milward examinent le même cycle historique en tenant compte de circonstan-
ces socio-économiques différentes au sein de l'Europe morcelée d'après-guerre. 
À ce sujet, il faut souligner l'interprétation différente de la notion de reconstruction 
qui est exprimée par les mots hongrois helyreállítás (rétablissement) et újjáépítés 
(reconstruction, renouvellement). Selon certains experts de l'histoire économique 
hongroise contemporaine - par exemple Sándor Szakács - il faut opérer une dis-
tinction nette entre les deux notions parce que la première notion signifie « réta-
blissement » des anciennes technologies et des infrastructures et la deuxième si-
gnifie plutôt « renouvellement qualitatif » de l'économie. Naturellement, au cours 
de ce cycle ces deux concepts sont présents en même temps et sont inséparables, 
mais il y a déjà des différences dans cette période entre les deux parties de 
l'Europe. Pour les économies de márché de l'Europe de l'Ouest, les aspects du 
renouvellement sont plus décisifs. Pour les pays dirigés par l'Union Soviétique 
refusant le secours du Plan Marshall, qui sont devenus les membres du 
COMECON, les aspects du rétablissement sont plus caractéristiques. Cela a exa-
cerbé les différences économiques entre les deux parties de l'Europe même après 
la Seconde Guerre mondiale et c'est bien sûr l'Europe de l'Ouest qui en a profité. 
En même temps, il est évident que dans les deux parties de notre continent la 
période de reconstruction a lourdement touché la société. Les simples frais de 
relance ont augmenté le déficit du budget de l'Etat et on a assisté à l'émergence 
d'un processus inflationniste. L'historien spécialiste de l'économie peut alors po-
ser cette question très intéressante: Est-ce que la reconstruction et le rétablisse-
ment sont nécessairement liés à une inflation importante? 
Avant d'essayer d'apporter une réponse, il faut tenir compte d'un nouvel 
élément. Au milieu du 20e siècle, les différentes politiques économiques faisaient 
intervenir l'Etat ce qui engendrait de l'inflation. On peut aussi constater une 
hausse des prix dans les pays qui n'ont pas subi des dommages de guerre im-
portants. Aux Etats-Unis, pays victorieux, si on prend l'indice des prix de gros et 
de détail 100 en 1938, celui du premier est passé à 210, celui du second à 192 
jusqu'en 1949 ce qui veut dire que le dollar a perdu la moitié de sa valeur mar-
4 L. Bogár, Kitörési kísérleteink. [Nos essais de ratrepementl Budapest 1989, 76-88. 
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chande au cours de cette décennie.5 Au début de l'année 1949, l'élite américaine a 
réussi à juguler l'inflation grâce au pouvoir de l'Etat, en stabilisant l'indice des 
prix et des salaires. Il est intéressant de constater qu'en Suisse on peut presque 
observer la même situation. La Suisse n'a pourtant pas participé à la guerre et elle 
n'a pas eu de dommages. Toutefois le franc suisse a aussi perdu la moitié de sa 
valeur marchande. En 1948 la parité du franc suisse/dollar US est devenue égale 
à celle d'avant-guerre. Il semble logique que dans les pays où, pendant la période 
de reconstruction, la mesure de l'inflation n'a pas dépassé le niveau « américano-
suisse », la reprise économique n'ait pas engendré elle-même l'inflation. Un tel 
acompte inflationniste favorable ne s'est manifesté en Europe qu'en Grande-Bre-
tagne après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. En 1948, dans ce pays, l'indice des prix 
des biens de consommation représentait 180% de celui de 1937 entre 1945-1948. 
L'indice des prix du commerce en gros est passé de 100 à 122.6 Parallèlement aux 
efforts menés par la politique anglaise stricte et rigoureuse - jusqu'en 1954 un 
système de coupon a existé avec des rations par tête bien limitées - il faut souli-
gner le fait que les gouvernements anglais ont essayé de faire supporter une assez 
grande partie des frais extraordinaires de la guerre et de la reconstruction aux 
pays étrangers. Ce sont les États-Unis et les pays du Commonwealth qui ont aidé 
la Grande-Bretagne grâce à des traitements de fermage et des emprunts ou grâce 
à l'accumulation de créances en livre Sterling. En décembre de l'année 1945, les 
États-Unis et le Canada ont accordé un crédit de 5 milliards dollars. (Cette somme 
représentait 60 à 70% de l'ensemble des dommages de guerre de la Hongrie!)7. 
Les sources monétaires extérieures ont donc joué un rôle important dans la re-
construction et la Grande-Bretagne a ainsi pu éviter une inflation extraordinaire. 
Il semble que l'exemple anglais ait été unique en Europe. Les cycles de re-
construction ont été liés à une inflation bien élevée. Il est vrai que la mesure de 
l'inflation était très différente d'un pays à un autre. L'historiographie économique 
européenne nous montre que la politique belge a engrangé quelques succès de ce 
point de vue. La politique monétaire dirigée par le Ministre des finances belge, 
M. Gutt a servi de modèle à plusieurs pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest. En octobre 
1944, M. Gutt a réduit la masse monétaire de 140 milliards francs à 31 milliards 
de francs à l'aide de la clôture à la banque et du changement des billets de ban-
que obligatoire. Les dépôts bloqués ont été débloqués prudemment et une partie 
d'entre eux a été retrouvée par le gouvernement sous forme fiscale. L'adminis-
tration belge n'a pas engendré lui-même l'inflation après la Seconde Guerre 
mondiale. Pour réaliser cette politique monétaire, le gouvernement a également 
eu recours à des sources étrangères. Il faut souligner le rôle des sommes en dollar 
pour les transports d'uranium et de cuivre des colonies africaines aux États-Unis 
et celui du fermage et de l'indemnisation du port d'Anvers. En même temps, en-
tre 1945-1949, l'indice des prix de gros s'est élevé de 100 à 290 et la reconstruction 
s Van Der Wee, 20. 
6 Van Der Wee, 20. 
7 R. Cameron, A világgazdaság rövid története a kőkorszaktól napjainkig. [L'histoire courte de 
l'économie mondiale de l'âge de pierre jusqu' à nos jours] Budapest 1994,440. 
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ne s'est pas déroulée sur fond d'une inflation marquée. L'inflation belge est restée 
supportable et elle n'a pas menacé l'équilibre budgétaire.8 
Jusqu'au printemps de l'année 1945, il a semblé que la France aurait pu éviter 
une inflation extraordinaire. En novembre 1944, l'administration financière a ré-
duit la masse monétaire de 644 milliards francs à 570 milliards francs.9 Il est vrai 
que cela a été sans commune mesure avec la réduction opérée par la Belgique. 
Les pertes de guerre de la France ont été spectaculaire surtout en ce qui concerne 
de l'infrastructure. 20% des habitations ont été détruites ou ont été lourdement 
endommagées, sur 17,000 locomotives 3,000 étaient encore en état de fonctionner, 
sur le territoire du nord et de l'est du pays, occupés par l'armée allemande, ne 
restaient que très peu de ponts en bon état. Le Ministre des finances français, 
M. Pleven, soutenant le Général De Gaulle, a rejeté la politique monétaire déflation-
niste. Entre 1945-1948 le taux d'inflation était de 50 à 70 % par an. Après la dé-
valorisation de 1948, la valeur du franc français s'est réduite à 20% par rapport 
à la valeur du dollar et de l'or de 1944. Selon les historiens spécialistes de 
l'économie française, ces années ont été une période d'hyperinflation.10 La dépré-
ciation monétaire a surtout augmenté en 1946. Il est intéressant de comparer 
quelques indices macroéconomiques de cette année-là: le revenu national a aug-
menté de 53.7%, la production industrielle de 68%, l'indice des prix de 72% de-
puis 1945. En même temps, les recettes du budget n'ont couvert que 57% des dé-
penses. C'était déjà une proportion plus favorable que celle de 43% de l'année 
précédente.11 Le rapport semble être évident: la croissance économique extraordi-
naire est explicable par l'élan de la reconstruction accompagnée d'une telle infla-
tion. Selon l'historiographie économique française, ce fut la période de la doctrine 
des investissements « coûte que coûte », celle de « la reconstruction payée par la 
Monnaie. »12 La relation entre l'inflation engendrée par l'Etat et les dépenses ex-
traordinaires de la reconstruction semble être évidente. La perte de la valeur du 
franc a été de deux fois et demie supérieure à celle de la livre Sterling. Il faut 
mentionner que l'empire colonial de la France et les relations internationales du 
pays n'ont rien pu faire pour changer la situation. 
Nul n'est sans ignorer que la plus grande inflation de l'histoire européenne 
s'est déroulée en Hongrie entre 1945 et 1946. Ce phénomène n'a quand même pas 
été unique à la Hongrie. On peut en effet constater une hyperinflation en Europe 
Centrale (territoires allemands) et en Europe du sud-est (Roumanie, Grèce). Selon 
notre connaissance, seule la Pologne a pu éviter une hyperinflation dans cette ré-
gion. Les raisons en ont été assez particulières. Sur le territoire de ce pays, nou-
vellement dessiné sur la carte de l'Europe, il y a eu des conditions financières tout 
à fait chaotiques en 1945. Plusieurs moyens de paiement étaient en circulation: 
s Van Der Wee, 29. 
9 F. Braudel-E. Labrousse, dir. Histoire Économique et Sociale de La France. Paris 1979, Vol. 
IV/3, chapitre III, 68. 
10 J.-P. Patat-M. Luftalla, Histoire Monétaire de La France au XX« siecle. Paris 1986,125. 
« Patat-Luftalla, 120. 
12 Braudel-Labrousse, 680 
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le mark allemand, le rouble soviétique, le dollar américain et le zloty « d'occupa-
tion. » Toutes ces monnaies ont été retirées de la circulation, mais la Banque Na-
tionale Polonaise, nouvellement créée, a fait face au manque d'argent en émettant 
très peu de nouveaux zlotys. Le 31 décembre 1945, 26.3 millions de zlotys étaient 
en circulation. En une année, pas de plus de 58.9 millions. Le gouvernement po-
lonais a reçu une allocation UNRRA des États-Unis qui s'élevait à 471 millions 
dollars. Cela excepté, l'Union Soviétique a prêté à la Pologne 36 millions dollars, 
les États-Unis 46 millions dollars, la Grande-Bretagne 10 millions livres, la Suède 
122 millions couronnes et le Danemark 2 millions couronnes. Les marchandises 
importées ont été vendues par le gouvernement lui-même avec un gros bénéfice. 
Le financement de la reconstruction n'a ainsi pas été lié à l'hyperinflation proba-
blement grâce aux allocations et aux crédits étrangers. Une certaine dépréciation 
monétaire a quand même eu lieu entre décembre 1945 et mars 1949. L'indice du 
marché libre s'est accru de 50%.13 Il est intéressant de constater que cette mesure 
ressemble à celle de l'inflation du forint hongrois introduit le 1er août 1946 jusqu'à 
la fin de 1949. Pendant cette période, l'inflation du forint a été à peu près de 40%, 
en comptant les prix du commerce et du marché libre.14 
Les processus inflationnistes ont commencé en Hongrie dès la première moitié 
de 1945. Selon Sándor Ausch « .. .les frais alimentaires contenant les prix du mar-
ché noir ont été 14,6 fois plus élevé entre le 1er décembre 1941 et le 15 juillet 
1945. »15 Après la fin de la guerre, « l'inflation cachée » est devenue visible car il 
n' y a plus eu de réglementation des prix et on a effacé provisoirement le système 
de coupons et les autres restrictions. L'autre cause importante de la hausse des 
prix a été le déséquilibre de l'offre et de la demande en marchandises en raison 
de la guerre. 
En 1945-1946 le revenu national hongrois n'était que de 49% par rapport 
à celui de 1938. La production de l'agriculture était de 43.2%, celle de l'industrie 
était de 40% de la production de la dernière année d'avant-guerre à cause des 
pertes humaines et des pertes matérielles.16 C'est pourquoi jusqu'à la stabilisation 
monétaire une inflation par la demande a existé selon toute évidence. Il faut sou-
ligner quand même que cela n'a pas été uniquement l'inflation par la demande 
qui a été la cause première de l'importance de l'hyperinflation en Hongrie qui 
a commencé dès la deuxième moitié de 1945. L'appareil d'Etat réorganisé a pris 
en charge les frais exceptionnels dus à cette situation historique unique en son 
13 I. Varga, Az újabb magyar pénztörténet és egyes elméleti tanulságai. [L'histoire monétaire 
nouvelle et ses morales théoriques] Budapest 1964,198-199. 
14 E. Huszti, Antiinflációs útkeresés - monetáris politika és gyakorlat Magyarországon [Recher-
che anti-inflationniste - pratique et politique monétaire en Hongrie] Budapest 1987, 
139. 
15 S. Ausch, Az 1945-46. évi infláció és stabilizáció. [L'inflation de 1945-46 et la stabilisation] 
Budapest 1958,99. 
16 I. Pető-S. Szakács, A hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története 1945-1985. [Histoire des 
quatre décennies de notre économie 1945-1985] Budapest 1985,20. 
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genre. En 1946, les dépenses du budget de l'Etat dans les différents secteurs 
étaient les suivantes:17 
Dépenses personnelles et retraites 
Investissement et reconstruction 
Frais d'investissements et de reconstruction des usines de l'Etat 
Réparation 
Soutien des municipalités 
Autres obligations internationales 
Dépenses extraordinaires 
On peut voir que les dépenses de compensation et des autres obligations in-
ternationales (le ravitaillement de l'Armée rouge et de la Commission du Con-
trôle interalliée) représentaient 37.6% des dépenses du budget. Ces frais ont 
dépassé ceux de la reconstruction et des investissements - déjà extraordinaires eux-
mêmes - de 7.8%! C'est pourquoi, en juin 1945, les recettes du budget n'ont cou-
vert que 7.7% des dépenses. Après la guerre, les institutions financières hongroi-
ses ont eu une grande insuffisance en capital et leur activité d'octroi de crédit est 
devenue minimale. Le gouvernement hongrois n'a pas reçu d'aides ni d'em-
prunts étrangers. Il ne lui est plus resté qu'une seule possibilité: obliger la Banque 
Nationale Hongroise à émettre des prêts à découvert. Ainsi, c'est le pouvoir cen-
tral qui a engendré lui-même l'inflation. 
Les économistes les plus éminents de la période qui nous occupe ont vu assez 
clairement les processus économiques en jeu. Les sources historiques des 4 partis 
de la coalition gouvernant la Hongrie après les élections parlementaires du 4 no-
vembre 1945 (Parti des Petits propriétaires, Parti Communiste, Parti Social Dé-
mocrate, Parti National des Paysans) nous en apportent de nombreux témoigna-
ges. Parmi ces sources, je mentionnerai une source de l'Archive du Parti Social 
Démocrate. L'exposé, adopté par le Comité des Affaires Commerciales, Indus-
trielles et Financières le 13 février 1946 lequel s'est occupé de la stabilisation fi-
nancière et économique du pays, souligne que: 
« Au cours de la vie économique normale, une partie de la valeur finan-
cière des marchandises produites qui se compose de biens d'équipements 
et d'articles de consommations est épargnée.. . L'investissement pour 
l'année économique suivante est calculé par rapport à la majeure partie de 
pengôs de comptes courants et de dépôts ... Dès que des investissements 
énormes sont devenus nécessaires pour la restructuration de la vie écono-
mique en raison des ravages dus aux opérations militaires, ce processus n'a 
pas pu se dérouler parce que une grande partie des pengôs en argent 
comptant avaient disparu. Les prix ont augmenté tout d'un coup à cause 
du manque de marchandises... Dans ces conditions, les investissements 
ont simplement été financés à découvert à l'aide de la presse à billet... La 
relance de la vie économique a naturellement élevé les dépenses de l'Etat. 
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La réparation, par ailleurs, a un double désavantage: d'une part elle 
augmente les dépenses du budget et d'autre part une grande partie de nos 
matières premières, de nos énergies et de notre travail qui devrait freiner 
l'inflation par l'élargissement des marchandises ad hoc est soustraite à la 
production ... »18 
Ainsi, les recettes fiscales peu élevées provenant du revenu national déjà ré-
duit ne sont pas suffisantes pour couvrir les frais extraordinaires dus à la recons-
truction et aux dépenses liées aux obligations internationales. Ainsi, c'est l'Etat 
qui engendre lui-même l'inflation ». 
En conclusion, il nous semble que la rapide relance des cycles de reconstruc-
tion entretien un rapport étroit avec l'inflation. Pour éviter l'hyperinflation, il 
a fallu des sources financières étrangères. Il est évident que tous les processus in-
flationnistes sont uniques. Ils se déroulent dans des conditions qui relèvent des 
sociétés et qui sont déterminées par l'espace, le temps et l'histoire. A ce titre, des 
recherches interdisciplinaires comparées peuvent donner des résultats intéres-
sants en matière d'historié économique. 
18 Politikatörténeti Intézet Levéltára [Archive de l'Institut d'Histoire politiquel 283-
32/21, pp. 34-38. 
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La marge d'action de la Hongrie dans les affaires étrangères a été plus que serrée 
au cours de la période examinée. Son système de relations extérieures n'était en 
effet qu'un moyen entre les mains de la diplomatie soviétique. Les pays arabes 
- et l'espace méditerranéen en général - ne suscitaient guère l'intérêt de Moscou. 
L'Union soviétique et les pays socialistes se concentraient exclusivement sur 
l'Europe, notamment sur la question allemande. Ils ont commencé à se détacher 
de ce concept, que l'on peut qualifier de continentaliste, seulement au lendemain 
de la mort de Staline. Ils ont ensuite élaboré une stratégie globaliste qu'ils ont for-
mulé lors du 20e congrès du PCUS (février 1956). C'est à ce moment qu'a eu lieu 
la réhabilitation de la bourgeoisie nationale qui avait été auparavant qualifiée de 
laquais de l'impérialisme. 
Après la crise de Suez, les pays du bloc de l'Est s'engagèrent dans la Méditer-
ranée et, en général, dans le Tiers Monde. Pour ce faire, ils utilisèrent les forums 
internationaux, ils encoururent aussi parfois des risques de conflit en attribuant 
une importance grandissante, voire une trop grande importance (on peut le dire), 
aux nouveaux Etats appelés « alliés naturels » dans leur startégie en matière de 
relations internationales. 
C'est ce contexte idéologico-politique qui détermina les relations de la Hon-
grie avec les pays arabes. L'étude de ces relations fournit des éléments intéres-
sants non seulement pour l'histoire de la diplomatie hongroise mais également 
pour celle de toute la région arabe. 
Le ministre plénipotentiaire de la République Hongroise Viktor Cholnoky 
(gendre du président de la République Zoltan Tildy) arriva au Caire en novembre 
1947 et présenta ses lettres de créances le 29 décembre de la même année, événe-
ment dont la presse égyptienne a rendu compte en détail. Le 31 mars 1948 le rois 
Farouk le reçut en audience particulière. Le Journal d'Egypte, dans son compte 
rendu, annonça également que la Hongrie accordait un crédit de 350 mille livres 
égyptiennes pour l'achat de coton. Le souverain qui, quelques jours auparavant 
avait distribué trois mille feddan de sa propre propriété foncière parmi les fel-
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lahs, avait manifesté un vif intérêt pour la réforme agraire hongroise et fit remar-
quer que « de toute manière, l'agriculture hongroise jouissait d'une bonne répu-
tation en Egypte. »1 
L'héritier du trône Mohamed Ali, qui avait reçu Chornoky le 16 janvier, 
s'intéressait aussi à l'agriculture et déclara catégoriquement que « ce que vous 
avez fait autour de la réforme agraire a été très incorrect ». Selon lui, c'était exa-
géré que l'on confisquât les biens de gens honnêtes - comme par exemple ceux 
d'Esterhazy. »2 
Le diplomate hongrois était arrivé en Egypte au moment où la tension était ar-
rivée à son paroxysme dans la région. Le souverain lui-même exprima lors de 
l'audience sus-mentionnée que la guerre était inévitable et qu'elle éclaterait sous 
peu au Proche-Orient. Dans le rapport de l'ambassade consacré au problème pa-
lestinien une image réaliste est donnée sur la position des Etats arabe: la Ligue 
Arabe était complètement divisée quoique « ses membres donnent naturellement 
des déclarations fantastiques. »3 
Le ministre, examinant les pays de la région les uns après les autres, constata 
que l'Egypte était contre l'intervention pour des raisons politique, économique et 
militaire, la Transjordanie et l'Irak contre la nomination au poste de chef militaire 
de Fawzi al Kawakidji, la Syrie contre le passage sur son territoire des troupes 
irakiennes et l'Irak contre le passage des troupes saoudiennes. Il n'y avait pas 
d'accord non plus sur la formation du gouvernement arabe palestinien émigré. 
Le problème principal était qu'Abdallah, souverain transjordanien voulait an-
nexer la Palestine. 
A propos de la reconnaissance de l'Etat d'Israël, il appelle à la prudence : 
« Etant donné nos intérêts économiques importants dans la région, les 
réactions prévues des Etats arabes, le fort retentissement d'un tel événe-
ment dans la presse internationale, à l'occasion de la proclamation éven-
tuelle d'un Etat juif indépendant le 15 mai prochain, je recommande, pour 
les déclarations des personnalités responsables, prudence et réserve jusqu'au 
moment où, dans la question de la reconnaissance, une décision soit prise 
et ce après l'examen de la situation toute entière (c'est l'auteur qui souligne 
- L. J. N.) Les manifestations de sympatie, sans objectif politique sont 
à éviter ».4 
1 Archives Nationales Hongroises (ANH), Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 
(AMAE), Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XlX-J-lla boîte No. 17. Document No. 
113. 
2 Ibid. Document No. 116. L'héritier du trône connaissait bien la Hongrie: avant la Pre-
mière guerre mondiale il s'est rendu souvent à Budapest et, dans le Theresianum 
de Vienne il poursuivait ses études avec plusieurs étudiants hongrois. Parmi eux, il 
a mentionné le Premier ministre Istvan Bethlen. 
3 ANH, AMEA, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire XlX-J-lla, boîte No 17. (rapport 
du 13 décembre 1947). 
4 Ibid. Télégramme le 10 mai 1948. 
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Dans son rapport rédigé au lendemain de l'éclatement de la guerre, il évoque 
comme motif principal du conflit le pétrole: « La question du pétrole est peut-être 
la force motrice la plus importante des intérêts politiques au Proche-Orient, tout 
lien logique mènant finalement au pétrole ».5 
La Hongrie n'a reconnu l'Etat d'Israël que quelques semaines après sa créa-
tion. Cela fut apprécié au Caire car « la Hongrie ne s'est pas précipitée dans cette 
reconnaissance. En revanche, la reconnaissance par les Etats-Unis suscita un vif 
mécontentement en Egypte. »6 
Ce fut l'un des derniers rapports du ministre Viktor Chornoky. Il fut rappelé 
et, deux jours après, le 23 juillet, arrêté. Il fut accusé de haute trahison, d 'espion-
nage, fut condamné à la peine capitale et fut exécuté le 7 décembre 19487 
Le destin tragique de M. Victor Chornoky montre que dans les relations poli-
tiques égypto-hongroises, on ne peut guère s'attendre à une amélioration quelle 
qu'elle soit. En revanche, les relations économiques que régulaient les contacts 
conclus en 1930, mais qui étaient toujours en vigueur, n'en étaient pas affectées. 
Selon le mémoire rédigé en 1955 sur les relations économiques entre l'Egypte et la 
Hongrie, le chiffre d'affaires du commerce entre les deux pays avait été stable 
entre 1949 et 1955 et le bilan - à l'exeption de celui de l'année 1950 - positif pour 
la Hongrie. Le chiffre moyen total des échanges s'était approché pour les années 
mentionnées des 3 millions de livres égyptiennes. La Hongrie acheta 40 mille 
balles de coton à l'Egypte et y exporta des produits industriels (machines-outils, 
voitures de chemin de fer, produits chimiques).8 
Dès l'automne 1947, les pays de l'Est, donc la Hongrie aussi, menèrent une 
politique extérieure conforme à l'analyse de la situation et à la conclusion de Jda-
nov: celui qui ne s'est pas aligné sur la ligne kominformiste soviétique est consi-
déré comme ennemi. Cela voulait dire, pour l'Egypte aussi, que l 'ambassade 
n'avait guère de relations avec les représentants de la politique officielle et que 
les rapports mêmes se reposaient plutôt sur des informations obtenues grâce 
à des groupes communistes concurrents. Cependant, c'est ce qui permit à l'am-
bassade d'acquérir des informations exactes sur le mouvement des Officiers 
libres. 
Le coup d'Etat du 23 juillet 1952 fut jugé de façon très négative par le mouve-
ment communiste international: il le qualifia de dictature militaire à tendance fa-
s Ibid. Rapport du 16 mai 1948. 
6 Ibid. Rapport du 27 juin 1948. 
7 II a été victime du complot contre la République monté par les communistes. Il a été ré-
habilité en 1992. Dans son rapport rédigé sur le rappel de M. Chornoky, le chargé 
d'affaires M. P. Nagy relate que l'histoire « a fait l'effet d'une bombe » dans les milieux 
diplomatiques du Caire. Ce n'est que le diplomate russe qui n'a pas manifesté 
d'étonnement. Il a simplement « pris acte » de la nouvelle. Ibid. Rapport du août 1948. 
8 ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire XlX-J-lla, boîte No. 4. Document 
No. 0037/1955. 
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sciste, derrière laquelle se trouvaient les Américains qui veulaient supplanter les 
Anglais dans la région.9 
Le mouvement communiste égyptien, n'ayant pas d'influence en dehors des 
milieux intellectuels, était fortement divisé. Le poète et propriétaire d'un journal, 
Ibrahim Abdel Halim, dirigeant de l'un de ces mouvements communistes, le 
Mouvement démocratique pour la libération nationale (en arabe: HADITU) ra-
conta en détail les événements de la politique intérieure à l'ambassade au début 
du mois d'août. Il parla favorablement du groupe des Officiers libres, du « mou-
vement Négib » comme il le nomma. Il fit ainsi fait allusion au fait qu'à ce mo-
ment-là le général était le seul membre populaire et connu dans le groupe. Parmi 
les 18 officiers dirigeants, quatre sympathisaient avec la gauche, les autres étaient 
nationalistes. Il ajouta que les Etats-Unis, malgré leurs gestes de sympathie, ne se-
raient pas à même d'user de leur influence dans le mouvement des Officiers li-
bres.10 Nous savons déjà qu'Ibrahim Abdel Halim avait disposé d'informations 
exactes puisque son groupe communiste avait maintenu des relations étroites 
avec les Officiers libres avant même la prise du pouvoir. C'est dans son imprime-
rie que le journal intitulé La voix des Officiers Libres était imprimé.11 
L'ambassade de Hongrie cherchait à profiter des relations existantes pour se 
renseigner sur le caractère et sur les objectifs du nouveau pouvoir. C'est ainsi 
qu'a eu lieu, à la mi-octobre, l'entrevue chez Ahmed El Guindi, entrepreneur in-
téressé dans le commerce égypto-hongrois, avec le colonel des forces aériennes 
Gamel Salem qui appartenait au groupe restreint des Officiers libres et qui était 
membre du Conseil de révolution. Lors de l'entrevue à caractère privé Gamel 
Salem décrit de la façon suivante la nouvelle Egypte: « En ce qui concerne 
l'influence soit de l'Occident soit de l'Est sur la situation intérieure de l'Egypte, 
il fait une remarque dont la véracité ne sera justifiée que par l'Histoire elle-même, 
à savoir que l'Occident prétend qu'ils agissent sur les ordres de l'Est tandis que 
l'Est suppose qu'ils sont aux mains de l'Occident, or il ne s'agit que du mouve-
ment de l'Egypte pour le bien des Egyptiens. Ils veulent l'Indépendance et une 
meilleure vie pour leur peuple; ils voient cependant que le chemin sera difficile; 
toutefois, ils sont sûrs de réussir. »12 
Les pays socialistes purent prendre connaissance plus tard du caractère natio-
'naliste du nouveau pouvoir : l'Egypte nassérienne ne s'est point révélée « une al-
liée naturelle en 1952 » facilement. L'image de l'Egypte ne changa pas. La presse 
hongroise publia les commentaires soviétiques et les informations des agences de 
9 Szabad Nép [Le Peuple libre], les 24 juillet et 12 août 1952; Tartós békéért, népi demokráciá-
ért [Pour la paix durable, pour la démocratie populaire], le 14 septembre 1952. Les 
constatations sur les objectifs des Américains se sont cependant avérées justes. 
10 ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-J-lla, boîte No. 1. Document 
No. 126. (le 8 août 1952). 
11 F.-R. Didor, Mémoires d'une militante communiste (1942-1990). Du Caire à Alger, Paris et 
Genève. Paris 1997,86-87. 
12 ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-J-lla, boîte No. 1. Document 
No. 145. (le 22 octobre 1952). 
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presse sans commentaire. La prise de position sur les événements d'Egypte se 
manifesta en fonction de la rivalité entre les grandes puissances traditionelles de 
la région - la France, la Grande-Bretagne - et les Etats-Unis, et aussi en fonction 
de la question allemande (intégration de la R. F. A. dans le système politico-éco-
nomique et militaire de l'Europe de l'Ouest).13 
En ce qui concerne les relations égypto-hongroises jusqu'en 1955, on ne peut 
parler ni d'élargissement ni d'approfondissement. Or, dès cette date, la situation 
changa considérablement: le rapprochement entre l'Egypte et les pays socialistes, 
dont la Hongrie, est de plus en plus marqué. Déjà au début de l'année, une vo-
lonté d'élargir les rapports avait été exprimée au Caire. Cette tendance coïncide 
avec les changements commencés non seulement dans la politique extérieure des 
pays socialistes, mais aussi dans l'ensemble des relations internationales. 
En avril, comme signe de changements et pour refuser le monde bipolaire, le 
mouvement des pays non-alignés à Bandung vit le jour. C'est ici que la stature 
politique de Nasser est devenue réellement internationale. C'est à Bandung lors 
de la rencontre entre Tsou En-laï et Nasser qu'il a été décidé de renforcer les rela-
tions entre l'Egypte et la Chine et - selon toute probabilité - que le Caire a décidé 
d'achater des armes aux pays socialistes. 
L'intention de l'Egypte d'acheter des armes aux pays socialistes n'était pas 
une idée nouvelle, la proposition ne date pas de la conférence de Bandung. 
L'Egypte avait fait les premiers pas assez tôt pour tâter même la Hongrie. 
Le 27 novembre 1951, le chargé d'affaires éyptien, Amransy rendit visite au 
premier ministre adjoint des Affaires étrangères, le secrétaire du Comité central 
du Parti communiste hongrois, M. Andor Berei et exprima le souhait de son pays 
d'élargir les relations commerciales et économiques avec l'Union soviétique et les 
démocraties populaires. Il signala aussi qu'ils voulaient acheter des armes en 
Hongrie. M. Berei fit allusion aux demandes précédentes lorsqu'il répondit que 
« nous n'avons pas pu satisfaire aux demandes précédentes car nous ne fabri-
quons pas ce genre d'armes » (c. à. d. des armes lourdes - L. J. N.). Le chargé 
d'affaires précisa que l'Egypte s'intéressait à toutes sortes d'armes. A la fin de la 
discussion, M. Berei se chargea d'examiner la question.14 
Le 9 février 1955, Anad El Kouni, directeur du Département politique du Mi-
nistère des Affaires étrangères, lors de l'entretien avec l'ambassadeur hongrois « 
posa la question de savoir si notre volonté de coopération économique avec 
l'Egypte englobait également la fourniture d'armes. » L'ambassadeur, dans sa ré-
ponse négative, nota que « la préoccupation pour les armes de la part de l'Egypte 
s'était déjà manisfestée ces dernières années et représentait chaque fois un mo-
ment où l'Egypte s'était relativement isolée de l'Ouest ou s'était dressée contre sa 
pression. » Le directeur voulait également savoir si les autres pays socialistes 
13 Szabad Nép du 15 août publie les informations de l'agence de presse soviétique TASS 
selon lesquelles dans l'armée égyptienne il y a des officiers de la R. F. A. et ils se sont 
aussi impliqués dans le coup d'Etat. 
14 ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-J-lla boîte No. 1., document 
No. 87. (le novembre 1951). 
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étaient prêts à fournir des armes. Quinze jours plus tard, le ministre des Affaires 
étrangères, M. Fawzi, avec qui « il avait mené des négociations dans une am-
biance particulièrement amicale », proposa que la délégation hongroise, lors de sa 
visite prochaine, se rende chez le général Roghab, inspecteur général des usines 
d'armement.15 
L'achat d'armes fut à chaque fois une initiative égyptienne; dans ce domaine il 
y eut une continuité entre l'Egypte monarchiste et nassérienne. C'est surtout 
après la démarche britannique humiliante de février 1942 que le Caire a voulu 
renforcer son armée nationale et se débarasser de tout ce qui l'avait lié à la Grande-
Bretagne. C'est, entre autres, à cause de cela, qu'il refusa l'adhésion au système 
d'alliance militaire (au Commandement suprême allié au Moyen-Orien). 
Nasser avait déjà proposé l'achat d'armes à Moscou en juin 1954, mais il avait 
toujours reporté la concrétisation de la demande. La demande concrète parvint 
à la capitale soviétique quelques jours avant l'ouverture de la conférence de Ban-
dung et, à la demande du Caire, le 12 avril, les négociations commencèrent à Pra-
gue. Le 16 juin, à la session du Comité central du P. C., le maréchal Joukov et le 
ministre adjoint des Affaires étrangères Gromyko proposèrent la conclusion du 
marché d'armes. Le contrat fut signé le 12 septembre à Prague avec les Tchéco-
slovaques et, quelques semaines plus tard, au même endroit avec les Polonais qui 
fournirent des navires de guerre.16 
Le marché d'armes est la première démarche concrète visannt à s'éloigner des 
puissances occidentales. Il renforça la position de Nasser ébranlée par la signa-
ture du traité avec les Britanniques. Après la conclusion du marché d'armes, 
l'Egypte manifesta de plus en plus nettement son désir d'intensifier les relations 
avec les pays socialistes. 
En octobre 1955, Budapest et le Caire décidèrent d'éléver leur représentation 
diplomatique du rang de la légation à celui de l'ambassade. Lors de la séance de 
novembre de l'Assemblée nationale, le Premier ministre M. Andrâs Hegedus 
parla du « développement heureux des relations » avec l'Egypte, l'Inde et la Bir-
manie. Il mentionna l'échange d'ambassadeurs et annonça que le président Nas-
ser avait accepté l'invitation du gouvernement hongrois et se rendrait l'année 
suivante en Hongrie.17 
Le chiffre d'affaires du commerce entre le premier trimestre de l'année 1955 et 
juin 1956 plus que doubla. La Hongrie se présenta au marché égyptien avec 16 
nouveaux produits (locomotive à moteur diesel, transformateur, pont etc.).18 Au 
!5 ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-I-lla, boîte No. 3., document 
No. 0013/11/1955 (rapports des 9 et 23 février). Le chef de la délégation hongroise était 
M. Ferenc Biro, le minstre adjoint de l'Industrie lourde. 
16 L. Rucher, « L'URSS et la crise de Suez, » Communisme, 48-50,155-156. 
17 Szabad Nép (Le Peuple libre), le 16 novembre 1955. L'invitation officielle destinée au 
président egyptien a été transmis par M. Fathe Radman, ministre des Transports, lors 
de sa visite en août dernier. 
18 ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XlX-J-lla, boîte No. 4., document 
No. 0189/1956 (Rapport sur le commerce extérieur de l'Egypte). 
147 
LÁSZLÓ J. NAGY 
printemps 1956, M. Lajos Bebrits, ministre des Transports et de la Poste effectua 
une visite officielle en Egypte. C'est alors que l'accord sur le transport des loco-
motives à moteur diesel fut signé.19 
Avec le Soudan devenu indépendant, nous avons aussitôt établi des contacts; 
déjà au printemps 1955, une délégation hongroise était partie pour Khartoum afin 
de sonder les possibilités. Le 1er janvier 1956, le jour de la proclamation de 
l'indépendance, Budapest reconnut officiellement la République du Soudan et 
établit des relations diplomatiques. M. György Zádor, ambassadeur en l 'Egypte 
a été accrédité à Khartoum et il est arrivé - en premier parmi les représentants 
des puissances européennes - à la capitale soudanaise au début de février 1956. 
La présentation de ses lettres de créances a eu lieu le 10 mars de la même année. 
Il mena des négociations avec le Premier ministre Ismail El Azhari qui déclara 
qu'ils souhaitaient élargir leurs relations avec les pays socialistes. Il demanda des 
spécialistes pour faire évaluer les possibilités de son pays. Ils voulaient industria-
liser leur pays et se sont particulièrement concentrés sur le développement de 
l'agriculture.20 
La visite à Budapest du président égyptien fait partie d'un tour en Europe de 
l'Est à partir de Moscou. Selon la première version, Nasser serait arrivé de Prague 
le 5 septembre et serait reparti pour Bucarest le 7. La date de l'arrivée fut reportée 
au 8, puis au premier septembre. En juillet le programme détaillé que le chargé 
d'affaires hongrois avait élaboré avec M. Ali Sabri fut mis au point. Hormi les vi-
sites officielles ont figuré dans le programme des événements culturels (spectacle 
de l'Ensemble folklorique), de tourisme (le lac Balaton), une promenade dans le 
centre de la capitale, visite du chemin de fer des pionniers, visite dans l'usine 
Ganz. Nasser aurait été honoré du titre de citoyen d'honneur de Budapest.21 La 
planification économique et les problèmes de l'industrialisation auraient été au 
centre des discussions. 
Cependant, au début du mois d'août, vu la situation internationale de plus en 
plus tendue à cause vdç la nationalisation du canal de Suez, Nasser annula ses 
voyages. 
La guerre de Suez eut Heu au même moment que le soulèvement hongrois 
(« crise parallèle »). L'opinion publique arabe ne s'est pas préoccupée - pour des 
raisons évidentes - des événements en Hongrie. Cela ne voulait pas dire pour 
autant que les dirigeants arabes avaient approuvé l'intervention soviétique, mais 
qu'ils voulaient le même jugement envers les peuples arabes - égyptien et algé-
rien avant tout - qu'envers le peuple hongrois. En d'autres termes que les deux 
événements ne soient pas jugés sur deux échelles différentes. C'est le président 
Bourguiba qui l'a exprimé le plus clairement: « L'Union soviétique n'a pas hésité 
à intervenir de la façon la plus brutale et la plus inhumaine pour étouffer la ré-
19 Szabad Nép (Le Peuple libre), les 1er avril, 28 et 29 mai 1956. Reportage sur la visite. 
20 ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-J-lla, boîte No. 5., Rapport 
sur les relations soudano-hongroises (les 30 mars et 28 avril 1956). 
21 ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, boîte No. 8., XIX-J-lla, docu-
ments Nos. 0107/2 et 0107/3 (Rapport du chargé d'affaires des 19 et 21 du juillet). 
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volte du peuple hongrois. Pendant que certains pays s'indignaient de ce qui se 
passait en Egypte, d'autres s'indignaient de ce qui se déroulait en Hongrie. Cette 
indignation nous paraît peu sincère. En matière de relations internationales, la 
duplicité est destructive et dangeureuse. L'accord est total avec Guy Mollet, 
quoique cela soit chose rare, lorsqu'il affirme qu'il n'y a pas de paix dans la ser-
vitude. C'est assurément vrai pour la Hongrie. Mais pourquoi en serait-il autre-
ment pour l'Algérie? >>22 
La lettre de Boulganine de novembre aux Premiers ministres israélien, britan-
nique et français dans laquelle il laisse entendre la possibilité d'une intervention 
militaire eut un grand retentissement dans le monde arabe. L'opinion arabe l'a 
bien apprécié et y a vu une nouvelle preuve du soutien indiscutable et ferme de 
Moscou vis-à-vis de l'Egypte et des mouvements nationalistes d'émancipation 
des colonies. L'article du Journal tunisien Al Sabah exprime bien cette atmo-
sphère: « Nous sommes convencus que c'est la « bombe Boulganine » qui a per-
mis d'aboutir si vite à ce résultat. »23 (à savoir la cessation des combats - L. J. N.) 
L'acroissement du prestige de l'Union soviétique dans les pays arabes permit 
au gouvernement Kádár, imposé par Moscou après l'écrasement du soulèvement, 
de tenter avec succès de sortir de son isolement international. En effet, c'était le 
but de la délégation de bons offices qui, à l'été 1957, sous la direction du Premier 
ministre adjoint Károly Szarka, s'est rendue dans plusieurs pays arabes et afri-
cains. C'est alors que le comité spécial de l'ONU (le « comité des Cinq ») rédigea 
son rapport sur l'affaire hongroise qu'il voulait soumettre à l'Assemblé générale. 
La délégation voulut gagner les voix des Etats arabes dans le débat du mois 
d'automne de la même année. La situation du gouvernement hongrois fut facili-
tée dans cette ambiton par le fait qu'en Egypte et en Syrie - à l'instar de la posi-
tion soviétique - on avait vu un rapport entre les événements en Hongrie et ceux 
au Proche-Orient. Nasser qui, le 29 août, avait reçu la délégation de bons offices 
à son domicile et l'avait assurée de son soutien parce qu' »à l'ONU, l'affaire hon-
groise servait de propagande et notammement de propagande contre l'Union so-
viétique. »24 Mais d'ajouter aussitôt qu'il n'était pas probable selon lui que l'on 
empêcherait la mise à l'ordre du jour de l'affaire hongroise. A part l 'Egypte, 
il était certain que la Syrie soutiendrait également le gouvernement hongrois. 
A Damas, devant la délégation hongroise, les hommes politiques syriens avaient 
déclaré que les puissances occidentales ne parlaient de l'affaire hongroise que 
pour obscurcir leur agression contre l'Algérie et Oman et obscurcir le complot 
contre les Arabes.25 Nasser trouva que le comportement de la Lybie était incer-
22 Action, le 12 novembre 1956. Il a répété la même chose dans son discours prononcé 
à l'ONU. 
23 Al Sabah, le 7 novembre 1956, Archives d'Outre-mer (Aix-en-Provence), 36H1, Prési-
dence du Conseil, Secrétariat général du gouvernement, Afrique du Nord (Articles et 
Documents). 
24 ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire, XIX-J-lla boîte No. 11., docu-
ment No. 096/1/1957. (Rapport de l'ambassadeur). 
25 Népszabadság [Liberté du peuple], le septembre 1957. 
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tain, le Yemen - comme il cherchait à mener une politique indépendante - pou-
vait être gagné. Cependant ce ne fut pas le cas de la Jordanie, du Liban, de l'Irak, 
de l'Arabie Saoudite sous influence américaine et du Soudan sous celle des Bri-
tanniques. Pour la Tunisie, la délégation hongroise ne reçut pas de visa d'entrée 
car le pays faisait partie du Comité des Cinq. Le Maroc lui aussi eut quelques ré-
ticences à l'égard des relations politico-diplomatiques, mais manifesta son désir 
d'établir des relations d'ordre commercial.26 
La visite de la délégation ne fut pas inutile. Le rapport du Comité des Cinq fut 
mis à l'ordre du jour. Toutefois, une partie des pays arabes, dans les cinq années 
qui ont suivi, quand l'affaire hongroise figura à l'ordre du jour de l'ONU, vota 
soit avec le gouvernement hongrois soit s'abstint. C'est ce que leur intérêt en ma-
tière de politique extérieure leur avait dicté de faire. 
En 1957, un mouvement politico-diplomatique de tendance opposée com-
mença à se faire connaître. Au cours de l'été et de l'automne, de nombreuses dé-
légations égyptiennes et de syriennes (des parlementaires, des journalistes, etc.) 
et des ministres (des Transports, de la Défense, des Finances) se rendirent en 
Hongrie. Avec ces pays, le chiffre d'affaires du commerce augmenta. On y ache-
mina entre autres des équipements militaires (vêtements, instruments de trans-
mission, etc.). L'ambassadeur français à Budapest, faisant allusion à la fréquence 
et à la réciprocité des visites parle, dans son rapport envoyé au Quai d'Orsay, 
de « fréquentations orientales » et « d'offesive commerciale » en Hongrie.27 
26 ANH, AMAE, Documents de l'Ambassade du Caire XIX-J-lla, boîte No. 11, document 
No. 062 (le 19 juin 1957). La Hongrie a établi des relations diplomatiques avec le Maroc 
le 25 octobre 1959. 
27 Archives du Ministère des Affaires étragères, Fonds Europe, Série 18, sous-série 23, 
dossier 14, télégramme No. 1462 (le septembre 1957). 
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Greek Sources of the Avar History 
of the Ninth Century1 
In this work, the well-known Byzantinologist of the University of Szeged has un-
dertaken a supplementary task. The book described below is unique in that it 
studies intensively an epoch of the history of the Carpathian Basin, that has not 
been adequately given its place in the edition of sources until now. It was after 
the publication of several proceedings of conferences and editions that a work 
entitled Az avar történelem forrásai (557-től 806-ig) - Die Quellen der Awarenge-
schichte (von 557 bis 806) was published in full by Samu Szádeczky-Kardoss and 
his colleagues (Cs. Farkas, M. Borsos, É. Csillik, F. Makk, T. Olajos) in 1998. The 
book presents in thematic order the Hungarian translation of the original sources, 
written in Greek, along with summaries written in German and commentaries, all 
referring to the successive events of Avar History. The other work of great im-
portance, elaborates on those sources that refer to the period lasting from the first 
mention of the Hungarians by Byzantine authors (902) till the end of the Árpád 
dynasty (1301).2 The book, in a bilingual Greek and Hungarian edition, supple-
mented by a Greek and a Hungarian index, contains those Byzantine sources that 
provide information on the Hungarians. What the book, described below, basi-
cally does, is to link the chronological limits of the two previous works. Before 
dealing with the book written by Terézia Olajos, I find it essential to allude to an-
other important work, which gives more information on the subject. The book is 
entitled Byzantinoturcica, written by Gyula Moravcsik, in which the author pres-
ents us with Byzantine original sources along with specialized literature referring 
to the Turks.3 
Terézia Olajos, author of the book introduced below, is a professor in the De-
partment of Auxiliary Disciplines of the Historical Institute at the University of 
Szeged. Her major fields of research are Roman Literature in the late period of 
1 Teréz Olajos, A 9. századi avar történelem görög nyelvű forrásai. [The Greek Sources for the 
Avar History of the Ninth Century] Szegedi Középkor történeti Könyvtár 16, Szeged 
2001. pp 207. 
2 Gy. Moravcsik, Az Árpád-kori magyar történet bizánci forrásai - Fontes Byzantini históriáé 
Hungaricae aevo ducum et regum ex stirpe Árpád descendentium. Budapest 1984. 
3 Gy. Moravcsik, Byzantinoturcica. 2 vols. Berlin 1958. 
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the Empire, early Byzantine literature and history, the relations between Byzan-
tium and the Steppe population in the sixth-ninth centuries and Hungarian pre-
history. She is a member of the Committee of Classical Studies of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences. Moreover, she is the editor of a Szeged series entitled Opus-
cula Byzantina and member of the editorial staff of the Byzantinische Zeitschrift. She 
is also the author of several books, among which one deserves particular attention, 
entitled Les sources de Théophylacte Simocatta historien.4 Furthermore, she has writ-
ten nearly 150 articles and essays among which many were published in foreign 
languages in important specialised periodicals. In honour of the completion of 
Professor Terézia Olajos sixtieth year, a volume of essays and studies appeared 
which contains her complete lifes' work.5 
In the book discussed here, Terézia Olajos - as mentioned before - meets 
a long felt need in many respect. On the one hand, she links the epochs dealt with 
in Gyula Moravcsik and Samu Szádeczky-Kardoss's source edition, and on the 
other, she presents (both in Greek and Hungarian) those sources referring to the 
history of the Avars which had been known before only from the Byzantinotur-
cica's descriptions. As mentioned by the author, she deals with two such sources 
that had not been treated before by Hungarian scholars of the Avar period 
(p. 10.). One of these is the Chronicle ofPetrus Alexandrinus, of which editio princeps 
came to light from the pen of Z. G. Samodurova after the publication pf the 
Byzantinoturcica. The other work entitled Additio patriarchicorum thronorum - ac-
cording to Terézia Olajos - escaped Gyula Moravcsik's attention. 
Sources, concerning Avar History in the ninth century, are presented in 
a thematic order. On every occasion, when Terézia Olajos expounds on a source, 
she also enlarges upon its authors as well as its original sources, manuscripts and 
editions but she also includes emerging problematic opinions and comments. 
These are followed by selected passages in Greek, then in Hungarian, and finally 
commentaries in Hungarian, which constitute a great help in orienting the reader 
within the rich specialized literature. 
The first thematic part of the book is the chapter entitled Krum, the Bulgarian 
Khan and the Avars. The first source included is the Lexicon Soda of which title 
- according to a debate of the 1930s - as opposed to previous views, does not come 
from a man called Suidas, as the word is derived from the Greek Σούδα ('fence, 
moat, palisade'), which refers to a well-constructed work metaphorically (pp. 
13-14.). From the Greek text editions, in fact only those, put forward by Teubner, 
collected by A. Adler, are considered to be up-to-date enough (pp. 14-15). From 
among the sources of the Souda it is worth mentioning - already highlighted by 
Adler - the Excerpta historica iussu imperatoris Constantini Porphyrogeniti confecta 
written by an obscure Byzantine author (p. 21). 
As regards its content, the source tells about the Bulgarians who completely 
eliminated the Avars and that the Avars took such delight in the costumes of the 
4 Byzantina Neerlandica 10. Leiden-New York-Kobenhavn-Köln 1988. 
5 Kultúrák találkozása. [Meeting of Cultures] ed. Ferenc Makk, Szeged 2002. 
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Bulgarians, that, they interchanged their own clothes with the Bulgarians. It also 
mentions that when Krum (c. 802-814) asked the Avars what they considered to 
be the main reason for the elimination of their whole nation and their ruler, that 
the Avars answered - in most cases - the making of repeated accusations against 
each other, straying from the true path and that thieves became the allies of the 
judges. Among other major problems, the spread of alcoholism, corruption and 
trading led to serious trouble for the Avars. Soon after the reply of the Avars, 
Krum enacted stringent laws, including a decree that all vineyards must be up-
rooted (pp. 25-28). Owing to this latter passage, the authenticity of the source is 
often questioned. On the one hand, the uncertainty is due to the fact that the 
source tells about those soldiers of Nicephorus (802-811), who found a plentiful 
supply of wine at the residence of Krum, but on the other hand, a total abstinence 
from wine is a recurring theme with several authors (Strabo, Caesar, Philostratus, 
Manuel II Palaiologos). However, in the Souda, from the letter of Pope Nicholas I 
(858-867) written to the Bulgarians (Responsa Nicolai I papae ad consulta Bulgaro-
rum) laws can be read, which show great similarity to those enacted by Krum. 
The former source deals With another issue, namely, that the Bulgarians asked 
the Pope's opinion on the wearing of trousers (femoralia), which complements the 
passage on the dressing habits of the Souda. Moreover, in contemporary Frankish 
sources, among the causes that made the Avars fall, we find very similar ones to 
those that were given to Krum by prisoners of war, and as such, we can accept 
the information of the Souda as authentic. However, it followed the literary style 
of its own age, richly decorated with topoi (pp. 21-25.). 
The most controversial point of the chapters of the Souda, referring to the 
Avars, is the part, in which we are informed about, that the Bulgarian eliminated 
the Avars completely. However, it seems to be contradiction with historical facts, 
since nowadays, due to archaeological, linguistic, anthropological and historical 
research, the general conclusion seems to be, that the Avars survived the Hun-
garian Conquest (895). This assumption also seems to be supported by the fact, 
that, according to the Scriptor incertus B, when Krum entered upon a campaign 
against Byzantium, he had a great number of soldiers. Béla Miklós Szőke takes 
the view that the passage on the complete fall of the Avars is not a real event, but 
serves only as a proverb or an adage, and that this is the reason for its repetition 
in the source. Terézia Olajos, after examining the Souda, on the basis of philologi-
cal arguments, considers this assumption impossible. In her opinion, the repeti-
tion of certain parts occurs frequently, without being their proverbs (p. 29.), and 
it is more acceptable to see the complete elimination as denoting a military vic-
tory instead of a complete elimination of the whole population (pp. 30-33). She 
considers unwarrantable the assumptions of Péter Váczy, who supports the idea 
that, this passage of the Souda linked with certain parts of the Tenth letter of patri-
arch Nikolaos Mystikos as well as with excerpts of similar content of the Povest' 
vremennykh let. However, she gives full credit to Péter Váczy, for realising that the 
Bulgarian campaign, taking place after Krum succeeded to the throne (802-803), 
played an important role in Frankish military successes. Váczy draws attention to 
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the fact that, in 803, the region between the Danube and Tisza rivers did not come 
under the rule of the Bulgarians, but under the Franks. This assumption is sup-
ported by Einhard's information on Charlemagne's (768-814) conquering of 
Dacia on the other side of the Danube. Also in those areas of the Great Hungarian 
Plain that were previously occupied by Avars, Slavs took up residence, who were 
called Abodriti Praedenecenti. At the time of the Emperor Louis I the Pious (814-
840), they occupied Dacia (the adjoining area of the Danube) and up to 824, they 
belonged to the Frankish protectorate. Obviously, the term Dacia did not denote 
the Province established by Traianus, but in compliance with early medieval con-
cepts, it referred to most parts of the region between the Danube and Tisza rivers 
as well (pp. 33-37.). According to Frankish annals, Charlemagne probably con-
quered these territories in 803. When writing notes of explanation to the Souda, it 
is important to draw attention to one source, entitled Notker Balbulus, which on 
the authority of Einhard, gives information about when Charlemagne got the 
Avars into his power after eight years had passed. Those eight years must be 
reckoned from the recording of 791 of the annals, used by Einhard, but in this 
Case we do not get the date of the end of the Frankish-Avar war. In Terézia Ola-
jos's opinion, the inaccurate data is due to the early transcriber's mistake, who, 
instead of number XIII read number VIII, and changed the latter into octavo. From 
791 till 803, till the actual conclusion of the war, exactly thirteen years passed 
(pp. 39-43.). 
The next source, dealing with Krum and the Avars is entitled Scriptor incertus 
A. This source have subsisted in a unique codex of the thirteenth century, which 
can be found only in the Library of the Vatican. The relevant edition of the source 
was created by Ivan Dujcev. It was established by H. Grégoire, that, on the basis 
of stylistic and semantic relations, the Scriptor incertus A and B are both extracts of 
the same work. According to Terézia Olajos, from aspect of genre, it cannot be 
decided whether the work is a chronica or a história. She also questions, whether 
the original source is contemporaneous or it was composed only after the Avars 
had adopted Christianity (middle of the 860s). On the whole, we can consider the 
source as authentic, contemporaneous, or almost contemporaneous (pp. 44-49). 
According to the source, the Bulgarians kept watch on the Byzantines from the 
mountains, took Avars into their service, provided women with arms, and on 23 
July 811 (26 July in reality), by Saturday morning, broke in upon the Byzantines 
(pp. 49-50.). The final result of the military expedition is quite well known: the 
complete annihilation of the Byzantine army and the death of Nicephorus. Ac-
cording to an Old Slavic hagiographie text (prolog), under the name Çgre~Vçgre~ 
Ugre, 'soldiers of the people' also battled on the side of the Bulgarians. For Péter 
Király, the name refers to those Hungarians, who lived in the region north of the 
Lower Danube at that time. As far as Imre Boba is concerned, the expression de-
notes the Onogurs. Terézia Olajos shares the view of Dujcev and Samu Szá-
deczky-Kardoss. As such, she finds it more probable, that an anonymous trans-
lator of Slavic origin from a later age, simply replaced the Avars - who had al-
ready fallen into oblivion by that time - with the Hungarians, whom he had 
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known well and who lived on the territory, previously occupied by the Avars. It 
is worth mentioning, that in about 670-680, a significant number of Onog(und)ur 
Bulgarian population immigrated into the Carpathian Basin, under the leadership 
of Kuber's fourth son. At the same time, this population constituted a great pro-
portion of the late Avars (pp. 54-57.). 
Another problematic issue while analysing the Scriptor incertus A, that, ac-
cording to the information of the Souda, Krum subjugated the Avars in 803, but, 
according to the records of the Scriptor incertus B, in 814 the Avars battled as the 
dependants of the Bulgarian Prince. Consequently, it is essential to find an expla-
nation for the question, for what reason did Krum take the Avars into his service 
in 811. In Terézia Olajos's opinion, this Avar population is not identical with 
those living in the south part of the Great Hungarian Plain, as they were Krum's 
subjects. Similarly, these people can hardly be identified with those living in the 
ex-Province of Pannónia under Frankish authority (right of the Danube). Terézia 
Olajos concludes, that it means those Avars, who lived on the northern part of the 
Great Hungarian Plain and were independent of Bulgaria. In the Chronicle of Re-
gino, produced in about 900, this region is described, as the wastelands of the 
Avars (Avarum solitudines), from where the border of Bulgaria can easily be 
reached (Vulgarum fines) (pp. 57-61.). 
The next source included in the book, is the Scriptor incertus B, - mentioned 
several times before - which survived in a manuscript of the eleventh century, 
preserved in Paris, and its relevant edition can be found in the Vol. 26. of the 
Corpus of Bonn. This source gives information on Krum's campaign against the 
Byzantine Emperor Leo V (813-820), and his large army, including the Avars (pp. 
64-65.). The campaign was brought to an end because of Krum's sudden death 
(13 April 814) and it was fraudulently made appear by Leo V as if Krum's death 
was caused by his arrow. However, after Krum's death the danger of an offensive 
by the Bulgarians still existed, which is evident from the fact that at the beginning 
of August 814, the Byzantines asked for help from the Frankish Emperor Louis I, 
the Pious, against the Bulgarians and other barbarians, whom perhaps might be 
identified with the Avars, living on the Upper-Tisza region and already men-
tioned by Regino (pp. 65-66.). 
In the Chronicle of Pseudo-Symeon, which was attributed mistakenly to Mag-
ister Symeon for a long time, except for a difference in one letter only, the same 
passage can be found exactly as in the Scriptor incertus B. The text has survived 
only in a single codex of Paris and today we examine it only on the basis of an 
obsolete edition of the Corpus of Bonn. However, A. Markopoulos has been cre-
ating a new critical edition of the Chronicle for the Corpus Fontium Históriáé 
Byzantinae, Series Berolinensis (pp. 67-69.). 
The next large thematic block of the book contains sources, which deal with 
those christianised Avars who fell under the jurisdiction of the Pope in Rome. 
The first of these is the Notitia episcopatuum no. 5., which shows that the Pope's 
authority extended oyer the Avars. The best edition among the preserved six 
texts is the Berlin one, published by Gustav Parthey in 1866, which was re-pub-
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lished in 1967. In the second half of the eight century, the Pope excepted only the 
Protectorate of the Carolingian rulers. In this way, among the people living under 
Frankish authority, the Avars, who once lived on the territory of the ex-Province 
of Pannonia, got under the inspectorship of the Pope. The Anuales regni Franco-
rum a. 795, 796. gives information on what happened in 796 when the Avar 
leader, who possessed the status of the tudun, together with his dependants, went 
to Charlemagne and adopted Christianity. According to the Conventus episcopo-
rum ad ripam Danubii, when in 796, viceroy Pippin was on the bank of the Danube 
with his army, waiting to cross the river and conquer the residence of the Avars' 
Chief Prince, then an episcopal council, under the chairmanship of the Aquileian 
Patriarch Paulinus, arrived at a decision on the methods of christening the Avars. 
According to the information of the Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum 6. ca-
put, Pippin annexed the territory, bounded by the Rivers Raba-Danube-Drava, to 
the Archbishopric of Salzburg in 796, which is also verified by the fact, that Al-
cuin, in his letters, written in 798-799 to Amo, Archbishop of Salzburg, mentions 
those Avars who were under the Archbishop's authority. According to the Anna-
tes Mettenses priores (a. 805) and the Annates regni Francorum (a. 805), the reason the 
Avar capcanus Theodorus gained the benevolence of Charlemagne and obtained 
a new residence for his people (inter Sabariam et Carnuntum) who were pressed 
closely by Slavs, was due to his adoption of Christianity. The Annates Iuvavenses 
maiores (a. 805) and the Annates Sancti Emmerami Ratisponenses maiores (a. 805) give 
information on the baptism of the Avar Khagan, Abraham, on 21 September, in 
the River Fischa. In this context, it is essential to mention a drinking cup, which 
was found nearby the River Raba bearing the inscription Cunpald fecit. In István 
Bóna's opinion, the drinking cup served as grave-furniture and was specially 
made for the Prelate. In the Biography of Consantine-Cyrill, written in Slav in 
about 867-868, the Avars, among other people, are described as a nation who 
read texts in their own language and give glory to God. However, it is not clear, 
whether Constantine meant the Slovenized Avars who were living on the Pelo-
ponnesus or a Caucasian ethnic group, or perhaps the Pannonian avars. Terézia 
Olajos's opinion is that the source probably denotes the Avars living in the Cau-
casus, although, in the light of the increasing number of runic relics, she does not 
exclude the possibility that Constantine's information may refer to the Avars, 
living in the Carpathian Basin (pp. 73-82.). 
A manuscript, from Pathmos, comprises the inconsistently redrafted version 
of the Notitia episcopatuum (rec. Parthey) no. 5. which occur under the name of Ad-
ditio patriarchicorum thronorum (pp. 83-84). 
The source entitled Notitia patriarchatuum p. 269-270. rec. Parthey, compiled by 
Doxopatres Nikolaos in the twelfth century, also has a connection with the text 
tradition of the Notitia episcopatuum. The work does not have an up-to-date edi-
tion, however, Terézia Olajos mentions, that one is being prepared by the Istituto 
Siciliano of Palermo, on the basis of V. Laurent's posthumous critical work 
(pp. 85-87.). 
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The third major subject of the book is the Avars of the ninth century, analysed 
in the light of a biblical interpretation and the Alexander Romance. From among 
the sources appearing in this chapter, there is one, which rises above the others. 
This is the Chronica of Petrus Alexandrinus, which was published in the volume of 
1961 of the Vizantijskij Vremennik by Z. G. Samodurova, on the sole basis of the 
manuscript of Moscow. The world Chronicle originates the Avars, who are Slavs 
too, from Shem. Among its sources appears a chronicle, written by the antipope, 
Hippolytos, in 234/235, in which the Sarmatian Jazigs are mentioned at the place 
where Alexandrinus Petrus describes the Avars. Consequently, the author of the 
source had accurate knowledge of the circumstances of the ninth century, 
namely, that Avars were living on the Great Hungarian Plain by that time and 
had become more and more Slavonized (pp. 91-96.). 
The Divisio populorum et linguarum, has survived in two codices, one preserved 
in Vienna, the other in the Vatican and gives a similar account of the Avars. The 
source of the work is supposed to be the Chronicle of Hippolytos, written in 
234/235, however, the Avars are identified with the Maramantes incorrectly here. 
The name Maramantes denotes the Garamantes, who were living on the border of 
the Sahara and whom are frequently mentioned in ancient literature, from Hero-
dotus up to Ptolemy. At the time of Hippolytos, they were identified only from 
these literary traditions and it is not at all probable that they ever existed. Their 
identification with the Avars is due to a misinterpretation (pp. 97-100.). The 
Avars had been inserted fraudulently into the Alexander Romance, in which they 
appear among the people whom Alexander the Great conquered in the ninth-
tenth centuries and which was preserved under the name of Kallisthenes, but of-
ten mentioned as Pseudo-Kallisthenes. The text is known from H. Meusel's edi-
tion of Leipzig (pp. 101-103.). 
The fourth principal theme of the book is concerned with those Avars who 
were living in Dalmatia till the second half of the tenth century. The source for 
this is the De administrando imperio by Constantinus Porphyrogenitus. The Greek 
text was translated into English and they were published together in Vol. I. of the 
Corpus Fontium Históriáé Byzantinae by Gyula Moravcsik and R. J. H. Jenkins. The 
work was compiled in about 948-952 and relates that the Avars were defeated by 
the Croatians, however, some of the Avars continued to live in Croatia, and their 
Avar origin is clearly recognisable. There are two sources for information on sur-
viving Avars. The first is the one written by Regino - already mentioned before -
in which we can read about pagan Avars, living in the northern part of the Great 
Hungarian Plain, at the end of the ninth century. The other is the Conversio 
Bagoariorum et Carantanorum from 871, which provides information about the 
baptized Pannonian Avars. In addition to these sources, the existence of a sur-
viving Avar population is confirmed by place names such as Obrov, Obrovo, 
Obrovac, Obre, Obri, referring to those Avars living in the region between Sir-
mium (Srem) and Zara (Zadar). Furthermore, the place called Haimburg in Ca-
rinthia, whose German name is often associated with the Hun ethnic name - is 
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also linked with the Avars - and the settlement's name is Vobre in Slovenian 
(pp. 107-117.). 
Information on the Avars living outside the Middle-Danube Region in the 
ninth century can be found in the appendix of the book. The information of the 
Vita Sancti Pancratii auctore qui dicitur Euagrio gives a flashback to the end of the 
eight and the beginning of the ninth century. The source, which is entirely un-
published and survived in several text tradition, gives an account of how Pank-
ratios met pagan Avars living in Greek captivity, in the vicinity of Dyrracchion 
(Durazzo, Durés) and Athens, who did not speak the Hellenic language and 
made sacrifices to fire, water and their swords. Theophylaktos, Archbishop of 
Ohrid (1088/89-1126) refers to the same people in his work, which deals with 
those fifteen martyrs of Tiberipolis, who sufferred martyrdom at the time of 
Apostata Iulianus (361-363). Similarly, he identifies those barbarians who de-
stroyed Tiberipolis (Strumica) with the Avars who arrived from the South. This 
Avar population might be one of those peoples who spoke Slavic, lived in the 
Balkans in the ninth century and who, on the basis of a reference to the sword 
cult, if not their language but had definitely preserved a Scythian-Hunnish tradi-
tion (pp. 121-128.). 
There are three other sources which provide information on those Avars who 
lived in the Peloponnesus: the Chronicon Monembasiae, the Scholion Arethae, and 
the Epistola synodalis Nicolai III. Grammatici patriarchae. According to the evidence 
of these three sources, the Peloponnesus emerged from the supremacy of Byzan-
tium between 587-588 and 805-806, because of an Avar campaign. It was Ni-
cephorus I, who put an end to the gradual reoccupation of the region in 805 /806 , 
when he reconquered the city of Patras and resettled in their former place the 
descendants of those who escaped to the South of Italy. The subdued Avars of 
that time probably did not have any link with the Avar Khaganate, since it was 
cut off by a vast zone of independent Bulgarian, Croatian and Serbian settlers 
(pp. 129-152.). 
The last source of the book is the De septem climatibus in codice Graeco Parisino 
854. In this thirteenth-century manuscript we can read about a text, composed in 
the nine-tenth century, which was published by E. Honigmann in Heidelberg in 
1929. According to the text, in the sixth Zone lay the Caspian Gates, residence of 
the Armenians and in the region of the Pontus Euxinus we find the land of the 
Avars. Because the Middle-Danube region is situated in the seventh Zone, the in-
formation cannot refer to those Avars who were living in the Carpathian Basin. 
As far as Terézia Olajos is concerned, the source probably deals with those Cau-
casian Avars, whom we only know from Oriental original sources (pp. 153-157.). 
The final chapter of the book is basically an evaluative section, which consists 
of a few pages only with a conclusion, based on the sources. This is followed by 
a rich bibliography. The picture presented by the different sources, is of Avar rem-
nants living under Frankish authority in the ex-Province of Pannónia in 870-871, 
in the northern part of the Great Hungarian Plain in c. 889, and in Dalmatia in 
c. 950. These data can be well complemented by those archaeological results, that 
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prove that much of the late Avar population lived to see the Hungarian Con-
quest, presumably assimilated gradually into the surrounding Slavs, and from 
895 into the Hungarians. 
The book contains twenty selected sources, arranged into five themes, which 
cover the complete Greek text tradition dealing with the Avars of the ninth cen-
tury. The exhaustive commentaries, on the individual sources, provides informa-
tion not only on the specialised literature of problematic issues, but also, on the 
non-Greek sources linked with the subject and in this way they are able to pro-
vide a full picture on the history of the age. On this basis, we can say, that the 
book is an indispensable tool for those historians, archaeologists and linguists 
whose field of research is not only the Carpathian Basin, but also the contempo-




Ein neues Buch 
über die Geschichte Siebenbürgens 
Die 1992 ins Leben gerufene „Szegedi Középkorász Műhely" (Werkstatt der Mit-
telalterforscher von Szeged) feiert ihren zehnten Geburtstag. 1992 ist von dieser 
Werkstatt die Buchreihe „Szegedi Középkortörténeti Könyvtár" (Szegediner Bi-
bliothek der Geschichte des Mittelalters) begründet worden. Der achtzehnte Band 
der Buchreihe ist ein Buch von Gyula Kristó, einem anerkannten Forscher des 
ungarischen Mittelalters, das unter dem Titel A korai Erdély (Die Frühgeschichte 
Siebenbürgens) erschienen ist. Seit mehreren Jahrzehnten untersucht der Autor 
die Geschichte Siebenbürgens, die eng mit der Politik und der Ideologie der 
verschiedenen Epochen verbunden ist. Die Geschichte Siebenbürgens ist bisher 
aus dem Gesichtspunkt des ungarischen, des rumänischen und des sächsischen 
Volkes geschrieben worden. Die Werke der rumänischen Historiker sind im Zei-
chen der dako-rumänischen Kontinuität entstanden, und im Mittelpunkt der un-
garischen Siebenbürgen-Geschichte ist auch nicht Siebenbürgen selbst gestanden, 
sondern das Ungarntum in Siebenbürgen. Die deutschen (sächsischen) Historiker 
haben zeitweise von Siebenbürgen so geschrieben, als wäre es wie Österreich und 
Baiern ein rein deutsches Gebiet gewesen. Gyula Kristó stellt die Geschichte die-
ses Raumes mithilfe der Daten der schriftlichen Quellen, der Linguistik und der 
Archäologie vom Jahr der ungarischen Landnahme bis 1324 vor. Dieses Jahr kann 
einerseits mit zwei königlichen Maßnahmen verbunden werden, die den Woi-
woden und den Adel von Siebenbürgen betroffen haben, andererseits lässt sich 
dieses Jahr mit dem Aussterben der letzten Generation der Dynastie der Árpádén 
verbinden. 
Bei der Erklärung des historischen Siebenbürgen wird vom Autor die Ansicht 
vertreten, dass die altertümliche Provinz Dacia nicht mit dem Gebiet des späteren 
Siebenbürgens identisch ist. Siebenbürgen erscheint zuerst in lateinischen Ur-
kunden des 11. Jahrhunderts, zum Teil mit einem Präposition wie ultra silvam 
'jenseits des Waldes', dann ultra silvas 'jenseits der Wälder', oder in der Form von 
adjektivischen Ortsbezeichnungen Alba Transsilvana, Ultrasilvane partes und Ultra-
siluanus. Die substantivierte Form Transsilvania wird erst von 1462 an ununter-
brochen verwendet. Die erste imgarische Erwähnung des Begriffs erscheint bei 
Anonymus in der Form Erdeuelu, die sich auf eine Wortzusammensetzung erdő + 
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el(ü) 'erdőn túl' (jenseits des Waldes) zurückzuführen lässt. Transsilvania ist die 
lateinische Übersetzung dieser ungarischen Form, und auch aus dem Wort Er-
dély kann man die 1444 zum ersten Mal erscheinende rumänische Wortform 
Ardeal ableiten. Die deutsche Benennung Siebenbürgen hängt nicht mit den Burgen 
der sieben siebenbürgischen Komitate (Burgkomitate), sondern mit Cibinburg 
'Szebenvár' neben Szeben (Hermannstadt, Sibiu) zusammen. Der Terminus ist 
außerhalb Siebenbürgens entstanden, und am Anfang hat er sich auf das Gebiet 
jenseits des Igyfon-Waldes bezogen. Mit der Ausbreitung der christlichen Kirche 
mit lateinischen Riten hat sich der Begriff auf immer größere Gebiete bezogen, 
die sich im 11. Jahrhundert bis zum Gebiet von Gyulafehérvár (Karlsburg oder 
Weißenburg, Alba Iulia) erstreckt haben. Der Autor hat bei der territorialen Be-
stimmung Siebenbürgens die Auslegimg von Zsigmond Jakó angenommen, also 
enthält das von ihm untersuchte Siebenbürgen die sieben innersiebenbürgischen 
Komitate, das Szeklerland, das Land der siebenbürgischen Sachsen, und aus Par-
tium die zwei Komitate Közép-Szolnok und Kraszna. Mit einem Wort: Das histo-
rische Siebenbürgen fällt überhaupt nicht mit dem heutigen rumänischen Sieben-
bürgen zusammen. 
Nach der Analyse der Quellen behauptet der Autor, dass die landnehmenden 
Ungarn im 9. Jahrhundert Siebenbürgen nicht besetzt, sondern es nach der Tief-
ebene, die für ihre nomadische Lebensweise bessere Möglichkeiten geboten hat, 
besiedelt haben. Die Gräber aus der Zeit der Landnahme, die sich im Halbkreis 
im westlichen Teil Siebenbürgens aneinanderreihen und die an der tiefebeni-
schen Seite des Siebenbürgischen Mittelgebirges deuten dem Autor nach auf das 
Existieren eines doppelten Schutzsystems, das gegen die Petschenegen gebaut 
worden ist. Durch die Wirkimg der Veränderungen in der zweiten Hälfte des 10. 
Jahrhunderts - die ungarischen Streifzüge sind zu Ende gegangen, die Unterwer-
fung der freien, aber verarmten Mitglieder der Stämme und Sippen hat begonnen -
ist es zur Besiedlung Siebenbürgens durch den Ungarn gekommen. 
Der Autor setzt die ersten siebenbürgischen Gebiete der Ungarn in die nord-
westliche Teile. Hier kann man auch den Stammesstaat des in den Quellen auf-
tretenden Anführers Gyula, der im 11. Jahrhundert gelebt hat, lokalisieren, und 
auch hier ist nach der Niederschlagung Gyulas das erste Komitat Doboka zu-
standegekommen, das seinen Namen von dem siegreichen königlichen Heerfüh-
rer bekommen hat. Aus diesem riesigen Komitat sind im 11-12. Jahrhundert die 
Komitate Kolozs, Kraszna und Torda herausgerissen worden. Das zweite Komi-
tat Siebenbürgens war Fehér, dessen Einheit durch die Ansiedlung der Sachsen, 
dann durch die der Szekler gespalten worden ist. Aus dem Komitat Fehér sind 
im 12. Jahrhundert das Komitat Küküllő, im 13. Jahrhundert das Komitat Hu-
nyad organisiert worden. Der Gespan des Komitats Fehér hat bis zum Ende des 
12. Jahrhunderts die Herrschaft über die anderen siebenbürgischen Komitate er-
worben und schon 1199 den Titel des Woiwoden getragen. Dieser Titel ist slawi-
scher Herkunft, und früher kann Kean von seinen slawischen Untertanen so ge-
nannt worden sein. Der Woiwode - der der Vorgesetzte der siebenbürgischen 
Gespane war - ist in den letzten Jahrzehnten der Epoche zum Herrn von Sieben-
bürgen geworden, der aber vom König abhängig war. 
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Vom Zustandekommen der Komitate und Burggespanschaften haben wir 
keine schriftlichen Quellen. Die Komitate haben ihren Namen im allgemeinen 
von der Burg bekommen, die in ihrem Gebiet gelegen ist, und um die sich diese 
Komitate organisiert haben. In Siebenbürgen sind im 11. Jahrhundert fünf Burgen 
aus Holz und Erde gelegen: Dobokavár, Kolozsvár (in heutigem Cluj-Mänä§tur), 
Tordavára (in heutigem Moldovene§ti), Hunyadvára (in der unmittelbaren Nähe 
von der heutigen Burg), (und Küküllővár, dessen Datierung unsicher ist.). 
Das Frühere bulgarische Zentrum, Fehérvár (Weißenburg) ist aus Stein erbaut 
worden. 
Am Anfang des 11. Jahrhunderts hat sich auch Siebenbürgen in den neu zu-
standekommenden christlichen ungarischen Staat eingefügt. Das bezeugt, dass 
auf dem Gebiet von Siebenbürgen parallel zum Entstehen der weltlichen Ver-
waltung auch die Kirchenorganisation ausgebaut worden ist. Nicht lange nach 
der Niederschlagung Gyulas muss das siebenbürgische Bistum von Stephan dem 
Heiligen ins Leben gerufen worden sein, das der Autor auf das nordsiebenbürgi-
sche Gebiet von Gyula setzt. Der Sitz der Diözese muss in der Burg von Doboka 
gewesen sein, und wahrscheinlich in der Zeit Ladislaus' I. ist es an (Gyula-) Fe-
hérvár gelangt, dessen Name aber nicht mit dem des niederschlagenen Gyulas 
verbunden werden kann, weil die Form Alba Jule (Gyulafehérvár) zum ersten Mal 
in einer Urkunde aus dem Jahre 1274 aufgetreten ist. Mit der territorialen Aus-
breitung der Diözese ist der Begriff von Siebenbürgen auch immer breiter ge-
worden, aber gleichzeitig ist er auch enger geworden, weil Ugocsa und Szatmár 
zum siebenbürgischen Bistum, nicht aber zum wéltlichen Siebenbürgen gehört 
haben. In dem 12. Jahrhundert haben sich die Begriffe von kirchlichen und weltli-
chen Siebenbürgen voneinander getrennt. Siebenbürgen ist von dem im weltli-
chen Sinne verwendeten Siebenbürgen-Begriff vertreten worden. 
Neben den weltlich-kirchlichen Institutionen sind im Laufe des 11-12. Jahr-
hunderts auch die Abteien der Benediktiner und die der Zistenzienser erschie-
nen. Neben der Burgen der Gespane sind Kirchen erbaut worden, und auch die 
ländlichen Kirchen sind aufgetaucht. Aus den wenigen Quellen geht hervor, dass 
Siebenbürgen zur östlichen Grenzfestung der römisch-katholischen Kirche ge-
worden ist. 
Die in die Tiefebene ziehenden landnehmenden Ungarn haben in Siebenbür-
gen Slawen vorgefunden, die seit dem 7. Jahrhundert dort gelebt hatten, und im 
südlichen Teil eine protobulgarische (türkische) Bevölkerimg, die die dortige 
Slawen erobert hatte. Infolge der schon erwähnten Veränderungen des 10. Jahr-
hunderts hat um die Wende vom 10. zum 11. Jahrhundert eine bedeutende unga-
rische Bevölkerung im nördlichen Teil Siebenbürgens gelebt. Wegen der im 11. 
Jahrhundert fortsetzenden Ansiedlung muss man in der zweiten Hälfte des 12. 
Jahrhunderts auch im südlichen Teil von Siebenbürgen mit einem dichten unga-
rischen Siedlungsnetz rechnen. Im Kapitel „Új betelepülők" (Neue Ansiedler) be-
handelt der Autor das Erscheinen der Sachsen, der Szekler und der Rumänen in 
chronologischer Reihenfolge und auch ihre Rolle im Ungarischen Königtum. Das 
Auftreten deutscher Ansiedler kann man von dem Ende des 11. Jahrhunderts an 
nachweisen. Im 12-13. Jahrhundert nimmt ihre Zahl zu. Die zunehmende Be-
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deutung der Deutschen zeigt das sog. Andreanum aus dem Jahre 1224, das die 
südsiebenbürgischen Sachsen von Szászváros (Broos, Orä§tie) bis Bárót zu einem 
Volk vereinheitlicht hat und unter die Obergewalt des Gespans von Szeben ge-
stellt hat. Dieser Freibrief hat den Sachsen eine weitreichende Autonomie gesi-
chert, ihre Felder vor den Fremden geschützt und hat ihren Körperschaften eine 
besondere Beurteilung zukomen lassen. Die siebenbürgischen Sachen sind von 
1298 an als universitas, von 1305 an als communitas, d. h. als eine geschlossene 
Körperschaft aufgetreten. Von 1302 an sind die Richterstühle erschienen, die als 
der organisatorischen Rahmen der Autonomie betrachtet werden können. 
Die Szekler sind zusammen mit den landnehmenden Ungarn angekommen, 
und dem Autor nach haben sie eine türkische Sprache gesprochen. Nachdem das 
System der Grenzgespanschaften geendet hat, können sie vor der Unterwerfung 
einerseits freiwillig weggegangen sein, andererseits kann es auch die königliche 
Macht gewesen sein, die die Szekler aus dem westlichen Grenzgebiet und der 
Gegend von Bihar nach Osten umgesiedelt hat. Die Szekler haben die ungarische 
Sprache, die sie an ihrem früheren Ort erlernt hatten, und auch die Namen ihrer 
geographischen Umgebung mitgebracht. Die Analyse dieser Namen hilft den 
Forschern bei der Bestimmung ihrer früheren Wohnorte und bei der Rekonstruk-
tion des Weges, auf dem sie um die Wende vom 12. zum 13. Jahrhundert oder am 
Anfang des 13. Jahrhunderts nach Siebenbürgen gelangt sind. In den 1220-er Jah-
ren hat der König einen Szeklergespan an die Spitze des Landes der Szekler ge-
stellt, das ähnlich wie das Sachsenland zu einer territorialen Einheit ausgebaut 
worden ist. Wie an dem früheren Ort, sind die Szekler an ihrem neuen Ort dem 
König in erster Linie zu militärischem Dienst verpflichtet gewesen, überdies ha-
ben sie mit Tieren Steuern zahlen müssen. Wegen ihrer ethnischen Sonderstel-
lung und der Stelle, die sie in der ungarischen Gesellschaft des 13. Jahrhunderts 
hatten, haben sie ihre Sonderrechte bis zum 16. Jahrhundert bewahrt. Ihre ge-
schlossenen Körperschaften werden, von den 1270-er Jahren an universitas ge-
nannt. Die szeklerische Verwaltung selbst ist nach der im Buch behandelten Epo-
che, aufgrund des sächsischen Musters, zu den schon erwähnten sieben Stühlen 
organisiert worden. 
Nach den Verfechtern der Theorie der dako-rumänischen Kontinuität hat sich 
die Bevölkerung von Dacia, das von dem Römischen Reich 105/106 erobert wor-
den ist, nicht nur ihre Sprache, sondern auch ihre Kultur assimiliert, und als die 
Römer 271 die Provinz verlassen haben, ist eine stark romanisierte Bevölkerung 
in diesem Gebiet zurückgeblieben. Anders gesagt: Die Ahnen der heutigen Ru-
mänen leben seit fast zwei Tausend Jahren in ihrer heutigen Heimat, in erster Li-
nie in Siebenbürgen, wo die Provinz Dacia existiert hat. 
Der Autor untersucht die Quellen, die sich auf dieses Gebiet und auf das 
dritte Drittel des 9. Jahrhunderts, also das Zeitalter der ungarischen Landnahme, 
beziehen. Danach behauptet er ausdrücklich, dass keine Rumänen in Siebenbür-
gen in dieser Epoche gelebt haben müssen. Die Wolohen, welche die Nestor-
Chronik unter der Jahreszahl 898 erwähnt, sind dem Autor nach nicht die Nach-
kommen der seit dem 1. Jahrhundert dort lebenden romanisierten Daken, son-
dern sie sind mit den den westlichen Teil des Karpatenbeckens im 8. Jahrhundert 
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erobernden Franken identisch. Die andere, „gemeinte" Hauptquelle der dako-
rumänischen Theorie ist Anonymus, der in seiner romanhaften Gesta die Wala-
chen erwähnt hat. Der anonyme Meister hat aber sein Werk 300 Jahre nach der 
Landnahme geschrieben, und in zahllosen Fällen beweist er in dem Werk, dass er 
weder die frühe Geschichte seines Volkes, noch die bedeutenden Persönlichkei-
ten des Zeitalters der Landnahme kennt. Die bei ihm auftretenden und den 
Ungarn gegenüber feindlichen Völker spiegeln die ethnische-politische Situation 
seines Zeitalters wider. 
Die Rumänen waren am Ende des 10. Jahrhunderts in Griechenland und in 
der Gegend von Ohrid. Sie sind am nördlichen Teil der Balkanhalbinsel im 12. 
Jahrhundert erschienen, und in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahrhunderts (im Jahre 
1166) haben sie sogar mit den byzantinischen Heeren Siebenbürgen angegriffen. 
In den schriftlichen Quellen von Ungarn sind sie in den 1210-er Jahren erschie-
nen. Nach diesen Daten haben sie Siebenbürgen entlang des Flusses Alt betreten. 
In Siebenbürgen sind sie auch von Süden nach Norden gezogen, und haben sich 
überall am Rande der Bergländer niederlassen. Infoge des Mongolensturmes sind 
die Rumänen zuerst von der königlichen Macht, dann von der Wende vom 13. 
zum 14. Jahrhundert an von den Privatgutsherren in Siebenbürgen angesiedelt 
worden. Wenn man die auf Quellen basierenden Ergebnisse des Autors ansieht, 
taucht die Frage auf: Warum erscheinen die ersten Ortsnamen rumänischer Her-
kunft erst im 14. Jahrhundert - und auch diese in der Gegend von Fogaras, dann 
in den südlichen Teilen Siebenbürgens, während im größeren, nördlichen Teil 
des Gebiets weder Rumänen, noch rumänische Ortsnamen zu finden waren -
und warum werden die ersten rumänischen orthodoxen Kirchen erst im 13-14. 
Jahrhundert erbaut, wenn in diesem Raum schon seit 271 eine romanisierte ru-
mänische Bevölkerung gelebt hat? 
Die transhumierende Viehhaltung (doppelten Weidewechsel) betreibenden 
Rumänen haben dem Herrscher mit Schafen Steuer zahlen müssen und sind zum 
militärischen Dienst verpflichtet gewesen. Am Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts ist die 
Rolle des Rumänentums aus dem Gesichtspunkt der schwächer werdenden kö-
niglichen Macht immer größer geworden. Andreas III. hat nach der Organisie-
rung der Rumänen nach dem Muster der Szekler und der Sachsen gestrebt. Die-
ser Plan ist gescheitert, zum Teil darum, weil er das Rumänentum wegen seiner 
transhumierenden Lebensweise nicht hat ansiedeln können, und andererseits 
darum, weil die Möglichkeit der Privilegisierung infolge der Ansiedlung durch 
die Privatgutsherren abgeschnitten gewesen ist. 
Mit der Wende vom 12. zum 13. Jahrhundert ist auch eine Phase der Ge-
schichte Siebenbürgens zu Ende gewesen. Das wird auch vom Quellenmaterial 
gezeigt, das vom Anfang des 13. Jahrhunderts an explosionsartig zugenommen 
hat. Unsere zeitgenössischen Quellen stellen uns das Bild einer sich bewegenden 
und sich anpassenden Gesellschaft vor. 
Die Ansiedlung des Deutschen Ritterordens im Burzenland im Jahre 1211 und 
die Veraustreibung der Ritter im Jahre 1225 hat die Aufmerksamkeit der interna-
tionalen Politik auf Siebenbürgen gerichtet. Andreas II. hat die Ritter mit Waffen-
gewalt vertrieben, da der Orden nach der Unabhängigkeit von der königlichen 
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Macht strebte. Zwischen 1226 und 1235 hat Siebenbürgen eine staatsrechtliche 
Funktion bekommen. Andreas II. hat seinen ältesten Sohn Béla als Herzog an die 
Spitze von Siebenbürgen gestellt. Nach den schriftlichen Quellen hat sich Béla 
während seiner fast zehnjährigen Herrschaft hautpsächlich mit den Kumanen be-
schäftigt, weil er die Mongolengefahr erkannt hat. Mit der Krönimg Bêlas im 
Jahre 1235 ist die Institution des siebenbürgischen Herzogtums verschwunden. 
Infolge der Verwüstungen, welche die Mongolen (Tataren) angerichtet haben, 
können die neuen Kennzeichen der Politik Béla IV. auch in Siebenbürgen beob-
achtet werden. Mit der Grenzwache hat er zuerst den 1247 hereingerufenen Mal-
teserorden beauftragt, dann nachdem dieser abgezogen war, wurden die Szekler 
mit derselben Aufgabe beauftragt. Der König hat die Ansiedlung der Rumänen in 
Siebenbürgen fortgeführt. Nach 1242 ist es zur Errichtung von Steinburgen ge-
kommen, die anfangs Verteidigungszwecken gedient haben, dann sind sie zu den 
Mitteln der herrschaftlichen Repräsentation geworden. In dem Zeitalter, das im 
Buch untersucht wird, sind im Gebiet Siebenbürgens nach dem Zeugnis der 
Quellen 26 Steinburgen und einige andere Festungen gestanden, die aus anderen 
Stoffen erbaut worden sind. 
An der Spitze Siebenbürgens ist zwischen 1257 und 1270 der ältere Sohn Béla 
IV., der Thronfolger, der spätere István V. gestanden. Er hat auch den Titel des 
Herzogs von Siebenbürgen getragen, obwohl sich sein Herrschaftsgebiet auf den 
ganzen Landesteil östlich der Donau mit der Ausnahme von Brassó (Kronstadt) 
erstreckt hat. Während seiner Herrschaft hat der Herzog István eine groß ange-
legte siebenbürgische Politik betrieben, die sich in der Verstärkung des sieben-
bürgischen Adels gezeigt hat. Siebenbürgen ist 1264 von einem innerlichen Krieg 
zwischen István und seinem Vater, dann von dem Ausbruch der Feindseligkeiten 
zwischen den Sachsen und dem siebenbürgischen Bischof im Jahre 1277, und 
schliesslich 1285 von einem neuerlichen tatarischen Angriff erschüttert worden. 
Im Buch wird neben dem wirtschaftlichen Leben Siebenbürgens auch die Ge-
schichte der Urbanisierung behandelt. Bei der Rekonstruierung des gesellschaftli-
chen Bildes schreibt der Autor, dass keine Adelsgeschlechter in Siebenbürgen 
entstanden seien, die siebenbürgische Aristokratie sei also eine Importerschei-
nung. Die schon erwähnte Politik des Herzogs István hat dem Autor nach zur 
Erhöhung der Bedeutimg des im 13. Jahrhundert entstandenen mittleren Adels 
und zur Herausbildung ihres eigenartig siebenbürgischen adeligen Selbstbe-
wusstseins wesentlich beigetragen. Die gesellschaftliche Verstärkung des Adels 
beweist, dass die Adeligen von 1288 an zu den Teilnehmern der siebenbürgi-
schen congregationes generales, d. h. Generalversammlungen gezählt haben, sie 
sind also von der königlichen Macht in die Rechtsprechung einbezogen worden. 
Parallel zu den anderen Teilen des Landes sind auch hier die adeligen Komitate 
erschienen. Im Laufe des 13. Jahrhunderts hat sich die Macht des Woiwoden ge-
festigt. Die Urkunden, die sich auf die ersten zwei Jahrzehnte des 14. Jahrhun-
derts beziehen, verweisen auf gefährliche Zeiten, die 1322 während der Herr-
schaft des Woiwoden Tamás Szécsényi aus dem Geschlecht Kacsics friedlicher 
wurden. 1324, im letzten Jahre der untersuchter Epoche hat der König die frühere 
Befreiung von der Gerichtsbarkeit des Woiwoden abgeschafft, und damit hat er 
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die Macht des Woiwoden erheblich erhöht. In demselben Jahre hat er auch dem 
siebenbürgischen Adel Zugeständnisse gemacht, und das hat zu ihrer Verein-
heitlichung wesentlich beigetragen. Die beiden Maßnahmen des Herrschers zei-
gen, dass die starke königliche Macht mit dem emporgekommenen Adel ein 
Bündnis eingegangen ist. 
Das wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche und politische System des aus den 
Quellen zum Vorschein kommenden Siebenbürgens hat sich zeitlich und auch 
auf der Art und Weise parallel zu den Geschehnissen des Ungarischen König-
tums gestaltet. Die Geschichte der den organischen Teil des Ungarischen König-
tums bildenden Siebenbürgischen Woiwodenschaft kann also nicht von der Ge-
schichte des zeitgenössischen Ungarns getrennt werden. 
Dieser mit Karten illustrierte Band, dessen Tatsachen auf der Analyse der 
Quellen basieren, ist eines der bedeutendsten Werke seit dem dreibändigen Buch 
Erdély története (Die Geschichte Siebenbürgens). Der Autor stellt die Geschichte 
Siebenbürgens sachlich, ausschliesslich auf den Quellen basierend und mithilfe 
der rationalen Analye dieser Quellen dar. Er zeigt, dass alle drei Völker, die heute 
in diesem Raum leben, Einwanderer, also nicht autochthon sind. Gestehend, dass 
die Darstellung der Frühgeschichte Siebenbürgens keine einfache Aufgabe ist, 
zeigt er genauso, dass die von der Nationalpolitik befreite Analyse des Quellen-
materials ein unparteiisches und zusammenfassendes Bild über die 430-jährige 
Geschichte Siebenbürgens bietet. 
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Acta Histórica, Tomus 111.1 
The 112th volume of Acta Historica was published in Spring 2002. With two ex-
ceptions, the authors of the studies are the lecturers of the Department of Medie-
val World History of the University of Szeged. The volume contains seven stud-
ies, which well reflect the research interests of the department: medieval history 
of Western Europe on one hand, and that of Inner and Central Asia as well as 
Eastern Europe on the other (including Hungarian early history, fifth-tenth cen-
tury, as well). 
László Gálffy: The Beginning of the Saint John Hospital in Angers at the turn of 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Summary in French: Les débuts d'un hôpital à Angers 
au tournant du 12e et 13e siècle). The author examines the foundation and the earli-
est period of the Saint John Hospital in Angers. The foundation of the Saint John 
Hospital in Angers in the last quarter of the twelfth century was important in two 
respects: 1) The Plantagenet land acquired a charitable institution. 2) The hospital 
became a reception point of donations. Due to the donations and its prudent fi-
nancial policy, the hospital acquired a financial monopoly in Angers in the thir-
teenth century. 
Richárd Szántó: Comparison of Hungarian and English Landowner Society in the 
late Middle Ages (Summary in English). The author compares late medieval Hun-
garian landowner society with its English counterpart. There are important dif-
ferences between the nobility of the two countries. Hungarian noblemen pos-
sessed political rights and they were under the jurisdiction of the king, but 
villeins belonged to manorial courts. The property of Hungarian noblemen was 
not feudal fee, because there was no military or other service attached to it. The 
most important social difference in medieval Hungary was between noblemen 
and villeins. English noblemen paid feudal aids, poll tax and income tax. Nobility 
in England did not have additional rights for itself, in comparison with the rights 
of other free elements of the society. The social differences did not sharpen in late 
medieval England. 
i Red. Gy. Galamb, Szeged 2002. 
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László Balogh: Lifting up on a Shield; The Eastern Background of the Enthronement 
of the first Hungarian Ruler (Summary in English). He analyses a passage of 
Chapter 38 of De administrando imperio. Constantine Porphyrogenitus gave an ac-
count of the inauguration of Hungarian Prince Árpád in the form of lifting up on 
a shield. This ceremony has been connected with Byzantine practice. Constantine 
however emphasized the Khazar origin of the enthronement. The ceremony of 
the inauguration of nomadic rulers lifting up a felt rug is attested in oriental 
sources on Topa, Turks, Uighurs and Mongols. Balogh concludes that Constan-
tine might interpret the nomadic ritual adapting the custom of enthronement to 
his own civilization. 
Mihály Dobrovits: Buyruq. Career of an Old Turkic Title (Summary in English). 
The author studied the title buyruq mentioned in numerous Turkic sources. Ac-
cording to Dobrovits the title buyruq was a royal office and did not belong either 
to charismatic clans, or to the tribal aristocracy. The title probably originated in 
the Turk Empire. The Buyruq was the personal representative of the qaghan in his 
court. The author took the later developments and changes in the title of buyruq 
into consideration. 
Szabolcs Felföldi: The Chronology of the Defeat of the Hephtalite Empire (Summary 
in English). The author analyzed the date and process of the fall of the Hephtalite 
Empire. There are Greek (Byzantine), Chinese and Muslim sources for the defeat 
of the Hephtalites. According to Felföldi, the Persians attacked the Hephtalites at 
the end of 557 or early 558. The Turks joined the campaign before 561 perhaps in 
558. When the Persians had reached the Oxus river (Amu-Darya) in 561, they 
finished their offensive. The Turk campaign finished before the end of 568 or the 
beginning of 569. 
Balázs Sinkovics: Vámbéry and the Hungarian-Turkic Affinity (Summary in 
German: (Vámbéry und die ungarisch-türkischen Verwandschaft). The author analy-
ses the role of Hungarian orientalist Ármin Vámbéry concerning the so-called 
"Ugric-Turkic war" (a dispute among Hungarian scholars in the nineteenth 
century on the origin of the Hungarian language and people) Vámbéry defended 
a theory of the Turkic origin of the Hungarian language. Vámbéry's viewpoint 
was erroneous, ánd was considered dilettante by his opponents. Sinkovics 
proved that Vámbéry and his opponents belonged to different paradigms (taking 
Thomas S. Kuhn's theory as a basis). There was no consensus in the dispute and 
lack of understanding between the opposite parties. In the center of the older 
paradigm was the term similarity, whereas the new paradigm was based on the 
concept of the origin. According to Vámbéry the Hungarian language could be in 
affinity with the Turkic and Finno-Ugric languages simultaneously. His oppo-
nents (Budenz, Hunfalvy, Szinnyei) maintained, that the Hungarian language 
could not belong to two families of language. In spite of the fallacy, certain find-
ings of Vámbéry concerning the Hungarian ethnogenesis are considered correct 
at present. 
István Zimonyi: Notes on the Differences between Bedouin and Inner Asiatic no-
madism (Summary in English). Zimonyi in his study compares the Bedouins of 
the Near East with the nomads of the Eurasian steppes. Both the Inner Asian no-
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mads and the Bedouins of the Near East founded enormous empires during the 
Middle Ages. There are significant differences between the Inner Asian nomadic 
empires and the Arab Caliphate. The author rises the question: how could the 
Arabs be the founders of a world religion while the nomads of Inner Asia showed 
indifference to creating a world religion? To answer in brief: The bedouins of the 
desert were able to change their way of life to a more advanced level than the 
nomads of the steppes. Some parts of Arab tribes settled in oases and became 
merchants and peasants. They took part in international trade and could preserve 
their ethnic character. They had no alternative solution in that particular geo-
graphical zone. So they were able to reach a higher cultural level. Islam was 
a synthesis of the urban, commercial and Bedouin societies of Arabia. The nomads 
of Inner Asia were able to occupy urban and forest regions, but could not pre-
serve their ethnicity so they were assimilated. As an extreme solution they pre-
ferred withdrawing to the steppe or the forest zone. They were unable to become 




Magyar Századok Series1 
1. Kristó, Gyula-Makk, Ferenc. A kilencedik és tizedik század története. [History of 
the Ninth and Tenth Centuries] (p222) 
2. Kristó, Gyula. A tizenegyedik század története. [History of the Eleventh Century] 
(pl82) 
3. Makk, Ferenc. A tizenkettedik század története. [History of the Twelfth Century] 
(p223) 
4. Almási, Tibor. A tizenharmadik század története. [History of the Thirteenth Cen-
tury] (p221) 
5. Bertényi, Iván. A tizennegyedik század története. [History of the Fourteenth Cen-
tury] (p213) 
6. Draskóczy, István. A tizenötödik század története. [History of the Fifteenth Cen-
tury] (p246) 
7. Pálffy, Géza. A tizenhatodik század története. [History of the Sixteenth Century] 
( P 275) 
8. Ágoston, Gábor-Oborni, Teréz. A tizenhetedik század története. [History of the 
Seventeenth Century] (p268) 
9. Barta, János, ifj. A tizennyolcadik század története. [History of the Eighteenth 
Century] (p249) 
10. Csorba, László. A tizenkilencedik század története. [History of the Nineteenth 
Century] (p270) 
11. Gergely, Jenő-Izsák, Lajos. A huszadik század története. [History of the Twenti-
eth Century] (p526) 
12. Almási, Tibor, ed. A magyar történelem kronológiája, 830-2000. [The Chronology 
of Hungarian History, 830-2000] (p281) 
The general-editor and the authors of the series entitled Magyar Századok (Hun-
garian Centuries) had embarked a monumental venture, when they decided to 
present to the general public a comprehensive picture of the more than thousand-
year history of the Hungarians. A good opportunity was offered to achieve this 
ambitious goal with the thousandth anniversary of the foundation of the Hun-
garian state, since during the celebration, understandably, an increasing demand 
1 Budapest: Pannonica Kiadó, n. d. [2000-2001]. 
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arose for an overview of all the events which had happened to our ancestors and 
us during the last millennium and/or to sum up what historians actually know 
about the Hungarian past in our days. Independently of the millennium, the rele-
vance of the preparation of the above series can be easily conceded, as a modern 
historical synthesis of the past thousand years had been long missing from the 
shelves of interested readers. The significance of the completed series is increased 
by the fact that, though several attempts were made at writing an integral Hun-
garian historical synthesis, all of these undertakings had aborted. Up to the pres-
ent, the larger part of the medieval history of Hungary is still missing from the 
ten-volume series planned by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, but the other 
series meant to embrace all the previous centuries, such as the Magyarok Euró-
pában (Hungarians in Europe), Magyar História (Hungarian History), and Magyar-
ország Krónikája (The Chronicle of Hungary) which also remained incomplete. 
With regard to the history of the present series it must be mentioned that in 
2000 only ten volumes were published covering Hungarian history from the 
eleventh up to the twentieth century, and the first volume dealing with the chro-
nology of the topic as well as the chronology volume concluding the whole series 
came out only during 2001. As an outcome of this enormous venture, today the 
whole of Hungarian history can be read in an integrated series of 3,176 pages. 
The volumes contain the latest results of recent research written by well-known 
Hungarian historians. The author of the present review - as a medievalist - can 
only express his opinion of the first six volumes of the series, leaving those vol-
umes dedicated to the second, undoubtedly more documented half of the millen-
nium to more competent expert(s) for criticism. 
Concerning the volumes of the Magyar Századok series, several questions may 
occur to the reader. 1) How can the integrity of the past millennium be presented, 
if it is cut into parts by such units of time mechanically intersecting the historical 
processes? 2) Is it possible to provide an organic image of the history of the past 
more than thousand years with the help of "century-histories" written by differ-
ent authors? 
The first question has already been answered in the prefaces of the volumes 
themselves as the authors attempted to choose breaking points relevant (also) 
from the angle of the historical processes as starting and ending dates of their 
monographs. Thus, for example, the volume on the history of the ninth and tenth 
centuries embraces the period from the 830s till 997, while that on the eleventh 
century deals with the years 997-1095, the one on the twelfth century about the 
period 1095-1196, and the volume written on the thirteenth century includes the 
years from 1196 to 1301. Obviously, due to the proportioning of the different vol-
umes, sometimes it was not possible to choose a clear-cut date that is also close to 
the turning of the appropriate century. Therefore, the account on the fourteenth 
century starts in 1301 and goes until 1402/03, while that on the fifteenth century 
has its beginnings "around" 1403 and ends in 1526. Accordingly, in relation to 
periodisation, the authors of the series tried their best to keep in mind the signifi-
cant changes and/or fateful events of Hungarian history. Moreover, in the vol-
ume about the eleventh century in one chapter the most important issues (every-
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day life, the raids, society, political relations) of the tenth century are also dis-
cussed, since otherwise the changes undergone in the eleventh century would 
hardly be understandable. 
Thematically the first, considering its date of publication the last volume of 
the series is slightly - though rightfully - different from the others, as it spans 
over two centuries, more precisely it examines the history of almost 160 years. It 
is an atypical volume in the series, but its material is also unusual, as it deals with 
a period of Hungarian history when our ancestors were just about to appear in 
written documents, thus the number and the relevant content of these written 
sources is both low and limited respectively. The authors of the volume, Gyula 
Kristo and Ferenc Makk, commendably decided not to include in their detailed 
presentation that part of the period about which even those few written sources 
are silent, about which only small "mosaic-pieces" from several other fields of 
science (linguistics, archaeology, anthropology) are available. Those more inter-
ested in this period, however, can obtain an overall picture in the first chapter 
(What might have happened before the ninth century). 
Afterwards, the authors survey the migration of the Magyars (ancient Hun-
garians) from their ancient homeland in Levedia to the Carpathian Basin. The 
scholarly attitude characterising the whole book is already clear in this chapter, 
accordingly the authors always indicate in relation to a certain issue if the aca-
demic position is still open and / o r if several answers can be given to a particular 
question. It is also apparent that the authors inserted quite a lot of quotations 
from the written records of the period under consideration. As a consequence, the 
line of their arguments can be followed more easily and, at the same time, the 
words of the contemporary writers increase the pleasure of reading. It should 
also be mentioned that Gyula Kristo and Ferenc Makk place this early phase of 
Hungarian history into a larger spacio-temporal context and, this way, provide 
the readers with indispensable background information on the history of the 
ninth-tenth-century steppe, Central, and Western Europe. 
The most debated stage of Hungarian history, the Hungarian Conquest is pre-
sented in a separate chapter, touching also upon the pre-Conquest history of the 
Carpathian Basin and the immediate background events to the Conquest itself. In 
this chapter the authors draw an overall picture of Hungarian society in the age 
of the Conquest, the number and the everyday life of the conquering Magyars. 
The following chapter introduces a fairly stirring period, the age of raids to the 
readers. The value of this chapter is enhanced by the fact that show the seven 
decades of the raids as divided into smaller periods accentuating the major char-
acteristics of each. In comparison with the earlier phases of Hungarian history, 
there are many more sources at our disposal about the age of raids, since the 
raiding Magyars attacked territories with a high level of literacy. Under the mili-
tary and foreign political surface of the raids significant economic, social, and po-
litical transformation took place. The domestic circumstances of the tenth century 
are presented demonstrating to the readers the metamorphosis of the Hungarians 
who, of necessity, left behind their nomadic life style to become settled cultiva-
tors. These changes changed their peak during the reign of Prince Geza. The 
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openness towards Western Europe and the centralising dynastic politics were 
those milestones marking the way for a long time for the development of the 
Hungarian state. Accordingly, the reign of Prince Géza is discussed in a separate 
chapter. 
The closing chapter of the book provides an evaluation summary of two dec-
ades in a form of summary. Perhaps the most important change during this 
eventful period was that by the last decades of the tenth century the Hungarians 
had arrived at the cross-roads: "radical change or, without it, quick perdition." 
The authors - evolving continuity with the following centuries - emphasise that 
while basically the reply to the challenges had already been established in the 
tenth century but, in many respect, the fate of the Hungarians was decided only 
at the turn of the tenth and eleventh a n d / o r in the first half of the eleventh 
century. 
In the second volume of the series Gyula Kristó grouped the history of the 
"sacral" eleventh century around four subjects. The first (The Kingdom) and the 
second (Christianity) introduce two major areas of transformation - the /state and 
religion - both with profound effects on the lives of the Hungarians. In the chap-
ter entitled The Kingdom one can not only read about the coronation of the first 
king and about the kings and queens of the eleventh century, but also about the 
ways of exercising royal power, about minting coins, taxation, jurisdiction, ad-
ministration, war affairs, foreign relations, and also about the issuing of charters 
that in the eleventh century should be considered as an attribute of royal power. 
These are all areas of life which were radically transformed by comparison with 
their tenth-century antecedents, moreover, some of them (minting, jurisdiction) 
were the consequences of the formation of the medieval Hungarian state. The 
spread of Christianity, the process of organizing church parallel to the missions, 
and the accompanying appearance of Western European civilisation also meant 
revolutionary new developments in the life of the Hungarians. All these are dis-
cussed in the chapter entitled Christianity in which the missionary activity, the 
organisation, the bishops, the monasteries, education, literature, the canonisation 
processes, church incomes, and religious life form the different subchapters. The 
additional two units of the book introduce the contemporary society (The People of 
the Country) and everyday life of the people (The Daily Life). The special value of 
these chapters that they provide summarising overviews of subjects probably less 
known to the general public. Thus, for example, one can read about foreigners ar-
riving in the Hungarian Kingdom and about Hungarians travelling abroad. The 
author clearly demonstrates the transformation of the terms 'freedom' and 'slav-
ery' of cardinal importance as well as the position of the masses marginalised and 
relegated to vassal status, that is the beginning of an essential transformational 
process during which the majority of a society that in the tenth century still con-
sisted predominantly of freemen became servants. 
In writing the history of the twelfth century, the author, Ferenc Makk intro-
duces a century hardly known to the wider public and which even among aca-
demic historians appears to be a grey, featureless period of Hungarian history. 
However, reading the book, one can be persuaded that this century brought some 
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exciting changes as well, not only with regard to later events, but also in them-
selves, even if these changes were not as fundamental as those of the eleventh or 
thirteenth centuries. The twelfth century brought the perfection of the state-
model of King Saint Stephen. The royal power was strengthened, its authority 
became absolute, therefore, the Hungarian rulers could already think of con-
quering new lands. As opposed to the defensive foreign policy of the eleventh 
century, expansion became the determinating ambition in foreign affairs, so it is 
not by chance that Ferenc Makk devoted a significant part of his book to pre-
senting the foreign relations of the country as well. With regard to empire-build-
ing, King Bela III achieved the most, his reign can be considered as the peak of 
the whole period though, at the same time, it is also the closing point of an as-
cending phase. The history of the century is "strung on the chain of chronology", 
each chapter discusses the age and reign of one ruler of the period. For that rea-
son, it is no accident that the summarising epilogue of this volume is the longest, 
as the summing-up of all the changes undergone in the fields of economy, soci-
ety, population, daily life, and royal power are to be read here. 
The thirteenth century presented by Tibor Almasi is characterised by far-
reaching and profound changes in almost every field of life, it is an era marked 
by "special contrast of destruction and construction". The history of hundred and 
five years is divided into chapters according to the reigns of various the kings. 
However, besides this division an inner caesura is also sensible in the volume 
formed by the subchapter (The Bequeathed Country) dealing with the reign of King 
Andrew II - practically the first third of the given period. Even enumerating all 
the inventions of the thirteenth century, from the social and economic changes 
through the question of settlement-network up to the issues of power and popu-
lation, would result in a long and formidable list. Among the volumes of this am-
bitious series, the book of Tibor Almasi is enhanced for its literary qualities which 
greatly increase the pleasures of reading. In the spirit of linguistic elegance, our 
thirteenth-century kings get appropriate adjectives for their names, so that is 
how, for example, King Andrew II became "the venturesome," while King Bela 
IV "the cautious innovator", and King Ladislas IV "the defier of fate". The au-
thor's aim is not to present the period only as the autumn of a dying dynasty and 
the political system has a fundamental significance. On the contrary, Almasi tried 
to bring about the buds of renewal bursting out on the detritus of the old regime, 
and tried to demonstrate all those processes - the evolution and development of 
commodity production and a money-economy, urbanisation, the evolution of 
personal and collective rights, etc. - that will raise the country back among the 
European powers during the fourteenth century. 
Ivan Bertenyi, while writing the history of the fourteenth century, chose a the-
matic structure as the main organising principle for his material. The author 
dedicated a separate chapter to a presentation of contemporary Europe. It is un-
derstandable, since Hungary in the fourteenth century overstepped its former 
spatial frames, not only by its rulers originating from foreign dynastic families, 
but also by its political status among the great European powers. Setting a time 
limit for the century was not easy, as it is proven by the fact that the author de-
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voted the whole preface to a discussion of this issue. The individual chapters ex-
amine all the important segments of fourteenth-century Hungarian history. Sepa-
rate units are dedicated to the issues of breaking the petty monarchs' power as 
well as to the society, economy, royal land-donation policy, military affairs, for-
eign policy, and the governing of the state. A chronological chapter discusses the 
rulers of the century and, there is a similar chapter for the wives of the contempo-
rary kings. It is already in itself significant that Iván Bertényi discusses, or better 
to say can discuss the cultural life of the fourteenth century in a separate chapter, 
as in this period Hungarian culture became an integral part of the mainstream 
European culture and, at the same time, the number of the surviving records and 
monuments makes it possible for the author to say more than before about the 
character of painting, architecture, literature, or even goldsmith work. 
The "long" fifteenth century is discussed by István Draskóczy. The period 
between 1403 and 1526 brought irreversible changes not only for the Hungarian 
Kingdom, but also for the whole of Europe. The stagnating, declining, then re-
viving, but already changed Europe defined the historical space of which Hun-
gary could only occupy a peripheral part, though in this period it was still 
counted among the leading powers of the continent. Though the country was 
able to preserve this role for a while, its victories were momentary, moreover, 
they exhausted the resources of the country to the utmost extent. The danger of 
the Turks appearing at the southern borderland already from the fourteenth 
century onwards but, in reality, becoming menacing in the fifteenth century 
forced the Hungarian Kingdom left alone by the European powers into an une-
qual and hopeless struggle and agony that inevitably caused the collapse of the 
country. The author investigates this stirring time through into several thematic 
chapters. After the presentation of the contemporary country and its peoples, 
separate chapters are dedicated to the world of the villages, towns, and noblemen 
and also to that of the churches and monasteries, thus embracing the most im-
portant scenes of everyday life. The political history of the era (Domestic and For-
eign Politics 1403-1526) and the functioning of the state (The King and the Orders) 
are discussed in separate chapters. Similarly, there is a separate discussion about 
the state of intellectuals and education in the fifteenth-century (At the edge between 
the Middle Ages and Modern Times). 
At this point, the review of the volumes - if they were disconnected mono-
graphs - could finish. However, as they are integral parts of a series, some reflec-
tions still need to be made. Inasmuch as the volumes of the Magyar Századok se-
ries altogether offer more than individual works, their aggregate value is higher 
than the sum-total of the individual parts. The series - presumably, due to the ex-
cellence of the general-editor, Gyula Szvák - offers a firm but flexible, permissive 
framework for the individual authors who, within the given timeframes, could 
arrange their material in a structure best fitting their given theme and / or period 
of Hungarian history. On the other hand, however, it is due to the excellence of 
the authors themselves, that they were able to keep their eyes on the entire work 
and, owing to this, the volumes of the series organically fit together. The histori-
cal processes - even if they extend over several centuries - are not lost of, but can 
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be followed throughout. The appendices at the end of the volumes together with 
the maps on the inner sides of the book-covers, prepared by the authors them-
selves should also be highlighted, as they also add to the unity in diversity. In 
these appendices the "mini-archontologies" of the different centuries, family-
trees, and maps are to be found. Each volume contains handy indices of names 
and places'as well as an abundant and thematically grouped bibliography for ref-
erence. The aesthetic appearance of the volumes is also noteworthy. The hard-
cover, the nicely designed binding, the elegant font type, the title-headings, and 
the system of page-numbering all increase the pleasure of handling the books. 
The first six volumes of the Magyar Szazadok series set a definitely high stan-
dard both with regard to content and aesthetics, therefore it is easy to stay that 




Die Schlacht von Mezőkeresztes 
und der Fünfzehnjährige Krieg1 
Die monographische Aufarbeitung der Geschichte des langen Türkenkrieges 
1593-1606, der in der ungarischen Historiographie als der „Fünfzehnjährige" ge-
nannt wird, verlangt von einem Historiker, daß er sich sowohl mit dem weitver-
zweigten Geflecht von diplomatischen Beziehungen von praktisch ganz Europa 
und den östlichen Grenzregionen des Osmanischen Reiches als auch mit den 
Ereignissen auf den ausgedehnten Kriegsschauplätzen auseinandersetzt und ver-
traut ist. Obwohl zahlreiche narrative Quellen und umfangreiche Aktenpublika-
tionen von deutscher, türkischer, ungarischer, italienischer, französischer, spani-
scher, englischer, rumänischer und polnischer Provenienz reichlich zur Verfü-
gimg stehen, blieb die Veröffentlichung des Quellengutes der beiden Hauptkon-
trahenten unvollendet, bzw. befindet sich noch in der Anfangsphase. Die syste-
matische Veröffentlichung der historischen Quellen kann wohl kaum durch solch 
ausführliche Teilaufarbeitungen, wie z. B. die Monographie von J. P. Niederkorn 
über die Türkenpolitik der europäischen Mächte oder die von der Rezensentin 
verfaßte Arbeit über die Rolle des Vasallenstaates des Osmanischen Reiches, des 
Chanats der Krim im Krieg ersetzt werden. Das Interesse der ungarischen For-
scher an den Geschehnissen am Kriegsschauplatz Ungarn war schon immer be-
deutend, weil die langanhaltenden Kriegshandlungen die Vernichtung der Wirt-
schaftsgüter auslösten und in der etnischen Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung 
zu irreversiblen Vorgängen führten. Trotz dessen wurde bisher keine umfassende 
Darstellung in ungarischer Sprache von dieser wandlungsreichen Ereigniskette 
veröffentlicht. Der Verfasser ist ein engagierter und bedeutender ungarischer 
Forscher des Fünfzehnjährigen Krieges. Seine Monographie ist nach zahlreichen 
Vorstudien und ausdauernden Archivforschungen entstanden. 
Die in zehn Teile gegliederte Monographie folgt dem traditionellen Aufbau-
schema. In den einleitenden Abschnitten werden die politischen, wirtschaftlichen 
und diplomatischen Zusammenhänge der Vorgeschichte des Krieges erläutert. Es 
wird ein überzeugendes Bild über die Mächteverhältnisse der beiden Kontra-
1 László Sándor Tóth, Die Schlacht von Mezőkeresztes und der Fünfzehnjährige Krieg, Szeged 
2000, S. 479. 
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henten, der Habsburger Monarchie und des Osmanischen Reiches präsentiert, 
weiters werden die machtpolitischen Überlegungen und Interessen, die die Stel-
lungnahmen der einzelnen west- und osteuropäischen Staaten in diesem Konflikt 
entschieden, in detailierten und treffenden Analysen dargelegt. Aus der diplo-
matiegeschichtlichen Rundschau wird lediglich nur die Zurückhaltung des ka-
tholischen Polens und der vom Heiligen Stuhl organisierten türkenfeindlichen 
Liga viel zu einseitig begründet. Das passive Verhalten Polens ist aber nur dann 
zu verstehen, wenn außer der innenpolitischen Lage auch die Tendenz der tür-
kisch-polnischen Beziehungen näher in Betracht gezogen werden. Der Dauerfrie-
den, den Polen mit der Pforte 1533 geschlossen hatte und die kriegerische Ausei-
nandersetzungen der beiden Mächte für beinahe 100 Jahre einstellte, wäre deutli-
cher zu akzentuieren gewesen, da die osmanische Diplomatie die Habsburger 
Monarchie als Erzfeind betrachtete und bewußt einen Zweifrontenkrieg in Ost-
Europa zu vermeiden versuchte. 
Das Kapitel über die logistischen Probleme des Krieges ist besonders interes-
sant. Darin sind sowohl die Ergebnisse der europäischen Kriegsgeschichtsschrei-
bung, als auch die Feststellungen der türkischen Forschungen, die auch große 
Fortschritte erzielten, hervorragend verwertet. Die Adaption der neuen metho-
dologischen Ergebnisse wurde dadurch erleichtert, daß die kaiserlichen Armeen 
auf dem ungarischen Kriegsschauplatz zum ersten Mal die technischen Neue-
rungen der militärischen Revolution und die neuen Formen der Heeresführung 
gerade während des Fünfzehnjährigen Krieges anzuwenden begannen. Die aus-
führlichen Vorstudien ermöglichten die Unterschiede in der logistischen Rüstung 
der kriegsführenden Parteien darzustellen. Die Heerverpflegung konnte von der 
zentralisierten osmanischen Verwaltung auf einem höheren Niveau und erfolg-
reicher gelöst werden, als von dem habsburgischen Hofkriegsrat, der über eine 
schwerfälligere Administration verfügte. Während der Feldzüge konnte die 
kriegstechnische Überlegenheit der kaiserlichen Armeen durch den besser orga-
nisierten Nachschub von Verpflegung und Kriegsmaterial der Osmanen ausge-
glichen werden. 
Das Ausmaß der dem Prager Hof gebotenen ausländischen Hilfsgelder wurde 
von dem Verfasser auf Grund schon veralteter ungarischer Arbeiten angegeben. 
Das Gesamtbild wäre realistischer ausgefallen, wenn er die neueren Forschungs-
ergebnisse von Niederkorn in Betracht gezogen hätte. Die Beschreibung der os-
manischen Kriegsverfassung und die des Finanzsystems ist korrekt, obwohl die 
Angaben über die Größe der türkischen Streitmacht einige Korrektionen bedür-
fen. Ohne Zweifel ist es außerordentlich schwer die Stärke der einsetzbaren os-
manischen Armee zu bestimmen. In erster Linie lassen sich Angaben über die 
Heeresstärke der Osmanen aus solchen Daten folgern, die auf innertürkischen 
Quellen beruhen. Es mag zwar der Wahrheit entsprechen, das solche Kalkulatio-
nen in der Literatur der Turkologie sich auf die Ära Suleimans des Prächtigen be-
ziehen, doch die Verhältnisse können auch auf spätere Epochen angewandt wer-
den. Obwohl am Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts ein starker Zuwachs bei den zentra-
len osmanischen Truppen bemerkbar war, wurden gleichzeitig die militärische 
Besatzungen in den Provinzen mindestens im gleichen Maße abgebaut. Eine all-
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gemeine Tendenz war doch unverändert vorherrschend, daß über den europäi-
schen Teil des Reiches ein doppelt so großes Heer wachte, wie über die östlichen 
Provinzen. Die während der ungarischen Feldzüge hierher versetzten Truppen 
der asiatischen Beglerbege stärkten zwar die osmanische Hauptarmee, doch 
weitaus nicht im dem Maße, wie es von dem Verfasser vermutet wird. Das irre-
guläre Kriegsvolk, das sich am Anfang der Feldzüge in der Hoffnung auf Beute 
der osmanischen Hauptarmee anschloß, machte etwa 20% der regulären Truppen 
aus. All das in Betracht ziehend scheint die Behauptung des Autors über das 
Kriegspotential des Osmanischen Reiches, wonach die Stärke 400,000 über-
schreite, als übertrieben (p. 123). Tatsächlich erreichte sie kaum die Hälfte. 
In den letzten sechs Kapiteln, die den zweiten Teil des Buches ausmachen, 
werden vor allem die Kriegsereignisse chronologisch beschrieben, weiters das 
Problem Siebenbürgens während des Fünfzehnjährigen Krieges und der Bocskai 
Aufstand behandelt. Ausführliche Darstellungen werden über die Belagerungen 
der wichtigeren Befestigungen, so wie Raab Erlau, Kanizsa, Gran geliefert. Bei 
der Beschreibung der Kriegsereignisse wurde erst die Ursache, der zum Feldzug 
führte, analysiert, dann wurde der Aufmarsch der gegenüberstehenden Heeren 
rekonstruiert und auf einer Karte eingezeichnet, anschließend die Heeresstärke 
der kriegsführenden Parteien festgestellt, schließlich der Ablauf der Belagerung 
oder die der Schlacht geschildert. Wo es möglich und nötig war, wurden in die-
sen Kapiteln die früheren Feststellungen der Fachliteratur mit neueren Archiv-
daten ergänzt. 
Von den Kriegshandlungen wurde der Schlacht von Mezőkeresztes eine be-
sondere Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Die äußerst detailiert und anschaulich be-
schriebene Schlacht wird nach neueren kriegsgeschichtlichen Prinzipien beurteilt, 
wobei das Erreichen des strategischen Ziels, die Bewahrung des Schlachtfeldes 
und die erlittenen materiellen und menschlichen Verluste untersucht werden. 
Der Beurteilung des Verfassers zufolge kamen eindeutig die Osmanen als Sieger 
aus der Schlacht heraus, doch es hätte auch solche Momente während des Kamp-
fes gegeben, in denen die Kräfteverhältnisse ausgeglichen waren. Die Schlacht 
entschied zwar nicht den Ausgang des Krieges, doch die Auswirkungen trafen 
beide Partein äußerst negativ. 
Die Monographie, die beinahe die ganze imgarische und ausländische Fach-
literatur des Fünfzehnjährigen Krieges nach einheitlichen Gesichtspunkten bear-
beitet, dient als ein wertvolles Handbuch, das nicht nur verläßlich in einem stür-
mischen Zeitalter orientiert, sondern mit ihren klaren Fragestellungen auch zu 
den weiteren Forschungen anregt. Doch im enormen lexikalischen Stoff des Wer-
kes könnten sich die Leser leichter zurechtfinden, wenn ein Namens- und Sach-
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